BETA

33 Amendments of Miguel VIEGAS related to 2016/0362(COD)

Amendment 35 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 5
(5) Member States should ensure that institutions have sufficient loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity to ensure smooth and fast absorption of losses and recapitalisation in resolution with a minimum impact on financial stability and taxpayerwithout taxpayer bail-outs. That should be achieved through compliance by institutions with an institution-specific minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities ('MREL') as provided in Directive 2014/59/EU.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 37 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 7
(7) Eligibility criteria for bail-inable liabilities for the MREL should be closely aligned with those laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 for the TLAC minimum requirement, in line with the complementary adjustments and requirements introduced in this Directive. In particular, certain debt instruments with an embedded derivative component, such as certain structured notes, should be eligible to meet the MREL to the extent that they have a fixed principal amount repayable at maturity while only an additional return is linked to a derivative and depends on the performance of a reference asset. In view of their fixed principal amount, those instruments should be highly loss-absorbing and easily bail-inable in resolution. Eligible liabilities should be clearly subordinated to other liabilities in order to avoid any ‘no creditor worse off’ issues.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 38 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 7 a (new)
(7 a) Recent cases of bank bail-outs with public money have highlighted fundamental shortcomings of the current recovery and resolution framework, which was drafted with the intention that no socialisation of losses should take place. It is therefore appropriate to close existing loopholes, namely precautionary recapitalisation, which enable authorities to inject public money into failing banks.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 39 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 8
(8) The scope of liabilities to meet the MREL includes, in principle, all liabilities resulting from claims arising from unsecured non-preferred creditors (non- subordinated liabilities) unless they do not meet specific eligibility criteria provided in this Directive. To enhance the resolvability of institutions through an effective use of the bail-in tool, resolution authorities should be able to require that the MREL is met with subordinated liabilities, in particular when there are clear indications that bailed-in creditors are likely to bear losses in resolution that would exceed their potential losses in insolvency. The requirement to meet MREL with subordinated liabilities should be requested only for a level necessary to prevent that losses of creditors in resolution are above losses that they would otherwise incur under insolvency. Any subordination of debt instruments requested by resolution authorities for the MREL should be without prejudice to the possibility to partly meet the TLAC minimum requirement with non-subordinated debt instruments in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as permitted by the TLAC standard.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 43 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 9
(9) The MREL should allow institutions to absorb losses expected in resolution and recapitalise the institution post-resolution. The resolution authorities should, on the basis of the resolution strategy chosen by them, duly justify the imposed level of the MREL in particular as regards the need and the level of the requirement referred to in Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU in the recapitalisation amount. As such, that level should be composed of the sum of the amount of losses expected in resolution that correspond to the institution's own funds requirements and the recapitalisation amount that allows the institution post- resolution to meet its own funds requirements necessary for being authorised to pursue its activities under the chosen resolution strategy. The MREL should be expressed as a percentage of the total risk exposure and leverage ratio measures, and institutions should meet simultaneously the levels resulting from the two measurements. The resolution authority should be able to adjust the recapitalisation amounts in cases duly justified to adequately reflect also increased risks that affect resolvability arising from the resolution group’s business model, funding profile and overall risk profile and therefore in such limitednecessary circumstances require that the recapitalisation amounts referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 45c(3) and (4) are exceeded.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 46 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 10
(10) To enhance their resolvability, resolution authorities should be able to impose an institution-specific MREL on G- SIIs in addition to the TLAC minimum requirement laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. That institution-specific MREL may only be imposed where the TLAC minimum requirement is not sufficient to absorb losses and recapitalise a G-SII under the chosen when deemed necessary by the resolution strategauthority.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 51 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 11
(11) When setting the level of MREL, resolution authorities should consider the degree of systemic relevance of an institution and the potential adverse impact of its failure on the financial stability. They should take into account the need for a level playing field between G-SIIs and other comparable institutions with systemic relevance within the Union. Thus MREL of institutions that are not identified as G-SIIs but the systemic relevance within the Union of which is comparable to the systemic relevance of G-SIIs should not diverge disproportionately from the level and composition of MREL generally set for G-SIIs and may also exceed that level.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 53 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 12
(12) Similarly to powers conferred to competent authorities by Directive 2013/36/EU, this Directive should allow resolution authorities to require institutions to meet higher levels of MREL while addressing in a more flexible manner any breaches of those levels, in particular by alleviating the automatic effects of those breaches in the form of limitations to the Maximum Distributable Amounts (MDAs). Resolution authorities should be able to give guidance to institutions to meet additional amounts to cover losses in resolution that are above the level of the own funds requirements as laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU, and/or to ensure sufficient market confidence in the institution post-resolution. To ensure consistency with Directive 2013/36/EU, guidance to cover additional losses may only be given where the 'capital guidance' has been requested by the competent supervisory authorities in accordance with Directive 2013/36/EU and should not exceed the level requested in that guidance. For the recapitalisation amount, the level requested in the guidance to ensure market confidence should enable the institution to continue to meet the conditions for authorisation for an appropriate period of time, including by allowing the institution to cover the costs related to the restructuring of its activities following resolution. The market confidence buffer should not exceed the combined capital buffer requirement under Directive 2013/36/EU unless a higher level is necessary to ensure that, following the event of resolution, the entity continues to meet the conditions for its authorisation for an appropriate period of time. Where an entity consistently fails to have additional own funds and eligible liabilities as expected under the guidance, the resolution authority should be able to require that the amount of the MREL be increased to cover the amount of the guidance. For the purposes of considering whether there is a consistent failure, the resolution authority should take into account the entity's reporting on the MREL as required by this Directiveen deemed necessary for resolution.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 14
(14) Institutions that are not resolution entities should comply with the MREL at individual level. Loss absorption and recapitalisation needs of those institutions should be generally provided by their respective resolution entities through the acquisition by resolution entities of eligible liabilities issued by those institutions and their write-down or conversion into instruments of ownership at the point where those institutions are no longer viable. As such, the MREL applicable to institutions that are not resolution entities should be applied together and consistently with the requirements applicable to resolution entities. That should allow resolution authorities to resolve a resolution group without placing certain of its subsidiary entities in resolution, thus avoiding potentially disruptive effects on the market. Subject to the agreement of the resolution authorities of the resolution entity and of its subsidiary, it should be possible to replace the issuance of eligible liabilities to resolution entities with collateralised guarantees between the resolution entity and its subsidiaries, that can be triggered when the timing conditions equivalent to those allowing the write down or conversion of eligible liabilities are met. The resolution authorities of subsidiaries of a resolution entity should also be able to fully waive the application of the MREL applicable to institutions that are not resolution entities if both the resolution entity and its subsidiaries are established in the same Member State. The application of the MREL to institutions that are not resolution entities should comply with the chosen resolution strategy, in particular it should not change the ownership relationship between institutions and their resolution group after those institutions have been recapitalised.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 169 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 20 a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – point d
(d) extraordinary public financial support is required except when, in order to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State and preserve financial stability, the extraordinary public financial support takes any of the following forms: (i) facilities provided by central banks according to the central banks’ conditions; (ii) liabilities; or (iii) an injection of own funds or purchase of capital instruments at prices and on terms that do not confer an advantage upon the institution, where neither the circumstances referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) of this paragraph nor the circumstances referred to in Article 59(3) are present at the time the public support is granted. 20 a. In Article 32(4), point (d) is replaced by the following: (d) public financial support would be required to continue the operation of the institution. a State guarantee to back liquidity a State guarantee of newly issued Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0059)
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 202 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
1. Eligible liabilities shall be included in the amount of own funds and eligible liabilities of resolution entities only where they satisfy the conditions referred to in Article 72a, except for point (d) of Article 72b(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 206 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45b – paragraph 2
By way of derogation from point (l) of Article 72a(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, liabilities that arise from debt instruments with derivative features, such as structured notes, shall be included in the amount of own funds and eligible liabilities only where all of the following conditions are met: (a) a given amount of the liability arising from the debt instrument is known in advance at the time of issuance, is fixed and not affected by a derivative feature; (b) derivative feature, is not subject to any netting agreement and its valuation is not subject to Article 49(3);deleted the debt instrument, including its
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 216 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45b – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
The liabilities referred to in the first subparagraph shall only be included in the amount of own funds and eligible liabilities for the part that corresponds with the amount referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph.deleted
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 223 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45b – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
Resolution authorities may decidshall ensure that the requirement referred to in Article 45f is met by resolution entities with instruments that meet all conditions referred to in Article 72a of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 with a view to ensure that the resolution entity can be resolved in a manner suitable to meet the resolution objectives.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 225 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45b – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
The resolution authority's decision under this paragraph shall contain the reasons for that decision on the basis of the following elements: (a) non-subordinated liabilities referred to in the first and second paragraphs have the same priority ranking in the national insolvency hierarchy as certain liabilities that are excluded from the application of the write-down or conversion powers in accordance with Article 44(2) or Article 44(3); (b) planned application of write-down and conversion powers to non-subordinated liabilities that are not excluded from the application of the write-down or conversion powers in accordance with Article 44(2) or Article 44(3), creditors of claims arising from those liabilities incur greater losses than they would incur in a winding up under normal insolvency proceedings; (c) liabilities shall not exceed the amount necessary to ensure that creditors referred to in point (b) shall not incur losses above the level of losses that they would otherwise have incurred in a winding up under normal insolvency proceedings.deleted the risk that as a result of a the amount of subordinated
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 262 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Without prejudice to the last subparagraph, for resolution entities, the amount referred to in paragraph 2 shall not exceedThe resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amounts referred to in the previous paragraphs in accordance with the resolution actions foreseen in the resolution plan and may adjust those recapitalisation amounts to adequately reflect risks that affect resolvability arising from the greater of the following:solution group’s business model, funding profile and overall risk profile.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 271 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point a
(a) the sum of: (i) absorbed in resolution that corresponds to the requirements referred to in Article 92(1)(a),(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU of the resolution entity at sub-consolidated resolution group level, (ii) allows the resolution group resulting from resolution to restore its total capital ratio referred in Article 92(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and its requirement referred to in Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU at resolution group sub- consolidated level;deleted the amount of losses to be a recapitalisation amount that
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 272 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
(i) the amount of losses to be absorbed in resolution that corresponds to the requirements referred to in Article 92(1)(a),(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU of the resolution entity at sub-consolidated resolution group level,deleted
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 276 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
(ii) a recapitalisation amount that allows the resolution group resulting from resolution to restore its total capital ratio referred in Article 92(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and its requirement referred to in Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU at resolution group sub- consolidated level;deleted
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 283 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) the sum of: (i) the amount of losses to be absorbed in resolution that corresponds to the resolution entity's leverage ratio requirement referred to in the Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 at resolution group sub-consolidated level; and (ii) allows the resolution group resulting from resolution to restore the leverage ratio referred to in Article 92(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 at resolution group sub-consolidated level.deleted a recapitalisation amount that
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 292 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
For the purposes of point (a) of Article 45(2), the requirement referred to in Article 45(1) shall be expressed in percentage terms as the amount calculated in accordance with point (a) of this paragraph divided by the total risk exposure amount.deleted
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 294 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3
For the purposes of point (b) of Article 45(2), the requirement referred to in Article 45(1) shall be expressed in percentage terms as the amount calculated in accordance with point (b) of this paragraph divided by the leverage ratio exposure measure.deleted
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 297 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 –subparagraph 4
The resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amounts referred to in the previous subparagraphs in accordance with the resolution actions foreseen in the resolution plan and may adjust those recapitalisation amounts to adequately reflect risks that affect resolvability arising from the resolution group’s business model, funding profile and overall risk profile.deleted
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 308 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 4
4. Without prejudice to the last subparagraph, for entities that are not themselves resolution entities, the amount referred to in paragraph 2 shall not exceed the greater of any of the following: (a) (i) absorbed in resolution that corresponds to the requirements referred to in Article 92(1)(a),(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU of the entity, and (ii) allows the entity to restore its total capital ratio referred in Article 92(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and its requirement referred to in Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU; (b) (i) absorbed in resolution that corresponds to the entity's leverage ratio requirement referred to in the Article 92(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, and (ii) allows the entity to restore its leverage ratio referred to in the Article 92(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 ; For the purposes of point (a) of Article 45(2)(a), the requirement referred to in Article 45(1) shall be expressed in percentage terms as the amount calculated in accordance with point (a) divided by the total risk exposure amount. For the purposes of point (b) of Article 45(2)(b), the requirement referred to in Article 45(1) shall be expressed in percentage terms as the amount calculated in accordance with point (b) divided by the leverage ratio exposure measure. The resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amounts referred to the previous subparagraphs in accordance with the resolution actions foreseen in the resolution plan and may adjust those recapitalisation amounts to adequately reflect risks that affect the recapitalisation needs arising from the entity's business model, funding profile and overall risk profile.deleted the sum of: the amount of losses to be a recapitalisation amount that the sum of: the amount of losses to be a recapitalisation amount that
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 358 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
8. EBA shall draft regulatory technical standards which shall further specify the criteria referred to in paragraph 1 on the basis of which the requirement for own funds and permissible liabilities is to be determined in accordance with this Article. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory standards to the Commission by [1 month after the entry into force]. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1090/2010.deleted
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 368 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45d – paragraph 2
2. The resolution authority may impose an additional requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities referred to in point (b) of paragraph 1 only: (a) in point (a) of paragraph 1 is not sufficient to fulfil the conditions set out in Article 45c; and (b) required own funds and eligible liabilities does not exceed a level that is necessary to fulfil the conditions of Article 45c.deleted where the requirement referred to to an extent that the amount of
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 384 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45e
[...]deleted
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 439 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45g – paragraph 4
4. Subject to the agreement of the resolution authorities of the subsidiary and the resolution entity, the requirement may be met with a guarantee of the resolution entity granted to its subsidiary, which fulfils the following conditions: (a) least the equivalent amount as the amount of the requirement for which it substitutes; (b) the subsidiary is unable to pay its debts or other liabilities as they fall due or a determination has been made in accordance with Article 59(3) in respect of the subsidiary, whichever is the earliest; (c) through a financial collateral arrangement as defined in point (a) of Article 2(1) of Directive 2002/47/EC for at least 50 per cent of its amount; (d) collateral arrangement are governed by the laws of the Member State where the subsidiary is established unless specified otherwise by the resolution authority of the subsidiary; (e) guarantee fulfils the requirements of Article 197 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, which, following appropriately conservative haircuts, is sufficient to fully cover the amount guaranteed; (f) the collateral backing the guarantee is unencumbered and in particular is not used as collateral to back any other guarantee; (g) the collateral has an effective maturity that fulfils the same maturity condition as that for referred to in Article 72c(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 , and (h) operational barriers to the transfer of the collateral from the resolution entity to the relevant subsidiary, including when resolution action is taken in respect of the resolution entity.deleted the guarantee is provided for at the guarantee is triggered when the guarantee is collateralised the guarantee and financial the collateral backing the there are no legal, regulatory or
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 470 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45g – paragraph 5 – point f
(f) the resolution entity holds more than 50 % of the voting rights attached to shares in the capital of the subsidiary orand has the right to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the management body of the subsidiary;
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 487 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45i – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Entities referred to in Article 1(1) shall report to their competent and resolution authorities on the following upon request and at least on a yearly basis:
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 499 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45k – paragraph -1 (new)
-1. An institution that meets the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities shall not make a distribution in connection with Common Equity Tier 1 capital or make payments on Additional Tier 1 instruments to an extent that would decrease its Common Equity Tier 1capital to a level where the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities is no longer met.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 519 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 24
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 55 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
TExcept for G-SIIs the requirement referred to in paragraph 1 may not apply where the resolution authority of a Member State determines all of the following conditions are met:
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 537 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 24
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 55 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 a (new)
The liabilities for which a waiver from the contractual recognition of bail-in has been granted by the resolution authority in accordance with this paragraph shall not exceed 10 per cent of all liabilities of an institution or entity referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1).
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON