BETA

8 Amendments of Stéphanie YON-COURTIN related to 2022/0074(COD)

Amendment 95 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
(6) The overarching objective of the settlement discipline regime is to improve settlement efficiency within the Union. However, the market volatility in 2020 amplified concerns about the potential negative effects of mandatory buy-in rules, both in normal and stressed market conditions. The application of those rules should therefore be subject to an assessment by the Commission as to its necessity, proportionality and appropriateness in the light of the evolution of settlement efficiency in the Union. Cash penalties and reporting requirements should however continue to apply in order to assess their impact on improving settlement efficiency in the Union. Considering the potential impacts of mandatory buy-in rules, such rules should apply only as a last resort measure when all other available measures fail to address insufficient level of settlement efficiency in the Union, provided that the cost-benefit analysis by ESMA proves the tool to be appropriate and only where certain conditions are met, namely where the application of cash penalties has not resulted in a long-term, continuoussustainable reduction of settlement fails in the Union, where settlement efficiency in the Union has not reached appropriate levels considering the situation in third- country capital markets that are comparable in terms of size, liquidity as well as instruments traded and types of transactions executed on such markets, or where the level of settlement fails in the Union has or is likely to have a negative effect on the financial stability of the Union. Where the Commission considers that any of those conditions is met and that the application of mandatory buy-ins is proportionate, necessary and adequate to address level of settlement fails in the Union, the Commission should be empowered to adopt an implementing act determining for which financial instruments or categories of transactions the mandatory buy-in rules should start to apply. The cash penalties referred to in the third subparagraph of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 should be calculated on a daily basis for each business day that a transaction fails to be settled until the end of the buy-in process or the actual settlement day, whichever is the earlier.
2022/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 99 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6 a (new)
(6 a) The removal of the central counterparty buy-in provisions from Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 by Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 was justified at the time because those provisions would be covered by the mandatory buy-in provisions of the latter Regulation. The buy-in provisions for cleared share trades should now be reintroduced in Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 in parallel with the removal of the mandatory buy-in provisions from Regulation (EU) No 909/2014.
2022/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 109 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26
(26) In order to avoid settlement risks due to the insolvency of the settlement agent, a CSD should settle, whenever practical and available, the cash leg of the securities transaction in central bank money through accounts opened with a central bank. Where that option is not practical and available, including where a CSD does not meet the conditions to access a payment system operated by a central bank other than that of its home Member State, that CSD should be able to settle the cash leg of transactions in foreign currenciesthird-country currencies in commercial bank money through accounts opened with institutions authorised to provide banking services under the conditions provided in Regulation (EU) No 909/2014. The efficiency of the settlement market would be better served by enhancing the possibilities for CSDs to provide settlement in foreign currencies through the use of accounts opened with institutions authorised to provide banking services, within appropriate risk limits, with a view to deepen capital markets and enhance cross-border settlement. For that purpose, CSDs authorised to provide banking-type ancillary services in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 909/2014, and for which the relevant risks are already monitored, should be able to offer such services pertaining to the settlement of the cash leg of securities transactions, where that cash is a third-country currency to other CSDs that do not hold such license irrespective if the latter are part of the same group of companies.
2022/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 111 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27
(27) Within an appropriately set risk limits, CSDs that are not authorised to provide banking-type ancillary services should be able to offer a sufficient amount of foreign currency settlementarrange payments in third-country currency through accounts opened with credit institutions orand through its own accountaccounts opened with CSDs authorised to provide banking-type ancillary services. The thresholds below which a CSD mayshould be able to designate either a credit institution as a separate legal entity or a CSD authorised to provide any banking- type ancillary services from within a separate legal entity without being required to comply with the conditions set out in Title IV of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 should consist of a maximum amount for those arranged payments. That threshold should be calibrated in a way that promotes efficiency of settlement and the use of banking ancillary services while ensuring financial stability. As a body with specialised expertise regarding banking and credit risk matters, EBA should be entrusted with the development of draft regulatory technical standards to set the appropriate thresholds and, where necessary, any risk mitigating requirements. EBA should also closely cooperate with the members of the ESCB and with ESMA. The Commission should be empowered to adopt regulatory technical standards in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) with regard to the detailed elements of the determining for the provisioning of banking type ancillary services, the accompanying details of the risk management and capital requirements for CSDs and the prudential requirements on credit and liquidity risks for CSDs and designated credit institutions that are authorised to provide banking-type ancillary services.
2022/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 120 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point b
Regulation (EU) No 909/2014
Article 7 – paragraph 2a – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Without prejudice to the penalty mechanism referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article and the right to bilaterally cancel the transaction, the Commission mayThe Commission may, upon consultation with ESRB and ESMA, by means of an implementing act, decide to which of the financial instruments referred to in Article 5(1) or categories of transactions in those financial instruments the settlement discipline measures referred to in paragraphs 3 to 8 of this Article are to be applied where the Commission considers that those measures constitute a necessary, appropriate and proportionate means to address the level of settlement fails in the Union and that, based on the number and volume of settlement fails, any. Based on the cost-benefit analysis provided by ESMA in accordance with Article 74(1), point (a), proving mandatory buy-ins as appropriate tool and based on the number and volume of settlement fails, the Commission may adopt the implementing act on mandatory buy-in if one of the following conditions is met:
2022/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 179 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14
Regulation (EU) No 909/2014
Article 40 – paragraph 2
2. Where it is not practical and available to settle in central bank accounts as provided in paragraph 1, a CSD may offer to settle the cash payments for all or part of its securities settlement systemsleg of transactions in third country currencies in commercial bank money through accounts opened with a credit institution, through a CSD that is authorised to provide the services listed in Section C of the Annex whether within the same group of undertakings ultimately controlled by the same parent undertaking or not, or through its own accounts. If a CSD offers to settle in accounts opened with a credit institution, through its own accounts or the accounts of another CSD, it shall do so in accordance with the provisions of Title IV.;
2022/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 185 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point a a
Regulation (EU) No 909/2014
Article 54 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
(a a) in paragraph 2, the following subparagraph is added: "A CSD that intends to settle the cash leg of all or part of its securities settlement system in accordance with Article 40(2) in a third-country currency, shall also be entitled to designate a CSD authorised to provide banking-type ancillary services pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article."
2022/11/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 197 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point a a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 909/2014
Article 74 – paragraph 1 –a (new)
(aa) the following paragraph 1-a is inserted: 1-a. Upon the request of the Commission, the ESMA shall provide a cost-benefit analysis as referred to in Article 7(1) of a potential mandatory buy-in procedure. The analysis shall consist of the following: (a) the average duration of settlement fails to which such a mandatory buy-in procedure could apply; (b) the impact of the mandatory buy-in procedure on the EU market, including the analysis of the implication of subjecting specific financial instruments and categories of transactions to the mandatory buy-in procedure; (c) the application of a similar buy-in procedure in comparable third-country markets and the impact on the competitiveness of the Union market; (d) any clear impacts on financial stability stemming from the settlement fails.
2022/11/16
Committee: ECON