14 Amendments of Pascal CANFIN related to 2010/2009(INI)
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Believes that the chair and the members of the remuneration committee must be members of the management body who do not perform any executive functions in the financial institution concernedor the listed company concerned and who are not directors of other companies as their own remunerations are based on benchmark which give them an interest to encourage remuneration inflation;
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Is of the opinion that shareholders should contribute towards the determination of sustainable remuneration policies and should be given the opportunity to express their views on the remuneration policies through a non- binding vote onvote with the possibility to reject the remuneration policy defined by the remuneration reportcommittee at the general meeting;
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Reminds that directors should not be driven by their personal financial interest in their management of listed companies; considers that the personal financial interest of directors linked to variable remuneration is in many case in conflict with the long term interest of the company, including the interest of its employees and stakeholders;
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Considers that share based variable remunerations are not appropriate incentives as share prices are particularly volatile which encourage short-term driven financial strategies;
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Considers that stock option plans are not an appropriate remuneration tool as stock options give only a bonus and not a malus in case of failure; believes also that all the remuneration should be based on a bonus and malus principle based on symmetrical rules;
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Is of the opinion that quality-linked performance criteria should be taken into consideration in order to determine the level of the variable compensation; proposes therefore that the 'social added value of companies' performance' should be taken into consideration as one essential criterion, as well as 'sustainability' criteria when applicable; considers therefore that variable remuneration of directors of listed companies should not be mainly based on financial results but also on operational, safety, social and environmental results;
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Is of the opinion, for ethical reasons, that the difference between the highest and the lowest remuneration in a company should be reasonable; proposes that the directors’ remunerations should not be higher than five times the average remuneration of the 1000 best paid employees of the company and in any case should not be higher than forty times the median income found in the concerned Member State;
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Is of the opinion, that the pay raise of directors should be consistent with the pay raise of employees of the company; propose that the remuneration of directors of a listed companies should not be increased more than three times the average pay raise of the employees of the company;
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Stresses that there must be an appropriate balance between variable and fixed remuneration and that in particular an individual's bonus variable remuneration must not make up more than 520% of their total annual remuneration;
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Suggests that variable remuneration should be paid only if it is sustainable in the light of the financial situation of the institution and justified in the light of the long-term performance of the firm; considers that for financial institutions, competent supervision authority should have the right to limit the overall amount of variable remuneration in order to strengthen equity capital;
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Underlines that the deferred proportion and the length of the deferral period should be established in accordance with the business cycle, the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the member of staff in question; considers that in the case of the financial institution all the variable remuneration should be deferred and the deferred period should not be less than five years;
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Believes that a substantial proportion, i.e. more than 50%, of variable compensation should be awarded in shares or share-linked instruments, as long as these instruments create incentives aligned with long-term value creation and the time horizons of riskbased on non financial criteria as operational, safety, social and environmental results;
Amendment 68 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Suggests setting a limit of a maximum two years of the fixed component ofbanning severance pay in case of non-performance or voluntary departure and that directors' pay on severance pay ('golden parachutes') in case of early termination and banning severance pay in case of non- performance or voluntary departureshould be aligned to the usual rights of employees in such situation;
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Calls on the Commission to adopt strong binding principles on remuneration policies in the financial sector as suggested in the draft report on the CRD and a naming and shaming procedureto propose binding legislation for listed companies which do notin order to make them respect these principles;