BETA

Activities of Jürgen KLUTE related to 2012/0150(COD)

Plenary speeches (1)

Framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms - Deposit guarantee schemes (debate)
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2012/0150(COD)

Amendments (82)

Amendment 141 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1
(1) The financial crisis that started in 2008 has shown that there is a significant lack of adequate tools at Union level to effectively deal with unsound or failing credit institutions. Such tools are, in particular, needed to prevent insolvency or, when insolvency occurs, to minimize negative repercussions by preserving the systemically important functions of the institution concerned. During the crisis, those challenges were a major factor that forced Member States to save credit institutions using public funds. This has fuelled a vicious cycle which is one of the main causes for the sovereign debt crisis the Member States are confronted with.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 144 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 2
(2) Union financial markets are highly integrated and interconnected with many credit institutions operating extensively beyond national borders. The failure of a cross-border credit institution is likely to affect the stability of financial marketeconomic structures in the different Member States in which it operates. The inability of Member States to seize control of a failing credit institution and to resolve it in a way that effectively prevents broader systemic damage can undermine Member States’ mutual trust and the credibility of the internal market in the field of financial services. The stability of financial markets is, therefore, an essential condition for the establishment and functioning of the internal markethave significant negative socio-economic consequences for the Member States.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 145 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 3
(3) There is currently no harmonisation of the procedures for resolving credit institutions at Union level. Some Member States apply to credit institutions the same procedures that they apply to other insolvent enterprises, which in certain cases have been adapted for credit institutions. There are considerable substantial and procedural differences between the laws, regulations and administrative provisions which govern credit institutions’ insolvency in the Member States. In addition, the financial crisis has exposed that general corporate insolvency procedures may not always be appropriate for credit institutions as they may not always ensure sufficient speed of intervention, the continuation of the essential functions of credit institutions and the preservation of financial stability. This has had devastating effects on public budgets.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 147 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 4
(4) A regime is, therefore, needed to provide authorities with the tools to intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing credit institution so as to ensure the continuity of the credit institution’s essential financial and economic functions, while minimizing the impact of an institution’s failure on the financial systemeconomy and ensuring that shareholders and creditors bear appropriate losses. New powers should enable authorities to maintain uninterrupted access to deposits and payment transactions, sell viable portions of the firm where appropriate, and apportion losses in a manner that is fair and predictable. Those objectives should help avoid destabilizing financial markets and minimize the costs for taxpayers.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 148 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 5
(5) Some Member States have already enacted legislative changes that introduce mechanisms to resolve failing credit institutions; others have indicated their intention to introduce such mechanisms if they are not adopted at Union level. National differences in the conditions, powers and processes for the resolution of credit institutions are likely to constitute barriers to the smooth operation of the internal market and hinder cooperation between national authorities when dealing with failing cross-border banking groups. This is particularly true where different approaches mean that national authorities do not have the same level of control or the same ability to resolve credit institutions. Those differences in resolution regimes may also affect bank funding costs differently across Member States and potentially create competitive distortions between banksAny form of regulatory arbitrage needs to be avoided. Effective resolution regimes in all Member States are also necessary to ensure that institutions cannot be restricted in the exercise of the single market rights of establishment by the financial capacity of their home Member State to manage their failure.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 149 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 6
(6) Those obstacles should be eliminated and rules should be adopted in order to ensure that the internal market provisions are not underminedfinancial institutions can no longer endanger socio-economic structures of Member States. To that end, rules governing the resolution of institutions should be made subject to common minimum harmonisation rules.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 154 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 10
(10) National Authorities should take into account the risk, size, legal status, nature, scope and complexity of business activity, and interconnectedness of an institution in the context of recovery and resolution plans and when using the different tools at their disposal, making sure that the regime is applied in an appropriate way.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 162 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 12
(12) In light of the consequences that the failure of a credit institution or an investment firm may have on the financial system and the economy of a Member State as well as the possible need to use public funds to resolve a crisis, the Ministries of Finance or other relevant ministries and other stakeholders in the Member States should be closely involved, at an early stage, in the process of crisis management and resolution.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 172 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 17
(17) Where an institution does not present an adequate recovery plan, supervisors should be empowered to require that institution to take any measure necessary to redress the deficiencies of the plan, including making changes to its business model or to its funding strategy. That requirement may affect the freedom to conduct a business as guaranteed by Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The limitation of that fundamental right is however necessary to meet the objectives of financial stability and for protecting depositors and creditorssocially balanced and inclusive economic development in the EU. More specifically, such a limitation is necessary in order to strengthen the business of institutions and avoid that institutions grow excessively or take excessive risks without being able to tackle setbacks and losses and to restore their capital base. The limitation is also proportionate as only preventative action can ensure that adequate precautions are taken and therefore complies with Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 239 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 68
(68) There are circumstances when the effectiveness of the resolution tools applied may depend on the availability of short- term funding for the institution or a bridge institution, the provision of guarantees to potential purchasers, or the provision of capital to the bridge institution. Notwithstanding the role of central banks in providing liquidity to the financial system even in times of stress, it is important that Member States set up financing arrangements to avoid that the funds needed for such purposes come from the national budgets. It should be the financial industry, as a whole, that finances the stabilisation of the financial system, according to the different risk profiles, the stabilisation of the financial system. Systemically important institutions should consequently make a higher contribution than institutions that are of limited systemic relevance.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 259 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 83
(83) The European Parliament and the Council should have twohree months from the date of notification to object to a delegated act. It should be possible for the European Parliament and the Council to inform the other institutions of their intention not to raise objections.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 304 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 83 a (new)
(83a) ‘Excessive speculation’ means positions held by any person, including any group or class of persons, which do not objectively reduce risks directly related to that person’s commercial activities and in which the counterparty is not reducing risks directly related to its commercial activities.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 306 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 83 b (new)
(83b) ‘Early intervention’ means any action taken by a competent authority, or any preventive and supportive measures taken by the IPS in consultation with a competent authority before a resolution phase is formally declared.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 347 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Any decision of the designated authority pursuant to this Directive shall be taken in consultation with the European Banking Authority.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 542 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 9 – paragraph 4 – point i
(i) an explanation by the resolution authority as to how the resolution options could be financed without the assumption of any extraordinary public financial support;
2013/01/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 581 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point e
(e) identify how the group resolution actions could be financed and, where appropriate, set out principles for sharing responsibility for that financing between sources of funding in different Member States. The plan shall not assume extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the financing arrangements established in accordance with Article 91. Those principles shall be set out on the basis of equitable and balanced criteria and shall take into account, in particular, the economic impact of the resolution in the Member States affected and the distribution of the supervisory powers between the different competent authorities.
2013/01/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 595 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 12 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
The group resolution plan shall take the form of a joint decision of the group level resolution authority, the EBA and the other relevant resolution authorities. The resolution authorities shall make a joint decision within a period of four months from the date of the transmission by the group level resolution authority of the information referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 1.
2013/01/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 606 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 12 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3
EBA may on its own initiativewill assist the competent authorities in reaching an agreement in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
2013/01/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 623 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities, in consultation with competent authorities and the EBA, assess the extent to which institutions and groups are resolvable without the assumption of extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the financing arrangements established in accordance with Article 91. An institution or group shall be deemed resolvable if it is feasible and credible for the resolution authority to either liquidate it under normal insolvency proceedings or to resolve it by applying the different resolution tools and powers to the institution and group without giving rise to significant adverse consequences for the financial systems, including in circumstances of broader financial instability or system wide events, of the Member State in which the institution is situated, having regard to the economy or financial stability in that same or other Member State or the Union and with a view to ensure the continuity of critical functions carried out by the institution or group either because they can be easily separated in a timely manner or by other means.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 693 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 15 – paragraph 1
1. The group level resolution authorities and the resolution authorities of the subsidiaries, in consultation with the relevant competent authorities and the EBA, shall consult each other within the resolution college and shall take all reasonable steps to reach a joint decision in regards to the application of measures identified in accordance with Article 14(3).
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 704 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 15 – paragraph 4
4. The group level resolution authority shall communicate any measure proposed by the parent undertakings or institution subject to consolidated supervision to the consolidating supervisor, EBA and the resolution authorities of the subsidiaries. The group level resolution authorities and the resolution authorities of the subsidiaries, in consultation with the competent authorities and the EBA, shall do everything within their power to reach a joint decision within the resolution college regarding the identification of the material impediments, and if necessary, the assessment of the measures proposed by the parent undertakings or institution subject to consolidated supervision and the measures required by the authorities in order to address or remove the impediments.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 709 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 15 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2
EBA may on its own initiativewill assist the resolution authorities in reaching an agreement in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 856 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 24 – paragraph 4
4. Competent authorities may set limits to the action of a special manager or require that certain acts of the special manager be subject to the competent authority's prior consent. The competent authorities may remove the special manager at any time.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 859 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 24 – paragraph 7
7. Subject to the provisions in paragraphs 1 to 6 the appointment of the special manager shall not prejudice the rights of the shareholders or owners provided for in accordance Union or national company law.deleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 869 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 25 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
The assessment shall take the form of a joint decision of the consolidating supervisor, the EBA and the other relevant competent authorities. The joint decision shall be reached within five days from the date of the notification referred to in paragraph 1. The joint decision shall be reasoned and set out in a document, which shall be provided by the consolidating supervisor to the parent undertaking or institution that is subject to consolidated supervision.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 873 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 25 – paragraph 3
3. EBA may on its own initiativewill assist the competent authorities in reaching an agreement in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 880 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 26 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. The resolution objectives referred to in paragraph 1 are the following, with decreasing significance:
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 882 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) to ensure the continuity of critical functionsavoid significant adverse effects on financial stability, including by preventing contagion, and maintaining market discipline;
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 887 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) to avoid significant adverse effects on financial stability, including by preventing contagion, and maintaining market disciplineprotect public funds by eliminating reliance on extraordinary public financial support;
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 889 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial supportdepositors covered by Directive 94/19/EC;
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 891 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point d
(d) to avoid unnecessary destruction of value and to seek to minimise the cost of resoluensure the continuity of critical functions;
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 894 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point e
(e) to protect depositors covered by Directive 94/19/EC and investors covered by Directive 97/9/ECavoid unnecessary destruction of value and to seek to minimise the cost of resolution;
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 895 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point e a (new)
(ea) to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 897 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point f a (new)
(fa) to prevent excessive speculation as defined in Article 2;
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 899 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 26 – paragraph 3
3. Subject to different provisions of this Directive, the resolution objectives are of equal significance, and resolution authorities shall balance them as appropriate to the nature and circumstances of each case.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 905 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 27 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. By derogation from paragraph 1 resolution authorities may take action in cases where the institution has: (a) engaged in excessive speculation as defined in Article 2; (b) acted against the general public interest.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 946 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
(aa) senior managers of the institution under resolution bear losses, both as shareholders and creditors;
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 950 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) creditors of the institution under resolution bear losses only after complethe shareholder value loss in accordance with the order of priority of their claims pursuant to this Directive;
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 955 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) senior managers of the institution under resolution bear losses that are commensurate under civil or criminal law with their individual responsibility for the failure of the institution;deleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 958 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point f
(f) no creditor incurs greater losses than those that would be incurred if the institution would have been wound down under normal insolvency proceedings.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 971 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Extraordinary public financial support will not be considered before the tools referred to in Paragraph 1 are implemented to their full extent.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 982 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 30 – paragraph 2
2. Without prejudice to the Union State aid framework, where applicable, the valuation required by paragraph 1 shall be based on prudent and realistic assumptions, including as to rates of default and severity of losses, and its objective shall be to assess the market value of the assets and liabilities of the institution that is failing or is likely to fail so that any losses that could be derived are recognised at the moment the resolution tools are exercised. However, wWhere the market for a specific asset or liability is not functioning properly the valuation may reflect the long term economic value of those assets or liabilities. Valuation shall not assume the provision of extraordinary public support to the institution, regardless of whether it is actually provided.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 998 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 30 – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 1 – point c
(c) the methodology for assessing the market value of the assets and liabilities of the institution that is failing or likely fail;
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1026 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 34 – paragraph 3
3. When applying the bridge institution tool, a resolution authority shall ensure that the total value of liabilities transferred to the bridge institution does not exceed 80% of a prudent assessment of the total value of the rights and assets transferred from the institution under resolution or provided by other sources.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1027 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 34 – paragraph 5 – point c
(c) transfer rights, assets or liabilities from the bridge institution to a third party, without prejudice to the criteria established in paragraph 3.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1028 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 34 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 – point b a (new)
(b a) After such a transfer, the total value of liabilities remaining in the bridge institution will not exceed 80% of a prudent assessment of the total value of its remaining rights and assets.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1033 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 34 – paragraph 9
9. Shareholders or creditors of the institution under resolution and other third parties whose property, rights or liabilities are not transferred to the bridge institution shall not have any rights over or in relation to the bridge institution or its property.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1046 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 35 – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 2
Any proceeds generated as a result of the termination of the operation of the bridge institutions as specified in paragraph 3 shall benefit the institution under resolution. If by virtue of unexpected events, the operation of the bridge institutions should result in losses those should be borne by the institution under resolution.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1051 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 36 – paragraph 9
9. Shareholders and creditors of the institution under resolution and other third parties whose property, rights or liabilities are not transferred to the asset management vehicle shall not have any rights over or in relation to the asset management vehicle, it property or its managers.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1084 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) secured liabilities,deleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1091 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b a (new)
(b a) liabilities that are guaranteed by an institutional protection scheme meeting the requirement of Art. 80(8) of Directive 2006/48/EC;
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1097 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d
(d) liabilities with an original maturity of less than one month;deleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1116 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e – point iii
(iii) tax and social security authorities, provided that those liabilities are preferred under the applicable insolvency law.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1121 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Points (a) and (b) of paragraph 2 shall not prevent resolution authorities, where appropriate, from exercising those powers in relation to any part of a secured liability or a liability for which collateral has been pledged that exceeds the value of the assets, pledge, lien or collateral against which it is secured. Member States may exempt from this provision covered bonds as defined in Article 22(4) of Council Directive 86/611/EEC.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1122 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 a (new)
Point (ba) of paragraph 2 shall not prevent resolution authorities, where appropriate, from exercising those powers in relation to any amount of a liability that exceeds the coverage of the IPS.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1123 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 a (new)
Point (ba) of paragraph 2 shall not prevent resolution authorities, where appropriate, from exercising those powers in relation to any amount of a liability that exceeds the coverage of the IPS.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1130 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 3
3. Where resolution authorities apply the bail-in tool, they may exclude from the application of the write-down and conversion powers liabilities arising from derivatives that do not fall within the scope of point (d) of paragraph 2, if that exclusion is necessary or appropriate to achieve the objectives specified in points (a) and (b) of Article 26(2).deleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1139 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 4
4. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts adopted in accordance with Article 103 in order to specify further: (a) specific classes of liabilities covered by point (d) of paragraph 2, and. (b) the circumstances when exclusion is necessary or appropriate to achieve the objectives specified in points (a) and (b) of Article 26(2), having regard to the following factors: (i) the systemic impact of closing out derivative positions in order to apply the debt write-down tool; (ii) the effect on the operation of a Central Counterparty of applying the debt write-down tool to liabilities arising from derivatives that are cleared by the Central Counterparty; and (iii) the effect of applying the debt write- down tool to liabilities arising from derivatives on the risk management of counterparties to those derivatives.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1212 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 42 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Member States shall ensure that, when applying the bail-in tool, resolution authorities take in respect of shareholders one or both of the following actions:will cancel existing shares;
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1214 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 42 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) cancel existing shares;deleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1215 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 42 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) exercise the power referred to in point (h) of Article 56(1) to convert eligible liabilities into shares of the institution under resolution at a rate of conversion that severely dilutes existing shareholdings.deleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1216 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 42 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. The actions provided for in paragraph 1 shall apply in respect of shareholders where the shares in question were issued or conferred in the following circumstances:
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1217 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 42 – paragraph 3
3. When considering which action to take in accordance with paragraph 1, resolution authorities shall have regard to the likely amount of losses relative to assets before the exercise of the bail-in tool, with a view to ensuring that the action taken in respect of shareholders is consistent with that reduction in equity value; the valuation carried out in accordance with Articles 30 and 31 and in particular to the likelihood that shareholders would have recovered any value if the institution had been wound up on the basis of that valuation.deleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1219 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 42 – paragraph 4
4. When resolution authorities apply the bail-in tool, the provisions of Article 30 and 31 shall apply.deleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1220 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 42 – paragraph 5
5. EBA shall develop guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, on the circumstances in which each of the actions referred to in paragraph 1 would be appropriate, having regard to the factors specified in paragraph 2 of this article. EBA shall develop these guidelines at the latest by the date provided for in the first subparagraph of Article 115(1) of this Directive.deleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1222 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 42 – paragraph 6
6. The Commission, taking into account, where appropriate, the experience acquired in the application of EBA guidelines, may adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 103 aimed at specifying the circumstances in which each of the actions mentioned in paragraph 1 would be appropriate, having regard to the factors specified in paragraph 2 of this Article.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1312 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 65 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) where resolution authorities transfer only parts of the rights, assets and liabilities of the institution, the shareholders and the creditors whose claims have not been transferred, receive in payment of their claims at least as much as what they would have received if the institution had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings immediately before the transfer,
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1313 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 65 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) where resolution authorities apply the bail-in tool, the shareholders and creditors whose claims have been written down or converted to equity receive in payment of their claims at least as much as what they would have received if the institution had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings immediately before the writing down or conversion.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1316 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 66 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the treatment that shareholders and creditors would have received if the institution in connection to which the partial transfer, write down or conversion has been made, had entered normal insolvency proceedings immediately before the transfer, write down or conversion was effected;
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1317 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 66 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) the actual treatment that shareholders and creditors have received, are receiving or are likely to receive in the winding up of the institution;
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1321 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 67 – title
Safeguard for shareholders and creditors
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1433 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 91 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Member States may exclude publicly owned entities that have explicit guarantee arrangements or comparable liability instruments provided by regional or central governments and that fulfil specific tasks of public interest, from the contribution to the resolution fund.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1447 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 92 – paragraph 2
2. Member States shall ensure that any losses, costs or other expenses incurred in connection with the use of the resolution tools shall be first borne by the shareholders and, if resources from the shareholders are exhausted, the creditors of the institution under resolution. Only if the resources from shareholders and creditors are exhausted, the losses, costs or other expenses incurred in connection with the use of the resolution tools shall be borne by the financing arrangements.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1454 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 93 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that, in a period no longer than 105 years after the entry into force of this directive, the available financial means of their financing arrangements reach at least 1% of the amount of deposittotal liabilities of all the credit institutions authorised in their territory which are, excluding own funds and deposits guaranteed under Ddirective 94/19/EC.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1461 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 93 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Member States may extend the initial period of time for a maximum of four years in case the financing arrangements make cumulated disbursements superior to 0.5% of covered deposits. Member States may ad hoc levy additional contributions if they deem necessary for the stability of the financial system.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1466 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 93 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. When the available financial means are equal or above 1% and below 2%, the annual contributions shall not be less than 0,1% of total liabilities, excluding own funds and deposits guaranteed under Directive 94/19/EC.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1475 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 94 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) if a Member State has availed itself of the option provided for in Article 99(5) of this Directive to use the funds of Deposit Guarantee Scheme for the purposes of Article 92 of this Directive, the contribution from each institution shall be pro-rata to the total amount of its liabilities, excluding own funds and deposits guaranteed under the Directive 94/19/EC, with respect to the total liabilities, excluding own funds and deposits guaranteed under the Directive 94/19/EC, of all the institutions authorised in the territory of the Member State.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1492 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 94 – paragraph 5
5. The amounts raised in accordance with this Article shall only be used for the purposes specified in Article 92 of this Directive, and, where Member States have availed themselves of the option provided for under Article 99(5) of this Directive, for the purposes specified in Article 92 of this Directive or for the repayment of deposits guaranteed under Directive 94/19/EC.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1544 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 97 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. These loans should be made from all other financing arrangements within the union, in proportion to the total liabilities, excluding own funds and deposits guaranteed under Directive 94/19/EC, of all the credit institutions authorised in the corresponding territory.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1551 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Member States shall ensure that financing arrangements under their jurisdiction are obliged to lend to other financing arrangements within the Union in the circumstances specified under paragraph 1 and in the conditions specified in paragraph 1a.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1561 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Subject to the first subparagraph, national financing arrangements shall not be obliged to lend to another national financing arrangement in those circonstances when the resolution authority of the Member State of the financing arrangement considers that it would not have sufficient funds to finance any foreseeable resolution in the near future. In any case they should not be obliged to lend more than half of the funds that the national financing arrangement has available at the moment when the borrowing request is formalised.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1597 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 99
Article 99deleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON