BETA

Activities of Jürgen KLUTE related to 2013/2047(INI)

Shadow reports (1)

REPORT on recovery and resolution framework for non-bank institutions PDF (199 KB) DOC (102 KB)
2016/11/22
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2013/2047(INI)
Documents: PDF(199 KB) DOC(102 KB)

Amendments (12)

Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas privatisation and liberalisation of financial markets have had devastating consequences for the global economy as short-term profit maximisation has caused excessive risk taking leading to systemic instability; whereas this behaviour needs to be ultimately stopped; whereas the general public interest needs to be the main focus of financial service providers including both banks and non-bank financial institutions;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas while EMIR and CSDR aim to reduce systemic risk through well- regulated market infrastructure, there is a strong possibility of unintended consequencessignificantly more regulation for both banks and non-bank financial institutions is needed in order to ensure that financial markets no longer pose a threat to the society;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas multiple failures of CCP members will have devastating consequences not only for financial market participants but for societies as a whole;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 24 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital O a (new)
Oa. whereas non-bank financial institutions that engage in bank-like activities such as channelling savings into investments or hedging risks should be covered by similar rules as banks;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Calls on the Commission not only to prioritise recovery and resolution of CCPs and those CSDs which are exposed to credit risk, and when considering other financial institutions to differentiate appropriately between each typebut also to develop similar legislation for other financial institutions that are active on the financial markets and which have the potential to pose systemic risks to the economy;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 28 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Emphasises the importance of EU legislation following internationally agreed principles, as agreed in CPSS-IOSCO, FSB and IAIS and to go further when deemed necessary for financial and economic stability;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Demands that the Commission ensures CCPs act in the general public interest and adopt their business strategies accordingly in order to significantly reduce the likelihood of triggering recovery and resolution scenarios;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Calls on the Commission to recognise that while the aim of ring-fencing asset classes within a default fund of a CCP is to limit contagion, it is unclear whether this will be sufficient to prevent such contagion in practice; calls on the Commission to propose further measures in order to minimise this contagion risk;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Believes that if the resolution authority had the ability to impose a stay on early termination rights, alongside the lifting of the clearing obligation which would pause the CCP for a maximum period of two days, this could allow the market to correctly re-price the contracts, thus allowing for a more orderly diffusion of risk whereby the lifting of a clearing obligation should be a means of last resort after it has at least been examined whether another CCP could provide the clearing in the short term or the respective products could be suspended from trading for a limited period of time;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Demands that the Commission ensures CCPs act in the general public interest and adopt their business strategies accordingly in order to significantly reduce the likelihood of triggering recovery and resolution scenarios;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Calls on the Commission to assess whether anyich asset managers should be designated as systemically important due to their size or business model and would therefore require a recovery plan;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Believes that an effective securities law regime could mitigate manysome of the issues involved in case of failure of a large crossborder asset manager;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON