BETA

27 Amendments of Burkhard BALZ related to 2012/2151(INI)

Amendment 28 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 28
– having regard to its posilegislative resolution of 16 February 2012 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (recast),
2012/09/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas the report of the Presidents of the European Council, the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup 'Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union' is to be welcomed as a vision for the Monetary Union; points out that any further integration needs a solid and reliable fundament consisting of a sound and efficient framework for resolution and recovery of financial institutions, a sound and efficient deposit guarantee framework and sound capital requirements without which no overarching structure such as a "genuine EMU" will be able to exist; calls therefore to wait with the building up of any such structure as long as these three proposals are not yet adopted.
2012/09/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
E. whereas the economic, financial and banking crisis has repeatedly demonstrated that public debt at national level and public financing problems as well as the disturbance of macroeconomic equilibriums quickly, directly and negatively affect the socio-economic development of the euro area and of the Union as a whole;
2012/09/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
I. whereas the important role played by the euro, both within the euro area and the Member States whose currency is not the euro at the global level, as the second most important international reserve currency, risks being increasingly undermined the longer the crisis persists;
2012/09/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
L. whereas euro area membership implies a high degree of economic and financial interdependence between the Member States concerned and therefore requires a much closer coordination of financial, fiscal and economic policies, linked to stricter supervisory instruments and effective enforcement;
2012/09/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital N
N. whereas Union and national policy makers should continuously explain to their citizens the benefits of European integration and of a single currency, including the costs and risks linked to a break up of the euro area;
2012/09/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 175 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AB
AB. whereas steady progress in the implementation of the long-term road map do not provide any immediate solution to the crisis and should not delay the needed short-term measures;
2012/09/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 181 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AC
AC. whereas it cannot be excluded that new Treaty changes, some of which may be unacceptable in some Member States at the moment might be needed for increasing the governance of a fully operational EMU; whereas the Commission should list without delay the necessarycurrent legislative initiatives that must not be delayed by the long-term institutional developments in the long term;
2012/09/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 211 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AH
AH. whereas the precarious situation of the banking sector in several Member States threatens the public finances and the cost of management of the banking crisis falls too heavily on taxpayers and the development of the real economy thus hampering growth; whereas the existing mechanisms and structures are insufficient to prevent mutual contagion;
2012/09/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 236 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AM
AM. whereas the Union would benefit from proposals that introduce a single European supervisory mechanism for financial institutions, a single European deposit guarantee scheme and a singleframework and a European recovery and resolution scheme;
2012/09/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 244 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AN
AN. whereas the scope of the deposit guarantee and crisis management framework should mirror that of the single supervisory mechanism in terms of the banks covered (symmetry);deleted
2012/09/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 275 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AT
AT. whereas European supervision of financial institutions within the euro area is an absolute priority to take measures to tackle the crisis, it should be, however, ensured that, for the purpose of internal financial market stability, countries whose currency is not the euro, which decide to access the single supervision mechanism, should be granted a participation formula, which guarantees symmetric relations between accepted obligations and impact on decision-making;
2012/09/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 345 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BG
BG. whereas the introduction of a single European deposit guarantee fund shcould be the ultimate goalvery long-term goal once an effective resolution scheme and an effective supervisory mechanism are working, further increasing the credibility of the scheme; the development of a similar scheme is justified considering the introduction of a European structure for prudential supervision and a European recovery and resolution framework;
2012/09/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 354 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BH
BH. whereas a single deposit guarantee schemeframework should cover all banks within the countries included in the system in order to guarantee a level playing field and avoid deposit flight from uncovered to covered financial institutions;
2012/09/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 455 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BZ
BZ. whereas the common issuance of debt is in the longer run a corollary of EMU; but will require a Treaty change which is unacceptable in some Member States at the moment and risks eroding other important reforms;
2012/09/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 563 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital CM
CM. whereas due to the ongoing crisis and the way the counter crisis measures have been taken the debate has grown not only on the governance of EMU but also on the democratic nature of the decision making within EMU;
2012/09/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 633 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.1 – paragraph 2
The legal basis, form and content of the proposal should provide for the possibility of full participation of all Member States in the European supervisor, in a form, which guarantees a symmetric relation between accepted obligations and the impact on decision-making, .
2012/10/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 690 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.2 – paragraph 1
The legislative act to be adopted should update and supplement the Commission's proposal of 12 July 2010 for a directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes in line with the position of the European Parliament of 16 February 2012 in order to introduce a stronger European dimension to deposit protection.
2012/10/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 696 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.2 – paragraph 2
The proposal should create a single European deposit guarantee fund (EDGF)ramework and ensure that the level of funds available at Union level are adequate to provide a high level of protection to eligible deposits. The EDGF should cover all banks in order to guarantee a level playing field and avoid deposit flight from uncovered to covered financial institutions.
2012/10/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 700 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.2 – paragraph 3
In order to maximise the protection of private savings, the EDGFdeposit guarantee funds should be kept separate from the single recovery and resolution funds (see recommendation 1.3 below).
2012/10/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 703 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.2 – paragraph 4
The EDGFdeposit guarantee funds should have a strong financial structure built on contributions from industry, with European public money only serving as an ultimate backstop.
2012/10/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 706 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.2 – paragraph 5
All deposits denominated in euro should be subject to a particular regime. Under that particular regime, the obligation on Member States to ensure that the EDGF has adequate funding should be a collective one in the case of Member States whose currency is the euro.deleted
2012/10/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 710 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.2 – paragraph 6
A vehicle should be established or designated to provide reassurance that that the collective obligation will be met. That vehicle could be the ESM.deleted
2012/10/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 723 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.3 – paragraph 2
A body at European level should be established or designated to exercise the required resolution tools in respect of those institutions (ERRA). This body should enjoy a wide independence. Its head should be appointed after confirmation by the European Parliament.
2012/10/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 729 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.3 – paragraph 3
In order to ensure adequate resources are available for resolution actions to be taken, a funds should be created aimed at preserving stability and limiting contagion from failing banks.
2012/10/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 731 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.3 – paragraph 4
These funds should be pan-European, funded ex-ante by the institutions concerned, and separate from deposit-guarantee schemes.
2012/10/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 743 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.3 – paragraph 6
That obligation should be a collective one in the case of Member States whose currency is the euro. A vehicle should be established or designated to provide reassurance that that collective obligation will be met and if required that vehicle needs to be able to intervene directly in institutions under recovery or resolution. That vehicle could be the ESM.
2012/10/02
Committee: ECON