41 Amendments of Marco ZANNI related to 2015/2221(INI)
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the BU is instrumnot sufficiental to ensuringe stability and restoringe confidence in euro area banks, enhancinge financial integration, and fostering risk sharing within the monetary union and contributing to breaking the link between sovereigns and banks at national level, because it acts only on effects and not on causes;
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
Amendment 35 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the SSM is the first pillar of the BU and aims tohas not, to date, ensured a uniform and homogeneous supervision of euro area banks, create a level playing field in the banking market, and contribute to thegreater safety and soundness of credit institutions and theor greater stability of the financial system;
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas the SRM is the second pillar of the BU and aimsmight not be sufficient to ensure uniform rules and procedures and a common decision- making process for orderly resolution of failing banks with minimum impact on the real economy and public finance;
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas a common DGS, originally intended as the third pillar of the BU, so far consists only in an approximation of national DGSs, while a common DGS that is able to ensure the same level of protection for deposits, irrespective of their location, is a necessary component of a true BUwell structured DGS is a necessary component to ensure stability of the financial system and protect savers;
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. WelcomNotes the establishment of the SSM, which has been successfulyielded questionable results both from an operational point of view and in terms of supervisory quality, and considers it a remarkable achievement, taking into account the complexity of the project and the very short time frame availablethat far more could be done in the field of single supervision;
Amendment 68 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. more specifically with regard to the operational arrangements by means of which the ECB and the EBA have performed the first comprehensive assessment of 130 banks consisting of an Asset Quality Review (AQR) and a Stress Test;
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Notes that the various operational arrangements adopted for the AQR have undermined the level playing field among banking groups and among Member States because of the different methods of assessment of assets;
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Notes that the non-performance of the Stress Tests for 2016 – which moreover has not been fully justified by the ECB’s decision-making bodies – creates a procedural void and a lack of transparency which undermine the very credibility of the Single Supervisory Mechanism;
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
Amendment 94 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Believes that while the degree of effectiveness achieved by JSTs in less than a year is remarkable, further improvements can be pursuedmany improvements could still be made to the operational aspect of the SSM, including by involving NCAs in a more effective way and ensuring that their staff are motivated and involved in the decision- making process;
Amendment 105 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
Amendment 107 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Deplores the location of the SSM inside the ECB, as this is a source of potential conflicts of interest, and observes that the ECB has not been very efficient to date because of insufficient interaction between the directorates- general of the ECB responsible for microprudential supervision and the directorate-general responsible for horizontal supervision and specialised services;
Amendment 111 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. UnderlinesRecalls that the signs indicating that economic recovery is underway but is still fragile and modest,are distorted by the performance of the euro, the price of oil and the Chinese economy, and are not due to structural changes in the European economy. deplores the fact that inflation remains below its target, and that credit dynamics are still subduedworrying in many jurisdictions and a large stock of non- performing loans weighs on many European banks’ balance sheets, limiting their capacity to finance the economy;
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
Amendment 138 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Believes that the worldwide drive towards more and better quality bank capital is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a sound banking system capable of supporting the economy and for avoiding any repeat of the enormous bailouts witnessed during the crisis;
Amendment 148 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Notes that an increase in capital requirements, beyond a certain threshold,further action with regard to capital requirements may in the short term induce banks to curtail the supply of credit, and therefore looks forward to an overall stabilisation of the level of capitalwishes banking regulation now to concentrate on balance- sheet assets;
Amendment 158 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Considers the stabilisation of the supervisory and regulatory framework an important element to restore investosavers’ confidence, to avoid uncertainty about regulatory and supervisory action, and to support growth and financial stability, but also considers that the approach adopted – or in other words the SSM – is not the right answer to the problem;
Amendment 164 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
Amendment 167 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Believes that the homogenisation of supervisory practices and standards within the euro area is a key objective for the SSM in order to ensure a true level playing field; in this respect, welcomes the agreement on a single implementation of national options and discretion for the euro area; considers that such a single implementation requires a gradual approach and should aim to address all existing barriers and segmentations; stands ready to cooperate at the legislative level to further improve regulatory and supervisory harmonisation;
Amendment 178 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Stresses the importance ofConsiders inadequate the work that has been undertaken to date on the homogenisation of the calculation of risk- weighted assets, which is pivotal for comparability purposes, and on the review of internal models for the calculation of banks’ capital requirements, and considers progress in this area, for all portfolios, crucial in order to preserve the effectiveness and credibility of banking supervision in the euro area;
Amendment 190 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
Amendment 203 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Considers transparency vis-à-vis market players and the public, including on sensitive topics, to be essential for fair competition in the banking market; underlines that transparency of both supervisors and supervised entities is also a prerequisite for accountability, as it allows Parliament and the public to be informed about key policy issues and to assess consistency with rules and supervisory practices; point out that a lack of transparency is currently making it impossible to lay the foundations for future stability and renewed trust in banks;
Amendment 210 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Welcomes theCriticises the lack of efficientcy and open way inness with which the ECB has so far fulfilled its accountability obligations towards Parliament and calls upon the ECB to continue to fully engage in this regard and to further contribute to improving Parliament’s capacity to assess SSM policies and activitiesthe lack of transparency shown with regard to the publication of minutes of meetings at which key decisions are made;
Amendment 227 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Welcomes the efficientNotes the setting up of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the establishment of the national resolution authorities (NRAs) in the Member States, and criticises the procedure used to select its members;
Amendment 239 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Highlights the importance of establishing efficient cooperation between the SRB and the NRAs for the smooth functioning of the SRM; considers the organisational model established by the SSM through the JSTs to be a good basis for organising cooperation within the SRM;
Amendment 247 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Underlines theCriticises the worrying discrepancy between banks directly supervised by the SSM and banks under the direct responsibility of the SRB (including other cross-border groups) and its potential consequences in terms of the SRB’s access to information, which are at the root of the failure of the Banking Union project;
Amendment 248 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. Calls for specific arrangements within the Commission and between the SRB and the Commission in order to define efficientin advance efficient and clear procedures for decision-making in the event of resolution;
Amendment 253 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. Calls for timely progress in drawing up resolution plans and the setting of a minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for institutions in the scope of the SRM, in order to be able to ensure an orderly resolution of failing banks with a minimumno impact on the real economy and public finances;
Amendment 260 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Takes note ofCriticises the double role of the Board members who are at the same time members of an executive body with decision-making roles and senior managers accountable in that capacity to the Chair, and considers that an evaluation of this structure should be undertaken before the end of the current mandatecompletely dismantled and replaced, because it is anti-democratic;
Amendment 261 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
Amendment 279 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
Amendment 294 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
Amendment 302 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
Amendment 316 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 a (new)
Paragraph 38 a (new)
38a. Points out that the entry into force of the SRF and the allocation of only EUR 55 billion to the fund have also played a part in the SRM’s lack of success and the lack of credibility of the entire Banking Union project; takes the view that temporary measures, such as bridge financing, can have only a palliative effect, doing no more than to conceal these failings; points out, lastly, that the introduction of a common backstop at EU level will not solve the problem of the SRF's inadequate resources;
Amendment 319 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. Underlines that, together with the SSM and the SRM, the capacity to afford the samea high level of protection to deposits, irrespective of their location and their size, is an indispensable component for completing the BU;
Amendment 335 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
Paragraph 40
40. WelcomCriticises the Commission’s announcementproposal regarding the presentation of a legislative proposal for the first steps towards a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) by establishing a reinsurance mechanism at EU level for the national deposit guarantee schemes;
Amendment 357 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 a (new)
Paragraph 40 a (new)
40a. Believes that it should be the job of national central banks to guarantee all foreign-currency deposits held by financial institutions based in their countries;