15 Amendments of Luigi MORGANO related to 2018/2100(INI)
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas entrusting the ECB with the supervision of financial institutions has proven to be generally successful;
Amendment 28 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas the weighted average NPL ratio for Europe’s main banks stood at 3.6% as of 30 June 2018, according to the EBA’s quarterly Risk Dashboard; whereas over the past 14 quarters this percentage has constantly fallen, particularly since the last quarter of 2016, and in particular with regard to the upper quartile of averages by country;
Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Takes note of the achievements ofresults hitherto achieved by the Banking Union in fostering a truly single market, a level playing field and predictability for market actors; considers that a fully completed Banking Union, which therefore includes the European Deposit Insurance Scheme, will further strengthen financial stability and growth prospects in the EU;
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Considers that one of the aims of the Banking Union should be to preserve the diversity of EU banking models, as this enables the requirements of citizens and of their projects to be met, as well as acting as a diversification tool, a key feature to cope with potential shocks; regrets that the approach hitherto taken by the SSM, however, tends to be guiding the European banking system towards a single operational and commercial banking model for all;
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Notes with concern that most cases of money laundering - in particular ABLV in Latvia and Danske Bank in Estonia - have been reported by non-EU jurisdictions; takes the view that in addition to endangering the reputation of the entire European banking system, cases of money laundering (such as, for example, those linked to ING in the Netherlands) expose the European economy to financial and political instability;
Amendment 80 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Regrets that its concerns regarding the risks stemming from the presence of Level 3 assets, including derivatives, on the balance sheets of the major banks in the euro area, and in particular the difficulty in ascertaining their value, have not been appropriately taken into consideration in the EBA’s stress tests; notes that these risks should be reduced and that this calls for a progressive reduction of the holdings of these assets; repeats its call to the SSM to make this issue one of its supervisory priorities and to organise, jointly with the EBA, a specific quantitative stress test regarding such assets or to justify to Parliament why it has decided not to do so;
Amendment 88 #
8. Highlights that sovereign debt is not risk-free; takes note of the on-going work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on sovereign risk; is concerned by the fact that some financial institutions are heavily invested in their own sovereign debt; calls on the Commission to assess whether to introduce risk weightingWarns against taking unilateral measures to address what is known as ‘home bias’ towards sovereign debt, as these could lead to financial instability in the euro area and create an unlevel playing field with respect to other jurisdictions; notes that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has practically halted its work on the prudential treatment of sovereign risk since the publication of its study in 20171 a, as it was unable to find any consensus on the issue; is concerned by the fact that the Union does not yet have a real, safe, pan-European sovereign bond; _________________ 1a 'Discussion paper - The regulatory treatment onf sovereign bonds or exposure limits in the EU;exposures', Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements, December 2017.
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Urges all negotiators to work towards the adoption of the legislative package to reduce risk in the banking system before the European elections in 2019; urges the Council, in particular, to negotiate in good faith, taking due account of the diversity of EU banking models and the balanced package adopted by the European Parliament;
Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the NPL package; welcomesCommission's legislative proposals concerning minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures and the development of a secondary market for NPLs, of the ECB addendum on NPLs and the work of the EBA on guidelines on management of non- performing and forborne exposures; welcomes the reduction in volume of NPLs over the past years; stresses that the risk to financial stability posed by NPLs is still significanttoday is less significant than it was a few years ago; agrees with the Commission that the primary responsibility for reducing NPLs lies with the Member States, notably through efficient insolvency laws, and banks themselves; considers that the causal link between economic growth and the decline in non-performing exposures should be properly assessed, as there is no empirical evidence that the supply of credit is causally determined by the level of NPLs in the European banking system;
Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Recalls the initial debate on the role of the ECB as both monetary and supervisory authority; considers that, overall, the ECB has succeeded in adequately keeping the two roles separate; believes, however, that further debate is necessary to avoidin order to ensure there risk of a no confusion or conflict of interests between the two taskroles of the ECB, there should be an institutional, as well as operational, separation of the ECB's monetary policy and supervisory functions;
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Welcomes the Considers totally inadequate the 'non-agreement' reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 that- an agreement in principle according to which the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will provide the common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and be turned into a true European Monetary Fund (EMF), based on strict conditions ensuring responsibility and the principle of avoiding moral hazard; stresses the need for proper democratic scrutiny; recalls Parliament’s position that the EMF should, however, on conditions which make it extremely difficult to be used from a counter-cyclical and crisis management viewpoint; takes the view that in order to be truly effective as an anti-crisis instrument, a fiscal support tool for the Banking Union should not be limited in its dimensions and should be able to issue debt on the markets to finance itself; stresses that only once it has been fully incorporated into the Union's institutional framework will proper democratic scrutiny be ensured for the EMF;
Amendment 161 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Reaffirms its position that the rules for precautionary recapitalisation need to be clarified; notes that precautionary recapitalisation can be anthat precautionary recapitalisation is a legitimate instrument for bank crisis -management but believes that it; notes that the conditions use needs to be strictly limited to exceptional cases where the bank is t for it by the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) are restrictive and have so far been effective in preventing its inappropriate use on insolvent band whereks, in addition to ensuring compliance with EU State aid rules is ensured; recalls that the objective of the EU resolution regime is to make sure that taxpayers are protected, the cost of bank management failures is borne by its shareholders and creditors, and that the stability of the financial system as a whole is preserved;
Amendment 166 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Calls on the Commission to regularly assess whether the banking sector has benefited from implicit subsidies and State aid since the beginning of the crisis and to publish a report in this regard; underlines the distortive effect State aid can have on the functioning of the internal market; recalls the strict requirements for the application of Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU);
Amendment 168 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20a. Welcomes the adoption of the agreement on emergency liquidity assistance (ELA), which clarifies the allocation of responsibilities, costs and risks; notes that this agreement is to be reviewed in 2019 at the latest; takes the view that certain recent banking scandals, in particular in north-eastern Europe, have highlighted the need for greater centralisation within the ECB of the procedures for providing ELA and the inadequacy of the sole criterion of ‘interference in monetary policy’ as the justification for intervention in an ELA operation by the ECB’s Executive Committee and Governing Council;
Amendment 182 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Takes note of the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS); underlines the necessity of EDIS as the third pillar of the Banking Union; believes it should be fully implemented once significant risk reduction has taken placeed for EDIS to be implemented in full, since it is the third pillar of the Banking Union; points out that effective risk sharing ensures the stability of the European banking and financial system;