BETA

48 Amendments of Molly SCOTT CATO related to 2014/2157(INI)

Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas, according to the Commission services' spring 2014 forecast, GDP in the euro area fell by 0.4 % in 2013 after a decline of 0.7 % in 2012, and whereas the Commission services expect a reco; whereas according to Eurostat the euro area expanded only slightly over the three first quarters of 2014; whereas the Commission services' autumn 2014 forecasts foresee a very, with GDP rising by 1.2 % ineak return to growth for 20145 and by 1.7 % in 2015ll over the EMU with prevailing downside risks;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 12 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas there are major disparities among the unemployment rates in different Member States, with figures varying between 5 % and 26 %; whereas percentages for youth unemployment are even higher, reaching around 50% in some Member States;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas current projections put in evidence that nearly half of all Member States will not achieve their National EU2020 targets on education schemes and greenhouse gas reductions by 2020 and that trends regarding employment and poverty reduction are even worse moving away rather than towards the National EU2020 targets;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas the consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem reached EUR 2.285 trillion at the end of 2013, representing a decrease of approximately 25% over the course of 2013;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D b (new)
Db. whereas non-marketable assets represented the largest component of assets put forward as collateral to the Eurosystem in the course of 2013, amounting to around 25% of the total; whereas non-marketable securities, together with asset-backed securities, represent around 40 % of total assets put forward as collateral;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 24 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
E. whereas, according to the Commission services’ s' Spring 2014 forecast, the average inflation rate in the euro area was 1.3 % in 2013, down from 2.5 % in 2012; whereas inflation in the euro area has continued to be on a downward path since the beginning of 2014, reaching a low of 0.34 % in SeptembeOctober with core inflation stalled around 0.7% over the last year;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
F. whereas the level of public and private investment in the euro area has been stagnating at levels significantly below those registered before the start of the crisis; whereas the relative share of investments in GDP has been declining steadily even before the crisis;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
H. whereas credit to the private sector has moved further into negative territory, with an annual rate of change of -2.4% in December 2013, compared with -0.2% in December 2012; whereas the lack of credit affecting SMEs in some Member States is one of the main problems delaying the economic recovery; whereas the drop in lending to SMEs has been of around 35% between 2008 and 2013;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
L. whereas Article 282 TFEU states that the primary objective of the ECBuropean System of Central Banks (ESCB) is to maintain price stability; whereas article 127 TFEU states that without prejudice to such primary objective, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union; whereas Article 123 TFEU and Article 21 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the ECB prohibit the monetary financing of governmentdirect purchase of debt instruments issued by EU or National public authorities or bodies;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. WelcomAcknowledges the swift reaction of the ECB in the face of a very challenging environment, and the fact that monetary policy has succeeded in reducing the level of stress in financial markets of the euro area, and in restoring investors' confidence in the soundness of the single currencyingle currency; welcomes the readiness of the ECB to do whatever it takes to save the Euro; underlines and welcomes the fact that the ECB Governing Council considers explicitly that its mandate allows it to fight excessive borrowing costs for Euro area Member States; notes that this was reflected in the general reduction of long- term domestic yields – notably in the most indebted countries of the euro area – to unprecedented levels since the beginning of the crisis;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Points out however that the announcement 'to do whatever it takes' to save the euro was overdue and that should such announcement be made earlier it would have alleviated substantially taxpayers costs in Member States experiencing financial difficulties;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. Notes that the recourse to the main refinancing operations, the medium and long-term refinancing operations with full allotment at fixed rates, the recourse to the marginal lending facility, the ELAs and the deposit facility remained all at significantly high levels throughout 2013 signalling an ongoing impairment of the monetary transmission mechanism and the Eurozone interbank lending market, albeit the situation improved significantly in comparison with the previous years as put in evidence by the stabilization of spreads a gradual normalization in interbank markets and the reduction of TARGET II imbalances;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 c (new)
1c. Is encouraged by the stabilization of the levels of TARGET II imbalances all over 2013 underlines that the TARGET II settlement system has played a crucial role for safeguarding the integrity of the euro area financial system;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 d (new)
1d. Is of the opinion that the ECB readiness to do whatever it takes to save the euro should ultimately lead the ECB to assume a role of lender of last resort for Member States with an implied need for real common economic and financial policy that may require Treaty change;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Remains deeply concerned by the fact that economic activity remains sluggish, with the euro area posting negative GDP growth in 2013, for the second year in a row, with GDP growth being extremely weak over the first three quarters of 2014 and with high unemployment rates in many euro-area Member States reaching levels that threaten the stability of the eurozone;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Remains deeply concerned by the fact that economic activity remains sluggish, with the euro area posting negative GDP growth in 2013, for the second year in a row, with economic activity being extremely weak over the first three quarters of 2014 and with high unemployment rates in many euro-area Member States reaching levels that threaten the stability of the eurozone;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Stresses its deep concern regarding the continuous fall in the inflation rate in the euro area since 2011; stresses that the important gap observed today, with between the ECB's aimexplicit target of keeping inflation rates below but close to 2% in the medium term, could lead to a disanchoring in medium- to longer-term inflation expectation and the current inflation rates which are close to zero and even below zero in several euro area Member States; is worried, as acknowledged by the ECB President that current deflationary trends have led in practice to a disanchoring in medium- to longer-term inflation expectations as put in evidence in expectations embedded in 5y5y swap rates which do not foresee inflation in the euro area to reach rates below but close to 2% over the next 10 years;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Warns against the risk of deflation estimated by the IMF as being currently of around 30%; recalls that an inflation rate of close to zero in the euro area hampers the effectiveness of monetary policy; understands that the ECB attributes the reason for a very low inflation to short-term effects, and that it is confident that the medium-term objective will be met without a deflationary phase, worsen the deleveraging burden and makes adjustment more difficult in crisis hit countries; understands that the ECB expects that the package of measures it has announced in combination with a greater role played by fiscal policy should help to achieve the medium-term objective without a deflationary phase; welcomes the ECB President acknowledgement that there is a lack of aggregate demand in the euro area and that the ECB stands ready to adjust its policy stance further, including the purchase of assets, should activity and inflation indicators warrant so;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Points out that in the perspective of further accommodative policies such as quantitative easing and having in mind the current legal challenges regarding the OMT programme it is crucial to have legal clarity and certainty for allowing these instruments to be effectively implemented;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Points out that the ECB forecasts published in 2013 had not anticipated the actual conjunction of a flat growth and a very low inflation; calls, against this background, for the current forecasts of stronger economic growth and higher inflation in 2015 and 2016 to be read with caution; recommends in that perspective the ECB to proceed to a thorough and independent assessment of the robustness and fitness of its models and theoretical background and to publish such assessment in its next annual report; stresses the need to avoid devising fiscal and monetary policy under overoptimistic assumptions and scenarios which may result in self-defeating and pro-cyclical effects;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. UnderlinesTakes note that Mario Draghi, in his speech at the annual central bank symposium in Jackson Hole on 22 August 2014, stated that we need action on both sides of the economy, noting that: aggregate demand policies have to be accompanied by national structural reforms and policies; on the demand side, monetary policy can and should play a central role, which currently means an accommodative monetary policy for an extended period of time; there is scope for fiscal policy to play a greater role alongside monetary policy; and no amount of fiscal or monetary accommodation can compensate for the necessary action on the supply side through structural reforms in the euro area;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. NotesWelcomes cautiously that in addition to the lowering of its key interest rates and the increase in its refinancing operations, the ECB has adopted innovative instruments such as forward guidance and the targeted longer- term refinancing operations (TLTROs);
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Welcomes the measures announced by the ECB in June 2014 aimed at enhancing the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism; acknowledges that the TLTRO introduces, for the first time, a link between loans to the non- financial private sector granted by banks and the amount of refinancing the banks can claim; regrets that such 'funding for lending' link was not made earlier as requested by the European Parliament in particular at the occasion of the LTRO operations of December 2011 and February 2012;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Is in that perspective of the opinion that the conditionality dimension of the TLTROs should be strengthened as the current TLTRO setting allow banks to benefit from new long term cheap liquidity provision even if some of these do not increase their credit provision to the real economy already in the first year of eligibility to the programme; Recalls its position on the CRD IV negotiation process to impose additional conditions to institutions having benefited from ECB liquidity support;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 105 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Notes that the ECB has announced that it will purchase asset-backed securities (ABS) and covered bonds in order to empower the credit-easing impact of the TLTROs; stresses that such interventions on ABS market must be conducted in a transparent manner that does not create excessive risks for the ECB’s balance sheetwhile limiting to the maximum extent possible risks transfers to the ECB's balance sheet as these would amount to implicit subsidies for the originators of the ABSs; is of the opinion that any ABS purchase should be strictly limited to the most senior tranches of the most simple and transparent products and that purchases of mezzanine tranches should be avoided while originators should retain at least retain 20% of original risks;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Underlines that, with the measures announced in June 2014, the ECB balance sheet is expected to move towards the size it used to have at the beginning of 2012; notes that this projected increase requires strong vigilance by the ECB with respect to the credit risks it ultimately bears; asks in that perspective the Commission and the ECB itself to assess the amount of implicit subsidies that has been provided since the beginning of the crisis to the banking sector in the form of funding advantage including inter alia carry-trade operations in comparison with what would have been required by the markets or by means of potential mispricing of assets that the ESCB has accepted as collateral;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 124 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Is of the opinion that the overall amount of implicit subsidies provided so far should be gradually recovered for the benefit of taxpayers once normal economic conditions return;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Welcomes the fact that the ECB has repeatedly stated its readiness to use additional unconventional instruments within its mandate, and to alter the size or composition of its interventions, in the event of an excessively lengthy period of low inflation; underlines that the overall price stability objective in the Euro area is not undermined by non-conventional policies implemented by the ECB given that an expansion of reserves in excess of compulsory requirement does not give banks more resources to expand lending nor represent idle resources but merely changes the composition of liquid assets of the banking system;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 129 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Deems that it would be useful if along with its assessment of monetary and financial conditions the ECB could provide in its statement following the monthly ECB Council of Governors meeting its assessment of the output gap extent;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Stresses that the impact of the unconventional monetary policy measures currently in use on the real economy should not be overestimated; stresses that such measures are transitory in nature and that their main advantage is that they can give Member States time to conso and that the value of implicit subsidies that such measures provide to the banking sector should not be underestimated; stresses that such measures are transitory in nature and that their claimed purpose is to facilidtate their fiscal situation and implement structural reforms that management of the debt overhang as wiell as create some of the necessary conditions for economic activity to rebound;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 139 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Notes that conducting non-standard monetary policies for an extended period of time createsmight exacerbate the distortions on the capital market; asks the ECB to strike the right balance between the risksevere risks and costs of exiting its accommodative monetary policy prematurely and the risks associated with further delaying such a departurend costs resulting from the distortions that such policies might carry; asks therefore the ECB to calibrate non- standard policies so as to limit such distortions;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 141 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Points out as illustrated by the leaked discussions of the ECB Council of Governors on the solvency of Cypriot banks that the concept of 'insolvency' underpinning the provision of central bank liquidity to institutions in the Euro area lacks a sufficient level of clarity as the concept refers both to a situation arising in a bank after a judicial determination of insolvency or alternatively as the situation where competent supervisory authorities determine that an institution does not comply with minimum requirements defined in the CRD/CRR framework; underlines that such a lack of clarity needs to be addressed so as to guarantee legal certainty and foster financial stability;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 145 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Recalls that monetary policy alone cannot stimulate aggregate demand unless it is complemented by adequate fiscal and structural national reforms and policiesin a liquidity trap environment;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 153 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Stresses as illustrated by the experience in the years ahead of the crisis that stable inflation rates, in line with the medium term rate objective defined by the ECB, might be associated with unsustainable private debt dynamics, underlying the importance to manage asset bubbles and the growth of credit even when price stability is guaranteed;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 154 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 b (new)
17b. Is concerned by the persistent inflation differentials within the Euro area; recommends that the ECB follow a proactive macroprudential approach associated with its monetary policy instruments so as to deal with regional asset bubbles and imbalances; asks the ECB to explore whether regional fine- tuning regarding collateral, haircut and reserve requirements may be appropriate for coping with asymmetric shocks, thereby enhancing financial stability within the monetary union while preserving price stability;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 163 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. Stresses that a clear separation between monetary and fiscal policy implies that the monetary authority should not provide subsidies to institutions benefiting from liquidity provision as such subsidy provision amounts to fiscal policy;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 164 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)
18b. Underlines in the same rationale that a proper separation between fiscal and monetary policy implies that the fiscal authority is not supposed to interfere with the specific decisions taken by monetary authority and conversely that the monetary authority should in principle refrain from commenting on fiscal policy and requesting any specific reform or fiscal stance as counterparty to its own policy as was unfortunately the case with the letters sent by the former ECB President to the Spanish, Italian and Irish government;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 165 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 c (new)
18c. Deplores the fact that the ECB has exceeded its Treaty based mandate as illustrated in the aforementioned letters;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 172 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Asks the ECB to disclose to the European Parliament the secret 'Agreements on Net Financial Assets' between the National central banks and the ECB regarding inter alia the amounts of different classes of assets, including government bonds that an Euro area central bank can hold in its balance sheet;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 173 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 b (new)
19b. Welcomes the decision by the Council of Governors to publish its minutes from 2015 onwards; believes that such disclosure will increase the accountability and transparency of the ECB modus operandi; recalls its request that the annual ECB report should include a feedback to the inputs provided in the annual European Parliament report;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 174 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 c (new)
19c. Recalls its request to improve the gender balance within the institution as well as to diversify the theoretical background of its staff; welcome the gender-quota system that has been introduced; believes that the ongoing crisis has highlighted the need to increase theoretical diversity within central banks; requests the ECB to report in its next annual report on how it intends to proceed in order to diversify the analytical background of its staff;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 188 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Emphasises that the SSM should contributes to ensurincreasing confidence in the euro area banking sector, and thus to financial stability; recalls that democratic accountability of the new SSM towards Parliament is crucial to ensuring the credibility of the new supervisory regime; stresses, therefore, the importance of the Interinstitutional Agreement between Parliament and the ECB, concluded in November 2013, on the practical modalities of the exercise of democratic accountability over the SSM, and of its full implementation;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 192 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Is of the opinion that placing the SSM under the aegis of the ECB is clearly a second best solution, largely due to the current EU treaties constraints; underlines that such solution has led to an undesirable concentration of powers in the ECB, with the potential for conflicts of interest; points out moreover that conglomerates of large insurance companies and banks cannot be effectively supervised by the ECB for legal reasons;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 193 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)
21b. Is of the opinion that a Treaty change is required for enabling the creation of a truly independent authority for common banking supervision;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 194 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 c (new)
21c. Is of the opinion that the latest stress tests deliver a clear cut illustration of the limits of the current interinstitutional setting as a scenario of deflation was not contemplated in the stress tests even though such deflation risks are far from being anecdotal;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 196 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Notes that, despite relatively low profitability, euro area banks have steadily continued to strengthen their capital positions through a combination of capital increases and reductions in risk-weighted assets and also public support;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 197 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
23. Is concerned by the remaining dependence on central bank funding and public recapitalization in many banks of the euro area;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 201 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. Points out that activity on government securities continues to be a major source of profit for banks of the euro area, even though credit to the non-financial private sector remains sluggish; underlines that several banks used LTRO lines for carry trade operations while reducing their credit provision to the real economy which amounts to facilitating recapitalization of the banking sector with taxpayer resources;
2014/11/19
Committee: ECON