25 Amendments of Molly SCOTT CATO related to 2015/2115(INI)
Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 a (new)
Citation 2 a (new)
– having regard to the ECJ judgment in Case C-62/14 of 16 June 2015
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the current recovery is mainly supported by private consumption, while private investment in the euro area continues to stagnate at levels significantly below those registered before the start of the crisis and the relative share of investments in GDP has been declining steadily over several decades;
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls that the geographically uneven and modest recovery expected for the coming years in the euro area will not be sufficient to reduce the high unemployment rates recorded in many euro area Member States or to reduce the burden of debt;
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Acknowledges that, in reaction to a complex environment of falling inflation, contraction of credit and sluggish economic growth, and with its interest rates close to the zero lower bound, the ECB resorted to non-conventional monetary policy instruments; Emphasises that non- conventional monetary policy intervention often has an impact on both the wider economy and the financial system; insists that in a mature EMU monetary, fiscal and prudential policy need to be clearly under the responsibility of entirely independent and democratically accountable bodies and that conflicts between them must be resolved in a further democratically accountable forum.
Amendment 94 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Points out that, ultimately, a proper, democratically accountable system of checks and balances and coordination between monetary, fiscal and prudential objectives with clear and independent mandates can only be achieved through Treaty change;
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Is concerned at the rise in long-term domestic yields in most Member States observed since the second quarter of 2015, which could ultimately erode the expected positive impact of non-conventional monetary policy measures adopted by the ECB; Welcomes the readiness of the ECB to do whatever it takes to save the Euro; underlines and welcomes the fact that the ECB Governing Council considers explicitly that its mandate allows it to fight excessive borrowing costs for Euro area Member States;
Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Is concerned that, in the absence of Union and Member State action to stimulate demand, continued application of unconventional monetary policy actions will further exacerbate the problems posed by sustained low interest rates and excess liquidity chasing yield leading to actual and potential distortions and instabilities in financial markets;
Amendment 111 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Asks the ECB to carefully monitor the risks associated with its purchase programmes, in order to avoid an unfair burden on EU taxpayers; Is of the opinion that any ABS purchase should be strictly limited to the most senior tranches of the most simple and transparent products and that purchases of mezzanine tranches should be avoided while originators should retain at least retain 20% of original risks;
Amendment 118 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Stresses that the positive impact of the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) on money and credit dynamics remains modest, with new loans to enterprises still weak and with significant differences across euro area economies; notes that since the launch of the APP, medium-term inflation expectations have risen, gradually converging towards the target of 2 %, while the risks of a deflation trap have decreased; asks the ECB to apply the APP to all Member States, without discrimination;
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Remains concerned by the significant levels of non-marketable assets and asset- backed securities put forward as collateral to the eurosystem in the framework of its refinancing operations; reiterates its request to the ECB to provide information on which central banks have accepted such securities as well as to disclose valuation methods regarding such assets; underlines that such disclosure would be beneficial for the purpose of parliamentary scrutiny of supervisory tasks conferred to the ECB;
Amendment 123 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)
Paragraph 7 b (new)
7b. Stresses that, according to the Annual Report, take up of the September and December TLTRO operations was around half of potential and 754 of the 1223 credit institutions reached by the operation did not even have the qualifying loans to non-financial on their books and the TLTROs benefits to the real economy has been minimal despite the significant beneficial effect on cost and maturity of funding to those institutions;
Amendment 124 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 c (new)
Paragraph 7 c (new)
7c. Points out that, while the effects on the real economy has been very limited, banks have been able to access funding at virtually no cost which has directly subsidised their balance sheets; deplores the fact that the size of this subsidy, despite representing a clear fiscal spill- over effect of monetary, is not monitored and published and that it is free from strict conditionality in terms of how it is invested; insists that any extraordinary measures of this kind should be accompanied by measures to mitigate distortions to markets and the economy;
Amendment 125 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 d (new)
Paragraph 7 d (new)
7d. Warns that prolonged non- conventional monetary policy actions can have significant distributional effects between the wealthy and poor, young and old, and also between regions with different financial structures. e.g. by decreasing savings and pension accumulation rates while propping up the value of financial assets of existing holders and that these could lead to increasing inequality; Urges the ECB to monitor the side effects of its monetary policy measures and its impact on inequality.
Amendment 126 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 e (new)
Paragraph 7 e (new)
7e. Asks the Commission to come forward with proposals to improve macroprudential oversight and the policy tools available for mitigating the risks in shadow banking, in the light of the warning by the ECB in the Annual report that, given the steady expansion over the last decade, to 22 trillion euro in assets, of non-bank credit intermediation, further initiatives are needed to monitor and assess vulnerabilities in the growing shadow banking sector;
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 f (new)
Paragraph 7 f (new)
7f. Urges the ECB together with other relevant Union bodies and in the light of the requirement under TFEU 127.1 that the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union to consider the possibility of using its APP strategically, by encouraging the development of safe and simple marketable asset classes, suitable for the Program, that are linked to the achievement of key EU targets particularly the transition to a sustainable and just economy and to consider drawing up a range of green and social projects for which credit created through quantitative easing could be used as direct financing;
Amendment 137 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Notes that, according to the ECJ judgment of 16 June 2015 in Case C-62/14, when the ECB purchases government bonds on secondary markets it is exposed to a significant risk of losses as well as to the risk of a debt cut;, stating that such risk is inherent in a purchase of bonds on the secondary market, an operation which the Court reminds was authorised by the authors in the Treaties, without conditional upon the ECB having privileged creditor status; Stresses that a de facto risk mutualisation through the ECB balance sheet is far inferior to an explicit mechanism for joint liability such as Eurobonds or a "redemption fund"
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Stresses that the high and divergent levels of public and private indebtedness in some Member States, in addition to the as yet unresolved structural weaknesses in the banking sector, are obstacles to the correct transmission of monetary policy, and that the non-conventional monetary policy implemented by the ECB is not able to change this situation;
Amendment 148 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Deplores the fact that the response to the crisis has resulted in structural reforms being imposed on MS but not banks;
Amendment 163 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Believes that the only effective solution to the excessive level of public debt in some member states is a conference aimed to agree on a definitive solution for the part of that debt that is unsustainable;
Amendment 171 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Insists that, in a properly functioning EMU, the counterpart to strong ECB independence with respect to its pursuit of monetary policy is to have strictly separated mechanisms for i) Union level coordination of fiscal policy, ii) financial supervision policy and iii) monetary policy subject to a high degree of democratic accountability; points out that, in addition to this institutional balance, it is essential to have a mechanism for resolving the inevitable conflicts between monetary, fiscal and prudential objectives in an equally democratically accountable manner;
Amendment 192 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Welcomes the step forward taken by the ECB in publishing the minutes of its meetings, and look forward to the announcement of further steps to improve the transparency of its communication channels; recalls its request that the annual ECB report should include a feedback to the inputs provided in the annual European Parliament report; Deems that it would be useful if along with its assessment of monetary and financial conditions the ECB could provide in its statement following the monthly ECB Council of Governors meeting its assessment of extent of the output gaps across the eurozone; (null)
Amendment 193 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Asks the ECB to disclose to the European Parliament the secret 'Agreements on Net Financial Assets' between the National central banks and the ECB regarding inter alia the amounts of different classes of assets, including government bonds that an Euro area central bank can hold in its balance sheet;
Amendment 201 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Stresses that the ECB’s supervisory role and its monetary policy function must not be confused and should not generate any conflict of interest in its execution of its principal functions; Further stresses the importance of exploring future institutional independence of these two functions with a democratically accountable mechanism for resolving conflicts between them;
Amendment 206 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Supports the ECB's assertion in its Annual Report that the current CRR/CRD IV package lacks certain measures which could also effectively address specific types of systemic risk - such as (i) various asset-side measures, such as the application of limits to loan-to-value, loan-to income or debt service-to-income ratios, and (ii) the introduction of various exposure limits falling outside the current definition of large exposures - and urges the Commission to examine the need for legislative proposals in this regard.
Amendment 211 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Deplores the fact that the ECB has exceeded even a broad interpretation of its Treaty-based mandate, inter alia in its role in the Troika and Quadriga; urges the ECB to take a step backwards and reinforce its independence from political decisions, abiding by the necessary preconditions for Treaty-compatible OMT as set out in ECJ judgment in Case C- 62/14 of 16 June 2015, especially its paragraph 102, as well as the opinion expressed by Advocate-General Cruz Villalón in the same case, especially its paragraphs 227 and 263;