BETA

20 Amendments of Martin SCHIRDEWAN related to 2020/2078(INI)

Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas the shock is symmetrical but the impact varies considerably among Member States, reflecting the severity of the pandemic and the stringency of their containment measures, but also their specific economic exposures and initial conditions, including their available scope for discretionary fiscal policy responses; whereas this scope for action has been limited as a result of the surge in public debt levels in the “peripheral” member states after 2008 and the key factors behind this were: (1) the policies of the EU institutions and member states in organising a coordinated rescue of the financial sector, socialising massive levels of private debt; (2) the ECB’s actions in failing to intervene to provide credit to the crisis-affected states for an extended period of time, causing the market borrowing costs for these states to surge; and (3) the contractionary austerity programmes imposed by the Troika;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Is concerned at the negative impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the global economy, trade, income inequalities and poverty; notes that fiscal policy is one of the most important ways a state has to redistribute wealth and contain or reduce income and wealth inequality1a, and that both investment-led growth and the social transfers made through government expenditure, which are vital for redistribution of wealth and preventing inequality from rising, have been reduced and constrained by the debt and deficit rules; notes that access to free or affordable, high-quality public services also plays a crucial role in addressing existing inequalities; _________________ 1aEuropean Economic and Social Committee, 2017. 'Wealth inequality in Europe: the profit-labour split between Member States'. Adopted on 06/12/2017. https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/agenda/ou r-events/events/wealth-inequality-europe- profit-labour-split/opinions.
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Is concerned that from the introduction of the European Semester in 2011, the specific policy measures demanded by the Commission in the country-specific recommendations focus on limiting wage growth; increasing the threshold age for receiving a pension; privatising state-owned enterprises, cutting public spending on healthcare provision; promoting longer working hours; reducing job security; and cutting funds to social services - all of which have contributed to weakening states', institutions' and individuals' capacity to respond to the outbreak of the pandemic; notes that the Commission has engaged in significant overreach through the European Semester process when it comes to public policy areas that legally fall under the competence of the member states under the TFEU, such as pensions and the provision of healthcare;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Notes that as a result of the pandemic, the ECB predicts public debt will reach 200 per cent of GDP in Greece, 160 per cent in Italy, 130 per cent in Portugal and 120 per cent in France and Spain, and that on average, eurozone debt will rise from its pre-pandemic level of 86 percent of GDP to above 100 per cent, while average deficits will be eight percent of GDP1a; expresses concern that several states including Italy, Spain, France and Portugal will have to refinance large proportions of their debt within the next year, which may put pressure on vulnerable sovereigns; notes that the Commission acknowledges that “Government finances may be permanently weakened”1b notes that this presents a unique problem in the eurozone due to the ‘no bailout clause’ in the Treaty that prohibits direct monetary financing of government debt by the central bank, and the Stability and Growth Pact rules that impose a deflationary dynamic in a downturn; calls for these self-imposed constraints to be ended as part of the review of the macroeconomic framework; _________________ 1aEuropean Central Bank, Financial Stability Review, May 2020. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/financial- stability/fsr/html/ecb.fsr202005~1b75555f 66.en.html#toc1 1b European Commission. Identifying Europe's Recovery Needs. Staff Working Document, 27/05/20. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/ec onomy- finance/assessment_of_economic_and_in vestment_needs.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1kxXW wWAUV8FLV8OMTBidRqeKIiwNCthC4 xEdoHdBWpzCYIND04rsUIiU
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 100 #
5. Welcomes the swift and strong response to the crisis in the area of monetary and fiscal policy, at both EU and Member State level, as well as the European Recovery Plan; is concerned that the recovery element of the Next Generation plan amounts to only 0.56% of EU GDP each year for four years1a, an amount that is clearly insufficient to deal with the scale of the recession we face and is unlikely to be able to provide the assistance required by the worst-affected member states; urges the Commission and Council to seek a new and additional package that goes beyond this figure; considers it essential that the recovery package is fully aligned with the EU’s new growth strategy, i.e. in accordance with the principles of the European Green Deal (EGD), the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and with the aim to protect women’s rights and achieve gender equality; demands that funds and resources be directed to projects and beneficiaries that comply with our Treaty-based fundamental values and that recipient firms protect their workers, pay their fair share of taxes, and refrain from paying out dividends or offering share buy- back schemes aimed at remunerating shareholders; _________________ 1aMünchau, Wolfgang. 'Why it is not 500 billion'. Eurointelligence, 30/05/20. http://www.eurointelligence.com/professio nal/briefings/2020-05- 29.html?cHash=a03f37f075470a52d93b1 a43be5102d9
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Welcomes the swift and strong response to the crisis in the area of monetary and fiscal policy, at both EU and Member State level, as well as the European Recovery Plan; considers it essential that the recovery package is fully aligned with the EU’s new growth strategy, i.e. in accordance with the principles of the European Green Deal (EGD), the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and with the aim to protect women’s rights and achieve gender equality; demands that funds and resources be directed to projects and beneficiaries that comply with our Treaty-based fundamental values and that recipient firms protect their workers, pay their fair share of taxes, and refrain from paying out dividends or offering share buy-back schemes aimed at remunerating shareholders; calls for the full separation of the recovery funds from the European Semester process;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Welcomes the swift and strong response to the crisis in the area of monetary and fiscal policy, at both EU and Member State level, as well as the European Recovery Plan; considers it essential that the recovery package is fully aligned with the EU’s new growth strategy, i.e. in accordance with the principles of the European Green Deal (EGD), the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and with the aim to protect women’s rights and achieve gender equality; demands that funds and resources be directed to projects and beneficiaries that are legally required by the Commission to comply with our Treaty- based fundamental values and that recipient firms protect their workers, pay their fair share of taxes, and refrain from paying out dividends or offering share buy- back schemes aimed at remunerating shareholders and inflating stock prices;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 112 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Notes that under the Next Generation plan, the Commission’s €750bn debt will be repaid using three possible options, with the Commission President stating her preference is for the EU to raise new own resources in future, such as a digital tax, a carbon border adjustment tax, the expansion of the emissions trading scheme, and a tax on large multinationals; is concerned that raising significant new own resources will be difficult without Treaty change ending unanimous voting on taxation in the Council, where many progressive proposals on taxation have failed or stalled due to the opposition of the EU’s tax haven member states, including the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Belgium, Hungary, Malta and Cyprus; expresses serious concern that the other two options for repayment will add to member states' pubic debt levels, and are to pay back the funds through future EU budgets, either through increased member state contributions or reduced programmes, meaning that the recovery funds will either add to member states' national debt or reduce the level of funds and services their citizens benefit from;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Welcomes the activation of the general escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact, and expecinsists that it will remain activated at least until the end of 2021 in order to support the efforts of the Member States to recover from the pandemic crisis and strengthen their economic and social resiliencePact is repealed or fundamentally transformed; notes that the existing headline debt and deficit benchmarks are completely detached from reality and insists they are never reapplied; believes that if any new goals are agreed in a future macroeconomic framework, they must be directed towards climate and wellbeing indicators;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 153 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8 a. Notes that European Court of Auditors found that, in relation to the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, the way in which the Commission classifies member states with imbalances “lacks transparency”; that the country- specific recommendations issued by the Commission under the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure do not actually stem from identified imbalances; and that, in general, there is a lack of public awareness, visibility and understanding of the procedure and its implications1a; calls for the review of the macroeconomic framework to improve transparency and accountability over the classification and recommendation processes; _________________ 1aEuropean Court of Auditors. 2018. Is the main objective of the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact delivered? Special report no 18/2018. https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocI tem.aspx?did=46430
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 156 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Is concerned about the significant but uneven negative impact of the COVID- 19 crisis on government deficit and private debt, which further aggravates the situation of Member States that are particularly affected by the pandemic and/or pre- existing high levels of government debt; calls for a solution that guarantees the sustainability of public debt; believes that this requires the introduction on common bonds that would allow governments to spend in response to the health and economic crisis caused by coronavirus in a way that does not add to their national debt and keeps borrowing costs relatively low; or, preferably, for the cancellation of the public debt purchased by the ECB under the Pandemic Emergency Purchasing Programme, or the crediting of national government accounts by the ECB on a per capita basis to directly finance pandemic related spending;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 174 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Considers it essential that the revision of the EU’s fiscal and economic policy framework should be completed by the time the escape clause is repealed and should enable fiscal policy to respond with discretion to shocks in the short term, and to reduce high public debt ratios to an agreed reference value in the long term, while allowing a sufficient level of public investment, progressive tax policies and the repayment of loans in a cycle- comfortable manner, and the long-term modernisationstrengthening of public commodities;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 176 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Urges the Commission and Council, in the process of reviewing the macroeconomic framework, to acknowledge that the prevailing economic conditions in the EU in the 1990s were significantly different to those that prevail today; notes that in 1997 interest rates were approximately 5 per cent for long- term government borrowing, the average public debt-to-GDP ratio in the EU was between 65 and 70 per cent of GDP, the median public debt among the 11 initial eurozone members was around 60 per cent of GDP, the forecast GDP growth rate was 3 per cent annually, and inflation was forecast at 2 per cent; notes that according to these economic conditions, maintaining the public debt to GDP ratio at or below 60 per cent would require governments to keep budget deficits limited to 3 per cent of GDP; insists that if any new goals are agreed in a future macroeconomic framework, they must reflect current economic realities and be directed towards climate and wellbeing indicators; notes that this will require a revision of the Treaty;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 205 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Welcomes the refocus of the European Semester Spring Package aimed at providing an immediate economic policy response to tackle and mitigate the health and socio-economic impact of COVID-19 and reboot economic activity; supports the Commission’s announcement of a reform of the European Semester to convert it into a tool to coordinate the recovery measures, framed by the principles of the EGD, the EPSR and the SDGs; is convinced that this has to include the coordination of measures concerning state aid and tax policies; underlines the need for the integration of a new set of binding sustainability and wellbeing indicators and alternative measurements of growth performance; urges the Commission and Council not to return to the austerity policies that were implemented in response to the global financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis; notes that these damaging policies are enshrined in the Stability and Growth Pact rules as well as the Six-Pack and Two-Pack, and that a break with this framework will require significant legislative change;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 215 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Expresses concern that, despite strong criticism of the methodology and findings of the “expansionary austerity” theory, the Commission has heavily depended on this theory since 2009; notes that a wide body of counter-evidence shows that austerity routinely results in lower GDP growth, higher unemployment and depressed demand; acknowledges the findings of the IMF's then-chief economist in 2013 that for every dollar governments had cut from their budgets, economic output was reduced by $1.501a; calls on the EU institutions and decision- makers to acknowledge the evidence that cuts to public spending have a contractionary impact on the economy and to reject this approach in the recovery from the pandemic lockdowns; _________________ 1aBlanchard, Olivier, and D. Leigh. 2013. ‘Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers’. American Economic Review, Vol. 103, No. 3, pp. 117–20.
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 220 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 b (new)
12b. Notes that research shows that fiscal multipliers are bigger in a slump in general, and particularly so when the impact of monetary policy is weakened, such as in the zero lower bound1a; notes that further research shows that public investment also has a much larger impact in the context of the zero lower bound, i.e., that if the short-term interest rates are low or at zero, the fiscal multiplier for spending is stronger1b; calls on the Commission and Council to consider this evidence during the review of the macroeconomic framework and during the collective response to the pandemic recession; _________________ 1aJordà, Òscar, and A. M.Taylor. 2013. ‘The Time for Austerity: Estimating the Average Treatment Effect of Fiscal Policy’. NBER Working Paper No. 19414. 1bBatini, Nicoletta, L. Eyraud, L. Forni, and A. Weber. 2014.‘Fiscal Multipliers: Size, Determinants, and Use in Macroeconomic Projections.’IMF Fiscal Affairs Department Technical Notes and Manuals.https://www.imf.org/external/pu bs/ft/tnm/2014/tnm1404.pdf.
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 221 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. RecogniseRejects the prole that the 13. Commission has allotted toposed role of the European Semester in the Recovery Plan; notes, however, that the effectivenes that the Commission's country- specific recommendations aund success of the alignment of Member States’ inveer the SGP and the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure since 2011 made consistment and reform programmes to the Semester process will depend on the progress of the Semester redemands for reductions in public spending, and that the Commission has specifically singled out pensions, healthcare provision, wage growth, job security and unemployment benefits form and the above-mentioned reform of the Stability and Growth Pactttack; believes these policy priorities must be abandoned by the EU institutions; calls for the full separation of the European Semester process from the Recovery Plan;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 230 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Recognises the strong criticism from economists and academics1a of the Commission’s model to determine the output gap, used to calculate the structural deficit in the Stability and Growth Pact and European Semester process, where the Commission has linked the size of the output gap and the fiscal adjustment requirements it imposes; notes that the output gap is unobservable and can only amount to a guess based on the experience and data of the recent past; notes that according to this model, in a period of strong economic growth the potential output of an economy will increase, meaning that its fiscal stance will appear to be well-balanced, and the EU’s double-dip recession has led to the opposite effect, causing the gap between real output and potential output to shrink; is concerned that this method resulted in the bizarre situation in 2018-19 where the Commission demanded that Italy (then in a recession and with a GDP 8 per cent smaller than in 2007) cut public spending lest its economy overheat; _________________ 1aSee Heimberger, Phillipp, and JKapeller. ‘How economic policy drives European (dis)integration’. Article, September 22, 2016. https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectiv es/blog/how-economic-policy-drives- european-disintegration; and Tooze, Adam. ‘Output gap nonsense’. Social Europe, April 30, 2019. https://www.socialeurope.eu/output-gap- nonsense.
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 239 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Reiterates its call for the strengthening of Parliament’s democratic role in the economic governance framework in any upcoming Treaty change and, in the meantime, for an Interinstitutional Agreement on Sustainable European Governance granting Parliament a right of consent on the policy recommendations presented in the Annual Sustainable Growth Survey, the euro area fiscal package and the Country Specific Recommendations; calls for the ending of the reverse-qualified majority voting procedure in the Excessive Deficit Procedure in the Council that was introduced as part of the Six-Pack;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 249 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Underlines that public revenues are essential to finance the post-pandemic recovery and the just transition to a sustainable economy; recalls that tax evasion and tax avoidance at EU level amount to up to EUR 160-190 billion each year, constituting missing revenues for the treasuries; calls for the end to unanimous voting on taxation in the Council; urges the German Council Presidency to make rapid progress in finding an agreement on an EU Financial Transaction Tax, which should include derivatives; and to proceed immediately with an EU-level digital tax on technology giants now that the US has withdrawn from OECD-level talks;
2020/07/13
Committee: ECON