33 Amendments of Jessica STEGRUD related to 2021/0214(COD)
Amendment 77 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
Recital 8
(8) As long as a significant number of the Union’'s international partners have policy approaches that do not result in the same level of climate ambition, there is a risk of carbon leakage. Carbon leakage occurs if, for reasons of costs related to climate policies, businesses in certain industry sectors or subsectors were to transfer production to other countries or imports from those countries would replace equivalent but less GHG emissions intensive products. That could lead to an increase in their total emissions globally,. thus jeopardising the reduction of GHG emissions that is urgently needed if the world is to keep the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre- industrial levels. Is however concerned that CBAM will promote the substitution of EU sales in third markets by non-EU output, thereby not only damaging EUs economy, but also fostering another form of "carbon leakage", since European producers emit substantially less carbon per unit of production than producers elsewhere do, which in particular applies lo commodities;
Amendment 86 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8 a (new)
Recital 8 a (new)
(8 a) Problems related to carbon leakage should primarily be prevented by not imposing unrealistic demands on the European industry. If European competitiveness is preserved, protectionist measures would not be necessary. A long- term strategy should be based on research and industrial development;
Amendment 88 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8 b (new)
Recital 8 b (new)
(8 b) Is highly concerned that the introduction of CBAM will lead to Europe increasingly producing for itself, thereby damaging its own economy without a positive effect on the net-effect on global carbon emissions;
Amendment 89 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8 c (new)
Recital 8 c (new)
(8 c) To protect a heavily regulated industry by protectionism may prove difficult and not a cost efficient way to reduce global emissions of greenhouse gases, considering that protectionist measures from the EU are likely to trigger countermeasures from its trading partners. This would hamper the global economic development, indirectly reducing the resources available for environmental improvements. Furthermore this would damage export oriented Member States;
Amendment 90 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8 d (new)
Recital 8 d (new)
(8 d) Rejects new measures that directly or indirectly transfer resources from European consumers and companies to the EU budget; any revenue generated from import taxes or adjustment fees should be retained by Member States;
Amendment 91 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8 e (new)
Recital 8 e (new)
(8 e) Highlights that CBAM not only increases the possibility of international trade conflicts, but also that it further promotes more subsidies in third countries in order to achieve a reduction in emissions, thereby damaging global trade rules substantially;
Amendment 92 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8 f (new)
Recital 8 f (new)
(8 f) Highlights that it is of utmost importance that the CBAM rules do not have any detrimental effects on SMEs;
Amendment 93 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
Recital 9
(9) The initiative for a carbon border adjustment mechanism (‘CBAM’) is a part of the ‘Fit for 55 Package’. That mechanism is to serve as an essential element of the EU toolbox to meet the objective of a climate-neutral Union by 2050 in line with the Paris Agreement by addressing risks of carbon leakage resulting from the increased Union climate ambition. Underlines that CBAM will be more costly for the EU economies, which are more integrated with the rest of the world. Is concerned about the combination of EU ETS (including the gradual deletion of free allowances) and CBAM, which is likely to make EU businesses lose competitiveness and decrease global sales due to replacement by production elsewhere in the world. Is particularly worried that global production of CBAM goods might move to countries with lower carbon costs and higher carbon intensity in the production;
Amendment 96 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
Recital 8
(8) As long as a significant number of the Union’s international partners have policy approaches that do not result in the same level of climate ambition, there is a risk of carbon leakage. Carbon leakage occurs if, for reasons of costs related to climate policies, businesses in certain industry sectors or subsectors were to transfer production to other countries or imports from those countries would replace equivalent but less GHG emissions intensive products. That could lead to an increase in their total emissions globally, thus jeopardising the reduction of GHG emissions that is urgently needed if the world is to keep the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre- industrial levels. There are concerns, however, that CBAM would promote the substitution of EU sales in third markets by non-EU output, thereby not only damaging Union's economy, but also fostering another form of “carbon leakage”, since European producers emit substantially less carbon per unit of production than producers elsewhere do, which in particular applies to commodities.
Amendment 99 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8 a (new)
Recital 8 a (new)
(8a) It is desirable that, for instance, China take measures to reduce its emissions of greenhouse gases and it would be legitimate for the EU to bring forward such demands. In this context, Chinese violations of human rights, tightly linked to its export industries, should be brought up.
Amendment 100 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8 a (new)
Recital 8 a (new)
(8a) Considers it a prerequisite for the introduction of CBAM that the mechanism will have both a positive effect on global carbon emissions and EU competitiveness. Further rejects the proposal to introduce CBAM, if the proposal is not compatible with WTO law.
Amendment 102 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8 b (new)
Recital 8 b (new)
(8b) Problems related to carbon leakage should primarily be prevented by not imposing unrealistic demands on the European industry. If European competitiveness is preserved, protectionist measures would not be necessary. A long- term strategy should be based on research and industrial development.
Amendment 104 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
Recital 9
(9) The initiative for a carbon border adjustment mechanism (‘CBAM’) is a part of the ‘Fit for 55 Package’. That mechanism is to serve as an essential element of the EU toolbox to meet the objective of a climate-neutral Union by 2050 in line with the Paris Agreement by addressing risks of carbon leakage resulting from the increased Union climate ambition. However, CBAM might be more costly for EU economies, which are more integrated with the rest of the world. In addition, there are concerns about the combination of ETS, including the gradual deletion of free allowances, and CBAM, which is likely to make EU businesses lose competitiveness and decrease global sales due to replacement by production elsewhere in the world. As a consequence, global production of CBAM goods might move to countries with lower carbon costs and where carbon intensity in production is higher.
Amendment 109 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9 a (new)
Recital 9 a (new)
(9a) There is a significant concern that the introduction of CBAM will lead to a Europe that increasingly produces for itself, thereby damaging its own economy without there being a positive impact on the net-effect for global carbon emissions.
Amendment 110 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9 b (new)
Recital 9 b (new)
(9b) To protect a heavily regulated industry by protectionism may prove difficult and not a cost efficient way to reduce global emissions of greenhouse gases, considering that protectionist measures from the EU are likely to trigger countermeasures from its trading partners. This would hamper the global economic development, indirectly reducing the resources available for environmental improvements. Furthermore this would damage export oriented member states.
Amendment 111 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9 c (new)
Recital 9 c (new)
(9c) It is necessary to ensure that new measures do not directly or indirectly transfer resources from European consumers and companies to the Union budget. Consequently, any revenue generated from import taxes or adjustment fees should be retained by Member States.
Amendment 136 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
Recital 12
(12) While the objective of the CBAM is to prevent the risk of carbon leakage, this Regulation would also encourage the use of more GHG emissions-efficient technologies by producers from thirdCBAM is unlikely to provide a profound incentive for other countries to introduce their own systems of carbon pricing, once they realise that the global economy is gradually shifting away from the Union towards emerging and middle- income countries, so and that less emissions per unit of output are generatedsuch a system would damage their total export and domestic consumption.
Amendment 137 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
Recital 12
(12) While the objective ofEmphasises that it is doubtful theat CBAM is to prevent the risk of carbon leakage, this Regulation would also encourage the use of more GHG emissions-efficient twill provide a profound incentive to other countries to introduce their own systems of carbon pricing, once they realize that the global echonologies by producers from thirdmy is gradually shifting away from the EU towards emerging and middle-income countries, so and that less emissions per unit of output are generated.it would damage their total export and domestic consumption;
Amendment 144 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
Recital 8
(8) As long as a significant number of the Union’s international partners have policy approaches that do not result in the same level of climate ambition, there is a risk of carbon leakage. Carbon leakage occurs if, for reasons of costs related to climate policies, businesses in certain industry sectors or subsectors were to transfer production to other countries or imports from those countries would replace equivalent but less GHG emissions intensive products. That could lead to an increase in their total emissions globally, thus jeopardising the reduction of GHG emissions that is urgently needed if the world is to keep the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre- industrial levels. There are concerns, however, that CBAM would promote the substitution of EU sales in third markets by non-EU output, thereby not only damaging Union's economy, but also fostering another form of “carbon leakage”, since European producers emit substantially less carbon per unit of production than producers elsewhere do, which in particular applies to commodities.
Amendment 145 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
Recital 13
(13) As an instrument to prevent carbon leakage and reduce GHG emissions the CBAM should ensure that imported products are subject to a regulatory system that applies carbon costs equivalent to the ones that otherwise would have been borne under the EU ETS. The CBAM is a climate measure which should prevent the risk of carbon leakage and support the Union’s increased ambition on climate mitigation, while ensuring WTO compatibility. Regrets that there is no consensus about the question if a CBAM-like system would be compatible with WTO rules or not. However highlights that the absence of a fully functional WTO dispute settlement mechanism, will increase the incentive for third countries to respond to CBAM directly without going to the WTO first, thereby increasing harmful and unexpected trade retaliation dynamics; Calls therefore for a realistic and profound assessment of trade implications, before continuing the political process of CBAM;
Amendment 150 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
Recital 13
(13) As an instrument to prevent carbon leakage and reduce GHG emissions the CBAM should ensure that imported products are subject to a regulatory system that applies carbon costs equivalent to the ones that otherwise would have been borne under the EU ETS. The CBAM is a climate measure which should prevent the risk of carbon leakage and support the Union’s increased ambition on climate mitigation, while ensuring WTO compatibility. Nevertheless, it is difficult to find a consensus whether a CBAM-like system would be compatible with WTO rules or not. However, the absence of a fully functional WTO dispute settlement mechanism might increase the incentive for third countries to respond to CBAM directly without going to the WTO first, thereby increasing harmful and unexpected trade retaliation dynamics. So it would be necessary to have a realistic and profound assessment of trade implications before continuing the political process of CBAM.
Amendment 152 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
Recital 9
(9) The initiative for a carbon border adjustment mechanism (‘CBAM’) is a part of the ‘Fit for 55 Package’. That mechanism is to serve as an essential element of the EU toolbox to meet the objective of a climate-neutral Union by 2050 in line with the Paris Agreement by addressing risks of carbon leakage resulting from the increased Union climate ambition. However, CBAM might be more costly for EU economies, which are more integrated with the rest of the world. In addition, there are concerns about the combination of ETS, including the gradual deletion of free allowances, and CBAM, which is likely to make EU businesses lose competitiveness and decrease global sales due to replacement by production elsewhere in the world. As a consequence, global production of CBAM goods might move to countries with lower carbon costs and where carbon intensity in production is higher.
Amendment 153 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 a (new)
Recital 13 a (new)
(13 a) Considers it a prerequisite for the introduction of CBAM that the mechanism will have both a positive effect on global carbon emissions and EU competitiveness. Further rejects the proposal to introduce CBAM, if the proposal is not compatible with WTO law;
Amendment 154 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 b (new)
Recital 13 b (new)
(13 b) Recalls that trade retaliation can have the aim to hit the EU where it would hurt the most; highlights that the EU, due to its climate ambitions, will increasingly be dependent of raw materials such as rare earth, lithium, cobalt, graphite; is worried about the danger that CBAM might lead to expensive restrictions to these much needed commodities and thus increase the EU's geopolitical vulnerability;
Amendment 155 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 a (new)
Recital 13 a (new)
(13a) Trade retaliation can have the aim to hit the Union where it would hurt the most. The Union, due to its climate ambitions, will increasingly be dependent on raw materials such as rare earth, lithium, cobalt, graphite. There is a risk that CBAM might lead to expensive restrictions on these much needed commodities and to increasing the Union's geopolitical vulnerability.
Amendment 155 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 c (new)
Recital 13 c (new)
(13 c) Whereas the WTO Appellate Body has ruled that the question of whether there is an import measure or an internal regulation turns on what triggers the obligation to pay; notes that if an obligation to pay accrues at the moment of and "by virtue of the event of importation," it is considered an import measure;
Amendment 156 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 b (new)
Recital 13 b (new)
(13b) CBAM not only increases the possibility of international trade conflicts, but promotes indirectly market distorting subsidies in third countries, thereby further damaging global trade rules substantially.
Amendment 156 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 d (new)
Recital 13 d (new)
(13 d) It is desirable that, for instance, China takes measures to reduce its emissions of greenhouse gases and it would be legitimate for the EU to bring forward such demands. In this context, Chinese violations of human rights, tightly linked to its export industries, should be brought up.
Amendment 157 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 c (new)
Recital 13 c (new)
Amendment 164 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9 a (new)
Recital 9 a (new)
(9a) There is a significant concern that the introduction of CBAM will lead to a Europe that increasingly produces for itself, thereby damaging its own economy without there being a positive impact on the net-effect for global carbon emissions.
Amendment 244 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
Recital 12
(12) While the objective of the CBAM is to prevent the risk of carbon leakage, this Regulation would also encourage the use of more GHG emissions-efficient technologies by producers from thirdCBAM is unlikely to provide a profound incentive for other countries to introduce their own systems of carbon pricing, once they realise that the global economy is gradually shifting away from the Union towards emerging and middle- income countries, so and that less emissions per unit of output are generatedsuch a system would damage their total export and domestic consumption.
Amendment 276 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 b (new)
Recital 13 b (new)
(13b) Trade retaliation can have the aim to hit the Union where it would hurt the most. The Union, due to its climate ambitions, will increasingly be dependent on raw materials such as rare earth, lithium, cobalt, graphite. There is a risk that CBAM might lead to expensive restrictions on these much needed commodities and to increasing the Union's geopolitical vulnerability.
Amendment 279 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 c (new)
Recital 13 c (new)
(13c) CBAM not only increases the possibility of international trade conflicts, but promotes indirectly market distorting subsidies in third countries, thereby further damaging global trade rules substantially.