3 Amendments of Nathalie LOISEAU related to 2023/2107(INI)
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas Russian war against Ukraine demonstrated the need for improving alliances in the Indo-Pacific area and to work more closely with like- minded partners around the world;
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas Japan adopted new national security and defence strategies in December 2022; whereas, on 19 April 2021, the Council adopted the EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo- Pacific, highlighting the region's strategic importance for Europe due to its growing economic, demographic, and political weight, which makes it a key player in shaping the international order; whereas, the Indo-Pacific strategy underlines the importance of engaging with partners in the region, such as Japan, Korea, Indonesia, India, and Singapore, on a wide range of issues, including security and defence, for example, within the Enhancing Security Cooperation in and with Asia (ESIWA) framework;
Amendment 105 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Takes note of the shift in Japan’s national security strategy; continues to support Japan’s engagement for a world without nuclear weapons; calls for ahighlights that both the EU and Japan’s enhanced defence policy framework provide new opportunities for cooperation including on securing sea lines of communication, combating piracy and terrorism, and upholding freedom of navigation in the region; welcomes Japan’s participation in EUNAVFOR Atalanta operation military exercise and calls on finalising an ongoing agreement on communication with it; continues to support Japan’s engagement for non-proliferation; welcomes the comprehensive security partnership between the EU and Japan as the basis for enhanced consultations, common exercises, shared defence research and development and work on joint contingency planning for dangerous crises; welcomes Member States’ 2+2 dialogue formats with Japan; welcomes NATO’s Individual Tailored Partnership Programme with Japan, but regrets the fact that the opening of a NATO liaison office in Japan has been delayed; proposes the creation of an EU/NATO/AP4 (Japan/Korea/Australia/New Zealand) security dialogue format; encourages the European External Action Service to post a military attaché in Tokyo; would welcome the negotiation of an EU-Japan Framework Participation Agreement; is critical of the fact that the Enhancing Security Cooperation In and With Asia (ESIWA) project is not very substantive; calls for enhanced maritime awareness cooperation on the basis of the Critical Maritime Routes Indian Ocean (CRIMARIO) initiative; insists on including non- conventional security issues such disinformation, cyber, space and climate change;