[ParlTrack]

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14

(14) In order to introduce a proportionate and effective set of binding rules for AI systems, a clearly defined risk- based approach should be followed. That approach should tailor the type and content of such rules to the intensity and scope of the risks that AI systems can generate for individuals and society, rather than depend on the type of technology. It is therefore necessary to prohibit certain artificial intelligence practices, to lay down requirements for high-risk AI systems and obligations for the relevant operators, and to lay down transparency obligations for certain AI systems.

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17 a (new)

(17 a) AI systems used in law enforcement and criminal justice contexts based on predictive methods, profiling and risk assessment pose an unacceptable risk to fundamental rights and in particular to the right of non- discrimination, insofar as they contradict the fundamental right to be presumed innocent and are reflective of historical, systemic, institutional and societal discrimination and other discriminatory practices. These AI systems should therefore be prohibited;

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Sandro GOZI, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Abir AL-SAHLANI, Sophia IN 'T VELD, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17 a (new)

(17 a) AI systems used by law enforcement authorities or on their behalf to predict the probability of a natural person to offend or to reoffend, based on profiling and individual risk-assessment hold a particular risk of discrimination against certain persons or groups of persons, as they violate human dignity as well as the key legal principle of presumption of innocence. Such AI systems should therefore be prohibited.

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Róża THUN UND HOHENSTEIN, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Sophia IN 'T VELD, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18

(18) The use of AI systems for ‘real- time’ remote biometric identification of natural persons in publicly accessible spaces ~~for the purpose of law enforcement~~ is considered particularly intrusive in the rights and freedoms of the concerned persons, to the extent that it may affect the private life of a large part of the population, evoke a feeling of constant surveillance and indirectly dissuade the exercise of the freedom of assembly and other fundamental rights. In addition, the immediacy of the impact and the limited opportunities for further checks or corrections in relation to the use of such systems operating in ‘real-time’ carry heightened risks for the rights and freedoms of the persons that are concerned by law enforcement activities. The use of those systems in publicly accessible places should therefore be prohibited.

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18

(18) The use of AI systems for ‘real- time’ remote biometric identification of natural persons in publicly accessible spaces ~~for the purpose of law enforcement~~ is considered particularly intrusive in the rights and freedoms of the concerned persons, to the extent that it may affect the private life of a large part of the population, evoke a feeling of constant surveillance and indirectly dissuade the exercise of the freedom of assembly and other fundamental rights. In addition, the immediacy of the impact and the limited opportunities for further checks or corrections in relation to the use of such systems operating in ‘real-time’ carry heightened risks for the rights and freedoms of the persons that are concerned by law enforcement activities.

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Róża THUN UND HOHENSTEIN, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Abir AL-SAHLANI, Sophia IN 'T VELD, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19

(19) The use of those systems for the purpose of law enforcement should therefore be prohibited, except in three exhaustively listed and narrowly defined situations, where the use is strictly necessary to achieve a substantial public interest, the importance of which outweighs the risks. Those situations involve the search for potential victims of crime, including missing children; certain threats to the life or physical safety of natural persons or of a terrorist attack; and the detection, localisation, identification or prosecution of perpetrators or suspects of the criminal offences referred to in Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA38 if those criminal offences are punishable in the Member State concerned by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three years and as they are defined in the law of that Member State. Such threshold for the custodial sentence or detention order in accordance with national law contributes to ensure that the offence should be serious enough to potentially justify the use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems. Moreover, of the 32 criminal offences listed in the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, some are in practice likely to be more relevant than others, in that the recourse to ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification will foreseeably be necessary and proportionate to highly varying degrees for the practical pursuit of the detection, localisation, identification or prosecution of a perpetrator or suspect of the different criminal offences listed and having regard to the likely differences in the seriousness, probability and scale of the harm or possible negative consequences. _________________ 38 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1).deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19

(19) The use of those systems for the purpose of law enforcement should therefore be prohibited, except in three exhaustively listed and narrowly defined situations, where the use is strictly necessary to achieve a substantial public interest, the importance of which outweighs the risks. Those situations involve the search for potential victims of crime, including missing children; certain threats to the life or physical safety of natural persons or of a terrorist attack; and the detection, localisation, identification or prosecution of perpetrators or suspects of the criminal offences referred to in Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA38 if those criminal offences are punishable in the Member State concerned by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three years and as they are defined in the law of that Member State. Such threshold for the custodial sentence or detention order in accordance with national law contributes to ensure that the offence should be serious enough to potentially justify the use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems. Moreover, of the 32 criminal offences listed in the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, some are in practice likely to be more relevant than others, in that the recourse to ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification will foreseeably be necessary and proportionate to highly varying degrees for the practical pursuit of the detection, localisation, identification or prosecution of a perpetrator or suspect of the different criminal offences listed and having regard to the likely differences in the seriousness, probability and scale of the harm or possible negative consequences. _________________ 38 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1).deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20

(20) In order to ensure that those systems are used in a responsible and proportionate manner, it is also important to establish that, in each of those three exhaustively listed and narrowly defined situations, certain elements should be taken into account, in particular as regards the nature of the situation giving rise to the request and the consequences of the use for the rights and freedoms of all persons concerned and the safeguards and conditions provided for with the use. In addition, the use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement should be subject to appropriate limits in time and space, having regard in particular to the evidence or indications regarding the threats, the victims or perpetrator. The reference database of persons should be appropriate for each use case in each of the three situations mentioned above.deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Róża THUN UND HOHENSTEIN, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Abir AL-SAHLANI, Sophia IN 'T VELD, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20

(20) In order to ensure that those systems are used in a responsible and proportionate manner, it is also important to establish that, in each of those three exhaustively listed and narrowly defined situations, certain elements should be taken into account, in particular as regards the nature of the situation giving rise to the request and the consequences of the use for the rights and freedoms of all persons concerned and the safeguards and conditions provided for with the use. In addition, the use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement should be subject to appropriate limits in time and space, having regard in particular to the evidence or indications regarding the threats, the victims or perpetrator. The reference database of persons should be appropriate for each use case in each of the three situations mentioned above.deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Róża THUN UND HOHENSTEIN, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Abir AL-SAHLANI, Sophia IN 'T VELD, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21

(21) Each use of a ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification system in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement should be subject to an express and specific authorisation by a judicial authority or by an independent administrative authority of a Member State. Such authorisation should in principle be obtained prior to the use, except in duly justified situations of urgency, that is, situations where the need to use the systems in question is such as to make it effectively and objectively impossible to obtain an authorisation before commencing the use. In such situations of urgency, the use should be restricted to the absolute minimum necessary and be subject to appropriate safeguards and conditions, as determined in national law and specified in the context of each individual urgent use case by the law enforcement authority itself. In addition, the law enforcement authority should in such situations seek to obtain an authorisation as soon as possible, whilst providing the reasons for not having been able to request it earlier.deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

(21) Each use of a ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification system in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement should be subject to an express and specific authorisation by a judicial authority or by an independent administrative authority of a Member State. Such authorisation should in principle be obtained prior to the use, except in duly justified situations of urgency, that is, situations where the need to use the systems in question is such as to make it effectively and objectively impossible to obtain an authorisation before commencing the use. In such situations of urgency, the use should be restricted to the absolute minimum necessary and be subject to appropriate safeguards and conditions, as determined in national law and specified in the context of each individual urgent use case by the law enforcement authority itself. In addition, the law enforcement authority should in such situations seek to obtain an authorisation as soon as possible, whilst providing the reasons for not having been able to request it earlier.deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Róża THUN UND HOHENSTEIN, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Abir AL-SAHLANI, Sophia IN 'T VELD, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22

(22) Furthermore, it is appropriate to provide, within the exhaustive framework set by this Regulation that such use in the territory of a Member State in accordance with this Regulation should only be possible where and in as far as the Member State in question has decided to expressly provide for the possibility to authorise such use in its detailed rules of national law. Consequently, Member States remain free under this Regulation not to provide for such a possibility at all or to only provide for such a possibility in respect of some of the objectives capable of justifying authorised use identified in this Regulation.deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22

(22) Furthermore, it is appropriate to provide, within the exhaustive framework set by this Regulation that such use in the territory of a Member State in accordance with this Regulation should only be possible where and in as far as the Member State in question has decided to expressly provide for the possibility to authorise such use in its detailed rules of national law. Consequently, Member States remain free under this Regulation not to provide for such a possibility at all or to only provide for such a possibility in respect of some of the objectives capable of justifying authorised use identified in this Regulation.deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Róża THUN UND HOHENSTEIN, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Sophia IN 'T VELD, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23

(23) The use of AI systems for ‘real- time’ remote biometric identification of natural persons in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement necessarily involves the processing of biometric data. The rules of this Regulation that prohibit, subject to certain exceptions, such use, which are based on Article 16 TFEU, should apply as lex specialis in respect of the rules on the processing of biometric data contained in Article 10 of Directive (EU) 2016/680, thus regulating such use and the processing of biometric data involved in an exhaustive manner. Therefore, such use and processing should only be possible in as far as it is compatible with the framework set by this Regulation, without there being scope, outside that framework, for the competent authorities, where they act for purpose of law enforcement, to use such systems and process such data in connection thereto on the grounds listed in Article 10 of Directive (EU) 2016/680. In this context, this Regulation is not intended to provide the legal basis for the processing of personal data under Article 8 of Directive 2016/680. However, the use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for purposes other than law enforcement, including by competent authorities, should not be covered by the specific framework regarding such use for the purpose of law enforcement set by this Regulation. Such use for purposes other than law enforcement should therefore not be subject to the requirement of an authorisation under this Regulation and the applicable detailed rules of national law that may give effect to it.deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23

(23) The use of AI systems for ‘real- time’ remote biometric identification of natural persons in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement necessarily involves the processing of biometric data. The rules of this Regulation that prohibit, subject to certain exceptions, such use, which are based on Article 16 TFEU, should apply as lex specialis in respect of the rules on the processing of biometric data contained in Article 10 of Directive (EU) 2016/680, thus regulating such use and the processing of biometric data involved in an exhaustive manner. Therefore, such use and processing should only be possible in as far as it is compatible with the framework set by this Regulation, without there being scope, outside that framework, for the competent authorities, where they act for purpose of law enforcement, to use such systems and process such data in connection thereto on the grounds listed in Article 10 of Directive (EU) 2016/680. In this context, this Regulation is not intended to provide the legal basis for the processing of personal data under Article 8 of Directive 2016/680. However, the use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for purposes other than law enforcement, including by competent authorities, should not be covered by the specific framework regarding such use for the purpose of law enforcement set by this Regulation. Such use for purposes other than law enforcement should therefore not be subject to the requirement of an authorisation under this Regulation and the applicable detailed rules of national law that may give effect to it.deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24

(24) Any processing of biometric data and other personal data involved in the use of AI systems for biometric identification, other than in connection to the use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement as regulated by this Regulation, including where those systems are used by competent authorities in publicly accessible spaces for other purposes than law enforcement, should continue to comply with all requirements resulting from Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 and Article 10 of Directive (EU) 2016/680, as applicable.deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Róża THUN UND HOHENSTEIN, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24

(24) Any processing of biometric data and other personal data involved in the use of AI systems for biometric identification, ~~other than in connection to the use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement as regulated by this Regulation,~~ including where those systems are used by competent authorities in publicly accessible spaces for other purposes than law enforcement, should continue to comply with all requirements resulting from Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 and Article 10 of Directive (EU) 2016/680, as applicable.

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Dita CHARANZOVÁ, Andrus ANSIP, Morten LØKKEGAARD, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Sophia IN 'T VELD, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24 a (new)

(24 a) Fundamental rights in the digital sphere have to be guaranteed to the same extent as in the offline world. The right to privacy needs to be ensured, amongst others through end-to-end encryption in private online communication and the protection of private content against any kind of general or targeted surveillance, be it by public or private actors. Therefore, the use of AI systems violating the right to privacy in online communication services should be prohibited.

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Morten LØKKEGAARD, Sandro GOZI, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Abir AL-SAHLANI, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 38

(38) Actions by law enforcement authorities involving certain uses of AI systems are characterised by a significant degree of power imbalance and may lead to surveillance, arrest or deprivation of a natural person’s liberty as well as other adverse impacts on fundamental rights guaranteed in the Charter. In particular, if the AI system is not trained with high quality data, does not meet adequate requirements in terms of its accuracy or robustness, or is not properly designed and tested before being put on the market or otherwise put into service, it may single out people in a discriminatory or otherwise incorrect or unjust manner. Furthermore, the exercise of important procedural fundamental rights, such as the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial as well as the right of defence and the presumption of innocence, could be hampered, in particular, where such AI systems are not sufficiently transparent, explainable and documented. It is therefore appropriate to classify as high-risk a number of AI systems intended to be used in the law enforcement context where accuracy, reliability and transparency is particularly important to avoid adverse impacts, retain public trust and ensure accountability and effective redress. In view of the nature of the activities in question and the risks relating thereto, those high-risk AI systems should include in particular AI systems intended to be used by law enforcement authorities for individual risk assessments, polygraphs and similar tools or to detect the emotional state of natural person, to detect ‘deep fakes’, for the evaluation of the reliability of evidence in criminal proceedings, for predicting the occurrence or reoccurrence of an actual or potential criminal offence based on profiling of natural persons, or assessing personality traits and characteristics or past criminal behaviour of natural persons or groups, for profiling in the course of detection, investigation or prosecution of criminal offences, as well as for crime analytics regarding natural persons. AI systems specifically intended to be used for administrative proceedings by tax and customs authorities should not be considered high-risk AI systems used by law enforcement authorities for the purposes of prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of criminal offences.

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 39 a (new)

(39 a) The use of AI systems in migration, asylum and border control management should in no circumstances be used by Member States or European Union institutions as a means to circumvent their international obligations under the Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the Protocol of 31 January 1967, nor should they be used to in any way infringe on the principle of non- refoulement, or deny safe and effective legal avenues into the territory of the Union, including the right to international protection;

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Abir AL-SAHLANI, Svenja HAHN, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 39 a (new)

(39 a) The use of AI systems in migration, asylum and border management should however not, at any point, be used by Member States or by the institutions or agencies of the Union to infringe on the principle of non- refoulement, the right to asylum or to circumvent international obligations under the Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the Protocol of 31 January 1967.

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Morten LØKKEGAARD, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 64

(64) Given the more extensive experience of professional pre-market certifiers in the field of product safety and the different nature of risks involved, it is appropriate to limit, at least in an initial phase of application of this Regulation, the scope of application of third-party conformity assessment for high-risk AI systems other than those related to products. Therefore, the conformity assessment of such systems should be carried out as a general rule by the provider under its own responsibility, with the ~~only~~ exception of AI systems intended to be used for the remote biometric identification of persons~~, for which~~ and AI systems intended to be used to make inferences on the basis of biometric data that produce legal effects or affect the rights and freedoms of natural persons. For those types of AI systems the involvement of a notified body in the conformity assessment should be foreseen, to the extent they are not prohibited..

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Nicola BEER, Morten LØKKEGAARD, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new)

(3 a) ‘risk’ means the combination of the probability of occurrence of a harm and the severity of that harm;

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Morten LØKKEGAARD, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 3 b (new)

(3 b) ‘significant harm‘ means a material harm to a person's life, health and safety or fundamental rights or entities or society at large whose severity is exceptional. The severity is in particular exceptional when the harm is hardly reversible, the outcome has a material adverse impact on health or safety of a person or the impacted person is dependent on the outcome;

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Morten LØKKEGAARD, Sandro GOZI, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Abir AL-SAHLANI, Moritz KÖRNER, Ondřej KOVAŘÍK, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

(b) the placing on the market, putting into service or use of an AI system that exploits any of the vulnerabilities of an individual, including characteristics of such individual’s known or predicted personality or social or economic situation, a specific group of persons due to their age~~, physical or mental~~ or disability, in order to materially distort the behaviour of a person pertaining to that group in a manner that causes or is likely to cause that person or another person physical or psychological harm;

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Sandro GOZI, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Abir AL-SAHLANI, Sophia IN 'T VELD, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)

(c a) the placing on the market, putting into service or use of an AI system for making individual risk assessments of natural persons in order to assess the risk of a natural person for offending or reoffending or for predicting the occurrence or reoccurrence of an actual or potential criminal offence based on profiling of a natural person or on assessing personality traits and characteristics or past criminal behaviour of natural persons or groups of natural persons;

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Róża THUN UND HOHENSTEIN, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point d – introductory part

(d) the use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces ~~for the purpose of law enforcement, unless and in as far as such use is strictly necessary for one of the following objectives:~~.

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point d – introductory part

(d) the use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement~~, unless and in as far as such use is strictly necessary for one of the following objectives:~~;

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point d – point i

~~(i) the targeted search for specific potential victims of crime, including missing children;~~deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Abir AL-SAHLANI, Sophia IN 'T VELD, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point d – point i

~~(i) the targeted search for specific potential victims of crime, including missing children;~~deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Abir AL-SAHLANI, Sophia IN 'T VELD, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point d – point ii

~~(ii) the prevention of a specific, substantial and imminent threat to the life or physical safety of natural persons or of a terrorist attack;~~deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point d – point ii

~~(ii) the prevention of a specific, substantial and imminent threat to the life or physical safety of natural persons or of a terrorist attack;~~deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point d – point iii

(iii) the detection, localisation, identification or prosecution of a perpetrator or suspect of a criminal offence referred to in Article 2(2) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA62 and punishable in the Member State concerned by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three years, as determined by the law of that Member State. _________________ 62 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1).deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Abir AL-SAHLANI, Sophia IN 'T VELD, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point d – point iii

(iii) the detection, localisation, identification or prosecution of a perpetrator or suspect of a criminal offence referred to in Article 2(2) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA62 and punishable in the Member State concerned by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three years, as determined by the law of that Member State. _________________ 62 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1).deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Nicola BEER, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN, Karen MELCHIOR, Morten LØKKEGAARD, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Abir AL-SAHLANI, Sophia IN 'T VELD

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new)

(d a) the use of an AI system for the general monitoring, detection and interpretation of private content in interpersonal communication services, including all measures that would undermine end-to-end encryption..

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new)

(d a) The use of predictive, profiling and risk assessment AI systems in law enforcement and criminal justice;

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point d b (new)

(d b) The use of predictive, profiling and risk assessment AI system by or on behalf of competent authorities in migration, asylum or border control management, to profile an individual or assess a risk, including a security risk, a risk of irregular immigration, or a health risk, posed by a natural person who intends to enter or has entered the territory of a Member State, on the basis of personal or sensitive data, known or predicted, except for the sole purpose of identifying specific care and support needs;

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point d c (new)

(d c) the placing on the market, putting into service, or use of AI systems by law enforcement authorities or by competent authorities in migration, asylum and border control management, such as polygraphs and similar tools to detect deception, trustworthiness or related characteristics;

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point d d (new)

(d d) the use of AI systems by or on behalf of competent authorities in migration, asylum and border control management, to forecast or predict individual or collective movement for the purpose of, or in any way reasonably foreseeably leading to, the interdicting, curtailing or preventing migration or border crossings;

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2

2. The use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement for any of the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 point d) shall take into account the following elements: (a) the nature of the situation giving rise to the possible use, in particular the seriousness, probability and scale of the harm caused in the absence of the use of the system; (b) the consequences of the use of the system for the rights and freedoms of all persons concerned, in particular the seriousness, probability and scale of those consequences. In addition, the use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement for any of the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 point d) shall comply with necessary and proportionate safeguards and conditions in relation to the use, in particular as regards the temporal, geographic and personal limitations.deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Róża THUN UND HOHENSTEIN, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Abir AL-SAHLANI, Sophia IN 'T VELD, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2

2. The use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement for any of the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 point d) shall take into account the following elements: (a) the nature of the situation giving rise to the possible use, in particular the seriousness, probability and scale of the harm caused in the absence of the use of the system; (b) the consequences of the use of the system for the rights and freedoms of all persons concerned, in particular the seriousness, probability and scale of those consequences. In addition, the use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement for any of the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 point d) shall comply with necessary and proportionate safeguards and conditions in relation to the use, in particular as regards the temporal, geographic and personal limitations.deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Róża THUN UND HOHENSTEIN, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Abir AL-SAHLANI, Sophia IN 'T VELD, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point a

~~(a) the nature of the situation giving rise to the possible use, in particular the seriousness, probability and scale of the harm caused in the absence of the use of the system;~~deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Róża THUN UND HOHENSTEIN, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Abir AL-SAHLANI, Sophia IN 'T VELD, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point b

~~(b) the consequences of the use of the system for the rights and freedoms of all persons concerned, in particular the seriousness, probability and scale of those consequences.~~deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Róża THUN UND HOHENSTEIN, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Abir AL-SAHLANI, Sophia IN 'T VELD, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

In addition, the use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement for any of the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 point d) shall comply with necessary and proportionate safeguards and conditions in relation to the use, in particular as regards the temporal, geographic and personal limitations.deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Róża THUN UND HOHENSTEIN, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Abir AL-SAHLANI, Sophia IN 'T VELD, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 3

3. As regards paragraphs 1, point (d) and 2, each individual use for the purpose of law enforcement of a ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification system in publicly accessible spaces shall be subject to a prior authorisation granted by a judicial authority or by an independent administrative authority of the Member State in which the use is to take place, issued upon a reasoned request and in accordance with the detailed rules of national law referred to in paragraph 4. However, in a duly justified situation of urgency, the use of the system may be commenced without an authorisation and the authorisation may be requested only during or after the use. The competent judicial or administrative authority shall only grant the authorisation where it is satisfied, based on objective evidence or clear indications presented to it, that the use of the ‘real- time’ remote biometric identification system at issue is necessary for and proportionate to achieving one of the objectives specified in paragraph 1, point (d), as identified in the request. In deciding on the request, the competent judicial or administrative authority shall take into account the elements referred to in paragraph 2.deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 3

3. As regards paragraphs 1, point (d) and 2, each individual use for the purpose of law enforcement of a ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification system in publicly accessible spaces shall be subject to a prior authorisation granted by a judicial authority or by an independent administrative authority of the Member State in which the use is to take place, issued upon a reasoned request and in accordance with the detailed rules of national law referred to in paragraph 4. However, in a duly justified situation of urgency, the use of the system may be commenced without an authorisation and the authorisation may be requested only during or after the use. The competent judicial or administrative authority shall only grant the authorisation where it is satisfied, based on objective evidence or clear indications presented to it, that the use of the ‘real- time’ remote biometric identification system at issue is necessary for and proportionate to achieving one of the objectives specified in paragraph 1, point (d), as identified in the request. In deciding on the request, the competent judicial or administrative authority shall take into account the elements referred to in paragraph 2.deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Róża THUN UND HOHENSTEIN, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Abir AL-SAHLANI, Sophia IN 'T VELD, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

The competent judicial or administrative authority shall only grant the authorisation where it is satisfied, based on objective evidence or clear indications presented to it, that the use of the ‘real- time’ remote biometric identification system at issue is necessary for and proportionate to achieving one of the objectives specified in paragraph 1, point (d), as identified in the request. In deciding on the request, the competent judicial or administrative authority shall take into account the elements referred to in paragraph 2.deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 4

4. A Member State may decide to provide for the possibility to fully or partially authorise the use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement within the limits and under the conditions listed in paragraphs 1, point (d), 2 and 3. That Member State shall lay down in its national law the necessary detailed rules for the request, issuance and exercise of, as well as supervision relating to, the authorisations referred to in paragraph 3. Those rules shall also specify in respect of which of the objectives listed in paragraph 1, point (d), including which of the criminal offences referred to in point (iii) thereof, the competent authorities may be authorised to use those systems for the purpose of law enforcement.deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Róża THUN UND HOHENSTEIN, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Abir AL-SAHLANI, Sophia IN 'T VELD, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 4

4. A Member State may decide to provide for the possibility to fully or partially authorise the use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement within the limits and under the conditions listed in paragraphs 1, point (d), 2 and 3. That Member State shall lay down in its national law the necessary detailed rules for the request, issuance and exercise of, as well as supervision relating to, the authorisations referred to in paragraph 3. Those rules shall also specify in respect of which of the objectives listed in paragraph 1, point (d), including which of the criminal offences referred to in point (iii) thereof, the competent authorities may be authorised to use those systems for the purpose of law enforcement.deleted

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 a (new)

Article 5 a Amendments to Article 5 The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 73 to update the list of AI systems and practices prohibited under Article 5 of the present regulation, according to the latest development in technology and to the assessment of increased or newly emerged risks to fundamental rights.

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Nicola BEER, Morten LØKKEGAARD, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Moritz KÖRNER, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2

2. In addition to the high-risk AI systems referred to in paragraph 1, AI systems ~~referred to in Annex III~~ shall also be considered high-risk in the meaning of this regulation, if they will be deployed in a critical area referred to in Annex III and an individual assessment of the specific application carried out in accordance with Art. 6a showed that a significant harm is likely to arise.

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Nicola BEER, Morten LØKKEGAARD, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Catharina RINZEMA, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Sophia IN 'T VELD, Moritz KÖRNER, Ondřej KOVAŘÍK, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 a (new)

Article 6 a Risk assessment 1. In order to determine the level of risk of AI systems, the provider of an AI system with an intended purpose in the areas referred to in Annex III has to conduct a risk assessment. 2.The risk assessment has to contain the following elements: a) name all possible harms to life, health and safety or fundamental rights of potentially impacted persons or entities or society at large; b) asses the likelihood and severity these harms might materialise; c) name the potential benefits of such system for the potentially impacted persons and society at large; d) name possible and taken measures to address, prevent, minimise or mitigate the identified harms with a high probability to materialise; e) asses the possibilities to reverse these negative outcome; f) the extent to which decision-making of the system is autonomous and outside of human influence. 3. If the risk assessment showed a significant harm is likely to materialise the provider has to comply with Chapter 2 in a way that is appropriate and proportionate to the identified risks.

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Morten LØKKEGAARD, Sandro GOZI, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Catharina RINZEMA, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Moritz KÖRNER, Ondřej KOVAŘÍK, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 73 ~~to update the list in Annex III by adding high-risk AI systems where~~, after an adequate and transparent consultation process involving the relevant stakeholders, to update the list in Annex III by withdrawing areas from that list or by adding critical areas. For additions both of the following conditions arneed to be fulfilled:

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 73 to update the list in Annex III by adding new area headings and high-risk AI systems where both of the following conditions are fulfilled:

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) the AI systems are intended to be used in any of the areas listed in points 1 to 8 of Annex III or in the newly identified area headings;

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Nicola BEER, Morten LØKKEGAARD, Sandro GOZI, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Moritz KÖRNER, Ondřej KOVAŘÍK, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – point b a (new)

(b a) the extent to which the AI system acts autonomously;

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Morten LØKKEGAARD, Sandro GOZI, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Moritz KÖRNER, Ondřej KOVAŘÍK, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – point e a (new)

(e a) the potential misuse and malicious use of the AI system and of the technology underpinning it;

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Nicola BEER, Morten LØKKEGAARD, Sandro GOZI, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Moritz KÖRNER, Ondřej KOVAŘÍK, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – point g a (new)

(g a) magnitude and likelihood of benefit of the deployment of the AI system for individuals, groups, or society at large;

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Morten LØKKEGAARD, Sandro GOZI, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Moritz KÖRNER, Ondřej KOVAŘÍK, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – point h – introductory part

(h) the extent to which existing Union legislation, in particular the GDPR, provides for:

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 a (new)

Article 16 a Obligations of users of high-risk AI systems Users of high-risk AI systems shall conduct and publish a fundamental rights impact assessment, detailing specific information relating to the context of use of the high-risk AI system in question, including: (a) the affected persons, (b) intended purpose, (c) geographic and temporal scope, (d) assessment of the legality and fundamental rights impacts of the system, (e) compatibility with accessibility legislation, (f) potential direct and indirect impact on fundamental rights, (g) any specific risk of harm likely to impact marginalised persons or those at risk of discrimination, (h) the foreseeable impact of the use of the system on the environment, (i) any other negative impact on the public interest, (j) clear steps as to how the harms identified will be mitigated and how effective this mitigation is likely to be.

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Title IV a (new)

Rights of affected persons Article 52 a 1.Natural persons have the right not to be subject to non-compliant AI systems.The placing on the market, putting into service or use of non-compliant AI system gives rise to the right of the affected natural persons subject to such non-compliant AI systems to seek and receive redress. 2.Natural persons have the right to be informed about the use and functioning of AI systems they have been or may be exposed to, particularly in the case of high-risk and other regulated AI systems, according to Article 52. 3.Natural persons and public interest organisations have the right to lodge a complaint before the relevant national supervisory authorities against a producer or user of non-compliant AI systems where they consider that their rights or the rights of the natural persons they represent under the present regulation have been violated, and have the right receive effective remedy.

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Morten LØKKEGAARD, Sandro GOZI, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Moritz KÖRNER, Ondřej KOVAŘÍK, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 68 a (new)

Article 68 a Right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority 1. Without prejudice to any other administrative or judicial remedy, every natural or legal person shall have the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority, in particular in the Member State of his or her habitual residence, place of work or place of the alleged infringement if the natural or legal person considers that their health, safety, or fundamental rights have been breached by an AI system falling within the scope of this Regulation. 2. Natural or legal persons shall have a right to be heard in the complaint handling procedure and in the context of any investigations conducted by the national supervisory authority as a result of their complaint. 3. The national supervisory authority with which the complaint has been lodged shall inform the complainants about the progress and outcome of their complaint. In particular, the national supervisory authority shall take all the necessary actions to follow up on the complaints it receives and, within three months of the reception of a complaint, give the complainant a preliminary response indicating the measures it intends to take and the next steps in the procedure, if any. 4. The national supervisory authority shall take a decision on the complaint and inform the complainant on the progress and the outcome of the complaint, including the possibility of a judicial remedy pursuant to Article 68b, without delay and no later than six months after the date on which the complaint was lodged.

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Svenja HAHN, Dragoş TUDORACHE, Nicola BEER, Karen MELCHIOR, Morten LØKKEGAARD, Sandro GOZI, Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Salima YENBOU, Moritz KÖRNER, Ondřej KOVAŘÍK, Jan-Christoph OETJEN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 68 b (new)

Article 68 b Right to an effective judicial remedy against a national supervisory authority 1. Without prejudice to any other administrative or non-judicial remedy, each natural or legal person shall have the right to an effective judicial remedy against a legally binding decision of a national supervisory authority concerning them. 2. Without prejudice to any other administrative or non-judicial remedy, each data subject shall have the right to a an effective judicial remedy where the national supervisory authority does not handle a complaint, does not inform the complainant on the progress or preliminary outcome of the complaint lodged within three months pursuant to Article 68a(3) or does not comply with its obligation to reach a final decision on the complaint within six months pursuant to Article 68a(4) or its obligations under Article 65. 3. Proceedings against a supervisory authority shall be brought before the courts of the Member State where the national supervisory authority is established.

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Article 84 – paragraph 6

6. In carrying out the evaluations and reviews referred to in paragraphs 1 to 4 the Commission shall take into account the positions and findings of the Board, of the European Parliament, of the Council, and of other relevant bodies or sources, including stakeholders, and in particular civil society.

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Article 84 – paragraph 7

7. The Commission shall, if necessary, submit appropriate proposals to amend this Regulation, in particular taking into account developments in technology and new potential or realised risks to fundamental rights, and in the light of the state of progress in the information society.

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Annex III – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point b

(b) AI systems intended to be used by competent public authorities or by third parties acting on their behalf to assess a risk, including but not limited to a security risk, a risk of irregular immigration, or a health risk, posed by a natural person who intends to enter or has entered into the territory of a Member State;

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Annex III – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point d

(d) AI systems intended to assist competent public authorities for the examination and assessment of the veracity of evidence and claims in relation tof applications for asylum, visa and residence permits and associated complaints with regard to the eligibility of the natural persons applying for a status.

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Annex III – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point d a (new)

(d a) AI systems intended to be used by or on behalf of competent authorities in migration, asylum and border control management for the forecasting or prediction of trends related to migration, movement and border crossings;

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Annex III – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point d b (new)

(d b) AI systems that are or may be used by or on behalf of competent authorities in law enforcement, migration, asylum and border control management for the biometric identification of natural persons;

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Salima YENBOU, Samira RAFAELA, Monica SEMEDO, Karen MELCHIOR, Peter POLLÁK

Proposal for a regulation
Annex III – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point d c (new)

(d c) AI systems intended to be used by or on behalf of competent authorities in migration, asylum and border control management to monitor, surveil or process data in the context of border management activities for the purpose of recognising or detecting objects and natural persons;

2022/06/13
Committee: IMCO LIBE

Activities of Samira RAFAELA related to 2021/0106(COD)

Plenary speeches (1)

Amendments (70)

ParlTrack - 2011-2024