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13 Amendments of José Manuel GARCÍA-MARGALLO Y MARFIL related to 2021/0114(COD)

Amendment 60 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
(4) No existing Union instruments address distortions caused by foreignre such as to deter foreign governments from distorting the internal market through subsidies. Trade defence instruments enable the Commission to act when subsidised goods are imported into the Union, but not when foreign subsidies take the form of subsidised investments, or when services and financial flows are concerned. Under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the Union has the possibility to initiate State-to-State dispute settlement against certain foreign subsidies granted by WTO members and limited to goods.
2022/02/11
Committee: INTA
Amendment 69 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
(7) To ensure a level playing field throughout the internal market and consistency in the application of this Regulation, the Commission should be the sole authority competent to apply this Regulation. The Commission should have the power to examine any foreign subsidy to the extent it is in the scope of this Regulation in any sector of the economy on its own initiative relying on information from all available sources. To ensure effective control, in the specific case of large concentrations (mergers and acquisitions) and public procurement procedures above certain thresholds, the Commission should have the power to review foreign subsidies based on a prior, mandatory notification by the undertaking to the Commission.
2022/02/11
Committee: INTA
Amendment 87 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
(14) When applying these indicators, the Commission could take into account different elements such as the size of the subsidy in absolute terms or in relation to the size of the market or to the value of the investment. For instance, a concentration, in the context of which a foreign subsidy covers a substantial part of the purchase price of the target, is likely to be distortive. Similarly, foreign subsidies covering a substantial part of the estimated value of a contract to be awarded in a public procurement procedure are likely to cause distortions. If a foreign subsidy is granted for operating costs, it seems more likely to cause distortions than if it is granted for investment costs. Foreign subsidies to small and medium-sized undertakings may be considered less likely to cause distortions than foreign subsidies to large undertakings. Furthermore, the characteristics of the market, and in particular the competitive conditions on the market, such as barriers to entry, should be taken into account. Foreign subsidies leading to overcapacity by sustaining uneconomic assets or by encouraging investment in capacity expansions that would otherwise not have been built are likely to cause distortions. A foreign subsidy to a beneficiary that shows a low degree of activity in the internal market, measured for instance in terms of turnover achieved in the Union, is less likely to cause distortions than a foreign subsidy to a beneficiary that has a more significant level of activity in the internal market. Finally, foreign subsidies not exceeding EUR 51 million should be deemed, as a general rule, unlikely to distort the internal market within the meaning of this Regulation.
2022/02/11
Committee: INTA
Amendment 95 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
(16) The Commission should take into account the positive effects of the foreign subsidy on the development of the relevant subsidised economic activity. The Commission should weigh these positive effects against the negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market in order to determine, if applicable, the appropriate redressive measure or accept commitments. It is of utmost importance to ensure a level playing field to support the economic recovery of the European Union. The balancing may also lead to the conclusion that no redressive measures should be imposed. Categories of foreign subsidies that are deemed most likely to distort the internal market are less likely to have more positive than negative effects.
2022/02/11
Committee: INTA
Amendment 199 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) the situation of the undertaking and the markets concerned. For a subsidiary of a foreign company established outside the Union, the situation of the parent company in its respective market;
2022/02/11
Committee: INTA
Amendment 208 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2
(2) A foreign subsidy is unlikely to distort the internal market if its total amount is below EUR 51 million over any consecutive period of three fiscal years.
2022/02/11
Committee: INTA
Amendment 262 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 3 – point h a (new)
(ha) exclusion from participation in future public procurement procedures
2022/02/11
Committee: INTA
Amendment 274 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 6
(6) Where the undertaking concerned proposes to repay the foreign subsidy including an appropriate interest rate, the Commission shall accept such repayment as commitment if it can ascertain that the repayment is transparent and effective, while taking into account the risk of circumvention, provided that the Commission considers that the distortion caused in the internal market will be fully corrected by the repayment of the subsidy.
2022/02/11
Committee: INTA
Amendment 371 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 3 – point a
(a) the acquired undertaking or at least one of the merging undertakings is established in the Union and generates an aggregate turnover in the Union of at least EUR 2500 million; and
2022/02/11
Committee: INTA
Amendment 381 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 4 – point a
(a) the joint venture itself or one of its parent undertakings is established in the Union and generates an aggregate turnover in the Union of at least EUR 2500 million; and
2022/02/11
Committee: INTA
Amendment 419 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 2
(2) For the purpose of Article 28, a notifiable foreign financial contribution in an EU public procurement procedure shall be deemed to arise where the estimated value of that public procurement is equal or greater than EUR 250 million.
2022/02/11
Committee: INTA
Amendment 436 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 2
(2) The obligation to notify foreign financial contributions under this paragraph shall extend to economic operators, groups of economic operators referred to in Article 26(2) of Directive 2014/23/EU, Article 19(2) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 37(2) of Directive 2014/25/EU, main subcontractors and main suppliers. A subcontractor or supplier shall be deemed to be main where their participation ensures key elements of the contract performance and in any case where the economic share of their contribution exceeds 3015% of the estimated value of the contract.
2022/02/11
Committee: INTA
Amendment 467 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 30 – paragraph 2
(2) Where the undertaking concerned does not offer commitments or where the Commission considers that the commitments referred to in paragraph 1 are neither appropriate nor sufficient to fully and effectively remove the distortion it shall adopt a decision prohibiting the award of the contract to the undertaking concerned (“decision prohibiting the award of the contract”). Where circumstances so warrant, the Commission may exclude the undertaking concerned from participation in future public procurement procedures.
2022/02/11
Committee: INTA