11 Amendments of Emmanuel MAUREL related to 2015/2221(INI)
Amendment 12 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 12 a (new)
Citation 12 a (new)
– having regard to Parliament’s Report on the review of the economic governance framework: stocktaking and challenges (2014/2145(INI)),
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the BU is instrumental to ensuring stability and restoring confidence in euro area banks, enhancing financial integration, fostering risk sharing within the monetary union and contributing to breakducing the limoral hazard banks between sovereigns and banks at national levelnefit from vis-à-vis states;
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Welcomes the establishment of the SSM, which has been successful both from an operational point of view and in terms of supervisory quality, and considers it a remarkable achievement, taking into account the complexity of the project and the very short time frame available;
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Is concerned, without prejudice to the importance of the internal dialogue at the ECB, about the potential conflict of interests at the ECB between its central bank role, notably its programmes for purchase of securities on the secondary market from major commercial banks which moreover it supervises, and its role as the Single Supervisory Mechanism; asks the Commission to examine any measures likely to ensure greater independence for the SSM;
Amendment 191 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Underlines the important role played by the SSM during the Greek crisis in monitoring the condition of the country’s banking sector, in conducting a comprehensive assessment of the significant Greek institutions and in contributing to the determination of the recapitalisation needs; condemns the SSM decision to limit Greek banks' exposure to Greek sovereign debt, thus increasing the danger of state bankruptcy, a decision which contributed to the systemic instability and which appeared as a political decision to add pressure to the Greek government in the context of the negotiations, in a breach of the political neutrality principle which should govern this institution;
Amendment 194 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20a. Asks the Commission to conduct and make public an evaluation of the decision-making procedure which led the Troika, in the implementation of the last Memorandum of Understanding signed with Greece, to require savings up to 25 billion EUR for the recapitalization of Greek banks, while the SSM, which role is to assess such needs, stated on 31 October 2015, that the recapitalization needs, in a baseline scenario, were up to 4.4 billion EUR, and the most risky scenario, up to 14.4 billion EUR;
Amendment 207 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23a. Calls on the SSM, which is best placed for this purpose as the supervisor of systemically important banks, to produce a public assessment of a reform of the separation of banking activities; and more specifically, to draw up scenarios, ranging from the most restrictive to the most expansive, of the current structural reform of banks under discussion in the European Parliament;
Amendment 211 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Welcomes the efficient and open way in which the ECB has so far fulfilled its accountability obligations towards Parliament and calls upon the ECB to continue to fully engage in this regard and to further contribute to improving Parliament’s capacity to assess SSM policies and activities, but very much regrets that the ECB has, in the context of monetary dialogue, left important questions unanswered; in particular, deplores the failure of the ECB, in its annual report, to mention its activities as part of the Troika in the countries subject to a macroeconomic adjustment programme;
Amendment 286 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Stresses the need, as a consequence of theRegrets the continued existence of the national compartments in the SRF, to rapidly put in place an adequate bridge finwhich are contrary to the spirit and the principles of the joint resolution of bancking mechanism in order to provide the fund, if necessary, with sufficient resources in the period before its completion; recalls that the Eurogroup and the Ecofin mcrises that is supposed to embody a new European solidarity through contributions from all national banking sectors; insisters identified, in their statement of 18 December 2013, the possibility of having recourse to both national sources and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and considers the latter the most effective and credible solution, which could be implemented either through a swift revision of the ESM treaty or through appropriate implementation of the provisions of Article 13 thereofn this regard on the absolute necessity for the second pillar of the Banking Union (the SRM), just like the future third pillar (the joint deposit guarantee), to be managed at a Community and not an intergovernmental level;
Amendment 322 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. UnderlineRecalls that, together with the SSM and the SRM, the capacity to afford the same level of protection to deposits, irrespective of their location, is an indispensable component for completing the BU;
Amendment 346 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
Paragraph 40
40. WelcomNotes the Commission’s announcement regarding the presentation of a legislative proposal for the first steps towards a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) by establishing a reinsurance mechanism at EU level for the national deposit guarantee schemes; but requests the Commission to desist as far as possible from a 'phased' approach and aim instead to put in place as swiftly as possible a joint deposit guarantee fund, as the cost of the lack of such a mechanism has been estimated by Parliament's research department to amount to EUR 64 billion or 0.5% of EU GDP in the event of a financial crisis;