Activities of Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a

Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point aa (new)

(a a) the offices of Members of the European Parliament, including those of their accredited parliamentary assistants and archives, shall only be subject to criminal investigations led by EPPO or the competent national authorities in accordance with the applicable rules on immunities. The offices shall only be subject to administrative investigations led by OLAF with prior authorisation by the President of the European Parliament and by the controller of procedural guarantees. According to Article 4 of the Statute for Members, documents and electronic records held by a Member shall not be treated as a document of the institution, unless tabled in accordance with the Rules of Procedure.

2019/02/13
Committee: CONT

2018/0170(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point a

Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013
Article 5 – paragraph 1

Without prejudice to Article 12d, the Director-General ~~may~~shall upon his own discretion and in line with the investigation policy priorities open an investigation when there is a sufficient suspicion, which may also be based on information provided by any third party or anonymous information, that there has been fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity or irregularity affecting the financial interests of the Union.; The evaluation period preceding the decision shall not exceed two months. If the informant who provided the underlying information is known, he or she shall be informed of the outcome of the evaluation.

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8 – point a b (new)

(a b) Article 9a (new): Controller of procedural guarantees 1. A Controller of procedural guarantees ('the Controller') shall be appointed by the Supervisory Committee, based on a list of suitably qualified candidates drawn up by the Director General. 2. The Controller shall have the necessary qualifications and experience in the field of procedural rights and guarantees. 3.The Controller shall monitor the Office's compliance with procedural rights and guarantees. He or she shall be responsible of handling the complaint received by the Office. 4. The Controller shall be independent in the performance of his or her duties. He or she shall report directly to the Supervisory Committee. 5. The Controller shall report on the exercise of this function in the annual report pursuant to Article 15(9). This shall not refer to individual cases under investigation and shall ensure the confidentiality of investigations even after their closure.

2019/02/13
Committee: CONT

37. Notes that, according to the Court’s summary, the external evaluations of the agencies are in general positive and agencies prepared action plans to follow up issues raised in the evaluation reports; notes that while most agencies’ founding regulations provide for an external evaluation to be carried out periodically (usually every four to six years), the founding regulations of ~~five~~six decentralised agencies - BEREC Office, EASO, eu- LISA, ETF, ENISA and European Institute for Gender Equality - do not include such a provision and the founding regulation of the European Medicines Agency (EMA) requires an external evaluation only every ten years; is of the opinion that this issue should be addressed;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2175(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Notes that carry-overs are often partly or fully justified by the multiannual nature of the agencies’ operational programmes, do not necessarily indicate weaknesses in budget planning and implementation and are not always at odds with the budgetary principle of annuality, in particular if they are planned in advance by the ~~Centr~~Office and communicated to the Court;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2175(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7 a. Notes with concern that the Office was negatively affected with the highest possible rate of cut according to the report of the European Court of Auditors on the implementation of the 5% reduction of staff posts published on 21 December 2017, namely a cut of 12.5%, irrespectively of the fact that Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 assigned additional tasks to the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications without adjusting the resources of the Office accordingly; Stresses the need for adequate human resources to ensure carrying out the mandate of the Office, while maintaining its smooth day-to-day operation;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2175(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 – introductory part

16. Welcomes the three main achievements and successes identified by the Office in 2016 reached in support to the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications, namely:

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2175(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 – indent 1

- ~~it adopted~~supporting the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications in the adoption of the Guidelines on net neutrality, including in processing the unprecedented high number of contributions (close to 500 000) received during the public consultation held in the period from 6 June to 18 July 2016 and in the field of roaming, thus bringing further benefits for the end user of electronic communication services;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2175(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 – indent 2

- it commissioneding two studies on net neutrality and mergers and acquisitions;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2175(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 – indent 3

- it further expandeding its transparency policy, including by the ~~adop~~implementation of an up- dated communication strategy and communication plan of the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2145(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)

24a. Observes that the 5% staff reduction agreement has led to institutions increasingly hiring staff with temporary contracts; regrets that internal competitions are organised with the aim and result of retaining staff that have previously held the same position under previous temporary contracts; considers it more cost and time efficient as well as transparent and fair if well-performing staff with temporary contracts would be switched to permanent contracts without the added financial and administrative burden of organising competitions with pre-determined outcomes at the expense of disappointing outside applicants;

2018/03/06
Committee: CONT

2017/2145(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36 – subparagraph 1 (new)

Notes that during the discharge procedure, Annual Activity reports are currently submitted to the Court of Auditors in June, submitted by the Court of Auditors to the European Parliament in October and voted in plenary by May; notes that by the time discharge is closed, if not postponed, at least 17 months have passed since the closing of annual accounts; points out that auditing in the private sector follows a much stricter timeline; stresses that the discharge procedure needs to be streamlined and sped up; requests that the EEAS and the Court of Auditors follow the good example set by the private sector and proposes to set a deadline for the submission of Annual Activity reports on 31 March of the following year, a deadline for the submission for the Court of Auditor’s reports on the 1st of July and subsequently vote on the discharge during the plenary in November, thereby closing the discharge procedure within the year following the accounting year in question;

2018/03/06
Committee: CONT

2017/2145(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36 a (new)

36a. Regrets the decision by the UK to withdraw from the Union; observes that at this point no predictions can be made about the financial, administrative, human and other consequences related to the withdrawal, asks the EEAS and the Court of Auditors to perform impact assessments and inform the European Parliament on the results by the end of the year 2018;

2018/03/06
Committee: CONT

2017/2144(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Welcomes the overall prudent and sound financial management of the Supervisor in the 2016 budget period; expresses support for the successful paradigm shift towards performance- based budgeting in the Commission’s budget planning introduced by Vice- President Kristalina Georgieva in September 2015 as part of the “EU Budget Focused on Results” initiative; encourages the Supervisor to apply the method to its own budget-planning procedure;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2144(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)

3b. Notes that during the discharge procedure, annual activity reports are currently submitted to the Court of Auditors in June, submitted by the Court of Auditors to the European Parliament in October and voted in plenary by May; notes that by the time discharge is closed, if not postponed, at least 17 months have passed since the closing of annual accounts; points out that auditing in the private sector follows a much stricter timeline; stresses that the discharge procedure needs to be streamlined and sped up; requests that the Supervisor and the Court of Auditors follow the good example set by the private sector and proposes to set a deadline for the submission of annual activity reports on 31 March of the following year, a deadline for the submission for the Court of Auditor’s reports on the 1st of July and subsequently vote on the discharge in the plenary session of November, thereby closing the discharge procedure within the year following the accounting year in question;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2144(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)

9a. Observes that the 5 % staff reduction agreement has led to institutions increasingly hiring staff with temporary contracts; regrets that internal competitions are organised with the aim and result of retaining staff that have previously held the same position under previous temporary contracts; considers it more cost and time efficient as well as transparent and fair if well-performing staff with temporary contracts would be switched to permanent contracts without the added financial and administrative burden of organising competitions with pre-determined outcomes at the expense of disappointing outside applicants;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2144(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

11a. Regrets the decision of the United Kingdom to withdraw from the European Union; observes that at this point no predictions can be made about the financial, administrative, human and other consequences related to the withdrawal, and asks the Committee and the Court of Auditors to perform impact assessments and inform Parliament on the results by the end of 2018;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2143(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3 a. Welcomes the overall prudent and sound financial management of the Ombudsman in the 2016 budget period; expresses support for the successful paradigm shift towards performance- based budgeting in the Commission’s budget planning introduced by Vice- President Kristalina Georgieva in September 2015 as part of the “EU Budget Focused on Results” initiative; encourages the Ombudsman to apply the method to its own budget-planning procedure;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2143(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)

3 b. Welcomes that the Ombudsman submitted the Annual Activity report to the Court of Auditors on in March; notes that the Court of Auditors submitted its report to the European Parliament in October and that the discharge will be voted on in plenary by May; notes that by the time discharge is closed, if not postponed, at least 17 months have passed since the closing of annual accounts; points out that auditing in the private sector follows a much stricter timeline; stresses that the discharge procedure needs to be streamlined and sped up; welcomes that the Ombudsman follows the good example set by the private sector and proposes to set a deadline for the submission of Annual Activity reports on 31 March of the following year, a deadline for the submission for the Court of Auditor’s reports on the 1st of July and subsequently vote on the discharge in the plenary session of November, thereby closing the discharge procedure within the year following the accounting year in question;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2143(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

11 a. Observes that the 5% staff reduction agreement has led to institutions increasingly hiring staff with temporary contracts; regrets that internal competitions are organised with the aim and result of retaining staff that have previously held the same position under previous temporary contracts; considers it more cost and time efficient as well as transparent and fair if well-performing staff with temporary contracts would be switched to permanent contracts without the added financial and administrative burden of organising competitions with pre-determined outcomes at the expense of disappointing outside applicants;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2143(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)

14 a. Regrets the decision of the United Kingdom to withdraw from the European Union; observes that at this point no predictions can be made about the financial, administrative, human and other consequences related to this withdrawal; asks the Ombudsman and the Court of Auditors to perform impact assessments and inform Parliament on the results by the end of the year 2018;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2142(DEC)

Wolf KLINZ, Arndt KOHN, Nedzhmi ALI, Martina DLABAJOVÁ

Proposal for a decision 1
Paragraph 1

1. Grants the Secretary-General of the Committee of the Regions discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Committee of the Regions for the financial year 2016; / Postpones its decision on granting the Secretary- General of the Committee of the Regions discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Committee of the Regions for the financial year 2016;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2142(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3 a. Welcomes the overall prudent and sound financial management of the Committee in the 2016 budget period; expresses support for the successful paradigm shift towards performance- based budgeting in the Commission’s budget planning introduced by Vice- President Kristalina Georgieva in September 2015 as part of the “EU Budget Focused on Results” initiative; encourages the Committee to apply the method to its own budget-planning procedure;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2142(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)

3b. Notes that during the discharge procedure, Annual Activity reports are currently submitted to the Court of Auditors in June, submitted by the Court of Auditors to the European Parliament in October and voted in plenary by May; notes that by the time discharge is closed, if not postponed, at least 17 months have passed since the closing of annual accounts; points out that auditing in the private sector follows a much stricter timeline; stresses that the discharge procedure needs to be streamlined and sped up; requests that the Committee and the Court of Auditors follow the good example set by the private sector and proposes to set a deadline for the submission of Annual Activity reports on 31 March of the following year, a deadline for the submission for the Court of Auditor’s reports on the 1st of July and subsequently vote on the discharge in the plenary session of November, thereby closing the discharge procedure within the year following the accounting year in question;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2142(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

11a. Observes that the 5% staff reduction agreement has led to institutions increasingly hiring staff with temporary contracts; regrets that internal competitions are organised with the aim and result of retaining staff that have previously held the same position under previous temporary contracts; considers it more cost and time efficient as well as transparent and fair if well-performing staff with temporary contracts would be switched to permanent contracts without the added financial and administrative burden of organising competitions with pre-determined outcomes at the expense of disappointing outside applicants;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2142(DEC)

Wolf KLINZ, Arndt KOHN, Nedzhmi ALI, Martina DLABAJOVÁ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Regrets that the whistleblower file of the Committee’s former internal auditor is still not closed; insists that the Committee do its utmost to find a just, honourable and equitable settlement of the case as soon as possible; requests that the Committee keep Parliament informed of its progress;deleted

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2142(DEC)

Wolf KLINZ, Arndt KOHN, Nedzhmi ALI, Martina DLABAJOVÁ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Notes that there has been a decision by the Civil Service Tribunal in the case of the Committee's former internal auditor in November 2014; acknowledges that the Civil Service Tribunal ruled that the Committee must indemnify the former internal auditor yet further dismissed the allegations made by him; underlines that the Committee has promptly complied with the Tribunal's decision and paid the indemnities; considers therefore that the Committee has done its part to bring the case to a just, honourable and equitable settlement as requested by the Committee on Budget Control in the discharge report for the year 2015; notes that the former internal auditor has lodged a new case against the Committee in November 2015; notes that a hearing has taken place in December 2017 and that the Court's ruling is expected in summer 2018; observes that the Committee has no influence either on the plaintiff having lodged a new case nor on the timetable of the Court;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2142(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)

19a. Regrets the decision of the United Kingdom to withdraw from the European Union; observes that at this point no predictions can be made about the financial, administrative, human and other consequences related to the withdrawal, and asks the Committee and the Court of Auditors to perform impact assessments and inform Parliament on the results by the end of 2018;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2141(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Welcomes the overall prudent and sound financial management of the Committee in the 2016 budget period; expresses support for the successful paradigm shift towards performance- based budgeting in the Commission’s budget planning introduced by Vice- President Kristalina Georgieva in September 2015 as part of the “EU Budget Focused on Results” initiative; encourages the Committee to apply the method to its own budget-planning procedure;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2141(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)

3b. Notes that during the discharge procedure, Annual Activity reports are currently submitted to the Court of Auditors in June, submitted by the Court of Auditors to the European Parliament in October and voted in plenary by May; notes that by the time discharge is closed, if not postponed, at least 17 months have passed since the closing of annual accounts; points out that auditing in the private sector follows a much stricter timeline; stresses that the discharge procedure needs to be streamlined and sped up; requests that the Committee and the Court of Auditors follow the good example set by the private sector and proposes to set a deadline for the submission of Annual Activity reports on 31 March of the following year, a deadline for the submission for the Court of Auditor’s reports on the 1st of July and subsequently vote on the discharge in the plenary session of November, thereby closing the discharge procedure within the year following the accounting year in question;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2141(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10a. Observes that the 5 % staff reduction agreement has led to institutions increasingly hiring staff with temporary contracts; regrets that internal competitions are organised with the aim and result of retaining staff that have previously held the same position under previous temporary contracts; considers it more cost and time efficient as well as transparent and fair if well-performing staff with temporary contracts would be switched to permanent contracts without the added financial and administrative burden of organising competitions with pre-determined outcomes at the expense of disappointing outside applicants;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2141(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)

19a. Regrets the decision of the United Kingdom to withdraw from the European Union; observes that at this point no predictions can be made about the financial, administrative, human and other consequences related to the withdrawal, and asks the Committee and the Court of Auditors to perform impact assessments and inform Parliament on the results by the end of 2018;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2140(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Notes that during the discharge procedure, Annual Activity reports are currently submitted to the Court in June, submitted by the Court to the European Parliament in October and voted in plenary by May; notes that by the time discharge is closed, if not postponed, at least 17 months have passed since the closing of annual accounts; points out that auditing in the private sector follows a much stricter timeline; stresses that the discharge procedure needs to be streamlined and sped up; requests that the Court follows the good example set by the private sector and proposes to set a deadline for the submission of Annual Activity reports on 31 March of the following year, a deadline for the submission for the Court's reports on the 1st of July and subsequently to review the timetable for the discharge procedure as set down in Article 5 of Annex IV to Parliament's Rules of Procedure so that the vote on the discharge can be held in in the plenary part-session of November, thereby closing the discharge procedure within the year following the accounting year in question;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2140(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)

3b. Welcomes the overall prudent and sound financial management of the Court in the 2016 budget period; expresses support for the successful paradigm shift towards performance-based budgeting in the Commission’s budget planning introduced by Vice-President Kristalina Georgieva in September 2015 as part of the “EU Budget Focused on Results” initiative; encourages the Court to apply the method to its own budget-planning procedure;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2140(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

11a. Observes that the 5% staff reduction agreement has led to institutions increasingly hiring staff on temporary contracts; regrets that internal competitions are organised with the aim and result of retaining staff that have previously held the same position under previous temporary contracts; considers it more cost and time efficient as well as transparent and fair if well- performing staff with temporary contracts would be switched to permanent contracts without the added financial and administrative burden of organising competitions with pre-determined outcomes at the expense of disappointing outside applicants;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2140(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)

20a. Regrets the decision by the United Kingdom to withdraw from the European Union; observes that at this point no predictions can be made about the financial, administrative, human and other consequences related to the withdrawal, asks the Court to perform impact assessments and inform the Parliament on the results by the end of the year 2018;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2139(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3 a. Notes that during the discharge procedure, Annual Activity reports are currently submitted to the Court of Auditors in June, submitted by the Court of Auditors to the European Parliament in October and voted in plenary by May; notes that by the time discharge is closed, if not postponed, at least 17 months have passed since the closing of annual accounts; points out that auditing in the private sector follows a much stricter timeline; stresses that the discharge procedure needs to be streamlined and sped up; requests that the CJEU and the Court of Auditors follow the good example set by the private sector and proposes to set a deadline for the submission of Annual Activity reports on 31 March of the following year, a deadline for the submission for the Court of Auditor’s reports on the 1st of July and subsequently to review the timetable for the discharge procedure as set down in Article 5 of Annex IV to Parliament's Rules of Procedure so that the vote on the discharge can be held in the plenary part- session of November, thereby closing the discharge procedure within the year following the accounting year in question;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2139(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)

3 b. Welcomes the overall prudent and sound financial management of the CJEU in the 2016 budget period; expresses support for the successful paradigm shift towards performance-based budgeting in the Commission’s budget planning introduced by Vice-President Kristalina Georgieva in September 2015 as part of the “EU Budget Focused on Results” initiative; encourages the Court to apply the method to its own budget-planning procedure;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2139(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)

20 a. Observes that the 5% staff reduction agreement has led to institutions increasingly hiring staff with temporary contracts; regrets that internal competitions are organised with the aim and result of retaining staff that have previously held the same position under previous temporary contracts; considers it more cost and time efficient as well as transparent and fair if well-performing staff with temporary contracts would be switched to permanent contracts without the added financial and administrative burden of organising competitions with pre-determined outcomes at the expense of disappointing outside applicants;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2139(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29 a (new)

29 a. Regrets the decision by the UK to withdraw from the European Union; observes that at this point no predictions can be made about the financial, administrative, human and other consequences related to the withdrawal, asks the Council and the Court of Auditors to perform impact assessments and inform the European Parliament on the results by the end of the year 2018;

2018/03/02
Committee: CONT

2017/2138(DEC)

Proposal for a decision 1
Paragraph 1

1. ~~Grants/~~Refuses to grant the Secretary- General of the Council discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European Council and of the Council for the financial year 2016;

2018/09/11
Committee: CONT

2017/2138(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Expresses its support for the successful paradigm shift towards performance-based budgeting in the Commission’s budget planning introduced by Vice-President Kristalina Georgieva in September 2015 as part of the “EU Budget Focused on Results” initiative; encourages the European Council and the Council to apply the method to their own budget-planning procedure;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2138(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Expresses support for the successful paradigm shift towards performance-based budgeting in the Commission’s budget planning introduced in September 2015 as part of the “EU Budget Focused on Results” initiative; encourages the European Council and the Council to apply the method to their own budget-planning procedure;

2018/09/11
Committee: CONT

2017/2138(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10a. Takes note of the decision by the United Kingdom to withdraw from the Union; observes that at this point no predictions can be made about the financial, administrative, human and other consequences related to the withdrawal; asks the European Council and the Council to perform impact assessments and inform Parliament on the results by the end of the year 2018;

2018/09/11
Committee: CONT

2017/2138(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

11a. Observes that the 5% staff reduction agreement has led to institutions increasingly hiring staff with temporary contracts; regrets that internal competitions are organised with the aim and result of retaining staff that have previously held the same position under previous temporary contracts; considers it more cost and time efficient as well as transparent and fair if well-performing staff with temporary contracts would be switched to permanent contracts without the added financial and administrative burden of organising competitions with pre-determined outcomes at the expense of disappointing outside applicants;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2138(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

13a. Regrets the decision by the UK to withdraw from the European Union; observes that at this point no predictions can be made about the financial, administrative, human and other consequences related to the withdrawal, asks the European Council and the Council to perform impact assessments and inform the European Parliament on the results by the end of the year 2018;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Martina DLABAJOVÁ, Andrey NOVAKOV, Wolf KLINZ, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

Ba. Whereas budgetary principles of unity, budgetary accuracy, annuality, equilibrium, universality, specification, sound financial management and transparency shall be respected when the Union budget is implemented;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to align the Union's policy objectives, financial cycles, the legislative period of the Parliament and the mandate of the Commission;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Insists that the Union budget, as a consequence of the “budget focused on results initiative”, should be presented according to the Union´s political objectives of the MFF; reminds, also in the light of the post-2020 MFF, that the Union budget should be a true European added value budget, aimed for common Union objectives promoting sustainable economic and social development of the whole Union, which cannot be achieved by singular Member States on their own and therefore should not be seen merely as a net balance or benefit of single Member States;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Calls on the Commission to commit itself to fundamentally review~~ing~~ the young farmers’ and greening schemes in light of the findings of the Court of Auditors (the “Court”) before the next ~~financing period~~MFF;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Calls on the Commission to include in its performance reports assessments on the quality of the data used and a declaration on the quality of the performance information;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)

5b. Calls on the Commission to provide the Parliament and the Court with more balanced reporting, by including in its performance reports more transparent information on challenges, pitfalls and failures;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Calls on the Commission to fulfil the original 20% spending target in integrating climate action into the various Union spending programmes;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Calls on the Commission to speed up the preparation of the Union accounts, to ensure that reliable information from Member States on shared management spending is obtained in a more timely manner and to present the management´s view on Union spending earlier and together with the accounts, with the view to adopting a discharge decision in year n+1; reminds, in this context, of the importance of data reliability;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Notes with concern that as to the revenue for 2016, the director general of Directorate-General for Budget has issued a reservation for the traditional own resources revenue, in view of the OLAF’s fraud case related to United Kingdom customs duties;deleted

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Points out that the revenue affected by the quantified reservation is EUR 20.1 billion: i.e. 15 % of own resources for 2016; calls on the Commission to provide precise information on this fraud case, which indirectly affects the Value Added Tax basis of some Member States and thus Value Added Tax-related resources plus the Gross National Income-related balancing of the Commission75 ; _________________ 75See Commission's 2016 Annual Management and Performance Report for the EU Budget, p. 81.deleted

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Martina DLABAJOVÁ, Andrey NOVAKOV, Wolf KLINZ, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Welcomes the positive trend of the most likely error rate issued by the Court compared to that of recent years since the payments are affected in 2016 by a most likely error rate of 3.1%; recalls that the most likely error rate for payments was estimated in the financial years 2015 at 3.8%, 2014 at 4,4%, 2013 at 4.7%, 2012 at 4.8%, 2011 at 3.9%, 2010 at 3.7%, 2009 at 3.3%; 2008% at 5.2%, and 2007 at 6.9%; as the Court's s estimated error rate is not final, considers it important that Commission´s residual error rate is taken into account when assessing efficiency of Union´s funding;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Martina DLABAJOVÁ, Andrey NOVAKOV, Wolf KLINZ, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Stresses that the estimated level of error for cohesion does not include a quantification of 2016 disbursements to financial instruments amounting to EUR 2.5 billion that the Court considers to be outside the eligibility period defined in Article 56(1) of Council Regulation EC 1083/2006; notes that those disbursements would represent an estimated level of error of 2.0% of overall expenditure; ~~points out~~notes that if the Court had quantified this flagrant irregularity, the most likely error rate would have been estimated at 5.1% (nearly the same level as for 2008); calls on the Court to take on board all the irregularities having a financial impact when determining the most likely error rate and the Commission to table the necessary legislative proposal to put an end to this irregularityseparately (box 1.2 of the 2016 annual report) as a one-off, ring-fenced observation related to the absence of a timely Commission legislative proposal; notes the Commission´s unilateral decision to accept expenditure up to 31 March 2017;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Martina DLABAJOVÁ, Andrey NOVAKOV, Wolf KLINZ, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Points out that the Court found the highest estimated levels of error in spending for economic, social and territorial cohesion (4.8. % ~~or 6.8% with the quantified irregularity concerning the financial instruments~~) and for competitiveness for growth and jobs (4.1 %), whilst administrative expenditure had the lowest estimated level of error (0.2 %);

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Notes, in particular, that the Commission points out in its 2016 AMPR76 that the ~~scope of the~~ reservations issued by the directors general in their AARs has increased and amounts at: EUR 35.3 billion, which corresponds to 26 % of the payments (2015: EUR 29.8 Bbillion: 21% of payments); _________________ 76 COM(2017) 351 final, p. 81,

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Is surprised by the divergent views expressed by the Court and the Commission as to financial management of the first pillar of the CAP; expresses doubts as to the assertion made by the Court that in expenditure the error is not “pervasive”Notes that, while the first pillar of the CAP is included in entitlement payments which are not affected by a material level of error (ECA annual report paragraph 1.~~8) since~~11), the director general of the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI), in his AAR, issued a reservation in direct payments concerning 18 paying agencies comprising 12 Member States;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

35. ~~Points out in particular~~Notes that for more than three quarters of 2016 expenditure, Commission directorates- general base their estimates of amount at risk on data provided by national authorities~~, whilst it appears from the AARs of the concerned Commission directorates-general (in particular DG AGRI and DG REGIO) that the reliability of Member States’ control reports remains a challenge~~; stresses, in this regard, the importance of Member States’ data reliability;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. Points out that since errors can be corrected more than 10 years after they have occurred, it is artificial to base the estimated impact of future corrections upon recorded corrections over the last six years;deleted

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42

42. Endorses the reservations issued by the directors general of DG REGIO, MARE, HOME, DEVCO and AGRI, in their annual activity report; is of the opinion that those reservations demonstrate that the control procedures put in place in the Commission and the Member States can~~not~~ give the necessary guarantees concerning the legality and regularity of all the underlying transactions in the corresponding policy areas if necessary correction procedures are implemented successfully;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44

44. Points out that the delays in the implementation of programmes in the first three years of the current MFF led to the transfer of commitment appropriations from 2014, mainly to 2015 and 2016, and to low payments in 2016 (implementing the Union budget at 7 % in 2014-2016 period of the current MFF);

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44 a (new)

44a. Notes with concern the complicated web of arrangements in the galaxy within and around the EU budget as this hampers accountability, transparency, public scrutiny and democratic oversight of the EU budget and financial arrangements linked to it; regrets, in this regard, the lack of the unity of the EU budget, and fully shares the Court’s concern as regards the complexity of the EU budget;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 58

58. Notes with concern that the Commission uses two sets of objectives and indicators to measure the performance of its services and of spending programmes with hardly any cross-references, which hampers comparability between different types of performance documents;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 62

62. Notes that the programme statements for the EU’s 2017 draft general budget contain 294 objectives and 709 indicators, which are particularly highly concentrated under MFF headings 1a, 3, 4, and that through the ‘budget focused on results’ (BFOR) initiative, the Commission is currently undertaking a review of its indicators to provide input for the next generation of spending programmes; stresses that the Commission should use mainly results indicators that have performance relevant value;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 70

70. ~~Stresse~~Regrets that AARs do not include a declaration on the quality of the reported performance data, and that consequently in adopting the AMPR, the College of Commissioners takes overall political responsibility for the management of the EU budget but not for the information on performance and results;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 70 a (new)

70a. Welcomes and takes a careful note of the Court’s observations on performance frameworks and reporting by entities within and outside the EU, especially as regards performance data quality and declaration on the quality of performance data;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 77 a (new)

77a. Notes with concern that as to the revenue for 2016, the director general of Directorate-General for Budget has issued a reservation for the traditional own resources revenue, in view of the OLAF’s fraud case related to United Kingdom customs duties;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 77 b (new)

77b. Points out that for 2016 the revenue affected by the quantified reservation is approximately EUR 517 million against total amount of EUR 20.1 billion of Traditional Own Resources: i.e. 2,5 % of Traditional Own Resources or 0,38% of all resources; calls on the Commission to provide precise information on this fraud case, which may also indirectly affect the Value Added Tax basis of some Member States and thus Value Added Tax-related resources plus the Gross National Income-related balancing of the Commission1a; _________________ 1aSee Commission's 2016 Annual Management and Performance Report for the EU Budget, p. 81.

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 78

78. Stresses that the Commission inspections found that by October 2017, the UK authorities had not introduced remedial measures to prevent continued traditional own resource losses; notes that from 12 October 2017 the UK authorities started to apply temporarily value thresholds at clearance to certain traders (so called Customs Operation Swift Arrow) with immediate result that the Traditional Own Resources losses incurred in the UK decreased dramatically;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 90

90. Appreciates that the Commission has invested considerable efforts in ~~reducing~~simplification leading to reduction of administrative complexity, by introducing a new definition of additional remuneration for researchers, streamlining the Horizon 2020 work programme for 2018-2020, providing targeted support for start-ups and innovators and making wider use of ~~lump-sum funding for project~~Simplified Cost Options;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Martina DLABAJOVÁ, Andrey NOVAKOV, Wolf KLINZ, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 123

123. Points out that the errors in cohesion contributed to 43% of the overall estimated level of error of 3,1%; notes that one of the reasons for the high error rate is the complexity of Union´ and Member States´ regulation;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 125

125. Notes also that 42% of the errors were caused by ineligible caosts included in expenditure declarations, 30% relate to serious failure to respect public procurement rules, and 28% relate to ineligible projects, activities or beneficiaries;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 131

131. Recalls that the summary of data on the progress made in financing and implementing financial engineering instruments in March 20167 was only published on ~~20 Septem~~1 October 20187, and that therefore the Court could not comment on the document;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 132 – introductory part

132. Notes that the key figures for 201607- 2013 programming period on 31 March 2017 are the following:

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 186 a (new)

186a. Notes that, while having a maximum annual budget of EUR 150 million, the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund mobilised only EUR 28 million for commitments from the reserve in 2016, benefitting eight Member States;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 187 – point g

(g) ~~bringing~~enhance transparency and accountability of financial engineering instruments under the EU budget~~, thereby enhancing transparency and accountability~~;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 189 – point a

~~(a) DG REGIO to report back to Parliament’s responsible committee when the “stork nest” file has been clos~~deleted;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 189 – point c

(c) Calls on DG REGIO to report back to Parliament’s responsible committee, in the 2016 Commission discharge follow-up, on progress made with ~~railway relat~~all above mentioned projects ~~in Poland~~;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Martina DLABAJOVÁ, Andrey NOVAKOV, Wolf KLINZ, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 199

199. ~~Regret~~Asks that DG AGRI ~~has no~~to define~~d any~~ objective accompanied with indicators to reduce the income inequalities between farms in the next MFF;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 213

213. Points out that since the ~~error rates reported by the Member State~~management and control systems for each paying agency are not always fully reliable, DG AGRI adjusts that level of error based mainly on the Commission's and the Court's audits carried out in the last three years;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 232 – point a

(a) the Commission to carefully analyse the causes of the overall decline in factor income since 2013 and to define a new key performance objective for the next MFF, accompanied with indicators, aiming at mitigating the income inequalities between the famers;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/2136(DEC)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 254

254. ~~Calls~~Stresses that trust funds should be established only when their use is justified and the required action is not possible through other, existing financing channels; calls, in this regard, on the Commission, when establishing trust funds, to set up guiding principles for carrying out concise an structured assessment of the comparative advantages of trust funds relative to other aid vehicles and also to carry out analyses of what specific gaps the trust funds are supposed to fill; calls furthermore on the Commission to consider putting an end to trust funds that are unable to attract a significant contribution from other donors;

2018/03/01
Committee: CONT

2017/0333R(APP)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8 a. Suggests to task the EMF with evaluating and making recommendations on the implementation of the Union fiscal framework and the appropriateness of the actual fiscal stance at euro area and national level in order to ensure independent assessments of the member states’ budgets and economic forecasts;

2018/11/22
Committee: CONT

2017/0333R(APP)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 b (new)

8 b. Requests that the EMF is complemented with an insolvency procedure for sovereigns. This would increase the incentives for sound fiscal policies and avoid that investors consider lending to unsustainably run economies;

2018/11/22
Committee: CONT

2017/0333R(APP)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 c (new)

8 c. Requests that, together with the transformation of the ESM into the European Monetary Fund, risk weighting should be introduced with regard to sovereign bonds on banks’ books. Banks have been and are still to a large extent intertwined with their sovereigns by holding significant amounts of national public debt. This reform would motivate banks to focus on the solidity rather than the nationality of sovereign bonds;

2018/11/22
Committee: CONT

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas membership of a common currency area requires common rules and obligations, as well as ~~common~~ tools to respond to symmetric and asymmetric shocks ~~and for the promotion of solidarity and socioeconomic upward convergence; whereas risk reduction and risk sharing should go hand in hand~~; whereas risk reduction should precede risk sharing in deepening the EMU;

2019/01/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas in the short term, the ESM reform should contribute in particular to the banking union, providing a proper common financial backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), without prejudice to the ~~need~~possibility to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS);

2019/01/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

2017/0333R(APP)

Jean ARTHUIS, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Suggests that the ESM ~~be renamed not the European Monetary Fund (EMF) but the European Stability Fund (ESF)~~retain its current name, which is recognised on the capital market, making it clear that the eurozone’s monetary policy remains the competence of the ECB;

2019/01/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Highlights that the proper functioning of an EMU depends on the existence of an institution serving as a ‘lender of last resort’; acknowledges, in this context, the positive contribution of the ESM, despite its intergovernmental nature, towards addressing the weaknesses of the institutional setting of the EMU, namely by providing financial assistance to several Member States affected by the financial crisis ~~and the Great Recession~~;

2019/01/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Underlines that the primary mission of the new ESFM should continue to be to provide transitional financial assistance to Member States in need, on the basis of the agreed adjustment programmes; stresses that the ESFM must have adequate firepower for that purpose; opposes, therefore, any attempt to turn the reformed ESM into an instrument for banks only, or to reduce its financial capacity to support Member States; recalls that financial assistance provided to Member States under the new ESF has to be complemented by other fiscal capacity tools, including precautionary instruments, to promote economic and financial stabilisation, investment and upward socioeconomic convergence in the euro area;

2019/01/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Stresses that evaluation of the financial assistance requests made by the ESF, as well as its decision-making on the design of the adjustment programmes, in cooperation with other institutions, should in no way replace, duplicate or overlap the normal macroeconomic and fiscal surveillance provided for in the EU’s financial rules and regulations, which must remain the Commission’s exclusive competenceuggests to task the ESM with evaluating and making recommendations on the implementation of the Union fiscal framework and the appropriateness of the actual fiscal stance at euro area and national level in order to ensure independent assessments of the member states’ budgets and economic forecasts;

2019/01/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8 a. Requests that the reformed ESM is complemented with an insolvency procedure for sovereigns. This would increase the incentives for sound fiscal policies and avoid that investors consider lending to unsustainably run economies;

2019/01/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)

8 b. Requests that together with reforming the ESM risk weighting should be introduced with regard to sovereign bonds on banks’ books. Banks have been and are still to a large extent intertwined with their sovereigns by holding significant amounts of national public debt. This reform would motivate banks to focus on the solidity rather than the nationality of sovereign bonds.

2019/01/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Highlights the need for an efficient decision-making procedure in the reformed ESM, particularly in the case of urgent situations while safeguarding, where applicable, the prerogatives of national parliaments;

2019/01/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Calls for a swift ESM reform that also redefines its role, functions and financial tools, so that the new ESFM can offer liquidity support in case of resolution and ~~serve as a~~ , once signifincan~~cial backstop for the SRF; calls for the SRF to be made operational as soon as possible and,~~ t risk reduction has taken place in all participating Member States, serve as a fin an~~y case, before 2024~~cial backstop for the SRF;

2019/01/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 25

Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Article 41 – paragraph 1

The Board of Supervisors may establish internal committees for specific tasks and decisions attributed to it. The Board of Supervisors may provide for the delegation of certain clearly defined tasks and decisions to internal committees, to the Executive Board, to a full-time member of the Executive Board, or to the Chairperson.;

2018/09/14
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 17 b (new)

Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010
Article 31c (new)

(17b) The following Article 31c is inserted: ‘Article 31c Collaboration platforms 1. In order to ensure enhanced cooperation and information exchange for the supervision of financial institutions doing cross border activities [on the basis of freedom to provide services or freedom of establishment], the Authority may, on its own initiative or at the request of the competent authorities of the home Member State(s) or of a host Member State(s), decide to set up and participate in collaboration platforms. 2. The functioning of the collaboration platforms might be based on an arrangement establishing the rules of cooperation and coordination between the Authority and the other authorities involved. 3. Without prejudice to Article 35, the competent authorities participating in a collaboration platform shall provide all the necessary information to ensure the efficient functioning of the platform. 4. In accordance with Article 16, the Authority may, on the basis of the discussions taking place within the framework of a collaboration platform, issue a recommendation to a competent authority to take appropriate measures to remedy an advert situation. In case of disagreement between the supervisory authorities participating in a platform, any of these authorities may refer the matter to the Authority and request its assistance in accordance with Article19.’

2018/09/19
Committee: ECON

2017/0116(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. An investigation shall be initiated following a written complaint submitted by a Member State, the European Parliament, a Union air carrier or an association of Union air carriers in accordance with paragraph 2, or on the Commission's own initiative, if there is prima facie evidence of either of the following:

2017/12/12
Committee: ECON

2017/0116(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b

(b) the Commission, after consulting the European Parliament, concludes that adopting redressive measures in accordance with Article 13 would be against Union interest;

2017/12/12
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23

Without prejudice to the last subparagraph, for resolution entities, the amount referred to in paragraph 2 shall ~~not exceed~~be equal to the greater of the following:

2018/01/31
Committee: ECON

2016/0362(COD)

Caroline NAGTEGAAL, Wolf KLINZ, Thierry CORNILLET

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparapgraph 4

The re~~solution authority shall set the recapitalisa~~capitalisation amount shall include any additional amounts referred to in the previous subparagraphs in accordance with the resolution actions foreseen in the resolution plan and may adjust those recapitalisation amounts to adequately reflect risks that affect resolvability arising from the resolution group’s business model, funding profile and overall risk profil the resolution authority considers necessary in order to ensure post-resolution market confidence. This additional amount shall be equal to the combined buffer requirement, as laid down in Chapter 4, Section 1 of Directive 2013/36/EU. The resolution authority may impose an amount above this minimum in order to ensure that the post-resolution entity is able to obtain liquidity on markets without any emergency liquidity assistance.

2018/01/31
Committee: ECON

2016/0360A(COD)

Caroline NAGTEGAAL, Wolf KLINZ, Lieve WIERINCK, Ashley FOX, Petr JEŽEK

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 54 a (new)

(54a) The main purpose of this regulation is promoting prudential behaviour of financial institutions. Before granting lower risk weights to green or social liabilities the European Commission should carry out an impact assessment that shows that lower risk weighting is justified by an overestimation of the risk over an entire economic cycle under the standard approach.

2018/02/02
Committee: ECON

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14

Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 36 – paragraph 1 – point b

~~"(b) intangible assets;" (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R0575&from=~~(14) In paragraph 1 of Article 36, point (b) is replaced by the following: "(b) intangible assets, except investments in software that have a market value;" Or. en)

2018/02/02
Committee: ECON

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 54

3. Institutions may determine the average risk -weight~~ed exposure amount of r a CIU's exposures~~ in accordance with the approaches set out in Article 132a where all of the following conditions are met:

2018/02/05
Committee: ECON

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83

Own funds requirements shall not be higher than the maximum potential loss a product can incur. An institution shall calculate the own funds requirements for market risk with the standardised approach for a portfolio of trading book positions or non-trading book positions generating foreign-exchange and commodity risks as the sum of the following three components:

2018/02/05
Committee: ECON

2016/0360A(COD)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 108 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 416 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

Shares or units in CIUs may be treated as liquid assets up to an absolute amount of EUR 500 million in the portfolio of liquid assets of each institution provided that the requirements in Article 132(3) are met and that ~~the CIU~~more than 75% of the CIU's investments, apart from derivatives to mitigate interest rate or credit or currency risk, ~~only invests~~are in liquid assets as referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

2018/02/05
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Aa. whereas the Troika and its role have been enshrined in Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 May 2013 and mentioned in the Treaty on the ESM;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT

Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)

Ab. whereas Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 May 2013 has been adopted in the European Parliament with 528 votes in favour, 81 against and 71 abstentions;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT

Motion for a resolution
Recital A c (new)

Ac. whereas the ECJ has confirmed in its ruling on Pringle C-370/12 that the Commission and the ECB can be entrusted with the tasks conferred to them in the ESM Treaty;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas, within the Troika, the Commission is responsible for negotiating the conditions for financial assistance for euro area Member States ‘in liaison with the ECB’ and ’wherever possible together with the IMF’, the financial assistance hereinafter referred to as ‘EU-IMF assistance’, but the Council is responsible for approving the macroeconomic adjustment programme;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas the Troika is the basic structure for negotiation between the official lenders and the governments of the recipient countries, as well as for reviewing the implementation of adjustment programmes; whereas for the European side, the final decisions as regards financial assistance and conditionality are taken by ~~the Eurogroup~~EU Finance Ministers;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is based on a draft macroeconomic adjustment programme prepared by the Member State requesting financial assistance and approved by the Council; whereas a MoU is an agreement between the Member State concerned and the Troika, which results from negotiations and whereby a Member State undertakes to carry out a number of actions in exchange for financial assistance; whereas the Commission signs the MoU on behalf of euro area finance ministers; whereas it is stipulated in the ESM Treaty that a Member State requesting assistance from the ESM has also to address a request for assistance to the IMF;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)

Ha. whereas the ECJ has stated in its Pringle ruling that the prohibition laid down in Article 125 TFEU ensures that the Member States remain subject to the logic of the market when they enter into debt, since that ought to prompt them to maintain budgetary discipline and that compliance with such discipline contributes at Union level to the attainment of a higher objective, namely maintaining the financial stability of the monetary union; it stresses, however, that Article 125 TFEU does not prohibit the granting of financial assistance by one or more Member States to a Member State which remains responsible for its commitments to its creditors provided that the conditions attached to such assistance are such as to prompt that Member State to implement a sound budgetary policy;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas the Task Force for Greece was set up to strengthen the capacity of the Greek administration to design and implement structural reforms to improve the functioning of the economy and ~~society and~~ create the conditions for sustained recovery and job creation, as well as to speed up the absorption of EU Structural and Cohesion Funds in Greece and to provide critical resources to finance investment;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Recital L a (new)

La. whereas it is crucial to recognize in this context that the four Member States under assistance were very different in terms of their industrial and financial structures and that for this reason one- size fits all policies could not work;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Considers that the precise triggers for the crises differed in all four Member States; points out that excessive public and private debt, and a loss of competitiveness played a crucial role all of which could not be prevented by the existing EU economic governance framework;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Notes that while domestic policy mistakes were important factors in the development of the underlying vulnerabilities, all four Member States also fell victim to repercussions of the global financial crisis that first surfaced with Lehman Brothers and further spread to the euro area, exposing rigidities and incompleteness in the fiscal and structural architecture of the EMU;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Points out that EU Finance Ministers approved the macroeconomic adjustment programmes;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

17a. Points out that each Member State's reform efforts need to be tailor-made taking the experiences and histories of the respective country into consideration;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal and the financial sector programme for Spain; regrets the lack of progress in Greece despite unprecedented reforms having been undertaken;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Considers that too little attention has been given to alleviating the negative impact of adjustment strategies in the programme countries; deplores that too often the one-size fits all approach taken to crisis management did not fully consider the balance in the social impact of the prescribed policy measures;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

29. Notes that the Troika’s mandate has been perceived as being unclear and lacking transparency; welcomes however that since the entry into force of Regulation No 472/2013 which codifies the surveillance procedures to be employed in the euro for countries experiencing financial difficulties, a de facto mandate for the Troika has been established; calls for full implementation and full ownership of this regulation;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 a (new)

30a. Points out that the Troika and its role are defined in Article 6 and 7 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 May 2013;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 b (new)

30b. Reminds that the Member State which requests financial assistance is responsible for the preparation of its macroeconomic adjustment programme and stresses that macroeconomic adjustment programmes are being approved by a qualified majority of EU Finance Ministers;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 c (new)

30c. Stresses that despite the Commission acting on behalf of the Member States the ultimate political responsibility for the design and approval of the macroeconomic adjustment programmes lies with EU Finance Ministers and their governments;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 d (new)

30d. Deplores that neither the President of the Eurogroup nor the President of the European Council did attend the hearings in the European Parliament on the role of the Troika;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

31. Notes the admission by the former President of the Eurogroup before the European Parliament that the Eurogroup endorsed the recommendations of the Troika without considering their specific policy implications; stresses that, if accurate, this does not discharge euro area finance ministers from their political responsibility for the macroeconomic adjustment programmes and the MoUs;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33

33. Points equally to a possible conflict of interest between the current role of the ECB in the Troika as ‘technical advisor’ and its position as creditor of the four Member States as well as its mandate under the Treaty; requests that possible ECB conflicts of interest, especially as regards crucial liquidity policy are carefully scrutinized; notes that throughout the crisis, the ECB has had crucial information on the health of the banking sector and financial stability in general, and that it has subsequently exerted policy leverage on decision- makers, at least in the cases of the Greek debt-restructuring, the Cypriot ELA operations and the Irish non-inclusion of senior-bondholders in the bail-in; calls for the appropriate lessons to be learnt;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34

34. Notes that the ECB’'s role is not sufficiently defined, as it is stated in Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 and the ESM Treaty that the Commission should work ‘in liaison with the ECB’, thus reducing the ECB’s role to that of a provider of expertise; further notes that the ECB mandate is limited by the TFEU to monetary policy and that the active involvement of the ECB in ~~any~~ matters related to budgetary, fiscal and structural policies ris ~~therefore on uncertain legal ground~~ks being outside its mandate;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36 a (new)

3a. Deplores that EU institutions are being portrayed as the scapegoat for adverse effects in Member States' macroeconomic adjustment while it is the Member States' Finance Ministers that bear the political responsibility for the Troika and its operations; stresses that this may lead to increased Euroscepticism although responsibility lies with the national not the European level;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36 b (new)

36b. Calls on the Eurogroup, the Council and the European Council to assume full responsibility for the operations of the Troika;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. Stresses that as long as Member States make direct contributions from their national budget to the ESM national parliaments should approve financial assistance; recommends for this purpose that all Member States establish an appropriate mechanism by which their parliaments approve financial assistance and monitor implementation to enhance ownership and democratic accountability; stresses that the ESM should evolve towards Community-method management as provided for in the ESM Treaty and demands that the ESM be made accountable to the European Parliament including with respect to decisions to grant financial assistance, in order to exert democratic accountability over the ESM;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43

43. Is concerned~~, in particular,~~ to improve the accountability of the Commission when it acts in its capacity as a member of the Troika; requests that the Commission representative(s) in the Troika should be heard in the European Parliament before taking up their duties and should be subject to regular reporting to the European Parliament;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43 a (new)

43a. Requests that in any reform of the Troika framework the ECB role is carefully analysed in order to align it with the ECB mandate; requests especially to assess the viability granting the ECB a transparent and clearly defined advisory role while not allowing it to be a full negotiation partner and discontinuing ECB co-signing mission statements;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 a (new)

45a. Stresses that the EU and the euro area in particular need to continue the path of economic reforms to increase the overall competitiveness of the Union, to create growth and jobs, and to make it more resilient to external shocks;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2175(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 8

– having regard to the ~~proposal for a~~ regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Venture Capital Funds (COM(2011)0860),

2013/12/05
Committee: ECON

2013/2175(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Stresses that long-term investments shall be in line with the objectives outlined in the Europe 2020 growth strategy, the 2012 industrial policy update, the Innovation Union initiative as well as Connecting Europe Facility;

2013/12/05
Committee: ECON

2013/2175(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Emphasises that long-term investments play a crucial part in stabilising financial markets by investing countercyclically and therefore promote sustainable economic growth;

2013/12/05
Committee: ECON

2013/2175(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

11a. Believes that Public Private Partnerships (PPP) can be an effective and cost-efficient method to facilitate collaboration between the public and the private sector for certain investments, especially infrastructure projects; notes that there is a strong need for a high level of expertise to allow the proper selection, evaluation, design, long-term planning and funding arrangements of such projects;

2013/12/05
Committee: ECON

2013/2175(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that national or multilateral development banks can stimulate private investments and catalyse long-term financing for undertakings of broader public interest; namely those which would add value to public policy objectives related to economic growth, social cohesion and environmental protection;

2013/12/05
Committee: ECON

2013/2175(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)

21a. Calls on the Commission services to reduce unnecessary administrative and regulatory burden, especially for SMEs and entrepreneurs, as mentioned in the Small Business Act and in the Competitiveness of enterprises and SMEs (COSME) regulation;

2013/12/05
Committee: ECON

2013/2175(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 a (new)

25a. Encourages the Commission to seek enhanced international cooperation and convergence in the area of long-term investment by pursuing a global dialogue on both G20 and Financial Stability Board (FSB) level;

2013/12/05
Committee: ECON

2013/2175(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 a (new)

26a. Encourages the Commission to closely follow the G20's work on proposals to create a multilateral investment framework that sets minimum standards and modifies certain long-term investment regulations and fair value accounting rules in order to address short-term fluctuations and volatility and to consequently foster cross-border investments;

2013/12/05
Committee: ECON

2013/2175(INI)

Wolf KLINZ, Vicky FORD, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 b (new)

26b. Calls on Member States to develop and publish their own national infrastructure plans in order to provide investors and other stakeholders with detailed information and to allow for more certainty about future projects;

2013/12/05
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 20 a (new)

– having regard to the Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions of Financial Stability Board published in October 2011,

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the financial crisis has demonstrated that inefficient and fragmented supervision of financial markets contributed to financial instability ~~and a lack of consumer protection in financial services~~;

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas the ~~structure of the ESRB and the size of its decision-making body h~~ESRB has performed tasks of macroeconomic nature, but also got involved in de~~rs a swift decision-making process~~veloping numerous micro- supervisory projects which go beyond its mandate;

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital L

L. whereas supervision by the European Central Bank (ECB) of financial conglomerates active in banking and insurance business is limited by the legal basis for the SSM which could have been avoided by establishing the SSM on the basis of Article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU);deleted

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital M

M. whereas the ECB and the ESAs have different reporting standards and intervals and the creation of the SSM might poses a ~~serious~~ risk of duplication of reporting requirements if national authorities do not cooperate sufficiently with the SSM and ESAs;

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital O

O. whereas the possibility of binding mediation has seldom been used and therefore should not be overestimated in the future legislation;

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital P

~~P. whereas the ESAs refrain from certain necessary requests for information in anticipation of a rejection in their Boards of Supervisors;~~deleted

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital R

R. whereas guidelines have proven to be a useful and necessary tool to f~~ill gaps in regulation where no powers for the ESAs~~ urther specify and clarify the rules and principles laid down in the according sectorial legislation. To avoid any shadow regulation which has not been subject to democratic legitimation, guidelines shall not go beyond the poweres provided for in ~~the~~ sectorial legislation;

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital U

U. whereas the ESAs are limited in fulfilling their mandate by a lack of resources, and staff andlthough they have been given full flexibility in recruiting;

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital U a (new)

Ua. whereas the recruiting process of the ESAs has not always been sufficiently transparent;

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital V

V. whereas some requirements that the ESAs imposed on all market participants were considered to be onerous, or inappropriate ~~and not proportional to the size and business model of the addressees~~;

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital AB a (new)

ABa. whereas some decisions and guidelines of the ESAs have gone beyond the relevant Level I legislation or even have been prepared without any legal base in the sectoral legislation;

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 1 – indent 1

– ~~Enhance~~Limit the mandate for the all ESAs for binding ~~and non-binding mediation especially with regard to the ECB and delete Recital 32 which is misleading on the mandate for non-binding~~ mediation;

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 1 – indent 2

~~– Give the ESAs the possibility to trigger binding and non-binding mediation on their own initiative;~~deleted

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 1 – indent 4

– ~~Ensure that the ESAs, national supervisory authorities and the ECB~~Ask the Commission to conduct an impact assessment whether the ESAs shall have access to the same supervisory information ~~which has to be provide~~as national supervisory authorities and wthe~~re possible in a common format which~~ ECB, which in any case would hasve to be ~~determined by the ESAs~~provided in a common electronic format;

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 1 – indent 5

– ~~Establish the ESRB outside the ECB~~Ask the Commission to assess the mandate and tasks of the ESRB in order to avoid the arising conflicts of interest between micro-prudential supervision and supervisory tools and macro-economic oversight.

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 1

~~– proposing a single seat for all three ESA;~~deleted

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 4

– granting the ESAs a~~n independent budget line as for the European Data Protection Supervisor funded~~ budget line funded solely by the contributions from ~~market participants and~~ the Union budget;

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 5

– taking account of the size of Member States and their respective financial sector when reviewing the voting rights on the boards of supervisors and introducing ~~simple~~qualified majority voting for all decisions within the ESAs;

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 6

– clarifying that guidelines to improve common standards for the whole internal market pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010, and of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 can be issued ~~without additional~~only based on the respective empowerment in sectorial legislation ~~and deleting Recital 26 of those Regulations~~, which can secure democratic legitimacy;

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 6 a (new)

– further clarify that guidelines can only be issued where public consultation has been conducted and therefore, delete “where appropriate” in Article 16 (2) in each of the Regulations;

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 9

– enabling the ESRB to explore and to propose additional measures for macroeconomic stability such as leverage and loan-to-value ratios, counter cyclical buffers and accounting standards promoting financial stability;deleted

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 10

– requiring the ESAs to respect where appropriate the principal of proportionality especially with regard to small and medium-sized market participants when carrying out their tasks and developing their supervisory methods, practices and handbooks;

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 15

~~– requiring the ESAs to have a possibility for citizens of all Member States in place to contact the ESAs to ask questions, obtain answers and file complaints;~~deleted

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2166(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 17

– providing for the ~~mandatory~~appropriate involvement of the ESAs ~~and of the ESRB~~ in legislative processes concerning their fields of expertise;

2014/01/15
Committee: ECON

2013/2076(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas, according to the Commission services' spring 2013 forecast, GDP in the eurozone fell by 0.6 % in 2012 , after a rise of 1.4 % in 2011 and will contract by 0.4 % in 2013 before rising by 1.2 % in 2014;

2013/07/12
Committee: ECON

2013/2076(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas, according to the same forecast, unemployment in the eurozone rose from 10.2 % at the end of 2011 to 11.4 % at the end of 2012 and risks further increasing to 12.2 % in 2013 before slightly decreasing again in 2014;

2013/07/12
Committee: ECON

2013/2076(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Is deeply concerned ~~at the fact~~ that persistently weak economic conditions ~~are becoming the norm in Europe, creating overwhelming~~create discontent among European citizens ~~and therefore jeopardising the whol~~with the European project;

2013/07/12
Committee: ECON

2013/2076(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Welcomes the decisions of July 2012 to reduce the key ECB interest rates in the context of very low inflation expectations and weak economic activity; recalls that, in the long term, very low interest rates may cause distortions in the business sector and harm private savings and pension plans;

2013/07/12
Committee: ECON

2013/2076(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Considers that the three-year LTRO settled on March 2012 contributed to stabilising the banking system, but that this should be a temporary measure; notes that, despite the liquidity injected into the banking system by the LTRO, the credit available to the real economy is still below pre-crisis levels; ~~suggests that it would be appropriate for the ECB to reduce its deposit facility rate to negative values in order to encourage banking lending to the real economy;~~

2013/07/12
Committee: ECON

2013/2076(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Welcomes the setting-up of the OMTs~~, with no ex ante quantitative limits,~~ in order to safeguard monetary policy transmission~~, but deplores the decision to link the activation of the OMT to strict conditionalities attached to an EFSF/ESM programme; calls on the ECB to activate OMTs independently from strict conditionality~~;

2013/07/12
Committee: ECON

2013/2076(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Considers unnecessary~~Welcomes the full sterilisation of the liquidity injected by the OMTs~~, as inflation expectations remain extremely low in a context of weak economic activity~~;

2013/07/12
Committee: ECON

2013/2076(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Considers that the monetary policy tools that the ECB has used since the beginning of the crisis, while providing a welcome relief in distressed financial markets, have revealed their limits as regards stimulating growth and improving the situation on the labour market; considers, therefore, that the ECB could investigate the possibilities of implementing new unconventional measures aimed at participating in a large, EU-wide pro-growth programme, including the use of the Emergency Liquidity Assistance facility to undertake an ‘overt money financing’ of government debt in order to finance tax cuts targeted on low-income households and/or new spending programmes focused on the Europe 2020 objectives;deleted

2013/07/12
Committee: ECON

2013/2076(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Considers it necessary to review the Treaties and the ECB's statutes in order to establish price stability together with full employment as the two objectives, on an equal footing, of monetary policy in the eurozone;deleted

2013/07/12
Committee: ECON

2013/2076(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

~~11. Argues that the conduct of monetary policy should be democratic and should result from deliberation between different viewpoints and approaches;~~deleted

2013/07/12
Committee: ECON

2013/2076(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Invites the ECB to pay more attention to the contractionary effects on GDP, employment and social welfare created by austerity policies carried out by national governments in the framework of Economic Assistance Programmes involving the ECB;deleted

2013/07/12
Committee: ECON

2013/2076(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Underlines th~~at the ECB's independence should not justify lack of democratic accountabi~~e need for democratic accountability with regard to the SSM and the ECB's involvement in the Troika, while stressing the ECB's independence in the field of monetary politcy;

2013/07/12
Committee: ECON

2013/2076(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 2

~~Exchange rate policy~~deleted

2013/07/12
Committee: ECON

2013/2076(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

~~14. Considers that the exchange rate is a crucial economic policy variable which impacts on the competiveness of the eurozone;~~deleted

2013/07/12
Committee: ECON

2013/2076(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

~~15. Calls on the ECB to pay more attention to the euro exchange rate in order to avoid excessive euro appreciation, which could in turn damage the eurozone;~~deleted

2013/07/12
Committee: ECON

2013/2076(INI)

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Underlines the importance of supporting the euro as an international currency, and stresses the need to pave the way for a new international monetary order taking into account the new multipolar world economy;deleted

2013/07/12
Committee: ECON

2013/2076(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Stresses the importance of a fruitful cooperation between the ECB and the competent national authorities within the framework of the SSM, in order to ensure an effective and smooth supervision, while guaranteeing full separation between monetary policy and supervision;

2013/07/12
Committee: ECON

2013/2076(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Considers it urgent to approve the establishment of a European Resolution System in order to protect depositors ~~and prevent fur~~, to reinforce the stability of ther banking ~~crises~~system as well as to prevent the "too big to fail" syndrome ;

2013/07/12
Committee: ECON

2013/2076(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

25. Notes that in order to strengthen the stability of the banking system and avoid the development of the ‘too big to fail’ syndrome, consideration should be given to introducing a full separation between deposit and investment banks, on the lines of the ‘Volcker Rule’ in the US;deleted

2013/07/12
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 a (new)

- having regard to the proposal of 6 June 2012 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010,

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas in the five years since the 2008 global economic and financial crisis, the EU economy has remained in a state of recession, with Member States providing s~~ubsidies~~tate anid i~~mplicit guarantees to banks~~n form of capital and guarantees to banks and markets that have remained fragmented;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas excessive risk-taking, excessive leverage, inadequate capital and liquidity requirements, weak banking and markets supervision and the excessive complexity of the overall banking system were at the root of the financial crisis;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Syed KAMALL, Wolf KLINZ, Sharon BOWLES, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Sven GIEGOLD

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas the loss of prudence in accounting standards as a consequence of the adoption of international financial reporting standards played and continues to play a central role in allowing banks to give a view of their accounts that was and is not always true and fair with particular reference to IAS 39 on loan loss provisioning;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the current post-crisis weakness in the ~~structure of EU bank~~capitalisation of EU banks, massive deleveraging and rising funding costs for banks in some Member States demonstrates the need for ~~reform~~further reform of capital requirements in order to serve the wider needs of the economy, break the link between sovereigns and banks and restore the confidence in capital markets;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas the eighth (December 2012) edition of the Commission's Consumer Markets Scoreboard clearly indicates that consumer trust in the EU banking sector is at an all-time low and that the industry has high levels of noncompliance with consumer protection legislation5 and the consumers' confidence needs to be restored ;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas research by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) suggests that once bank assets exceed a country's GDP, its financial sector ~~has~~might have a negative impact on economic growth, as human and financial resources are drained from other areas of economic activity6 ;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas the financial crisis demonstrated the problem of potential cross- contamination between banks' ~~retail and investment~~core business and non-banking holding activities;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas ~~the~~every adopted Commission proposal should provide for a strong, stable and resilient banking sector for the internal market while respecting the diversity of the Member States' banking sectors;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas, since it is neither feasible nor desirable to effect a bank separation post- failure, an effective recovery and resolution regime is needed in order to provide authorities with a credible set of tools, including a bridge bank, so that they can intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing bank to enable its essential financial and economic functions to continue, while minimising the impact on financial stability and ensuring that appropriate losses are imposed on the shareholders and creditors who bore the risk of investing in the institution in question, and not by taxpayers or insured depositors;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the HLEG's analysis and recommendations on banking reform and considers them a sound basis for ~~initiating~~discussions about necessity of potential additional reforms;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Takes the view that ~~while~~ current proposals for reforms of EU banking sector rules (including the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, the Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive and shadow banking initiatives) are vital~~, a more fundamental reform of the banking structure is essential, and complementary to the other proposals~~;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Deplores the national initiatives in France, Germany and UK that, although well intended, risk to undermine the Single Market and distort competition in the EU banking sector;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Insists that the Commission's impact assessment include a thorough assessment of the cost to both public finances and financial stability of the failure of an EU- based bank during the current crisis, together with information on the nature of the EU's current universal banking model, including the size and balance sheets of the retail and investment activities of all universal banks operating in the EU, broken down by individual bank and countryincluding all cumulative costs and benefits of adopted legislation for the EU banking sector together with information on additional costs and benefits of other proposals currently discussed and expected to be adopted;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Syed KAMALL, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Sven GIEGOLD

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Notes that the HLEG did not look at the issue of accounting standards and their role in financial crisis in sufficient depth; notes that European company law requires that accounts must be true and fair in order for directors of a company to discharge their liabilities to creditors and shareholders of companies; suggests that as a consequence of international financial reporting standards being overly complex and being principally about providing information to the share trading part of capital markets, these standards did and do not give a true and fair view of banks' accounts; notes that despite commitments from the IASB to update IAS 39 on loan loss provisioning from an incurred to expected loss model, its adoption has been delayed due to concerns expressed by FASB that the revised IASB model is still not a lifetime expected loss model; notes that although moving to an expected loss model recognises the problems caused by IAS 39 during the crisis, the added complexity may well create problems of their own; argues that, therefore, structural reform must include a thorough assessment of what role accounts should play in driving better governance of banks;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Considers that the core principle of potential banking reform must be to deliver a safe, stable and efficient banking system that serves the needs of the real economy, customers and consumers; takes the view that ~~structur~~every additional reform must stimulate economic growth by supporting the provision of credit to the economy, in particular to SMEs and start-ups, provide greater resilience against potential financial crises, restore trust and confidence in banks and remove risks to public finances;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Calls for more legal certainty and clarity in all ongoing and additional reforms, which have direct impact on funding costs for banks and - in consequence - also effect lending to the real economy;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Considers that an effective banking system must deliver a change in banking culture ~~in order to~~and reduce complexity, ~~enhance competition~~simplify the structure, limit interconnectedness between ~~risky and commercial~~core banking and non-banking holding activities, improve corporate governance, create a responsible and sustainable remuneration system based on long-term incentives, allow effective bank resolution and recovery, reinforce the customer oriented banking, reinforce bank capital and deliver credit to the real economy;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

~~8. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for mandatory separation of banks' retail and investment activities;~~deleted

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges the Commission to come forward with a proposal for such mandatory separation through the establishment of a thorough, transparent and credible ‘ring fence’ around bank activities that are vital for the real economy, such as those relating to credit functions, payment systems and deposits; takes the view that in the event of a bank failure, the ring fence must ensure that the retail entity continues business unaffected by operational problems, financial losses, funding shortages or reputational damage resulting from the resolution or insolvency of the investment entitysupport the legislators in a fast and credible implementation of the banking crisis management and resolution directive proposal, foreseeing a mandatory simplification of banking structure in case of a stated non-resolvability in the resolution plan of an institution;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Urges the Commission to ensure that trading activities do not benefit from implicit guarantees, the use of insured deposits or taxpayer bailouts and that these activities do not pose a risk to the delivery of ring-fenced retail serviceresponsible management of banks and competent supervisors to ensure that trading activities in the banking system do not pose a systemic risk and are subject to robust risk management controls;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Urges the ~~Commission~~management of banks and supervisors to ensure that where banks undertake trading activities, the risks and costs associated with those activities are borne by their trading ~~arm and not~~unit; calls for internal control mechanisms to ensure that losses are not borne by othe~~ir ring-fenced retail arm~~r units and asks for mandatory reporting of profits and losses borne by all relevant units;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation results in: (a) separate legal entities, with separate sources of funding for the bank's retail and investment entities; (b) limits on the extent to which the two entities are reliant on each other for funding and/or resources; in particular, there should be no legal basis for shifting capital and liquidity from ring-fenced entities to other entities in the group; (c) the application of adequate, thorough and separate capital, leverage and liquidity rules to each entity, including separate balance sheets; (d) net and gross large exposure limits for intra-group transactions between ring- fenced and non-ring-fenced activities, which are at least as strict as those for third-party exposure, including strict limits on the exposure of ring-fenced activities to the investment entity's riskier activities;deleted

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Urges the Commission to take into account the ECB's proposal to establish clear and enforceable criteria for separation8 ; __________________ 8 http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/120128_ eurosystem_contributionen.pdf, p. 2.deleted

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Underlines the necessity of assessing the systemic risk presented by both the retail and investment ~~entitie~~banks, as well as by ~~the group as a whole~~universal banks, with a view to the application of appropriate capital buffers and liquidity requirements for each entity as well as regular checks of the quality of assets held by banks across the EU since RWAs lost their credibility in the financial crisis;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)

14a. Stresses the need for enhanced macro-surveillance as one of the crucial aspects to mitigate risks in the interconnected EU banking sector;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Urges the Commission to ensure that ~~the retail entity~~every bank has sufficient capital ~~and~~, liquid assets and bail-inable instruments to enable it, in the event of the bank's failure, to maintain depositors' access to funds, and to protect the essential services ~~of the ring-fenced arm~~ from the risk of disorderly failure ~~and to prioritise paying out depositors in a timely fash~~through an efficient resolution;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Urges the Commission and competent supervisors to ensure that adequate differentiation exists in terms of capital, leverage and liquidity requirements between ~~the~~ investment ~~and~~, retail ~~entities, with~~and universal banks, and e~~mphasis on higher capital requirements for the investment entity~~specially appropriate and needed capital and liquidity flows within banking groups operating in different Member States are ensured;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Calls on the Commission to ~~implement~~assess the proposals set out in the HLEG's report in the area of corporate governance of ~~separated~~ banks, including a) governance and control mechanisms, b) risk management, c) incentive schemes, d) risk disclosure and e) sanctions, taking into account where the proposals have been addressed in adopted legislation and aiming at enforcing faster change of bankers' behaviours;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Urges the Commission to ensure that separation delivers independent decision- making and governance for each entity, with separate executive and non-executive board members and whereby neither side of the ring fence is owned by or reports to the other;deleted

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls on the Commission to include provisions establishing an obligation for all board members of the retail entity, both executive and non-executive, and all levels of management and risk-takers to originate from, and only have responsibility for, the retail entity and not the investment entity;deleted

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Urges the Commission to ~~includ~~explore possible and adequate provisions introducing personal accountability and liability for board members ~~on both sides of the ring fence and at group level~~;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

22. Urges the Commission to continue the reform of banks' compensation and remuneration culture by prioritising long- term incentives for variable remuneration with ~~larger~~appropriate deferral periods up to ~~retirement~~5 years;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Urges the Commission to ensure that remuneration systems ~~prioritis~~might include the use of instruments such as shares, options and bonds subject to bail- in, a~~nd shares, rather than~~longside cash;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

~~26. Urges the Commission to make provision for national supervisors to have the power to implement full and legal separation of banks;~~deleted

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Asks the Commission to propose that adequate resources and powers be allocated to ~~national~~competent supervisors; y authorities including SSM;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Syed KAMALL, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Sven GIEGOLD

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)

27a. Urges the Commission to conduct a study to ensure that accounting standards used by financial institutions give a genuinely true and fair view of banks' financial health; points out that accounts are the main source of information for an investor to understand whether or not a company is a going concern or not; notes that auditors can only sign off accounts if they are true and fair, independent of the financial standards used by preparers of financial statements; believes that if auditors are unsure that a company is a going concern they should not sign off the company's accounts, even if they have been drawn up in line with accounting standards; this should however be a driver of better management of the company in question; suggests that international financial reporting standards do not necessarily give a true and fair view of accounts, as shown by numerous examples of banks collapsing despite their accounts having been signed off by auditors;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

29. Urges the Commission and the Member States to work together to promote greater diversification of the EU's banking sector by encouraging and facilitating more consumer-oriented banking, for example through cooperative, building society, peer-to-peer lending and saving bank models;deleted

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

30. Urges the ~~Member States~~Commission to ensure that ~~their national supervisors~~competent supervisory authorities including SSM have the clear objective of promoting effective competition in their banking sectors;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

31. Asks the Commission to bring forward measures to facilitate consumer switching between banks and assist in improving consumer choice in the banking sector by reducing the barriers to entry and exit and applying proportionate rules to new entrants to the market;deleted

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/2021(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. Calls on the Commission to brevaluate the need for any additional banking refor~~ward the necessary structural reforms outlined in this report~~ms considered in this report, provided their necessity will be proven in the Commission impact assessment analysing all costs and benefits of all adopted proposals, which, while maintaining the integrity of the internal market, respect the diversity of national banking systems and ensure Member States' ability to reinforce them where appropriate;

2013/04/18
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Wolf KLINZ, Burkhard BALZ, Olle SCHMIDT

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6 a (new)

(6a) Measures need to be implemented to reduce the risk of runs and to address the first mover advantage. As recommended by IOSCO, appropriate safeguards shall reinforce MMFs' resilience and ability to face significant redemptions. These measures shall be: 1) Imposing minimum levels of daily, weekly and monthly liquid assets that MMFs must hold. MMF should also adjust their holdings depending on market conditions and their investor basis. 2) Enhancing the quality of the assets a MMF holds. 3) Requiring money market funds to institute a liquidity fee in cases of high stress in financial markets in which the MMF is facing an unusually high volume of redemptions. 4) Permitting MMFs to impose a gating mechanism in certain circumstances which would allow the fund to temporarily suspend redemptions.

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23

(23) Asset Backed Commercial Papers (ABCPs) should be considered eligible money market instruments to the extent that they respect additional requirements. Due to the fact that during the crisis certain securitisations were particularly unstable, it is necessary to impose maturity limits and quality criteria on the underlying assets. Not all categories of underlying assets should be eligible because some were more confronted to instability than others. For this reason the underlying assets should be exclusively composed of short-term debt instruments that have been issued by corporates in the course of their business activity, such as trade receivables. Instruments such as auto loans and leases, equipment leases, consumer loans, residential mortgage loans, credit card receivables or any other type of instrument linked to the acquisition or financing of services or goods by consumers should ~~not be eligible~~undergo a thorough examination. ESMA should be entrusted with drafting regulatory technical standards to be submitted for endorsement by the Commission with regard to the conditions and circumstances under which the underlying exposure or pool of exposures is considered to exclusively consist of corporate debt and the conditions and numerical thresholds determining when corporate debt is of high credit quality and liquid.

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23 a (new)

(23a) In order to assess the eligibility of certain instruments and their underlying assets, ESMA shall develop a set of criteria to define 'high-quality securitisation'. These criteria should take into consideration the need for more standardisation and transparency to avoid securitisation structures of high complexity.

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 39

(39) It is important that the risk management of MMFs not be biased by short-term decisions influenced by the possible rating of the MMF. Therefore, it is necessary to prohibit a MMF or its manager from requesting that the MMF is rated by a credit rating agency in order to avoid that this external rating is used for marketing purposes. The MMF or its manager should also refrain from using alternative methods for obtaining a rating of the MMF. Should the MMF be awarded an external rating, either on the own initiative of the credit rating agency or following request by a third party that is independent of the MMF or the manager and does not act on behalf of any of them, the MMF manager should refrain from relying on criteria that would be attached to that external rating. For ensuring appropriate liquidity management it is necessary that the MMFs establish sound policies and procedures to know their investors. The policies that the manager has to put in place should help understanding the MMF's investor base, to the extent that large redemptions could be anticipated. In order to avoid that the MMF faces sudden massive redemptions, particular attention should be paid to large investors representing a substantial portion of the MMF's assets, as with one investor representing more than the proportion of daily maturing assets. In this case the MMF should increase its proportion of daily maturing assets to the proportion of that investor. The manager should whenever possible look at the identity of the investors, even if they are represented by nominee accounts, portals or any other indirect buyer.

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Wolf KLINZ, Sharon BOWLES, Olle SCHMIDT

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 45

(45) In order to be able to absorb day-to- day fluctuations in the value of a CNAV MMF's assets and allow it to offer a constant NAV per unit or share, the CNAV MMF should have at all times a NAV buffer amounting to at least 3% of its assets. The NAV buffer should serve as an absorbing mechanism for maintaining the constant NAV. All differences between the constant NAV per unit or share and the NAV per unit or share should be neutralized by using the NAV buffer. During stressed market situations, when the differences can rapidly increase, a procedure should ensure that the whole chain of management is involved. This escalation procedure should permit the senior management to take rapid remedy actions.deleted

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 46

(46) As a CNAV MMF that does not maintain the NAV buffer at the required level is not capable of sustaining a constant NAV per unit or share, it should be required to fluctuate the NAV and cease to be a CNAV MMF. Therefore, where despite the use of the escalation procedure the amount of the NAV buffer remains for one month below the required 3% by 10 basis points, the CNAV MMF should automatically convert into a MMF that is not allowed to use amortised cost accounting or rounding to the nearest percentage point. If before the end of the one month allowed for the replenishment a competent authority has justifiable reasons demonstrating the incapacity of the CNAV MMF to replenish the buffer, it should have the power to convert the CNAV MMF into a MMF other than a CNAV MMF. The NAV buffer is the only vehicle through which external support to a CNAV MMF can be provided.deleted

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 48

(48) Investors should be clearly informed, before they invest in a MMF, if the MMF is of a short-term nature or of a standard nature and if the MMF is of a CNAV type or not. In order to avoid misplaced expectations from the investor it must also be clearly stated in any marketing document that MMFs are not a guaranteed investment vehicle. CNAV MMFs should clearly explain to investors the ~~buffer~~safeguard mechanisms they are applying to maintain ~~the constant NAV per unit or share~~and reinforce their resilience to losses and their ability to satisfy significant redemption requests.

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 54

(54) It is essential to carry out a review of this Regulation in order to assess the appropriateness of exempting certain CNAV MMFs that concentrate their investment portfolios on debt issued by the Member States from the requirement to establish a capital buffer that amounts to at least 3 % of the total value of the CNAV MMF's assetthe additional safeguards introduced to reinforce the CNAVs resilience to face significant redemptions. Therefore, during the three years after the entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission should analyse the experience acquired in applying this Regulation and the impacts on the different economic aspects attached to the MMFs. The debt issued or guaranteed by the Member States represents a distinct category of investment displaying specific credit and liquidity traits. In addition, sovereign debt plays a vital role in financing the Member States. The Commission should evaluate the evolution of the market for sovereign debt issued or guaranteed by the Member States and the possibility to create a special framework for MMF that concentrate their investment policy on that type of debt.

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new)

(da) units or shares of other MMFs.

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 5 – point c a (new)

(ca) units or shares of other MMFs.

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 2 – point a

(a) the internal rating system shall be based on a single rating scale which exclusively reflects quantification of the credit risk of the issuer. ~~The rating scale shall have six grades for non-defaulted issuers and one for defaulted issuers;~~

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – point c

(c) at least 105% of its assets shall be comprised of daily maturing assets. A short-term MMF shall not acquire any asset other than a daily maturing asset when such acquisition would result in the short-term MMF investing less than 105% of its portfolio in daily maturing assets;

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – point d

(d) at least 205% of its assets shall be comprised of weekly maturing assets. A short-term MMF shall not acquire any asset other than a weekly maturing asset when such acquisition would result in the short-term MMF investing less than 205% of its portfolio in weekly maturing assets.

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23

~~Article 23 MMF credit ratings The MMF or the manager of the MMF shall not solicit or finance a credit rating agency for rating the MMF.~~deleted

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 a (new)

Article 23a Each MMF needs to establish appropriate mechanisms for its internal credit risk assessment. External ratings should only be one out of several elements that the fund managers take into consideration when they assess the credit quality of a specific instrument.

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 2

2. In addition, in the case of CNAV MMFs, the stress tests shall estimate for different scenarios the difference between the constant NAV per unit or share and the NAV per unit or share~~, including the impact of the difference on the NAV buffer~~.

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 2 – point a

~~(a) it has established a NAV buffer in accordance with the requirements in Article 30;~~deleted

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 2 – point b

~~(b) the competent authority of the CNAV MMF is satisfied with a detailed plan by the CNAV MMF specifying the modalities of the use of the buffer in accordance with Article 31;~~deleted

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 2 – point c

~~(c) the competent authority of the CNAV MMF is satisfied with the CNAV MMF's arrangements to replenish the buffer and with the financial strength of the entity expected to fund the replenishment;~~deleted

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 2 – point d

(d) the rules or instruments of incorporation of the CNAV MMF provide clear procedures for the conversion of the CNAV MMF into a MMF that is not allowed to use the amortised cost accounting or the rounding methods;deleted

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 2 – point f

(f) the CNAV MMF has established clear and effective communication tools towards investors that ensure prompt information in relation to ~~any~~the use o~~r replenishment of the NAV buffer and the conversion of the CNAV MMF~~f a temporary suspension of redemptions;

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 2 – point g

(g) the rules or instruments of incorporation of the CNAV MMF state clearly that the CNAV MMF cannot receive external support ~~other than through the NAV buffer~~.

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Burkhard BALZ

Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. in case of the money market fund's weekly liquid assets falling below 15% of its total assets, the fund must impose a liquidity fee on all redemptions, unless the board of directors of the fund, including a majority of its independent directors, after having consulted the competent authority, concludes that imposing such a fee would not be in the best interest of the fund.

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Burkhard BALZ

Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 2 b (new)

2b. in case of the money market fund's weekly liquid assets falling below 15% of its total assets, the money market fund board, after having consulted the competent authority, is entitled to impose a temporary suspension of redemptions for a limited period of time, of up to 30 days, unless the board of directors of the fund, including a majority of its independent directors, after having consulted the competent authority, concludes that imposing such a temporary suspension would not be in the best interest of the fund.

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 2 c (new)

2c. ESMA shall develop the criteria for the additional safeguard mechanisms, in particular how the liquidty fee should be calculated as well as how the temporary suspension of redemptions should be designed.

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 30

~~[...]~~deleted

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 31

Article 31 Use of the NAV buffer 1. The NAV buffer shall only be used in case of subscriptions and redemptions to equalise the difference between the constant NAV per unit or share and the NAV per unit or share. 2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, in case of subscriptions: (a) where the constant NAV at which a unit or share is subscribed is higher than the NAV per unit or share, the positive difference shall be credited to the reserve account; (b) where the constant NAV at which a unit or share is subscribed is lower than the NAV, the negative difference shall be debited from the reserve account. 3. For the purposes of paragraph 1, in case of redemptions: (a) where the constant NAV at which a unit or share is redeemed is higher than the NAV per unit or share, the negative difference shall be debited from the reserve account; (b) where the constant NAV at which a unit or share is redeemed is lower than the NAV per unit or share, the positive difference shall be credited to the reserve account.deleted

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33

Article 33 Replenishment of the NAV buffer 1. Whenever the amount of the NAV buffer falls below 3% it shall be replenished. 2. When the NAV buffer has not been replenished and for one month the amount of the NAV buffer stays below the 3% referred to in Article 30(1) by 10 basis points the MMF shall automatically cease to be a CNAV MMF and be prohibited from using the amortised cost or rounding methods. The CNAV MMF shall inform immediately each investor thereof in writing and in a clear and comprehensible way.deleted

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 34

Article 34 Powers of the competent authority concerning the NAV buffer 1. The competent authority of the CNAV MMF shall be immediately notified of any decrease below 3% in the amount of the NAV buffer. 2. The competent authority of the CNAV MMF and ESMA shall be immediately notified when the amount of the NAV buffer decreases by 10 basis points below the 3% referred to in Article 30(1). 3. Following the notification referred to in paragraph 1, the competent authority shall closely monitor the CNAV MMF. 4. Following the notification in paragraph 2, the competent authority shall control that the NAV buffer has been replenished or the MMF has ceased to hold itself as a CNAV MMF and informed accordingly its investors.deleted

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 35 – paragraph 1

1. A ~~CNAV~~ MMF may not receive external support other than in the form and under the conditions laid down in Articles 30 to 34.

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 35 – paragraph 2

2. ~~MMFs other than CNAV~~ MMFs shall not be allowed to receive external support, except under the conditions laid down in Article 36.

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 36 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. In exceptional circumstances justified by systemic implications or adverse market conditions the competent authority may allow a MMF ~~other than a CNAV MMF~~ to receive external support referred to in Article 35 that is intended for or in effect would result in guaranteeing the liquidity of the MMF or stabilising the NAV per unit or share of the MMF provided that all of the following conditions are fulfilled:

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 37 – paragraph 5

5. In addition to the information to be provided in accordance with paragraphs 1 to 4, a CNAV MMF shall explain clearly to investors and potential investors the use of the amortised cost method and/or of rounding. A CNAV MMF shall indicate ~~the amount of its NAV buffer~~its additional safeguard mechanisms, the procedure to equalise the constant NAV per unit or share and the NAV per unit or share and shall state clearly the role of the buffer and the risks related to it. The CNAV MMF shall clearly indicate the modalities of replenishing the NAV buffer and the entity expected to fund the replenishment. It shall make available to investors all information concerning compliance with the conditions of all additional safeguard mechanisms set out in Article 29(2)(a) to (g).

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 43 – paragraph 3

3. By way of derogation from the first sentence of Article 30(1), an existing UCITS or AIF that meets the criteria for the definition of a CNAV MMF set out in Article 2(10) shall establish a NAV buffer of at least (a) 1% of the total value of the CNAV MMF's assets, within one year from the entry into force of this Regulation; (b) 2% of the total value of the CNAV MMF's assets, within two years from the entry into force of this Regulation; (c) 3% of the total value of the CNAV MMF's assets, within three years from the date of entry into force of this Regulationdeleted

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 43 – paragraph 4

4. For the purposes of paragraph 3 of this Article, the reference to 3% in Articles 33 and 34 shall be interpreted as referring to the amounts of the NAV buffer mentioned in points (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 3 respectively.deleted

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 45 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

By three years after the entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall review the adequacy of this Regulation from a prudential and economic point of view. In particular the review shall consider the operation of the CNAV buffer and the operation of the CNAV buffer to those CNAV MMFs that, in future, might concentrate their portfolios on debt issued or guaranteed by the Member States. The review shall:

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0265(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17

(17) For domestic transactions, a transition period is necessary to provide payment services providers and schemes with time to adapt to the new requirements. Therefore, after a ~~two~~one year period following the entry into force of this Regulation and in order to provide for a completion of an internal market for card- based payments, the caps on interchange fees for consumer card transactions should be extended to cover all, cross-border and domestic payments.

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0265(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18

(18) In order to facilitate cross border acquiring all (cross-border and domestic) ‘consumer’ debit card transactions and card based payment transaction should have a maximum interchange fee of 0,205% and all (cross-border and domestic) consumer credit card transactions and card based payment transactions based on those should have a maximum interchange fee of 0.340% based on a yearly weighted average.

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0265(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29

(29) The Honour all Cards Rule is a twofold obligation imposed by issuing payment services providers and payment card schemes on payees to, on the one hand, accept all the cards of the same brand (‘Honour all Products’ - element), irrespective of the different costs of these cards, and on the other hand irrespective of the individual issuing bank which has issued the card (‘Honour all Issuers’ – element). It is in the interest of the consumer that for the same category of cards the payee cannot discriminate between issuers or cardholders, and payments schemes and payment service providers can impose such obligation on them. Therefore, although the ‘Honour all Issuers’ element of the Honour all Cards Rule is a justifiable rule within a payment card system, since it prevents that payees from discriminating between the individual banks which have issued a card, the ‘Honour all Products’ element is essentially a tying practice that has the effect of tying acceptance of low fee cards to acceptance of high fee cards. A removal of the ‘Honour all Products’ element of the Honour All Cards Rule would allow merchants to limit the choice of payment cards they offer to low(er) cost payment cards only, which would also benefit consumers through reduced merchants' costs. Merchants accepting debit cards would then not be forced also to accept credit cards, and those accepting credit cards would not be forced to accept commercial cards. However, to protect the consumer and his ability to use the payment cards as often as possible, merchants should be obliged to accept all cards that are subject to the same regulated interchange fee. Such a limitation would also result in a more competitive environment for cards with interchange fees not regulated under this Regulation, as merchants would gain more negotiating power as regards the conditions under which they accept such cards.deleted

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0265(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1

1. With effect from two months after the entry into force of this Regulation, payment services providers shall not offer or request for cross-border debit card transactions a per transaction interchange fee or other agreed remuneration with an equivalent object or effect of more than 0,25 % based on a yearly weighted average of the value of the transaction.

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0265(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2

2. With effect from two months after the entry into force of this Regulation, payment services providers shall not offer or request for cross-border credit card transactions a per transaction interchange fee or other agreed remuneration with an equivalent object or effect of more than 0,~~3 %~~40 % based on a yearly weighted average of the value of the transaction.

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0265(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1

1. With effect from ~~two~~one years after the entry into force of this Regulation, payment service providers shall not offer or request a per transaction interchange fee or other agreed remuneration with an equivalent object or effect of more than 0,25 % based on a yearly weighted average of the value of the transaction for any debit card based transactions.

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0265(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2

2. With effect from ~~two~~one years after the entry into force of this Regulation, payment service providers shall not offer or request a per transaction interchange fee or other agreed remuneration with an equivalent object or effect of more than 0,~~3 %~~40 % based on a yearly weighted average of the value of the transaction for any credit card based transactions.

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0265(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10

Article 10 Honour All Card rules 1. Payment schemes and payment service providers shall not apply any rule that may oblige payees accepting cards and other payment instruments issued by one issuing payment service provider within the framework of a payment instruments scheme to also accept other payment instruments of the same brand and/or category issued by other issuing payment service providers within the framework of the same scheme, except if they are subject to the same regulated interchange fee. 2. The restriction of Honour all card rules referred to in paragraph 1 is without prejudice to the possibility for payments schemes and payment service providers to provide that certain cards may not be refused on the basis of the identity of the issuing payment service provider or of the cardholder. 3. Merchants deciding not to accept all cards or other payment instruments of a payment card scheme shall inform consumers in a clear and unequivocal manner at the same time as they inform the consumer on the acceptance of other cards and payment instruments of the scheme. That information shall be displayed prominently at the entrance of the shop, at the till or on the website or other applicable electronic or mobile medium, and shall be provided to the payer in good time before he enters into a purchase agreement with the payee. 4. Issuing payment service providers shall ensure that their payment instruments are visibly and electronically identifiable, enabling payees to identify unequivocally which brands and categories of prepaid, debit, credit or commercial cards or card based payments based on these are chosen by the payer.deleted

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2

(2) Divergences in national resolution rules between different Member States and corresponding administrative practices and the lack of a unified decision making process at Union level for the resolution of cross-border banks contribute to this lack of confidence and market instability, as they do not ensure certainty and predictability as to the possible outcome of a bank failure. ~~Resolution decisions taken at the national level only may lead to distortions of competition and ultimately to the undermining of the internal market.~~

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6

(6) Directive [ ] of the European Parliament and of the Council13 has harmonised to a certain extent national bank resolution rules and has provided for cooperation among resolution authorities when dealing with the failure of cross- border banks. However, ~~the harmonisation provided by the Directive [ ] is not complete and~~ the decision making process is not centralised. Directive [ ] essentially provides for common resolution tools and powers available for the national authorities of every Member State but leaves discretion to national authorities in the application of the tools and in the use of national financing arrangements in support of resolution procedures. Directive [ ] does not avoid the taking of separate and potentially inconsistent decisions by Member States regarding the resolution of cross-border groups which may affect the overall costs of resolution. Moreover, as it provides for national financing ~~arrangements, it does not sufficiently reduce the dependence of banks on the support from national budgets and does not prevent different approaches by Member States to the use of the financing~~ arrangements. __________________ 13 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. OJ C, , p. .

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7 a (new)

(7a) Every current and new framework for banking recovery and resolution within the EU should solely be governed by the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (BRRD).

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9

(9) Whilst banks in Member States remaining outside the SSM benefit at national level from supervision, resolution and financial backstop arrangements which are aligned, banks in Member States participating in the SSM are subject to Union arrangements for supervision and national arrangements for resolution and financial backstops. This misalignment creates a competitive disadvantage for the banks in the Member States participating in the SSM compared to those in the other Member States. Because supervision and resolution are at two different levels within the SSM, intervention and resolution in banks in the Member States participating in the SSM would not be as rapid, consistent and effective as in banks in the Member States outside of the SSM. This has negative repercussions on the funding costs for these banks and creates a competitive disadvantage with detrimental effects for the Member States in which those banks operate and for the overall functioning of the internal market. Therefore, a centralised resolution mechanism for ~~all~~ banks operating in the Member States participating in the SSM and subject to the direct ECB supervision is essential to guarantee a level playing field.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13

(13) A centralised application of the bank resolution rules set out in Directive [ ] by a single Union resolution ~~authority~~mechanism in the participating Member States can only be ensured where the rules governing the establishment and functioning of a single resolution mechanism are directly applicable in the Member States to avoid divergent interpretations across the Member States. This should bring benefits to the internal market as a whole because it will contribute to ensuring fair competition and to preventing obstacles to the free exercise of fundamental freedoms not only in the participating Member States but in the whole internal market.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14

(14) Mirroring the scope of the Council Regulation (EU) No …/…, a single resolution mechanism should cover all credit institutions established in the participating Member States. However, within the framework of a single resolution mechanism, it should be possible to resolve directly any credit institution of a participating Member State in order to avoid asymmetries within the internal market in the treatment of failing institutions and creditors during a resolution process. To the extent that parent undertakings, investment firms and financial institutions are included in the consolidated supervision by the ECB, they should be included in the scope of the single resolution mechanism. Although the ECB will not supervise those institutions on a solo basis, it will be the only supervisor that will have a global perception of the risk to which a group, and indirectly the individual members, is exposed to. To exclude entities which form part of the consolidated supervision within the scope of the ECB from the scope of the single resolution mechanism would make it impossible to plan for the resolution of banking groups and to adopt a group resolution strategy, and would make any resolution decisions much less effective.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16

(16) The ECB, as the supervisor within the SSM, is the best placed to assess whether a credit institution is failing or likely to fail and whether there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector or supervisory action would prevent its failure within a reasonable timeframe. The Board, upon notification of the ECB, should provide a recommendation to the Commission. Given the need to balance the different interests at stake the Commission should decide whether or not to place an institution under resolution and should alsoECB decides whether or not to place an institution under resolution, based on triggers set out in the Directive (BRRD). The Board should decide on a clear and detailed resolution framework establishing the resolution actions to be taken by the ~~Board~~home national resolution authority. Within this framework, the Board should decide on a resolution scheme and instruct the home and where appropriate additionally the host national resolution authorities on the resolution tools and powers to be executed at national level.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18

(18) It is instrumental for the good functioning of the internal market that the same rules apply to all resolution measures, regardless of whether they are taken by national resolution authorities under Directive [ ] or within the framework of the single resolution mechanism The Commission will assess those measures under Article 107 of the TFEU. Where the use of resolution financing arrangements does not involve State aid pursuant to Article 107 (1) of the TFEU, the Commission should, in order to ensure a level playing field within the internal market, assess those measures by analogy to Art 107 of the TFEU. If a notification under Article 108 of the TFEU is not necessary as no state aid pursuant to Article 107 of the TFEU is entailed in the proposed use of the Fund by the Board, in order to ensure the integrity of the internal market between participating and non- participating Member States, the Commission should apply the relevant State aid rules under Article 107 of the TFEU by way of analogy when assessing the proposed use of the Fund. The Board should not decide on a resolution scheme until the Commission has ensured, by way of analogy with State aid rules, that the use of the Fund follows the same rules as interventions by national financing arrangements and in order to ensure the integrity of the internal market between participating and non- participating Member States, the Commission should apply the relevant State aid rules under Article 107 of the TFEU.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19

(19) In order to ensure a swift and effective decision making process in resolution, the Board should be a specific Union agency with a specific structure, corresponding to its specific tasks, and which departs from the model of all other agencies of the Union. Its composition should ensure that due account is taken of all relevant interests at stake in resolution procedures. The Board should operate in executive and plenary sessions. In its ~~executive~~plenary session, it should be composed of an Executive Director, a Deputy Executive Director, a~~nd representatives of the Commission and~~ representative of the ECB and representatives of each national resolution authority from all participating Member States. In its executive session, it should be composed of an Executive Director, a Deputy Executive Director, and a representative of the ECB. Considering the missions of the Board, the Executive Director and Deputy Executive Director should be appointed by the Council ~~on a proposal from the Commission and~~ after hearing the European Parliament. When deliberating on the resolution of a bank or group established within a single participating Member State, the executive session of the Board should also convene and involve in the decision-making process the member appointed by the Member State concerned representing its national resolution authority. When deliberating on a cross- border group, the members appointed by the home and all host Member States concerned representing the relevant national resolution authorities should also be convened and involved in the decision- making process of the executive session of the Board. However, home authorities and host authorities should have a balanced influence on the decision, so host authorities should have jointly ~~one single~~two votes. The home authority should also have two votes. Observers, including a representative of the ESM and of the Euro Group, may also be invited to attend the meetings of the Board.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21

(21) The Board ~~and the Commission, where relevant, should replac~~should coordinate the national resolution authorities designated under Directive [ ] in respect of all aspects related to the resolution decision-making process. The national resolution authorities designated under Directive [ ] should continue to carry out activities related to the implementation of resolution schemes adopted by the Board. In order to ensure transparency and democratic control, as well as to safeguard the rights of the Union institutions, the Board should be accountable to the European Parliament and to the Council for any decisions taken on the basis of this proposal. For the same reasons of transparency and democratic control, national parliaments should have certain rights to obtain information about the activities of the Board and to engage in a dialogue with it.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23

(23) To ensure a uniform approach for institutions and groups the Board should be empowered to coordinate drawing up resolution plans for such institutions and groups. The Board should assess the resolvability of institutions and groups, and take measures aimed at removing impediments to resolvability, if any. The Board should require national resolution authorities to apply such appropriate measures designed to remove impediments to resolvability in order to ensure consistency and the resolvability of the institutions concerned.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27

(27) In order to minimise disruption to the financial market and to the economy, the resolution process should be accomplished in a short time. The ~~Commission~~Board should, throughout the resolution procedure, have access to any information which it deems necessary to take an informed decision in the resolution process. Where the ~~Commission~~ECB decides to put an institution under resolution, the Board together with the home national resolution authorities should immediately adopt a resolution scheme establishing the details of the resolution tools and powers to be applied, and the use of any financing arrangements.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 30

(30) When exercising resolution powers, the ~~Commission and the Board~~Board and national authorities should make sure that shareholders and creditors bear an appropriate share of the losses, that the managers are replaced, that the costs of the resolution of the institution are minimised, and that all creditors of an insolvent institution that are of the same class are treated in a similar manner.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36

(36) The ~~Commission~~Board together with national resolution authorities should provide the framework for the resolution action to be taken depending on the circumstances of the case and should be able to designate for use all necessary resolution tools. Within that clear and precise framework, the Board should decide on the detailed resolution scheme. The relevant resolution tools should include the sale of business tool, the bridge institution tool, the bail-in tool and the asset separation tool, which are also provided for by Directive [ ]. The framework should also make it possible to assess whether the conditions for the write- down and conversion of capital instruments are met.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 39

(39) An effective resolution regime should minimise the costs of the resolution of a failing institution borne by the taxpayers. It should also ensure that even large institutions of systemic importance can be resolved without jeopardising financial stability. The bail-in tool achieves that objective by ensuring that shareholders and creditors of the entity suffer appropriate losses and bear an appropriate part of those costs. To this end, statutory debt write down powers should be included in a framework for resolution as ~~an additional option~~the first choice tool in conjunction with other resolution tools, as recommended by the Financial Stability Board.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 42

(42) It is not appropriate to apply the bail- in tool to claims in so far as they are secured, collateralised or otherwise guaranteed. However, in order to ensure that the bail-in tool is effective and achieves its objectives, it should be possible to apply it to as wide a range of the unsecured liabilities of a failing institution as possible. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to exclude certain kinds of unsecured liability from the scope of application of the bail-in tool. For reasons of public policy and effective resolution, the bail-in tool should not apply to those deposits that are protected under Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council15, to liabilities to employees of the failing institution, to covered bonds or to commercial claims that relate to goods and services necessary for the daily functioning of the institution. __________________ 15 Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes. OJ L 135, 31.5.1994, p. 5–14.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 43

(43) Depositors that hold deposits guaranteed by a deposit guarantee scheme should not be subject to the exercise of the bail-in tool. The deposit guarantee scheme, however, contributes to funding the resolution process to the extent that it would have had to indemnify the depositors. The exercise of the bail-in powers would ensure that depositors continue having access to their deposits which is the main reason why the deposit guarantee schemes have been established. Not providing for the involvement of those schemes in such cases would constitute an unfair advantage with respect to the other creditors which would be subject to the exercise of the powers by the resolution authorityand the deposit guarantee scheme itself should not be subject to the exercise of the bail-in tool. The exercise of the bail-in powers would ensure that depositors continue having access to their deposits.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 44

(44) In order to implement the burden- sharing by shareholders and junior creditors, as required under State aid rules, the single resolution mechanism would be able to apply, by way of analogy, as of the entry into application of th~~is Regulation~~e Directive (BRRD), the bail-in tool.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 45

(45) To avoid institutions structuring their liabilities in a manner that impedes the effectiveness of the bail in tool, the Board should be able to establish that the institutions hold an aggregate amount of own funds, subordinated debt and senior liabilities subject to the bail-in tool expressed as a percentage of the total liabilities of the institution, that do not qualify as own funds for the purposes of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council16 and of Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council17 , which institutions should have at all times and which is set out in the resolution plans. __________________ 16 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p.1. 17 Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 50

(50) Since the Board ~~replace~~supports national resolution authorities of the participating Member States in their resolution decisions, the Board should also ~~replace~~co- operate with those authorities for the purposes of the cooperation with non- participating Member States as far as the resolution functions are concerned. In particular, the Board should represent all authorities from the participating Members in the resolution colleges including authorities from non- participating Member States.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 52

(52) In order to carry out its tasks effectively, the Board should have appropriate investigatory powers. It should be able to require all necessary information either directly or through national resolution authorities, and to conduct investigations and on-site inspections, where appropriate in cooperation with national competent authorities. In the context of resolution, on-site inspections would be available for the Board to effectively monitor implementation by national authorities and to ensure that the ~~Commission and the~~ Board take their decisions on the basis of fully accurate information.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 69

(69) Until the Board is fully operational, the ~~Commission~~national resolution authorities should be responsible for the initial operations including collecting contributions necessary to cover administrative expenses and the designation of an interim executive director to authorise all necessary payments on behalf of the Board.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) credit institutions established in participating Member States; and subject to direct supervision carried out by the ECB in accordance with Article 4 of Council Regulation (EU)No[ ] conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions;

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1

1. Where, by virtue of this Regulation, ~~the Commission or~~ the Board exercises tasks or powers, which, according to Directive [ ] are to be exercised by the national resolution authority of a participating Member State, the Board shall, for the application of this Regulation and Directive [ ], be considered to be a coordinator for the relevant national resolution authority or, in case of cross-border group resolution, the relevant group national resolution authorityies.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2

2. The Board, when acting as national resolution authority, shall act, where relevant, under authorisation of the ~~Commission~~national resolution authorities.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1

1. No action, proposal or policy of the Board~~, the Commission~~ or a national resolution authority shall discriminate against entities referred to in Article 2, deposit holders, investors or other creditors established in the Union on grounds of their nationality or place of business.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – introductory part

2. When making decisions or taking action, which may have an impact in more than one participating Member State, and in particular when taking decisions concerning groups established in two or more participating Member States, the ~~Commission~~Board shall give due consideration to all of the following factors:

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 3

3. The ~~Commission~~Board shall balance the factors referred to in paragraph 2 with the resolution objectives referred to in Article 12 as appropriate to the nature and circumstances of each case.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 4

4. No decision of the Board ~~or the Commission~~ shall require Member States to provide extraordinary public financial support.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1

1. The Board shall together with national resolution authorities draw up resolution plans for the entities referred to in Article 2 and for groups.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 4

4. The resolution plan shall provide for the resolution actions which the ~~Commission and the Board~~Board and national resolution authorities may take where an entity referred to in Article 2 or a group meet the conditions for resolution. The resolution plan shall take into consideration a range of scenarios including that the event of failure may be idiosyncratic or may occur at a time of broader financial instability or of system wide events. The resolution plan shall not assume any extraordinary public financial support ~~besides the use of the Fund established in accordance with this Regulation~~.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. The resolution plan for each entity shall include all items set out in Chapter 2 of the Directive (BRRD).

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1

1. When drafting resolution plans in accordance with Article 7, the Board, after consultation with the competent authority, including the ECB, and the resolution authorities of non-participating Member States in which significant branches are located insofar as is relevant to the significant branch, shall conduct an assessment of the extent to which institutions and groups are resolvable without the assumption of extraordinary public financial support ~~besides the use of the Fund established in accordance with Article 64~~.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1

1. The Board~~, on its own initiative or upon proposal by a national resolution authority, may~~ shall apply simplified obligations in relation to the drafting of resolution plans referred to, in ~~Article 7~~Chapter 1 of the Directive (BRRD) or may waive the obligation of drafting those plans.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2

2. National resolution authorities may propose to the Board to apply simplified obligations or to waive the obligation of drafting resolution plans for specific institutions or groups. That proposal shall be reasoned and shall be supported by all the relevant documentation.deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 3

3. On receiving a proposal pursuant to paragraph 1, or when acting on its own initiative, the Board shall conduct an assessment of the institutions or group concerned. The assessment shall be made having regard to the potential impact that the failure of the institution or group could have, due to the nature of its business, its size or its interconnectedness to other institutions or to the financial system in general, on financial markets, on other institutions, or on funding conditions.deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3

Where the national resolution authority which has proposed the application of simplified obligation or the grant of a waiver in accordance with paragraph 1 considers that the decision to apply simplified obligation or to grant the waiver must be withdrawn, it shall submit a proposal to the Board to that end. In that case, the Board shall take a decision on the proposed withdrawal taking full account of the justification for withdrawal put forward by the national resolution authority in the light of the elements set out in paragraph 3.deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 5

5. The Board may grant, in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4, a waiver concerning the obligation of drafting recovery plans to individual institutions affiliated to a central body as in Article 21 of Directive 2013/36/EU and wholly or partially exempted from prudential requirements in national law in accordance with Article 2(5) of Directive 2013/36/EU. In that case the obligation of drafting the resolution plan shall apply on a consolidated basis to the central body.deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 6

6. The Board may grant waiver concerning the application of the obligation of drafting resolution plans to institutions that belong to an institutional protection scheme in accordance with Article 113(7) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. When deciding to grant a waiver to an institution that belongs to an institutional protection scheme, the Board shall consider whether the institutional protection scheme is likely to be able to meet simultaneous demands placed on the scheme in relation to its members.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 7

7. The Board shall inform the EBA about its application of paragraphs 1~~, 4 and 5~~.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2

2. The minimum requirement shall be calculated as the amount of own funds and eligible liabilities expressed as a percentage of the total liabilities and own funds, excluding liabilities arising from derivatives, of the institutions and parent undertakings referred to in Article 2ccording to the rules set out in the Directive (BRRD).

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 3

~~[…]~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 4

4. The determination referred to in paragraph 1 ~~may~~shall provide that the minimum requirement of own funds and eligible liabilities is ~~partially~~ met on a consolidated orand an individual basis. The minimum requirement may be met through contractual bail-in instrument.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

The ECB ~~or competent authorities of participating Member States~~ shall inform the Board of any measure that they require an institution or group to take or that they take themselves pursuant to Article 13b of Council Regulation (EU)No[ ], pursuant to Articles 23(1) or 24 of Directive [ ], or pursuant to Article 104 of Directive 2013/36/EU.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

~~The Board shall notify the Commission of any information which it has received pursuant to the first subparagraph.~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1

1. When acting under the resolution procedure referred to in Article 16, ~~the Commission and~~ the Board, in respect of their respective responsibilities, shall have regard to the resolution objectives, and choose the tools and powers that, in its view, best achieve the objectives that are relevant in the circumstances of the case.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

When pursuing the above objectives, ~~the Commission and~~ the Board shall seek to avoid the unnecessary destruction of value and to minimise the cost of resolution.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 3

~~3. The Commission shall balance the objectives referred to in paragraph 2 as appropriate to the nature and circumstances of each case.~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. When acting under the resolution procedure referred to in Article 16, ~~the Commission and~~ the Board shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the resolution action is taken in accordance with the ~~following principles:~~principles set out in the Directive (BRRD).

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point a

~~(a) the shareholders of the institution under resolution bear first losses;~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point b

~~(b) creditors of the institution under resolution bear losses after the shareholders in accordance with the order of priority of their claims pursuant to Article 15;~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point c

(c) management of the institution under resolution is replaced, except in those cases when the retention of the management, in whole or in part, as appropriate to the circumstances, is considered necessary for the achievement of the resolution objectives;deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point d

~~(d) in accordance with due process of law, individuals and entities are held accountable for the failure of the institution under resolution to the extent of their responsibility under national law;~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point e

~~(e) creditors of the same class are treated in an equitable manner;~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point f

~~(f) no creditor shall incur greater losses than would have been incurred if the entity referred to in Article 2 had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings.~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2

2. Where an institution is an entity belonging to a group, the Commission, where applicable, and the Board shall apply resolution tools and exercise resolution powers in a way that minimises the impact on other entities belonging to the group and on the group as a whole and minimises the adverse effect on financial stability in the Union and particularly in Member States where the group operates.deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 3

3. Where the sale of business tool, the bridge institution tool or the asset separation tool is applied to an entity referred to in Article 2, that entity shall be considered to be the subject of bankruptcy proceedings or analogous insolvency proceedings for the purposes of Article 5(1) of Directive 2001/23/EC22 . __________________ 22 Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses. OJL 82, 22.3.2001, p. 16.deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 1

1. The ~~Commission~~Board shall take a resolution action in relation to a financial institution, when the conditions s~~pecified in Article 16(2~~et out in the Directive (BRRD) are met with regard to both the financial institution and with regard to the parent undertaking.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 2

2. The ~~Commission~~Board shall take a resolution action in relation to a parent undertaking referred to in point (b) of Article 2, when the conditions s~~pecified in Article 16(2~~et out in the Directive (BRRD) are met with regard to both that parent undertaking and with regard to one or more subsidiaries which are institutions.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 3

3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2 and notwithstanding the fact that a parent undertaking may not meet the conditions established in Article 16(2), the Commission may take resolution action with regards to that parent undertaking when one or more of the subsidiaries which are institutions comply with the conditions established in Article 16(2) and action with regard to that parent undertaking is necessary for the resolution of one or more subsidiaries which are institutions or for the resolution of the group as a whole.deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

When applying the bail-in tool to an institution under resolution, ~~and without prejudice to liabilities excluded from the bail-in tool under Article 24(3), the Commission shall decide on, and~~ the Board and the national resolution authorities of the participating Member States shall exercise the write down and conversion powers to claims following ~~a reverse order of priority to the following order for normal insolvency procedures:~~the order set out in the Directive (BRRD).

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point a

~~(a) claims related to eligible deposits and claims from deposit guarantee schemes;~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point b

~~(b) unsecured non preferred claims;~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point c

~~(c) claims subordinated other than those mentioned in points (d) to (f);~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point d

~~(d) claims from senior executives and directors;~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point e

~~(e) claims related to additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments;~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point f

~~(f) claims related to common equity Tier 1 instruments;~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

~~starting from point (f) and ending with point (a).~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 1

1. Where the ECB ~~or a national resolution authority~~ assesses that the conditions referred to in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 2 are met in relation to an entity referred to in Article 2, it shall communicate that assessment without delay to the ~~Commission and the~~ Board.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – introductory part

2. ~~On receiving a communication pursuant to paragraph 1, or on its own initiative, the Board~~The ECB shall conduct an assessment of whether the following conditions are met:

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 3

~~3. [...]~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 5

5. If all the conditions established in paragraph 2 are met, the Board shall recommend to the Commission that the entity be placed under resolution. The recommendation shall include at least the following: (a) the recommendation to place the entity under resolution; (b) the framework of the resolution tools referred to in Article 19(3); (c) the framework of the use of the Fund to support the resolution action in accordance with Article 71.deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 6

6. HIf all the conditions established in paragraph 2 are met and having regard to the urgency of the circumstances in the case, the ~~Commission~~ECB shall decide, on its own initiative or taking into account, if any, the ~~communication referred to in paragraph 1 or the recommendation of the Board referred to in paragraph 5~~recommendation of the Board, whether or not to place the entity under resolution~~, and~~. The Board shall decide on the framework of the resolution tools that shall be applied in respect of the entity concerned and of the use of the Fund to support the resolution action. ~~The Commission, on its own initiative, may decide to place an entity under resolution if all the conditions referred to in paragraph 2 are met.~~

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 7

7. The decision of the ~~Commission~~ECB and the Board shall be addressed to the ~~Board. If the Commission~~national resolution authorities. If the ECB decides not to place the entity under resolution, because the condition laid down in paragraph 2(c) is not met, the entity concerned shall be wound up in accordance with national insolvency law.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 8

8. Within the framework set by the ~~Commission~~ECB decision, the Board shall decide on the resolution scheme referred to in Article 20 and shall ensure that the necessary resolution action is taken to carry out the resolution scheme by the relevant national resolution authorities. The decision of the Board shall be addressed to the relevant national resolution authorities and shall instruct those authorities, which shall take all necessary measures to implement the decision of the Board in accordance with Article 26, by exercising any of the resolution powers provided for in Directive [ ], in particular those in Articles 56 to 64 of that Directive [ ]. Where State aid is present, the Board may only decide after the Commission has taken a decision on that State aid.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 9

9. On receiving a communication pursuant to paragraph 1, or on its own initiative, if the Board considers that resolution measures could constitute State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU, it shall invite the participating Member State or Member States concerned to immediately notify the envisaged measures to the Commission under Article 108(3) TFEU.deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 10

10. To the extent that the resolution action as proposed by the Board involves the use of the Fund and does not entail the grant of State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) of the TFEU, the Commission shall apply in parallel, by way of analogy, the criteria established for the application of Article 107 TFEU.deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 11

11. The Commission shall have the power to obtain from the Board any information which it deems relevant for fulfilling its tasks under this Regulation and, where applicable, Article 107 TFEU. The Board shall have the power to obtain from any person, in accordance with Chapter 5 of this Title, any information necessary for it to prepare and decide upon a resolution action including updates and supplements of information provided in the resolution plans.deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 12

~~12. The Board shall have the power to recommend to the Commission to amend the framework for the resolution tools and for the use of the Fund in respect of an entity placed under resolution.~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17

~~[...]~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – point b

~~(b) extraordinary public financial support is required by the entity or group, except in any of the circumstances set out in point (d)(iii) of Article 16(3).~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 5

5. The ~~Commission~~Board, upon a recommendation of the ~~Board~~ECB or on its own initiative, shall verify that the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 are met. The ~~Commission~~Board shall determine whether the powers to write down or convert capital instruments shall be exercised singly or, following the procedure under Article 16(4) to (7), together with a resolution action.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 6

6. Where the ~~Commission~~Board determines that the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 are met, but the conditions for resolution in accordance with Article 16(2) are not met, the Board~~, following a decision of the Commission,~~ shall instruct the national resolution authorities to exercise the write down or conversion powers in accordance with Articles 51 and 52 of Directive [ ].

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 20 – paragraph 1

The resolution scheme adopted by the Board under Article 16(8) shall establish, in compliance with ~~the decisions of the Commission on the resolution framework under Article 16(6) and with~~ any decision on State aid where applicable by analogy the details of the resolution tools to be applied to the institution under resolution concerning at least the measures referred to in Articles 21(2), 22(2), 23(2) and 24(1) and determine the specific amounts and purposes for which the Fund shall be used.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 20 – paragraph 2

In the course of the resolution process, the Board may amend and update the resolution scheme as appropriate in light of the circumstances in the case and within the resolution framework decided upon by the Commission pursuant to Article 16(6).deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. Within the framework decided by the ~~Commission,~~Board the sale of business tool shall consist of the transfer to a purchaser that is not a bridge institution of the following:

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. Within the framework decided by the ~~Commission~~Board, the bridge institution tool shall consist of the transfer to a bridge institution of any of the following:

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Within the framework decided by the ~~Commission~~Board, the asset separation tool shall consist of the transfer of assets, rights or liabilities of an institution under resolution to an asset management vehicle.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – introductory part

Within the framework decided by the ~~Commission~~Board concerning the bail-in tool, the resolution scheme shall follow all relevant provisions set out in the Directive (BRRD) and shall establish in particular:

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 3 – introductory part

3. The following liabilities ~~shall~~may not be subject to write down and conversion according to the relevant provisions set out in the Directive (BRRD):

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 14

14. Exclusions under paragraph 5 and according to the relevant provisions set out in Directive (BRRD) may be applied either to completely exclude a liability from write down or to limit the extent of the write down applied to that liability.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 1

1. The Board shall inform the Commission of any action it takes in order to prepare for resolution. With regard to any information received from the Board, the members of the Commission and Commission staff shall be subject to the professional secrecy requirement laid down in Article 79.deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 2

2. In the exercise of their respective responsibilities under this Regulation, the Board, ~~the Commission,~~ the ECB and the national competent authorities and resolution authorities shall cooperate closely. The ECB and the national competent authorities shall provide the Board ~~and the Commission~~ with all information necessary for the exercise of ~~their~~its tasks.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 3

3. In the exercise of their respective responsibilities under this Regulation, the Board, ~~the Commission,~~ the ECB and the national competent authorities and resolution authorities shall cooperate closely in the resolution planning, early intervention and resolution phases pursuant to Articles 7 to 26. The ECB and the national competent authorities shall provide the Board and the Commission with all information necessary for the exercise of their tasks.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 6

6. The Board shall co-operate closely with the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), in particular where the EFSF or the ESM have granted or are likely to grant, direct or indirect financial assistance to entities established in a participating Member State, in particular in those extraordinary circumstances referred to in Article 24(9).deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 2

2. The Board shall provide the Commission with any information relevant for fulfilling its tasks under ~~this Regulation and, where applicable,~~ Article 107 of the TFEU.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 30 – paragraph 1

Where a group includes entities established in participating Member States as well as in non-participating Member States, without prejudice to any approval by the ~~Commission~~Board required under this Regulation, the Board shall represent the national resolution authorities of the participating Member States, for the purposes of cooperation with non- participating Member States in accordance with Articles 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, 50, and 80 to 83 of Directive [ ].

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 31 – paragraph 1

The ~~Commission and the Board within each of their~~Board within its respective responsibilities shall be exclusively responsible to conclude, on behalf of the national resolution authorities of participating Member States, the non- binding cooperation arrangements referred to in Article 88 (4) of Directive [ ] and shall notify them in accordance with paragraph 6 of that Article.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 39 – paragraph 1 – point c

~~(c) a member appointed by the Commission;~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 39 – paragraph 2

2. The term of office of the Executive Director, the Deputy Executive Director and of the members of the Board appointed by the ~~Commission and the~~ ECB shall be five years. Subject to Article 53(6), that term shall not be renewable.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 40 – paragraph 1

The Board shall act in compliance with Union law~~, in particular with the Commission decisions pursuant to this Regulation~~.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 44 – paragraph 1

The Board shall have its seat in ~~Brussels, Belgium~~Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 47 – paragraph 2

2. The Board in its plenary session shall hold at least two ordinary meetings a year. In addition, it shall meet on the initiative of the Executive Director, at the request of the ~~Commission~~ECB, or at the request of at least one-third of its members.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 48 – paragraph 1

1. The Board, in its plenary session, shall take its decisions by a ~~simple majority of its members. However, decisions referred to in point (c) of Article 47(1) shall be taken by a majority of two-thirds~~qualified majority of its members.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 50 – paragraph 2 – point b – point i

~~(i) providing the Commission, as early as possible, with any relevant information allowing the Commission to assess and take a reasoned decision pursuant to Article 16(6);~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 51 – paragraph 2

2. When deliberating on a cross-border group, the Board shall take its decisions in its executive sessions by a simple majority of its participating members. The members of the Board referred to in Article 40(2) and the member appointed by the Member State in which the group level resolution authority is situated shall each have ~~one~~two votes. The other participating members shall each have a voting right equal to a fraction of ~~one~~two votes and the number of national resolution authorities of the Member States in which a subsidiary or entity covered by consolidated supervision is established. In case of a tie the Executive Director shall have a casting vote.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Peter SIMON, Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a regulation
Article 66 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Liabilities of a credit institution are excluded from the calculation of contributions where the credit institution has been set up by a Member State's central or regional government or local authority and that government or authority has an obligation to protect the economic basis of the institution and maintain its viability throughout its lifetime or the liabilities are explicitly guaranteed by that government or authority or at least 90% of the loans granted by the institution are directly or indirectly guaranteed by that government or authority and the predominant purpose is to fund promotional loans granted on a non-competitive, not-for-profit basis in order to promote that government's public policy objectives;

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 66 – paragraph 2

2. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target funding level specified in Article 65 may include payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the Board for the purposes specified in Article 71(1). The share of these irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 320% of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with paragraph 1.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 68

~~[…]~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 70 – paragraph 3

3. The Board shall invest the amounts held in the Fund only in obligations of the participating Member States or intergovernmental organisations, o~~r in highly liquid assets of~~f the highest credit worthiness. Investments should be sufficiently geographically diversified. The return on those investments shall benefit the Fund.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – point b

~~(b) to make loans to the institution under resolution, its subsidiaries, a bridge institution or an asset management vehicle;~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – point c

~~(c) to purchase assets of the institution under resolution;~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 71 – paragraph 3

3. The Fund shall ~~not~~by no means be used directly or indirectly to absorb the losses of an institution or an entity referred to in Article 2 or to recapitalise an institution or an entity referred to in Article 2. In the event that the use of the resolution financing arrangement for the purposes in paragraph 1 indirectly results in part of the losses of an institution or an entity referred to in Article 2 being passed on to the Fund, the principles governing the use of the resolution financing arrangement set out in Article 24 shall apply.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 73

~~[…]~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 85 – paragraph 1

From the date of application referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 88, the Fund shall be considered a part of the resolution financing arrangement ~~of the~~for credit institutions subject to this Regulation of each of participating Member States under Title VII of Directive [ ].

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 88 – paragraph 3

Article 24 shall apply from 1 J~~anuar~~uly 20186.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0214(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4 a (new)

(4a) Calls on the Commission to propose a European framework for less liquid investment funds in order to channel the short-term liquidity of private households into long-term investments, and to provide an additional retirement solution.

2013/12/05
Committee: ECON

2013/0190(NLE)

Draft legislative resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Calls on the Latvian authorities to maintain the present course of practical preparations to ensure a smooth changeover process; calls on the Latvian Government to ensure that the introduction of the euro is not used for hidden price increases; calls on the Latvian Government to closely observe inflationary pressures due to a dependency on energy imports;

2013/06/19
Committee: ECON

2013/0190(NLE)

Olle SCHMIDT, Nils TORVALDS, Philippe DE BACKER, Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Draft legislative resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Calls on the Latvian authorities to maintain the present course of practical preparations to ensure a smooth changeover process; calls on the Latvian Government to establish appropriate control mechanisms to ensure that the introduction of the euro is not used for hidden price increases;

2013/06/19
Committee: ECON

2013/0045(CNS)

Olle SCHMIDT, Nils TORVALDS, Philippe DE BACKER, Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 a (new)

(1a) Prior to the introduction of an FTT the Commission shall demonstrate that enhanced cooperation will not undermine the internal market or economic, social and territorial cohesion. It shall also demonstrate that it does not constitute a barrier to or discrimination in trade between Member States, nor distort competition between them. The Commission shall present a new robust analysis and impact assessment, of the consequences the proposal for a common FTT both on participating and non participating countries as well as on the Single Market as a whole.

2013/04/30
Committee: ECON

2013/0045(CNS)

Olle SCHMIDT, Nils TORVALDS, Philippe DE BACKER, Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a directive
Recital 16

(16) The minimum tax rates should be set at a level sufficiently high for the harmonisation objective of a common FTT to be achieved. At the same time, they have to be low enough so that delocalisation risks are minimised as well as increases in the cost of funding for business. The tax rate should not in any way reduce the value of pension rights.

2013/04/30
Committee: ECON

2013/0045(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 19 a (new)

(19a) The Commission should establish an expert working group (FTT Committee) comprising representatives from all Member States in the EU, the European Commission, the ECB and ESMA to assess the effective implementation of this Directive and the effects of the single markets as a whole. The FTT Committee should make full use of Union law, if appropriate, in the field of taxation and financial services regulation and of the instruments for cooperation on tax matters established by the OECD and the Council of Europe.

2013/04/30
Committee: ECON

2013/0045(CNS)

Olle SCHMIDT, Nils TORVALDS, Philippe DE BACKER, Wolf KLINZ, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Proposal for a directive
Recital 22 a (new)

(22a) The revenues collected from the FTT shall be allocated to the respective Member State and not be used as own resources for the EU.

2013/04/30
Committee: ECON

2013/0045(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point b

(b) the transfer between entities of a group of the right to dispose of a financial instrument as owner and any equivalent operation implying the transfer of the risk associated with the financial instrument, in cases not subject to point (a);deleted

2013/04/30
Committee: ECON

2013/0045(CNS)

Olle SCHMIDT, Nils TORVALDS, Philippe DE BACKER, Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 8 – point e

(e) an undertaking for collective investments in transferable securities (UCITS) as defined in Article 1(2) of Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and a management company as defined in Article 2(1)(b) of Directive 2009/65/EC;deleted

2013/04/30
Committee: ECON

2013/0045(CNS)

Olle SCHMIDT, Nils TORVALDS, Philippe DE BACKER, Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 8 – point f

(f) a pension fund or an institution for occupational retirement provision as defined in Article 6(a) of Directive 2003/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council , an investment manager of such fund or institution;deleted

2013/04/30
Committee: ECON

2013/0045(CNS)

Olle SCHMIDT, Nils TORVALDS, Philippe DE BACKER, Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point c c (new)

(c c) a pension fund or an institution for occupational retirement provision as defined in Article 6(a) of Directive 2003/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council36 , an investment manager of such fund or institution;

2013/04/30
Committee: ECON

2013/0045(CNS)

Olle SCHMIDT, Nils TORVALDS, Philippe DE BACKER, Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point c d (new)

(cd) an undertaking for collective investments in transferable securities (UCITS) as defined in Article 1(2) of Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council35 and a management company as defined in Article 2(1)(b) of Directive 2009/65/EC;

2013/04/30
Committee: ECON

2013/0045(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – point g a (new)

(ga) transactions of investment or pension funds set up for private retirement schemes.

2013/04/30
Committee: ECON

2013/0045(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 11 – paragraph 6 a (new)

(6a) The administrative burden imposed on tax authorities through the introduction of the FTT should be kept to a minimum. In this respect the European Commission shall encourage cooperation between national tax authorities.

2013/04/30
Committee: ECON

2013/0045(CNS)

Olle SCHMIDT, Nils TORVALDS, Philippe DE BACKER, Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Proposal for a directive
Article 11 – paragraph 6 b (new)

(6b) A thorough examination shall be undertaken to analyse the arising administrative costs for federal states, counties and municipalities.

2013/04/30
Committee: ECON

2013/0045(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 15 a (new)

Article 15 a Establishment of the FTT Committee 1. The Commission shall establish an expert working group (the FTT Committee) comprising representatives from all EU Member States, the Commission, the ECB, and ESMA to assist participating Member States in the effective implementation of this Directive and prevent tax fraud, evasion and avoidance and to preserve the integrity of the Single market. 2. The FTT Committee shall assess the effective implementation of this Directive, assess the effects on the single market, for participating and non participating Member States, and detect avoidance schemes including abusive arrangements as defined in Article 14 in order to propose countermeasures, where appropriate, making full use of Union law in the field of taxation and financial services regulation and of the instruments for cooperation on tax matters established by international organisations including the OECD and the Council of Europe.

2013/04/30
Committee: ECON

2013/0045(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 19 – paragraph 2

In that report the Commission shall, at least, examine the impact of the FTT on the proper functioning of the internal market, the financial markets and the real economy and it shall take into account the progress on taxation of the financial sector in the international context. Based on the results of this examination, necessary adjustments shall be undertaken.

2013/04/30
Committee: ECON

2012/2296(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Agrees with the Commission that the current EETS system has been a failure, and emphasises that drastic action is needed in order to create an interoperable EETS; believes that the Commission should draw up proposals for a regulation in the area of interoperability as soon as possible so as to ~~oblige all stakeholders to~~further advance the EETS project; regrets the fact that Member States have on the whole shown little interest in developing the EETS;

2013/03/26
Committee: TRAN

2012/2296(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Underlines that Member States must remain free to introduce road tolls and to set the amount charged for road use, and should have the final say in spending revenues collected from road charging, while calling upon Member States to continue to upgrade their transport networks to make them as sustainable, efficient and environmentally friendly as possible;

2013/03/26
Committee: TRAN

2012/2296(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Urges the Commission to oblige Member States with vignette systems to substantially simplify the sale of vignettes and access to information and to operate an online payment service that allows customers to pre-pay their charges online; stresses the need for adequate and visible advance signage informing motorists about how much they will have to pay; stresses also that information about fines and other penalties should be clearly indicated and easily available;

2013/03/26
Committee: TRAN

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

Ba. whereas the rigidity of labour market regulation in several Member States lacks the flexibility to effectively absorb shocks such as the current crisis; whereas current labour market legislation disproportionally protects insiders and adversely affects the inclusion of young people into the workforce;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas it should be recalled that, in 2007, at the start of the crisis, the countries which now experience the severest difficulties, had accumulated excessive current account deficits;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the sharp deterioration of public deficits ~~and debt, which has been seen since~~between 2007 and 2009 in many Member States, has been triggered by the reaction of governments to the crisis~~, in the absence of European anticyclical instruments~~;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)

Da. whereas the average public deficit for the euro area peaked in 2009 at 6.3 % and since then the trend has been reversed with average public deficits in 2010 at 6.2 %, in 2011 at 4.1 % and a further decrease in the first two quarters of 2012;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas the analysis of 2010 and 2011 statistics now clearly documents that the policy options taken caused a reversal of the mild recovery of 2010 resulting from the premature and massive tightening of fiscal policy, with contractionary effects across Member States that still persist;deleted

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas the Commission forecasts for 2012 ~~have been successively~~needed to be revised downwards from 1.8 % in spring 2011 to - 0.4 % in autumn 2012 for 2012, partly due to a delay in the implementation of growth enhancing structural reforms; whereas in its autumn forecasts the Commission predicts a GDP growth of ~~a mere~~ 0.1 % for 2013; whereas ~~there are serious doubts as to~~ the accuracy of these 2013 forecasts~~, since they are likely to be based on an underestimated fiscal multiplier, thereby underestimating the negative effect of current fiscal con~~ will depend on the implementation of the adjustment programmes and growth enhancing strauct~~ion on economic growth~~ural reforms;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

~~G. whereas the size of fiscal multipliers in bad economic times can be 2 to 3 times higher than in normal economic times, when the output gap is close to zero;~~deleted

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas the simultaneous consolidation across most of the EU also increased the size of the fiscal multiplier in the eurozone as a whole, and its impacts were amplified by the high degree of openness of the European economies inside the internal market;deleted

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas each Member State is ~~suffering from~~experiencing the consequences of its own fiscal tightening and of the ~~synchronised rapid~~ consolidation conducted by the other Member States which is particularly the case for countries in severe economic difficulties;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas ~~this~~ fiscal tightening ~~str~~in some Member Stategys forces down demand, wages and prices while driving up unemployment; in the short-term; whereas the excessive levels of public and private debt restrict the scope for new activities and investment;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital L

L. whereas the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) scoreboard for 2011 illustrates the huge imbalances inside the European Union, especially in the eurozone; the 3-year average of Current Account Balance as % of GDP shows strong surpluses for only three countries (Luxembourg and the Netherlands at +7.5 and Germany at +5.9), with the majority of the other countries in negative positions;deleted

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital M

M. whereas this shows that the gains from the internal market and common currency are spread very unevenly across the Member States, reducing the margin of manoeuvre of the weaker economies in response to crisis;deleted

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital N

N. whereas austerity measures adopted by several Member States have reached an unprecedented dimension: the fiscal stance for Greece from 2010 to 2012 amounts to 18 points of GDP, for Portugal, Spain and Italy respectively 7.5, 6.5 and 4.8 points of GDP ~~without any significant~~but there are signs of improvement of the economic and fiscal situation ~~and with huge social disruption, calling for a new assessment of the policies imposed~~showing that countries need to continue the adjustment path;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital O

O. whereas current sovereign interest rates show ~~unprecedented~~large divergences within the euro area and remain at unsustainable levels for certain Member States;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital O a (new)

Oa. whereas the competitiveness gap within the euro area is reflected in the divergences of sovereign interest rates;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital O b (new)

Ob. whereas high sovereign interest rates in certain euro area Member States are due to a perceived lack of credibility of their capacity to conduct structural reforms;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital O c (new)

Oc. whereas the euro area has failed to use the overall reduction of sovereign interest rates in the first ten years of the euro to close the competitiveness gap, which amongst others has been reflected in persistently large current account deficits and rapidly increasing unit labour costs;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital O d (new)

Od. whereas current adjustment in certain countries would be politically, economically and socially less difficult if the positive economic climate in the first ten years of the euro had been used to adjust;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital P

P. whereas ~~surplus countries should have been asked to share the adjustment burden by stimulating their internal demand~~adjustment is also taking place in surplus countries, notably by adjusting wages;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital Q

Q. whereas the ~~Commission has been unable to make a convincing case that the policy options imposed will deliver over time and that they will impact on society in a fair and acceptable way~~policy options chosen by the Commission will deliver over time;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital R a (new)

Ra. whereas adjustment has to be perceived as credible if investment flows are to return;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital T

T. whereas the 2013 Annual Growth Survey (AGS 2013) seeks to set out the economic ~~and social~~ priorities for 2013;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital U

U. whereas the fiscal discipline pillar should be developed hand in hand with the ~~solidarity~~growth and democracy pillars;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital U a (new)

Ua. whereas the Single Market is the EU's key engine for growth and jobs through economies of scale and greater competition but Member States show complacency in implementing internal market legislation, particularly the services directive;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the recognition in the AGS 2013 that growth is necessary in order to exit the crisis, but doubts whether the positive signs of recovery seen by the Commission are accurate; warns of the risk of a continued contraction of economic activity over the coming year resulting from the aggregate negative effect of significant and simultaneous procyclical budget cuts across the euro area and supports the Commission in its view that there are positive signs of recovery; warns of the risk of a relapse over the coming year resulting from a lack of implementation of adjustment programmes and structural reforms;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Calls on the Commission to study seriously the possibility of ~~spreading fiscal adjustment ove~~putting forward proposals for a lcon~~ger period, thereby providing additional temporary room for manoeuv~~vergence code for Member States' economies with the objective of increasing competitiveness in the whole of the euro area t~~o re-ignite growth as soon as possible;.~~hrough binding commitments to structural reforms;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

~~3. Calls on the Commission to admit the self-defeating nature of the prevailing policy stance and to revise its policy recommendations for next year, as contained in its AGS;~~deleted

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Believes that the recent debate on the size of the fiscal multiplier, notably following the IMF analysis on this matter in its latest World Economic Outlook, has been unduly downplayed by the Commission, while a broad consensus has been emerging on this matter from recent theoretical and empirical work in the existing economic literature; considers this matter to be of central importance to policy-making, as wrong fiscal multipliers can lead to massive policy mistakes; calls on the Commission, therefore, rapidly to open its macroeconomic modelling and forecasting to serious and systematic scrutiny by independent institutes on a regular basis;deleted

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. ~~Welcom~~Notes the recognition by the Commission of ‘a possible’ adjustment in the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficits ~~as being justified~~, in full respect of the spirit and the letter of the Stability and Growth Pact; considers, however, that this ~~recognition is already overdue~~should only apply in very exceptional cases;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Calls on the Commission to reassess the Member States' situation in the light of the exceptional circumstances they are facing – ‘an unusual event outside the control of the [Member States] which has a major impact on the financial position of the general government or periods of severe economic downturn as set out in the revised SGP (…)’;deleted

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Calls on the Commission and the Council to ease the path of consolidation for Member States with excessive deficits due to exceptional circumstances while ensuring that ‘annual budgetary targets [...] are consistent with a minimum annual improvement of at least 0.5 % of GDP as a benchmark, in its cyclically adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures, in order to ensure the correction of the excessive deficit within the deadline set in the recommendation’, as formulated in the preventive arm of the SGP;deleted

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Calls on the Commission and the Council to balance productive public investment needs with fiscal discipline objectives by ~~accommodating public investment programmes~~taking into account growth enhancing investment in its assessment of Stability and Convergence Programmes ~~and excessive deficit procedures~~while fully respecting the provisions laid down in EU law;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Calls on the Commission to start developing as a matter of urgency a plan which would ensure that elements of fiscal discipline are ~~in parallel~~ followed up with concrete proposals on ~~solidarity~~growth among Member States and democratic legitimacy as part of the Interinstitutional Agreement on the European Semester;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Calls on the Commission and the Council to ~~improve substa~~work on continually improving the quality, the national specificity and the adequacy of the country-specific recommendations~~, notably through a competent interpretation of the macroeconomic imbalances exercise~~;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Calls on the Commission and the Council to ~~revise the recommended fiscal adjustment policies whenever economies move into recession,~~aim at guaranteeing minimum levels of social welfare, safeguarding basic labour rights and avoiding a recessionary spiral~~; calls on the Commission and the Council to propose Union instruments for social protection and minimum social standards~~ in the recommended adjustment policies whenever economies move into recession;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Calls also on the Commission to come forward with a holistic approach to tackling growth, which should include include completing the internal market, increasing competition and reducing a genuine European industrial policy and the guarantee that Europe will use all its strength and influence in its external trade relations; calls on the Commission to fully exploit ~~to the full~~ the sources of growth stemming from trade with third countries ~~and establish reciprocity as well as fair trade~~through speeding up the conclusion of ongoing free trade agreementswith Canada, Singapore, Malaysia and India, and launching negotiations with the EU major trading partners such as the USA and Japan; calls on the Commission to ~~include strong social~~continue to include clauses in trade agreements on the basis of International Labour Organisation labour standards;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Stresses that determined efforts by Member States to sustain public finances, at an appropriate pace, can only work if excessive macroeconomic imbalances are reduced ~~symmetrically~~;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)

15a. Calls on the Commission to step up enforcement of the implementation of internal market legislation; urges Member States to fully implement internal market legislation, particularly the Services Directive;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Calls on the Commission and the Council to engage urgently in the creation of a~~ppropriate mechanisms for the common management~~ debt redemption fund based ofn s~~overeign debt~~rict conditionality in order to alleviate the debt burden on several Member States ~~and to create the conditions for a future joint issuance setting a limit to the divergence of sovereign financing costs~~;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2256(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

17a. shares the assessment of the Commission in its blueprint and calls on the Commission and the Council to commit to a concrete and timely bound roadmap to achieve the objectives as set out in the blueprint;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital X

X. whereas from a democratic point of view ~~it is incomprehensi~~and in the light of all provisions of the Lisbon Treaty it is unacceptable that the President of the European Parliament, who represents more than 502 million European citizens, has not been involved in the drafting of the report of 26 June 2012 of the President of the European Council, in collaboration with the Presidents of the European Commission, the Eurogroup and the European Central Bank, entitled ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital X a (new)

Xa. whereas the step undertaken by the President of the European Council gives the impression that the representatives of the Council try to collect all legislative initiative, legislative and enforcement powers in one hand;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital Z a (new)

Za. whereas the Council should strengthen its efforts to close negotiations with the European Parliament in many key dossiers for the financial regulation and stability;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital AM

AM. whereas the Union would benefit from proposals that introduce a single European supervisory mechanism for financial institutions~~, a single European deposit guarantee scheme and a single European recovery and resolution scheme~~;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital BC

BC. whereas deposit guarantee schemes are only one type of instrument which should guarantee financial stability; whereas they are part of a larger financial safety net consisting of regulation, prudential supervision, deposit protection ~~and a lender of last resort~~, recovery and resolution;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital BF

BF. whereas ~~after~~ the increase of the deposit protection to a uniform Union level of EUR 100 000 ~~the current Commission proposal for a European system of deposit guarantees~~ is another step in the right direction; whereas the Commission proposal ~~mainly~~ aims at the harmonisation of national systems in the area of the offered guarantees as well as their financing;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital BG

BG. whereas the introduction of a single European deposit guarantee fund should be the ultimate goal, further increasing the credibility of the scheme; the development of a similar scheme is justified considering the introduction of a European structure for prudential supervision and a European recovery and resolution framework;deleted

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital BH

BH. whereas a single deposit guarantee scheme should cover all banks within the countries included in the system in order to guarantee a level playing field and avoid deposit flight from uncovered to covered financial institutions;deleted

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital BJ

BJ. whereas a single European recovery and resolution authority (ERRA) should be established~~, preferably in parallel with~~ in the years following the introduction of the single supervisory mechanism, for restoring the viability of banks in difficulties and resolving non- viable financial institutions;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital BK

BK. whereas the ERRA, once fully operational, will be able to work more efficiently, more promptly and more consistently than a network of national recovery and resolution authorities, avoiding the negative consequences of purely national decisions, breaking the negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns and eliminating the need for ad hoc intergovernmental crisis solutions;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital BL

BL. whereas the ERRA, whenever the situation requires, needs to explain and justify and should be accountable to the European Parliament for the actions and decisions taken in the field of European recovery and resolution of financial institutions;deleted

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital BM

~~BM. whereas the head of the ERRA should be appointed after a hearing in and confirmation by the European Parliament;~~deleted

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital BO

BO. whereas progress also must be made to create a single European recovery and resolution fund which is essential to guarantee at all times the stability of the financial system and to manage the resolution of financial institutions, whatever their size or nature, while safeguarding public finances;deleted

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital BP

BP. whereas it is necessary for the protection of private savings to keep separate ~~European~~ funds for deposit guarantee and recovery and resolution;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital BQ

BQ. whereas ~~European~~ resolution and deposit guarantee mechanisms should have a strong financial structure built on contributions from the industry, with ~~European~~ public money only serving as an ultimate backstop;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital BR

BR. whereas if the ESM is chosen to work as an additional fiscal safety net for the financial institutions in the euro area, sufficient financial resources have to be foreseen to perform these additional missions in a credible manner;deleted

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital BZ

~~BZ. whereas the common issuance of debt is in the longer run a corollary of EMU;~~deleted

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital CA

CA. whereas as a necessary precondition for common issuance of debt a sustainable fiscal framework needs to be in place, aimed at both enhanced economic governance, fiscal discipline and SGP compliance, as well as control instruments to prevent moral hazard;deleted

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital CB

CB. whereas it must be kept in mind that the introduction in a hasty or not credible way of instruments for common issuance of debt may lead to uncontrollable consequences and the loss of long-term trust in the euro area's capacity to act decisively;deleted

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital CC

CC. whereas the European Semester offers a ~~good~~n appropriate framework to coordinate economic policies implemented at national level in line with the country-specific recommendations adopted by the Council;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital CD

CD. whereas fiscal discipline ~~is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to get out of the crisis,~~needs to go hand in hand with in-depth structural reforms and initiatives ~~are also nee~~in ordedr to ensure a qualitative and sustainable growth and employment ~~in a socially just society~~;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital CE

~~CE. whereas national economic policies must reflect the reality of membership of EMU within a social market economy;~~deleted

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital CG

CG. whereas ~~it is up to the~~ Member States need to deliver without delay on the agreed reforms in their national reform programmes;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital CH

CH. whereas the instrument of enhanced cooperation should be used more frequently in the field of taxation; whereas reference can be made to the European Parliament's position on the common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) ~~and the financial transactions tax (FTT)~~;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.1 – paragraph 1

The legislative act to be adopted should create a high-quality single European supervisory mechanism ~~within~~close to, but not under the roof of the ECB (European supervisor) to ensure the effective application of prudential rules, risk control and crisis prevention concerning credit institutions and other financial institutions throughout the Union.

2012/10/02
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 –p 1.1 – paragraph 7

The European supervisor needs to be accountable to the ~~European Parliament~~group of Members of the competent committee of the European Parliament from countries participating in the European supervisor for the actions and decisions taken in the field of European supervision and should report on a ~~quarterly~~regular basis to the competent committee of the European Parliament.

2012/10/02
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.1 – paragraph 9 a (new)

The split of the Union through the participation of some but not all Member States in the banking union should be avoided and despite the enhanced integration of the euro zone the internal market in the financial sector must be preserved;

2012/10/02
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.2 – title

Recommendation 1.2 relating to ~~a European~~ deposit guarantee schemes and recovery and resolution framework

2012/10/02
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.2 – paragraph 1

The European Parliament considers that the ~~legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows: The legislative act to be adopted should update and supplement the~~ Commission's proposals of 12 July 2010 for a directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes ~~in order to introduce a stronger European dimension to deposit protection~~, 6 June 2012 for a directive on Recovery and Resolution framework and of 12 July 2010 on Investor Protection Schemes should be finalised in the ordinary legislative procedure as soon as possible.

2012/10/02
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.2 – paragraph 2

The proposal should create a single European deposit guarantee fund (EDGF) and ensure that the level of funds available at Union level are adequate to provide a high level of protection to eligible deposits. The EDGF should cover all banks in order to guarantee a level playing field and avoid deposit flight from uncovered to covered financial institutions.deleted

2012/10/02
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.2 – paragraph 3

~~In order to maximise the protection of private savings, the EDGF should be kept separate from the single recovery and resolution fund (see recommendation 1.3 below).~~deleted

2012/10/02
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.2 – paragraph 4

~~The EDGF should have a strong financial structure built on contributions from industry, with European public money only serving as an ultimate backstop.~~deleted

2012/10/02
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.2 – paragraph 5

All deposits denominated in euro should be subject to a particular regime. Under that particular regime, the obligation on Member States to ensure that the EDGF has adequate funding should be a collective one in the case of Member States whose currency is the euro.deleted

2012/10/02
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.2 – paragraph 6

~~A vehicle should be established or designated to provide reassurance that that the collective obligation will be met. That vehicle could be the ESM.~~deleted

2012/10/02
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.3

Recommendation 1.3 relating to a European recovery and resolution scheme The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows: The legislative act to be adopted should update and supplement the current proposal for a directive establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms in order to create a European scheme for the application of resolution measures to institutions subject to direct supervision under the single supervisory mechanism. A body at European level should be established or designated to exercise the required resolution tools in respect of those institutions (ERRA). This body should enjoy a wide independence. Its head should be appointed after confirmation by the European Parliament. In order to ensure adequate resources are available for resolution actions to be taken, a fund should be created aimed at preserving stability and limiting contagion from failing banks. The fund should be pan-European, funded ex-ante by the institutions concerned, and separate from deposit- guarantee schemes. The resolution scheme should have a strong financial structure built on contributions from industry with public money only serving as an ultimate backstop. However, Member States should have an obligation to ensure that the fund is of an adequate size. That obligation should be a collective one in the case of Member States whose currency is the euro. A vehicle should be established or designated to provide reassurance that that collective obligation will be met and if required that vehicle needs to be able to intervene directly in institutions under recovery or resolution. That vehicle could be the ESM. The proposal should also accord with other aspects of the European Parliament's resolution of 7 July 2010 with recommendations to the Commission on Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector, such as harmonisation of insolvency laws and common risk assessments.deleted

2012/10/02
Committee: ECON

2012/2115(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the concept of the shadow banking system (SB) as defined by the FSB covers the system of credit intermediation which involves entities and activities outside the regular banking system;

2012/09/18
Committee: ECON

2012/2115(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Aa. whereas some elements that fall under the term SB are vital for financing the real economy and due care should be taken when defining the scope of any new or extension of existing regulatory measure;

2012/09/18
Committee: ECON

2012/2115(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas, according to FSB estimates, the size of the global SB system was approximately € 4651 trillion in 20101, having grown from € 21 trillion in 2002; this represents 25-30 % of the total financial system and half the size of bank assets;

2012/09/18
Committee: ECON

2012/2115(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas despite certain potential positive effects, SB can ~~weaken the~~threathen the stability of the financial system, especially through regulatory arbitrage and increased systemic risk;

2012/09/18
Committee: ECON

2012/2115(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas ~~proposals on shadow banking and on the structure of lenders' retail and investment arms are important elements of a European banking union~~all-encompassing regulation that covers potential risks stemming from the SB system is important to ensure a stable and sustainable financial system;

2012/09/18
Committee: ECON

2012/2115(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Agrees with the FSB's definition of SBthe SB system as ‘a system of intermediaries, instruments, entities or financial contracts generating a combination of bank-like functions but outside the regulatory perimeter or under a regulatory regime which is either light or addresses issues other than systemic risks, and without access to central bank liquidity facility or public sector credit guarantees’; contrary to the suggestion of the term, shadow banking is not necessarily an unregulated or illegal part of the financial sector; underlines the challenge involved in implementing this definition in a monitoring, regulatory and supervisory context also due to the continuous opacity, lack of data and understanding of this system;

2012/09/18
Committee: ECON

2012/2115(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Believes that close international cooperation and a pooling of efforts at global level is absolutely vital to get a holistic view on the SB system;

2012/09/18
Committee: ECON

2012/2115(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Supports, therefore, as a first step, the creation by the ECB of a central EU database on euro repo transactions~~, and invites the Commission to submit a legislative proposal for the creation of such a database by the end of 2013, after under~~ by the end of 2013; stresses in this respect the need for cooperation with international and 3rd country regulatory authorities and Central Banks in order to obtakin~~g a feasibility study~~ information on repo transactions denominated in other currencies;

2012/09/18
Committee: ECON

2012/2115(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Considers that despite the substantial amount of data and information required by the CRD under the repo reporting obligation the Commission should investigate the availability, timeliness and completeness of data for mapping and monitoring purposes;

2012/09/18
Committee: ECON

2012/2115(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Believes that bank reporting requirments are a vital and valuable tool to catch SB activity; reiterates that accounting rules should reflect reality and that ideally the balance sheet should reflect aggregates to the maximum extent possible;

2012/09/18
Committee: ECON

2012/2115(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Believes further that the ~~proposed extension of~~Commission should carefully assess the extension of specific elements of the CRD IV to certain non-deposit-taking financ~~e companie~~ial institutions not covered by the definition in the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) i~~s necessary~~n order to address specific risks;

2012/09/18
Committee: ECON

2012/2115(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Stresses the need to ensure that all SB entities having a bank sponsor or linked to a bank are included in the bank's balance sheet for prudential consolidation purposes; ~~invit~~highlights the role of sponsor support with respect to Money Market Funds and its potential significant effects; urges the Commission to examine, b~~y the beginning of~~efore end 2013, means of ensuring that entities which are not consolidated from an accounting perspective are consolidated for prudential consolidation purposes; considers that a work stream should be started aiming at aligning to the maximum extent possible financial and prudential reporting requirements;

2012/09/18
Committee: ECON

2012/2115(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Underlines the need to ensure greater transparency in the structure and activities of financial institutions; ~~invites the Commission, taking account of the conclusions of the Liikanen report, to propose legislation to separat~~looks forward in this respect to the conclusions of the Liikanen Group and invites the cComm~~ercial and investment banks, in particular in order to avoid the financing of SB activities via savings~~ission to consider these carefully;

2012/09/18
Committee: ECON

2012/2115(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Takes note of the importance of the repo and securityies lending market; invites the Commission to adopt measures~~, by the beginning of 2013,~~ to increase transparency, as well as to ~~allow regulators to impose minimum~~oblige market participants engaged in the repo and securities lending market to set haircut rates or margin levels ~~for the collateralised financing markets;~~ internally and define specific triggers and criteria to changes thereto; considers that the Commission should set reporting requirements to regulators on these internal policies as well as to define the potential for regulators to intervene;

2012/09/18
Committee: ECON

2012/2115(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Believes that incentives associated with securitisation ~~need to b~~are adequately addressed; invites the Commission to examine the securitisation market and to submit a legislative proposal at the latest by the beginning of 2013 for limiting the number of times a financial product can be securitised; calls on it to impose particular requirements on suppliers of securitisation (e.g. originators or sponsors) to retain part of the risks associated with securitisation and of measures to achieve transparency, by the introduction of an external valuer of the underlying assets and the Capital Requirements Directive; stresses however that the retained part of the securitised product needs to stay on the originators or sponsors book and cannot be sold on; invites the Commission to consider a legislative proposal for limiting the number of times a financial product can be securitised or for an increase on the retention rate for re- securitised products under the CRD; calls for a further standardisation of securitisation products as well as resolution processes;

2012/09/18
Committee: ECON

2012/2115(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Recognises the important role money market funds (MMFs) fulfil in the financing of financial institutions in the short run and in allowing for risk diversification; recognises the different role and structure of MMFs based in the EU and the US; nevertheless considers that the regulatory framework in the US and the EU should be aligned as much as possible in order to prevent regulatory arbitrage; recognises that the 2010 ESMA guidelines imposed stricter standards on MMFs (credit quality, maturity of underlying securities and better disclosure to investors); ~~notes, however, that some MMFs, in particular those offering a stable net asset value to investors, are vulnerable to massive runs; stresses, therefore, that~~stresses the need to take additional measures ~~need to be taken~~ to improve the resilience of these funds and to cover ~~the~~ liquidity risk; invites the Commission to submit a legislative proposal at the beginning of 2013 requiring MMFs either to adopt a variable asset value with a daily evaluation or, if retaining a constant value, to be subject to capital requirementss as well as ensuring to the extent possible the equal treatment of investors; invites the Commission to continue the workstream on the UCITs VI revision and to submit a review of the framework with particular focus on the issue of MMFs in the first half of 2013;

2012/09/18
Committee: ECON

2012/2115(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)

15a. Invites the Commission in the context of the UCITs review to explore further the idea of introducing specific liquidity provisions for MMFs, by setting minimum requirements for overnight, weekly and monthly liquidity [20%, 40%, 60%] and to charge liquidity fees upon a trigger which also leads to a direct information obligation to the competent supervisory authority and ESMA;

2012/09/18
Committee: ECON

2012/2115(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Recognises the benefits Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) provide by giving retail investors access to a wider range of assets (such as commodities, in particular), but stresses the risks ETF carry in terms of complexity, counterparty risk, liquidity of products and possible regulatory arbitrage; invites the Commission, therefore, to ~~submit a legislative proposal at the beginning of 2013 to~~assess and tackle these potential structural vulnerabilities in the ongoing UCITs VI review;

2012/09/18
Committee: ECON

2012/2055(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas access to basic banking services is a precondition for consumers to benefit from the internal market, notably from cross-border migration, money transfer and the purchase of goods and services at ~~non-discriminatory~~appropriate cost; whereas the annual opportunity cost of not having access to a payment account is estimated at between EUR 185 to EUR 365 per consumer;

2012/03/30
Committee: ECON

2012/2055(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital K

K. whereas as part of their corporate social responsibility strategies, banks should share responsibility with public authorities and civil society for the provision of access to basic banking services weith~~out~~er free of charge or at appropriate cost;

2012/03/30
Committee: ECON

2012/2055(INI)

Proposal for a recommendation
Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 1

1. The legislation should ~~obli~~encourage as many payment service providers as possible, as defined in Article 4(9) of Directive 2007/64/EC, to provide basic banking services.

2012/03/30
Committee: ECON

2012/2055(INI)

Proposal for a recommendation
Annex – recommendation 1 – paragraph 4

~~4. Any payment service providers exempted under point (a) of point 3 should contribute to a compensatory fund unless the provider is operating at a non- profit basis.~~deleted

2012/03/30
Committee: ECON

2012/2055(INI)

Proposal for a recommendation
Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 10

10. To facilitate this, basic bank accounts should be classified as low-risk products in accordance with Article 3(3) of Commission Directive 2006/70/EC implementing Directive 2005/60; providers should be obliged to apply simplified customer due diligence requirements and the Commission should aim to further harmonise national interpretations of anti-money laundering rules to ensure that it can no longer be used to deny access to a basic bank account.deleted

2012/03/30
Committee: ECON

2012/2055(INI)

Proposal for a recommendation
Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 14

14. ~~The payment service provider should not offer, explicitly or tacitly, any overdraft facilities or overrunning in conjunction with a basic bank account.~~ A payment order to the consumer’s payment service provider should not be executed where such an execution would result in a negative balance of the consumer’s basic bank account. Access to credit should not be considered as a component of or a right related to a basic bank account, whatever the purpose or the form of the credit.

2012/03/30
Committee: ECON

2012/2055(INI)

Proposal for a recommendation
Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 15

15. Access to a basic bank account should be either free of charge or upon an appropriate fee.

2012/03/30
Committee: ECON

2012/2055(INI)

Proposal for a recommendation
Annex – recommendation 3 – paragraph 17 – section A – subparagraph 1

The consumer should be provided with non-discriminatory access to personal service, such as over-the-counter service in branches and to the use of automatic teller machines (ATMs), including other banks’ ATMs where technically possible. The provider should ~~not~~ charge anyppropriate fees related to the execution of basic account management services.

2012/03/30
Committee: ECON

2012/2055(INI)

Proposal for a recommendation
Annex – recommendation 2 – paragraph 32

32. The Commission should complement basic banking legislation by further initiatives aiming at further integration and harmonisation of retail banking services, better and more efficient financial education and prevention of financial exclusion. ~~Such a package should:~~

2012/03/30
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 1

– having regard to the enhanced economic governance framework of the Union, including the six-pack, ~~the~~Parliament’s agreed-upon proposals for th~~coming~~e two-pack and the fiscal compact;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. ~~Welcomes the fiscal consolidation and structural reform efforts undertaken by Member States~~Calls on the Member States to continue to pursue fiscal consolidation and structural reform and to comply strictly with the earlier commitments and agreements concluded;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Believes that there is a~~n urgent~~ need to ~~further discuss~~take action with regard to a longer-term vision for the euro area which ensures sound public finances, sustainable growth and high levels of employment~~, preventing moral hazard and supporting convergence~~;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Notes that the mutualisation of public debt violates provisions of the constitutional law in some Member States.

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Believes that ~~the prospect of~~ common bonds can only foster stability in the euro area and be an additional element to incentivise compliance with the stability and growth pact; reiterates its position that sequencing is a key issue involving a binding roadmap, included in the annex, similar to the Maastricht criteria for introducing the single currencincentivising element if the provisions of the stability and growth pact are complied with in the long term and in a comprehensive way;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Reiterates that as a necessary precondition for any common issuance of bonds, enhanced economic governance in the euro area surveying and enforcing fiscal policies needs to be in place.

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)

7b. Emphasises that a prerequisite for bond market stability in the euro area and the common currency is strict compliance with the agreed-upon budgetary criteria;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 c (new)

7c. Acknowledges that inadequate competitiveness and a failure to undertake structural reforms are a crucial factor, in real economic terms, in the continuing decline in the budget situation of a country;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges Member States to seriously consider the immediate issuance of common short-term debt in the form of eurobills to protect Member States with fundamentally sustainable fiscal polices from illiquidity runs and the negative feedback loop between sovereign and banking crises;deleted

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Calls on the Commission to prepare contingency plans allowing a rapid implementation of th~~ese~~is schemes;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Believes that, in parallel, there is an urgent need to recapitalise the European banking sector and to ~~further~~ complete ~~financial integration~~the single market for financial services in the EU; calls on the Commission to put forward proposals for a single financial supervisory authority to oversee ~~systemic~~ financial institutions, a banking resolution regime ~~including a recapitalisation fund and an EU-wide~~and eventually harmonised deposit guarantee schemes in all Member States;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that the issuance of common bonds under separate liability, similar to the EFSF bond, risks not being sufficiently attractive for investors and that the roadmap should therefore include a system, which does not require any Treaty change, for the allocation of debt below 60 % of GDP to be issued under joint and several liabilities (blue- bond/red-bond proposal);deleted

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Believes that if the blue-bond/red- bond system proves to be beneficial to the euro area as a whole, a further step, requiring a Treaty change, should be envisaged, which is the issuance of bonds under joint and several liability;deleted

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Advocates, following the implementation of short-term measures to exit the crisis, the setting-up of a committee inspired by the Delors Committee of 1988, including representatives from Member States, the Commission and the ECB; believes that this committee should evaluate progress and make recommendations for further steps with regard to post-crisis phases, to be discussed in Parliament~~; takes the view that this committee should also look at the possibility of issuing genuine federal bonds;~~.

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Title

~~The Roadmap~~Explanatory notes on the various proposals on joint sovereign debt

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Title

~~Phase 1 - Immediate measures to exit the crisis~~deleted

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 1 - Subtitle 1

1.Proposal 1: Setting up of a temporary European redemption fund to reduce debt to sustainable levels at affordable interest rates

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 2 - Subtitle 2

2.Proposal 2: Introducing eurobills to protect Member States from illiquidity runs, in conjunction with an amendment of the Treaties;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 2 - Paragraph 1

The ~~Commission makes a proposal for the immediat~~proposal for considering the setting up of a system for the issuance of common short-term debt alis based ong the following principles:

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 2 - Title

P~~hase 2 - B~~roposal 3 - introduction of blue bond ~~proposal~~: yearly allocated debt ≤ 60 % of GDP to be issued in common ~~without~~and a Treaty change

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Syed KAMALL, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 3 - Title

P~~hase 3 –~~roposal 4 - Common issuance of national debt involving a Treaty change

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/0364(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2 b (new)

(2b) It is important to recognise the fundamental differences between the US and EU accounting traditions. The former rules-based system, introduced in 1933, is based on the narrower view that accounts are only about providing timely and reliable information about a company's finances to the capital markets. The latter principles-based system not only has this requirement but also plays a much more central role in ensuring directors do not sign off accounts illegally. It should be noted that there has never been a requirement for accounts to be true and fair in US GAAP and such a requirement is nowhere present in the IASB's Conceptual Framework, despite this being the overriding principle of European accounting law. Although it is clear that attempts have been made by the IASB to introduce a principles-based system, there is some disagreement as to whether convergence with a legally different system is possible or desired.

2013/06/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0364(COD)

Syed KAMALL, Sven GIEGOLD, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3

(3) In a global economy, there is a need for a global accounting language, while taking into account the many different accounting traditions and languages already used. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) developed by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) are adopted and used in many jurisdictions around the world, although it must be noted that there are no processes currently in place to ensure that IFRS have been fully implemented in those jurisdictions. Such international accounting standards need to be developed under a transparent and democratically accountable process. To ensure that the interests of the Union are respected and that global standards are of high quality and compatible with Union law, it is ~~essenti~~vital that the ~~interests of the Union are adequately taken into account in that international standard-setting process~~IASB accepts the central idea at the heart of European accounting, which is the requirement for accounts to be prepared on a prudent basis and to be true and fair for all the functions required of accounts by Union law.

2013/06/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0364(COD)

Syed KAMALL, Sven GIEGOLD, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Wolf KLINZ, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4

(4) According to Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002 on the application of international accounting standards, IFRS should only be incorporated into Union law to be applied by companies with securities listed on a regulated market in the Union, provided that the IFRS meet the criteria set out in that regulation and the requirements of the fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 and the seventh Council Directive 83-3497EEC of 13 June 1983. IFRS therefore play a major role in the functioning of the internal market and thus the Union has a direct interest in ensuring that the process through which IFRS are developed and approved delivers standards that are consistent with the requirements of the legal framework of the internal market. It should be noted that the IAS Regulation 2002 uses the conceptual framework from 2001 which has now been changed in several significant manners, particularly around the word 'prudence', which includes not booking unrealised profits, and stewardship, which includes the capital maintenance function of accounts.

2013/06/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0364(COD)

Syed KAMALL, Sven GIEGOLD, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5

(5) IFRS are issued by the IASB and related interpretations are issued by the IFRS Interpretations Committee, two bodies within the International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation. It is therefore important to establish appropriate funding arrangements for the IFRS Foundation. These funding arrangements will be reliant on the IASB achieving certain milestones in terms of updating its own governance and specific standards and also overhauling its Conceptual Framework to ensure it properly reflects Union company law requirements.

2013/06/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0364(COD)

Syed KAMALL, Sven GIEGOLD, Wolf KLINZ, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6

(6) The European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) was founded in 2001 by European organisations representing issuers~~, investors~~ and the accountancy profession involved in the financial reporting process. In accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002, EFRAG provides the Commission with opinions on whether an accounting standard issued by the IASB or an interpretation issued by the IFRS Interpretations Committee, which is to be endorsed, complies with the endorsement criteria set out in that Regulation. ~~EFRAG is also taking up the role of the ‘single European accounting voice’ in the global arena. In that capacity, EFRAG provides input to the IASB's standard-setting process.~~

2013/06/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0364(COD)

Syed KAMALL, Sven GIEGOLD, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6 a (new)

(6a) There are also calls for EFRAG to take up the role of the 'single European accounting voice'. It must be clearly understood whether there is appetite for such a role from national standard-setters and regulators, given the significant differences of opinion that already exist between Member States. If this role is given to EFRAG, all interactions with the IASB must be made fully transparent and any decisions taken by EFRAG should be made in full consultation with national standard-setters.

2013/06/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0364(COD)

Syed KAMALL, Sven GIEGOLD, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7

(7) Taking into account EFRAG's ~~key~~single role in ~~supporting internal market law and policy and in rep~~ensuring that IFRS are compliant with the requiresment~~ing European interests in the standard-setting process at international level~~s of Union company law and policy, as laid out in the IAS Regulation 2002, it is necessary for the Union to ensure EFRAG's stable financing and thus contribute to its funding. Such financing arrangements should be reassessed in the light of any decision taken to give EFRAG more responsibilities in terms of influencing the IASB in addition to fulfilling the basic task required by the IAS Regulation 2002.

2013/06/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0364(COD)

Syed KAMALL, Sven GIEGOLD, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10

(10) Bodies working in the field of accounting and auditing are highly dependent on funding and play major roles in the Union which are decisive for the functioning of the internal market. The proposed beneficiaries of the Programme established by Decision No 716/2009/EC have been co-financed by operating grants from the Union budget, which has allowed them to increase their financial independence from private-sector and ad- hoc ~~funding~~sources, thereby raising their capacity and credibility. Public funding in itself however should not be seen as having confirmed this independence from the private sector. In particular, greater transparency around membership of the IASB's and EFRAG's board and other committees should be required to ensure all stakeholders are represented in the endorsement process. All employees of EFRAG and IASB should be required to declare other relevant financial or job interests or commitments.

2013/06/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0364(COD)

Syed KAMALL, Sven GIEGOLD, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11

(11) Experience has shown that Union co- financing ensures that beneficiaries benefit from clear, stable, diversified, sound and adequate funding and it contributes to enabling the beneficiaries to accomplish their public interest mission in an independent and efficient manner. Therefore, sufficient funding should continue to be provided by means of a Union contribution towards the functioning of international accounting and auditing standard-setting, and in particular to the IFRS Foundation, EFRAG and the PIOB, subject to certain milestones being achieved in terms of updating the conceptual framework of the IFRS Foundation and clarifying what roles EFRAG and PIOB play.

2013/06/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0364(COD)

Syed KAMALL, Sven GIEGOLD, Wolf KLINZ, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12

(12) In addition to changing their funding patterns, the IFRS Foundation and EFRAG have undergone governance reforms to ensure that through their structure and processes they accomplish their public interest mission in an independent, efficient, transparent and democratically accountable manner. In relation to the IFRS Foundation, the Monitoring Board was created in 2009 to ensure public accountability and oversight, the effectiveness of the Standards Advisory Council has been enhanced, transparency has been improved and the role of impact assessments has been formalised as part of the due process of the IASB. Given that the convergence project with the US has stalled, it would be appropriate for the IASB to reassess the role and presence of representatives of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) on the IASB.

2013/06/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0364(COD)

Syed KAMALL, Sven GIEGOLD, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Wolf KLINZ, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16

(16) This Regulation should provide for the possibility of co-financing activities of certain bodies pursuing an objective forming part of and supporting the Union policy in the field of designing standards, endorsing standards or supervising standard-setting processes related to financial reporting and auditing. This financing should only be given to the bodies in question if it is clear that European accounting concepts, in particular around prudence and the requirement for a true and fair view, are embedded at the core of their conceptual frameworks or structures.

2013/06/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0364(COD)

Syed KAMALL, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Sven GIEGOLD, Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19

(19) In order to promote the Union's interests in the fields of financial reporting and auditing and flexibly adapt to eventual governance and institutional changes in those fields, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of selecting new beneficiaries for the Programme. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, national standard-setters and the European Parliament. The Commission, when preparing and drawing up delegated acts, should ensure a simultaneous, timely and appropriate transmission of relevant documents to the European Parliament and to the Council.

2013/06/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0364(COD)

Syed KAMALL, Sven GIEGOLD, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Wolf KLINZ, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20 a (new)

(20a) A review must be carried out within six months of the adoption of this Regulation to identify whether or not existing IFRSs and in particular the IASB's conceptual framework fulfil the requirements of Union company law. In this review, the Commission should explore the possibility of introducing tougher liability standards for directors and auditors and also to introduce a legally binding true and fair override, that if the accounts prepared in accordance with IFRS do not give a true and fair view, the accounts cannot be signed off. The review must also ensure existing governance arrangements in EFRAG and IASB are overhauled to ensure all private sector interests and commitments are made fully public.

2013/06/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0364(COD)

Syed KAMALL, Sven GIEGOLD, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2

2. The Programme covers the activities of ~~developing or providing input to the development of standards, applying, ass~~the IASB, which develops IFRS, EFRAG, which assesses whether or not an IFRS is compliant with Union company law as part of the implementation of Union policiess in~~g or monitoring standards or oversee~~ the field of financial reporting stand~~ard-setting processes in suppo~~ auditing and PIOB, which assesses whether or not an ISA is compliant with Union company law as part of the implementation of Union policies in the field of financial reporting and auditing.

2013/06/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0364(COD)

Syed KAMALL, Sven GIEGOLD, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Wolf KLINZ, Sharon BOWLES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1

1. The objective of the Programme is to improve the conditions for the functioning of the internal market, the ability for regulators to enforce prudential regulation and to strengthen corporate governance by supporting transparent and independent development of international financial reporting and auditing standards.

2013/06/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0364(COD)

Syed KAMALL, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Sven GIEGOLD, Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1

Financing under the Programme shall be provided in the form of operating grants, renewed annually after the Commission has conducted an assessment of whether the beneficiaries have achieved the goals laid out in the Programme and subject to approval from the European Parliament.

2013/06/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0364(COD)

Syed KAMALL, Sven GIEGOLD, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1

The financial envelope for the implementation of this Regulation over the period 2014-2020 shall be EUR 58 010 000 in current prices, although this figure can be reduced or adjusted if it is found that the beneficiaries have not achieved certain milestones.

2013/06/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0364(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. By 30 November 2013, the Commission shall submit a first report on necessary governance reforms in the area of accounting and financial information (EFRAG and ARC) based, inter alia, on the conclusions of the special advisor to the Internal Market Commissioner, expected by the end of October 2013.

2013/06/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0364(COD)

Wolf KLINZ, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anne E. JENSEN, Nils TORVALDS

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. The Commission shall evaluate and submit, if appropriate, a legislative proposal changing the Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 by 31 October 2013.

2013/06/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0299(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall enstablish binding measures that ensure that the listed companies ~~in whose boards members of the under-represented sex hold less than 40 per cent of the non-executive director positions make the appointments to those positions on the basi~~set a target figure for the proportion of the under-represented gender in boards. The individual company shall thus specifically set a target which is realistic and ambitious for the company itself. The listed companies are also required to have a policy for increasing the proportion of the under-represented gender at the management levels of athe compa~~rative analysis of the qualifications of each candidate, by applying pre-establ~~nies in general. This means that the individual company must establish the optimum recruitment basis in the light of its specific needs and ideas. Lishted, c~~lear, neutrally formulated and unambiguous criteria, in order to attain the said percen~~ompanies must report on the status of fulfilment of the target set out in the annual report, including, if so, why the companies failed to achieve the targe ~~at the latest by 1 J~~t set. Moreover, companies must present the policy in the annua~~ry 2020 or at the latest by 1 January 2018 in case of listed companies which are public undertakings.~~l report, how the policy is implemented and what has been achieved. If the companies fail to do so, they may be fined. These requirements do not apply to representatives of the employees

2013/05/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0299(COD)

Wolf KLINZ, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anne E. JENSEN, Nils TORVALDS

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 2

~~2. The number of non-executive director positions necessary to meet the objective laid down in paragraph 1 shall be the number closest to the proportion of 40 per cent, but not exceeding 49 per cent.~~deleted

2013/05/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0299(COD)

Wolf KLINZ, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anne E. JENSEN, Nils TORVALDS

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 3

3. In order to attain the objective laid down in paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that, in the selection of non- executive directors, priority shall be given to the candidate of the under-represented sex if that candidate is equally qualified as a candidate of the other sex in terms of suitability, competence and professional performance, unless an objective assessment taking account of all criteria specific to the individual candidates tilts the balance in favour of the candidate of the other sex.deleted

2013/05/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0299(COD)

Wolf KLINZ, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anne E. JENSEN, Nils TORVALDS

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 4

4. Member States shall ensure that listed companies are obliged to disclose, on the request of an unsuccessful candidate, the qualification criteria upon which the selection was based, the objective comparative assessment of those criteria and, where relevant, the considerations tilting the balance in favour of a candidate of the other sex.deleted

2013/05/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0299(COD)

Wolf KLINZ, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anne E. JENSEN, Nils TORVALDS

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 5

5. Member States shall take the necessary measures, in accordance with their national judicial systems, to ensure that where an unsuccessful candidate of the under-represented sex establishes facts from which it may be presumed that that candidate was equally qualified as the appointed candidate of the other sex, it shall be for the listed company to prove that there has been no breach of the rule laid down in paragraph 3.deleted

2013/05/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0299(COD)

Wolf KLINZ, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anne E. JENSEN, Nils TORVALDS

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 6

6. Member States may provide that listed companies where the members of the under-represented sex represent less than 10 per cent of the workforce are not subject to the objective laid down in paragraph 1.deleted

2013/05/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0299(COD)

Wolf KLINZ, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anne E. JENSEN, Nils TORVALDS

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 7

7. Member States may provide that the objective laid down in paragraph 1 is met where listed companies can show that members of the under-represented sex hold at least one third of all director positions, irrespective of whether they are executive or non-executive.deleted

2013/05/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0299(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 8 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

~~Without prejudice to Article 4(6) and (7),~~ Member States which before the entry into force of this Directive have already taken measures to ensure a more balanced representation of women and men among the non-executive directors of listed companies may suspend the application of the procedural requirements relating to appointments contained in Article 4(1), (3), (4) and (5), provided that it can be shown that those measures enable members of the under-represented sex to hold at least 40 per cent of the non- executive director positions of listed companies by at the latest 1 January 2020, or at the latest 1 January 2018 for listed companies whichmay suspend the application of this Directive provided that those measures are binding, and that the listed companies are obliged to report to the Member State on the status of fulfilment of the target on a re ~~public undertaking~~gular basis.

2013/05/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0299(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

Member States having suspended pursuant to Article 8(3) the application of the procedural requirements relating to appointments contained in Article 4(1)~~, (3), (4) and (5~~ and Article 5(1) shall include information in the reports mentioned in paragraph 1 demonstrating the concrete results obtained by the national measures referred to in Article 8(3). The Commission shall then issue a specific report ascertaining whether those measures effectively enable members of the under-represented sex to hold at least 40 per cent of the non-executive director positions ~~by 1 January 2018 for listed companies which are public undertakings, and by 1 January 2020 for listed companies which are not public undertakings~~of listed companies by 1 January 2020. The first such report shall be issued by the Commission by 1 July 2017, and subsequent reports shall be issued within six months after notification of the respective national reports under paragraph 1.

2013/05/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0299(COD)

Olle SCHMIDT, Wolf KLINZ, Philippe DE BACKER

Proposal for a directive
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

Member States in question shall ensure that listed companies, which by applying the national measures referred to in Article 8(3) have not appointed or elected members of the under-represented sex for at least 40 per cent of the non-executive director positions of their boards by 1 January 20~~18, where they are public undertakings, or by 1 January 2020, where they are not public undertakings,~~20 apply the procedural requirements ~~relating to appointments~~ contained in Article 4(1)~~, (3), (4) and (5~~ and Article 5(1) with effect ~~respectively~~ from th~~ose~~at dates.

2013/05/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0298(APP)

Olle SCHMIDT, Nils TORVALDS, Philippe DE BACKER, Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a recommendation
Recital L

L. whereas enhanced cooperation will respect the rights, competences and obligations of the non-participating Member States, inasmuch as the possibility of raising harmonised FTT on the territories of the participating Member States does not affect the availability or the conditions of raising FTT on the territories ofxtraterritorial aspects of enhanced cooperation have not been fully considered to ensure that it will respect the rights, competences and obligations of the non-participating Member States,

2012/11/22
Committee: ECON

2012/0298(APP)

Olle SCHMIDT, Wolf KLINZ, Nils TORVALDS, Philippe DE BACKER

Proposal for a recommendation
Recital O a (new)

Oa. whereas Parliament can only give its consent after a robust analysis of the consequences of the initial Commission proposal for a common FTT, on participating and on non-participating countries as well as on the internal market as a whole is undertaken,

2012/11/22
Committee: ECON

2012/0298(APP)

Sharon BOWLES, Olle SCHMIDT, Nils TORVALDS, Philippe DE BACKER, Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a recommendation
Recital O b (new)

Ob. whereas prior to the introduction of FTT, the Commission should demonstrate that enhanced cooperation will not undermine the internal market or economic, social and territorial cohesion; whereas the Commission should also demonstrate that FTT does not constitute a barrier to, or discrimination in trade between, Member States, and that it does not distort competition between them,

2012/11/22
Committee: ECON

2012/0298(APP)

Sharon BOWLES, Olle SCHMIDT, Philippe DE BACKER, Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a recommendation
Recital O c (new)

Oc. whereas prior to the introduction of FTT, the Commission should demonstrate that any enhanced cooperation will respect the competences, rights and obligations of non-participating Member States,

2012/11/22
Committee: ECON

2012/0298(APP)

Olle SCHMIDT, Sharon BOWLES, Nils TORVALDS, Philippe DE BACKER, Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a recommendation
Recital O d (new)

Od. whereas the Commission must closely monitor the implementation of FTT with regard to Articles 326 and 327 TFEU and must report annually to the European Parliament and to the Council on any adverse affects this has in respect of those provisions,

2012/11/22
Committee: ECON

2012/0298(APP)

Proposal for a recommendation
Paragraph 1

1. CDeclines to consents to the proposal for a Council decision~~, without prejudice to which Member States participate~~;

2012/11/22
Committee: ECON

2012/0244(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 a (new)

(3 a) Nevertheless in order to achieve a fully effective supervisory framework in the Union it is crucial to go beyond the current legal limitations of the mechanism set up around the ECB and include all Member States irrespective of their currencies and all credit institutions, financial conglomerates, investment firms and insurance companies operational throughout the Union in the future. Therefore it is necessary to start preparing an essential institutional framework including possible changes of the Treaty as soon as possible in order to create a Single Supervisory Authority in the co-decision procedure. A Single Supervisory Authority, once fully operational, should take over supervisory tasks granted to the ECB according to this Regulation and play a central role in the ESFS.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0244(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5

(5) In view of the supervisory tasks conferred on the ECB by Council Regulation (EU) No …/… [127(6) Regulation], EBA should be able to carry out its tasks also in relation to the ECB. ~~In order to ensure that e~~Existing mechanisms for settlement of disagreements and actions in emergency situations should remain effective, a specific procedure should be provided for. In particular, if the ECB does not comply with an action by EBA to settle a disagreement or to address an emergency situation, it should be required to explain its reasons. In that case, whenever based on requirements set out in directly applicable Union law EBA can adopt an individual decision addressed to the financial institution concerned, it should do sond preserve a level playing field, and therefore should apply in the same way to the ECB and other national supervisors.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0244(COD)

Wolf KLINZ, Werner LANGEN, Philippe DE BACKER

Proposal for a regulation
Article 406 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b

~~(b) 5% for the assets in points (b) and (c) of Article 404(1) ;~~deleted

2012/03/09
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Wolf KLINZ, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Gunnar HÖKMARK, Olle SCHMIDT

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 3 – point c

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 4

4. The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) of the Treaty shall establish a deadline of six months at most for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. The Council recommendation shall also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit, which should be completed in the year following its identification unless there are special circumstances. In the recommendation, the Council shall request that the Member State achieves annual budgetary targets which, on the basis of the forecast underpinning the recommendation, are consistent with a minimum annual improvement of at least ~~0,5~~ 1% of GDP as a benchmark, in its cyclically adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures, in order to ensure the correction of the excessive deficit within the deadline set in the recommendation.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Wolf KLINZ, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Gunnar HÖKMARK, Olle SCHMIDT

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 5 – point a

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1

1. Any Council decision to give notice to the participating Member State concerned to take measures for the deficit reduction in accordance with Article 126(9) of the Treaty shall be taken within two months of the Council decision establishing that no effective action has been taken in accordance with Article 126(8). In the notice, the Council shall request that the Member State achieve annual budgetary targets which, on the basis of the forecast underpinning the notice, are consistent with a minimum annual improvement of at least ~~0,5~~ 1% of GDP as a benchmark, in its cyclically adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures, in order to ensure the correction of the excessive deficit within the deadline set in the notice. The Council shall also indicate measures conducive to the achievement of these targets.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Wolf KLINZ, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Gunnar HÖKMARK, Olle SCHMIDT

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 6

(6) For the purposes of private placements of securities, investment firms and credit institutions should be entitled to treat as qualified investors those natural or legal persons that are considered to be or that they treat as professional clients, or that are recognized eligible counterparties in accordance with Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments ~~amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC~~. An alignment of the relevant provisions of Directives 2003/71/EC and 2004/39/EC in this sense would reduce complexity and costs for investment firms in the event of private placements because the firms would be able to define the persons to whom the placement is to be addressed relying on their own list of professional clients and eligible counterparties. The issuer should be able to rely on the list of professional clients and eligible counterparties that has been drawn up in accordance with Annex II of Directive 2004/39/EC. Therefore, the definition of qualified investors in Directive 2003/71/EC should be widened to include those persons and no separate register should be maintained.

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 8

(8) A valid prospectus, drawn up by the issuer or the offeror and available to the public at the time of the final placement of securities through financial intermediaries or in any subsequent resale of securities, provides sufficient information for investors to make informed investment decisions. Therefore, financial intermediaries placing or subsequently reselling the securities should be entitled to rely upon the initial prospectus published by the issuer or the offeror as long as this is valid and duly supplemented in accordance with Articles 9 and ~~Article~~ 16 of Directive 2003/71/EC and the issuer or the offeror responsible for drawing up such prospectus ~~consents to its use. In this case~~and any other entity which, pursuant to national law, is liable for the accuracy of the content of such prospectus consents to its use. The issuer or the offeror should be able to attach conditions to his or her consent. In the event that consent to use the prospectus has been given, the issuer or the offeror responsible for drawing up the initial prospectus should be liable for the information stated therein and no other prospectus should be required. However, ~~in cas~~where the issuer or the offeror responsible for drawing up such initial prospectus does not consent to its use, the financial intermediary should be required to publish a new prospectus. In that case, the financial intermediary should be liable for the information stated in the prospectus. Where the financial intermediary chooses to use the initial prospectus without consent or beyond the terms of the consent given, the intermediary should also be liable for the information stated in the initial prospectus.

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 10 b (new)

(10b) The key information document should replace the summary of the prospectus for the purposes of the notification process. The final terms should complement the key information document where those terms are not known at the time of drawing up the key information document. The information contained in the final terms should be given in the same format as the key information document of the base prospectus.

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 11 a (new)

(11a) The proportionate disclosure regime should take account of the special needs of SMEs to the highest extent possible. The measures elaborating the model for a light regime for SMEs should also consider the role of small and medium- sized issuers.

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 4 a (new)

(4a) This Directive lays down minimum core principles on remuneration policy. Those principles should be applied in a manner that is proportionate to the nature, scope, complexity and riskiness of the activities, size and internal structure of the credit institution or investment firm concerned. This Directive should urge Member States to implement common measures which guarantee a level playing field.

2010/03/31
Committee: ECON

2009/0099(COD)

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 9 a (new)

(9a) In order to enhance transparency further as regards the remuneration practices of credit institutions and investment firms, the competent authorities of Member States should collect information on remuneration to benchmark institutions in accordance with the categories of quantitative information that those institutions are required to disclose under this Directive. The competent authorities should provide the European Banking Authority (EBA) with such information to enable it to conduct similar benchmarking at Union level. The collection of information should be confined to data on the integrity and efficiency of the remuneration scheme without harming the personal rights and the confidential contract agreements of those employees whose professional activities are covered by that scheme.

2010/03/31
Committee: ECON

2009/0064(COD)

Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Carl HAGLUND, Dirk STERCKX

Proposal for a directive
–

The European Parliament rejects the Commission proposal.

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0035(COD)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs calls on the Committee on Legal Affairs, as the committee responsible, to ~~propose rejection of~~accept the Commission proposal ~~and to ask for a general revision of the 4th and 7th Company Law Directives in 2010, accompanied by an all-inclusive impact assess~~with the following amendment.s:

2009/10/02
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas the consequences of the financial crisis on the real economy result in exceptional economic circumstances that require ~~excep~~timely, targeted and proportional measures and decisions, and whereas public intervention, although inevitable, drives a wedge between the gains of the private sector in the recent past and the losses of the public sector in the present and near future,

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas joining the euro has proved to enhance economic stability in the Member States; whereas, however, citizens expect, particularly in a time of economic recession, ~~a strong enforcement of the Treaty provisions on social and regional cohesion~~responsible government intervention to counter the economic downturn and offset the social effects, whilst preserving the rules and principles that guarantee a strong and stable single currency,

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)

Fa. whereas it is of the utmost importance that confidence is restored in order to allow for an orderly functioning of the financial markets and to dampen the effects on the real economy,

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. welcomes the Commission'’s prompt initiative to launch a European economic recovery plan (Recovery Plan) as a reaction to the serious ongoing ~~downturn; regrets, however, that the Community dimension of that proposal amounts to only 15 % of the budget for the recovery programme~~economic downturn;

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. stresses that the top priority of the Recovery Plan must be to ~~protect citizens of the Union from the effects of the financial crisis, as they are the most strongly affected whether as workers, as members of households, or as entrepreneurs~~counter the economic decline whilst intensifying its strategy to strengthen the EU economy and labour market and improving the framework conditions for growth and job creation;

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. stresses that in tackling the acute problems resulting from the economic crisis, we should not lose sight of the long-term strategy and achieve some long- overdue goals, notably: - stepping up the elimination of barriers to the freedom to provide services, as provided for in the Services Directive, the implementation of which has been delayed, because of the enormous job- creation potential in the services sector; - stepping up the implementation of the Postal Services Directive; - completing the internal market for energy; - urgently stepping up investment in R&D, because the – fairly modest – Lisbon target of 3 % GDP has not been met to date, mainly because the private sector has failed to deliver on its 2 % share, and because despite the stated objective of becoming the most dynamic knowledge economy in the world, the gap in R&D investment with other regions is widening; substantial investment in R&D and innovation must be a pre-condition for any support to industry; - urgently finalising an EU patent regime; - removing any remaining obstacles to freedom of movement for workers;

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. strongly regrets the absence of clear growth and job benchmarks and targets from the Recovery Plan; calls for the European Union to agree on sustainable job creation, the safeguarding of employment, and the prevention of mass unemployment as its most important common goals, which should determine the size and components of the Recovery Plancalls for the European Union to step up its efforts to invest in skills training and sustainable job creation, and the prevention of mass unemployment;

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. strongly calls for new horizontal initiatives at European Union level, given that different national capacities and margins of budgetary manoeuvre may generate very asymmetric outcomes across Europe; recalls, however, the responsibility of each Member State to exercise fiscal discipline and structural reforms;

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. calls on the Commission to give clear guidance on the interpretation of the flexibility clause of the revised Stability and Growth Pact, namely ~~when addressing~~to assess whether short-term investment decisions ~~which~~ are compatible with medium-term budgetary targets and conducive to sustainable growth and long-term Lisbon goals;

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. notes with concern the rapid rise of public debt and budget deficits; concerned that public debts may become an excessive burden for future generations;

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. insists on the need for conditionality to be attached to the banking sector rescue plans in terms of ~~dividend distribution, remuneration policy,~~ provision of credit, lending conditions and protection of social policy terms;

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. underlines the importance of ensuring that central interest rate cuts are passed on to borrowers;

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. reaffirms that more transparency and better risk-management as well as coordinated supervision provide most of the solutions to further crisis-prevention and that the regulatory reform must be all- encompassing, applying to all actors and transactions in the financial markets; ~~underlines that regulatory initiatives must cover executive remuneration, transparency, leverage, capital requirements and securitisation~~points to the fact that the global nature of financial markets necessitates an international coordination of reforms; underlines that regulatory initiatives must aim at creating transparency, sustainability, stability and responsibility in the market; reminds the Commission of its obligation to respond to Parliament's requests on the regulation of hedge funds and private equity;

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

~~20. calls for a true European Pact for Employment; supports the Commission's initiative to put forward European Social Fund spending, to promote the development and matching of skills;~~deleted

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. ~~underlines the need to guarantee minimum living standards for all citizens of the Union and calls for adequate emergency measures to be taken;~~ calls for social policies to be adapted to cope with the recession, supporting active labour market policies, ~~living conditions (in particular in the housing market and access to quality public services) and~~ paying special attention to the most vulnerable members of society;

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

~~22. calls on the Commission urgently to assess the recession risks affecting industrial sectors across Europe in order pro-actively to intervene at European Union level, if needed;~~deleted

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)

22a. warns against the undue loosening of the EU competition rules, as this might weaken the internal market; is concerned that national responses to the economic downturn may lead to protectionism and distortion of competition, which, in the long term, would seriously undermine the economic prosperity of the citizens of the Union;

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

~~24. regrets the absence of territorial cohesion goals from the proposed stimulus arrangements, in spite of the clear asymmetric impact of the crisis across the European territory;~~deleted

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. welcomes all the Commission proposals that simplify and accelerate access to the available cohesion instruments, and speed up project implementation, namely through anticipating funds, temporarily increasing community support rates, and improving technical assistance and accelerating payment procedures;

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29 a (new)

29a. stresses the need to reduce the bureaucratic burden on investment projects co-financed by private companies; therefore calls on the Commission and the Member States to take measures that accelerate and facilitate investments;

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. calls for adequate detailed criteria and standards to be developed for close monitoring and ~~permanent re~~regular assessment of the effectiveness of the recovery plans, bearing in mind that the full extent of the crisis cannot yet be totally assessed;

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33

33. ~~consider~~underlines that the present disinflationary recessive environment renders a broad interpretation of the ECB mandate crucial; underlines that the ECB has a responsibility to ensure supportive monetary policy for recovery in the euro areaECB has a major role in ensuring that its monetary policy is conducive to recovery in the euro area; recalls the independence of the ECB and its mission to ensure price stability;

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33 a (new)

33a. considers that due to rising public debt levels the political pressure to allow for higher inflation in the medium term will rise; underlines that the ECB is fully independent and follows the goal of price stability;

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34 - indent 2

- the establishment of a ~~binding~~ framework for ~~Member States within which consult each other and~~consultation and coordination between Member States and with the Commission ~~before taking~~on major economic policy decisions, based on a common understanding of problems and priorities while accepting some national specificities;

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

35. considers that involvement of the European Investment Bank (EIB) is crucial and that a large share of lending referred to in the Recovery Plan is within its competence; welcomes the Member States' agreement on a capital increase for the EIB; ~~recalls that some of the EIB interventions also require support from the EU budget, but that this is not currently provided for in the Recovery Plan~~emphasises the EIB role in refinancing commercial banks, including existing PPP structures;

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. calls on Member States to consider Eurobonds as a low-cost financing instrument for major European political priorities; stresses that issuing common euro area bonds would reduce the spreads and attract domestic and foreign savings;deleted

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2334(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38

38. ~~recommends a flexible approach to the European budget spending structure, reinforcing its internal social and cohesion dimensions; strongly supports the mobilisation of~~proposes to assess the options for using unspent EU funds tofor priorities identified under a cohesion framework;

2009/01/29
Committee: ECON

2008/2247(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Notes that the Directive was adopted as a response to the crisis following the collapse of Enron; emphasises that the current financial crisis ~~raises serious concerns about~~highlights the importance of high-quality accounting and auditing practices; deplores the fact that only 12 Member States have transposed the Directive in full; urges the Commission to ensure its immediate transposition and enforcement;

2008/11/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2247(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Stresses that recent experience shows the need for frequent and high-quality interaction within audit committees and between independent directors, supervisory boards and auditors ~~and that executive board members should not always be present at such meetings~~;

2008/11/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2247(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Deplores that not all Member States have set up an adequately resourced independent public oversight of auditors; ~~recommends that a new European oversight body coordinate~~stresses that this gap should be closed and that coordination between the national public oversight ~~activities, give input in preparation and implementation of standards, and act as a strong counterpart in a global context~~bodies should be strengthened; urges for mutual recognition with third-country oversight authorities;

2008/11/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2247(INI)

Wolf KLINZ, Jorgo CHATZIMARKAKIS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Welcomes the Commission's recommendation relating to the limitation of the civil liability of auditors; encourages Member States to implement that recommendation;

2008/11/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2237(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Calls for an increase in funding for innovation within the scope of the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme and for better access for SMEs to such funding to be ensured via the European Institute of Innovation and Technology; calls on the Commission, furthermore, significantly to reduce red tape within the 7th Framework Programme in order to ensure better access for SMEs;

2008/11/11
Committee: ECON

2008/2237(INI)

Wolf KLINZ, Jorgo CHATZIMARKAKIS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 b (new)

4b. Urges Member States to direct more regional funds to research and development and to include SMEs to a greater extent in the respective programmes;

2008/11/11
Committee: ECON

2008/2237(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Strongly opposes the planned introduction of a directive on reduced VAT rates for locally supplied services, as this would lead to distortion of competition and is likely to present challenges regarding the definition of the services concerned;

2008/11/11
Committee: ECON

2008/2237(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 b (new)

7b. Recalls the Commission communication entitled 'Tackling the corporation tax obstacles of small and medium-sized enterprises in the Internal Market - outlining a possible Home State Taxation pilot scheme' (COM(2005)0702); supports the idea of homestate taxation for SMEs and recommends that Member States make use of the pilot scheme;

2008/11/11
Committee: ECON

2008/2196(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Notes that the transfer of a company’s seat goes hand in hand with the transfer of supervision~~, and that a 14th Directive must not lead to the undermining of the~~; points out that when drafting the 14th Directive the maintenance of the existing rights of shareholders, creditors and workers must be duly taken into account;

2008/10/15
Committee: ECON

2008/2196(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. ~~Stresses that dec~~Calls on the Commission~~s on the transfer of a company seat may be taken for reasons related to n~~ to submit a proposal for a common consolidated assessment basis for corporation tax; stresses that a joint consolidated corporational tax ~~incentive schemes, rather than for economic reasons; calls on the Commission to submit a proposal for a common consolidated assessment basis for corporation tax~~assessment base encourages tax competition and decisions on the transfer of a company seat are facilitated by better comparability of the tax systems of individual Member States;

2008/10/15
Committee: ECON

2008/2156(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Stresses the need for mutual reinforcement of stability and growth- oriented macro-economic policies by making demand-side policy a matter of common concern: the need to follow closely public balances through the composition and level of taxes and expenditures and their impact on the demand side and in parallel agree on common approaches regarding wage policy;

2008/09/03
Committee: ECON

2008/2156(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Notes that the revised Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has proven its value and that a strong consolidation of budgets has to be adhered to, as demographic change and possible decline in economic growth could lead to budgetary problems in euro area Member States, which could have negative effects on the stability of the euro area as a whole; criticises in this context the lack of discipline in combating budgetary deficits in times of economic growth and stresses that Member States must effectively extend the scope for an anti-cyclical fiscal policy, especially in order to be better prepared for external shocks; and demands, therefore, a ~~long~~short- term strategy to reduce national debts to a maximum of 60 % and a long-term strategy to a substantially higher reduction;

2008/09/03
Committee: ECON

2008/2156(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Takes the view that structural reforms should focus on increasing productivity through a better combination of economic and social policy, ~~increasing capital intensity, and a greater participation of worker~~as defined in the Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs;

2008/09/03
Committee: ECON

2008/2156(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Considers that the monetary policy dialogue between Parliament and the ECB has been a success, and one which should be built on further; expects an improvement of the monetary dialogue on several points, such as coordinating the dates for the regular hearings of the ECB President with the ECB’s calendar for monetary policy decisions so as to improve the debate on them and still having the possibiin order to ensure a regular and topical debate on monetary politcy ~~to invite ECB President for discussing topical issues when necessary~~decisions;

2008/09/03
Committee: ECON

2008/2156(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Notes that the primary objective of the ECB’s monetary policy is to maintain price stability, and that the ECB aims at inflation rates of below, but close to, 2 % over the medium term; ~~considers that this definition of price stability should be examined in the context of a new age of globalisation characterised by rising energy and food prices;~~

2008/09/03
Committee: ECON

2008/2156(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Is of the opinion that the ECB should move towards a full inflation target regime where a shift to a range of targets might be more meaningful than a point target inflation rate, and should make public its inflation forecasts;deleted

2008/09/03
Committee: ECON

2008/2156(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. Underlines that, with regard to retail services, more integration is needed, without such integration being to the detriment of consumer protection; believes that customer mobility, financial literacy, access to basic services, and comparability of products~~, and procedures of redress~~ need to be improved;

2008/09/03
Committee: ECON

2008/2156(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

30. Requests that the Commission examine the creation of European bonds and develop a long-term strategy which enables the issuing of such bonds within the euro area, in addition to Member States' national bonds; refers to the need for an appraisal of its consequences for both international financial markets and EMU;deleted

2008/09/03
Committee: ECON

2008/2156(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31 a (new)

31a. Considers that the Member States outside the euro area that fulfil the Maastricht criteria and have no derogation in the Treaty should adopt the common currency at the earliest possible opportunity;

2008/09/03
Committee: ECON

2008/2156(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 a (new)

37a. Stresses that the euro is being used as a national currency outside the euro area; considers that the implications of such use need to be analysed;

2008/09/03
Committee: ECON

2008/2156(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. Demands stronger forward-looking cooperation and an improved international financial and monetary dialogue between the ~~three~~ most important central banks and 'currency blocks', ~~i.e. between the euro area, the US dollar and the yen,~~ to manage international crises, and recalls the common successful crisis management during the recent US 'sub-prime credit crisis';

2008/09/03
Committee: ECON

2008/2156(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41 – point b

(b) The Integrated Policy Guidelines should set a broad framework for closer economic policy co-ordination in order to align National Reform Programmes, taking, however, into account economic diversity and differing national traditions~~. A mandatory consultation process of national parliaments regarding the Stability and Convergence Programmes and the National Reform Programmes should be established~~;

2008/09/03
Committee: ECON

2008/2156(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41 – point g

(g) A binding framework for the euro area Member States to consult each other and the Commission before taking major economic policy decisions, such as in the case of measures to tackle higher food and energy prices, should be established;deleted

2008/09/03
Committee: ECON

2008/2156(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41 – point h

~~(h) The BEPGs and the Employment Guidelines should be given the same legal status, and the role of the Commission, the Council and the Parliament needs to be redefined in this respect;~~deleted

2008/09/03
Committee: ECON

2008/2156(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41 – point i

(i) In case of economic downturns the ex ante coordination of fiscal policy should take the form of an integrated "European Economic and Employment Strategy" on the basis of the existing economic policy instruments - in particular the Lisbon Strategy, the Integrated Policy Guidelines, the Sustainable Development Strategy, and the Convergence and Stability Programmes; Calls upon national governments, under the leadership of the president of the Eurogroup, to support economic activity in a joint way, at the same moment and in the same direction;deleted

2008/09/03
Committee: ECON

2008/2156(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41 – point n – indent 4

~~– the main preparatory bodies i.e. the Economic Policy Committee, the Economic and Financial Committee of the Council (ECOFIN) and the Eurogroup should be merged;~~deleted

2008/09/03
Committee: ECON

2008/2156(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41 – point p

(p) Active macro-economic dialogue needs to be established between the Eurogroup, and the European Central Bank ~~and European social partners~~ for the purpose of discussions on an appropriate policy mix ~~of monetary, fiscal, exchange rate, wage and structural policies by inter alia inviting Parliament and European social partners to informal hearings with the Eurogroup~~.

2008/09/03
Committee: ECON

2008/2155(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Believes it necessary to re-consider carefully the EIB's current external lending policies as adopted in 2006; is looking forward to Parliament's involvement under co-decision in the mid term review in 2010 on the European Union’s external lending policy;

2009/01/15
Committee: ECON

2008/2155(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Notes ~~also that, even though~~that the objectives, expertise and modus operandi of the two banks are different, and a line cannot be simply drawn between lending operations to the public and private sectors,; points out that there are, increasingly, common areas on which both banks develop skills such as in the financing of SMEs, energy and climate change, and PPP projects; highlights in this regard the need for enhanced cooperation;

2009/01/15
Committee: ECON

2008/2155(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 – point d

(d) ~~a culture~~clear mechanisms of cooperation in both institutions isare implemented, both top-down and on the ground;

2009/01/15
Committee: ECON

2008/2155(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 – point e

(e) the two banks come up with a ~~global~~concrete proposal on more consistent cooperation, including a reflection on common standards, to the benefit of their shareholders, stakeholders and beneficiary countries;

2009/01/15
Committee: ECON

2008/2155(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 – point e a (new)

(ea) accountability of the banks' activities be strengthened by means of regular reporting to the banks' respective stakeholders;

2009/01/15
Committee: ECON

2008/2155(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 – point f

(f) therefore the two banks regularly report to the Commission on their cooperation;

2009/01/15
Committee: ECON

2008/2155(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Is of the opinion that any proliferation of the European Union's external assistance instruments should be avoided; calls for enhanced cooperation with regional and national development institutions in the European Union, in order to provide for efficient funding by avoiding overlaps and duplications and to ensure better visibility of the EU impact; supports the possibility of mutual delegation and recognition of procedures in this respect;

2009/01/15
Committee: ECON

2008/2155(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Recognises that the EIB and the EBRD need to work together with other international or regional financial institutions, such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the African Development Bank, in order to make greater effects in regions further away from Europe and to avoid unwanted overlaps and duplications in funding activities;

2009/01/15
Committee: ECON

2008/2155(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Notes ~~with satisfaction~~ that those banks and institutions have a ~~positive~~n impact on the developing world; ~~suggests that the financing of land ownership should be an eligible investment cost under the EIB mandate, as it is key for endogenous development, especially in African countries~~deems it necessary to further analyse this impact and to consider further activities against the objectives and operations of the European Development Fund (EDF).

2009/01/15
Committee: ECON

2008/2155(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)

15a. Encourages the reinforcement of risk-sharing arrangements between commercial banks and the EIB Group in providing financing for SMEs and mid- sized companies;

2009/01/15
Committee: ECON

2008/2155(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Suggests, that ~~depend~~, after carefully studying on the effects of the financial crisis on the real economy, the EIB shcould be invited to enhance its support to the new Member States ~~and that a review of the definition of the "transition" countries and an evaluation of the need of the EBRD to delay its withdrawal from those Member St~~, provided that these Member States actively seek assistance; furthermore points to the importance of involving the privates s~~hould be undertaken~~ector in re-stabilizing these economies;

2009/01/15
Committee: ECON

2008/2155(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

17a. Is of the opinion that the EIB and the Commission should accelerate the implementation of projects in Member States most affected by the crisis; with that respect considers important to mobilise the expertise of the technical assistance programmes like JASPERS, JEREMIE, JESSICA and JASMINE;

2009/01/15
Committee: ECON

2008/2155(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 b (new)

17a. Approves of the EIB capital increase from around 65 billion to 230 billion EUR; stresses, however, that funds must aim at long-term effects rather than short- sighted projects distorting competition;

2009/01/15
Committee: ECON

2008/2155(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)

21a. Requests the Commission to come up with a concrete proposal serving as a temporary solution in order to guarantee continuity in EIB external operations until the envisaged mid-term review in 2010;

2009/01/15
Committee: ECON

2008/2155(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

22. Recommends, therefore, to the Steering Committee for the purposes of the mid- term review, that it finalise its work by 2010 and invites the Chairman of the Committee to report on its conclusions to Parliament and Council soon thereafter~~; requests Parliament participation on the Steering Committee, at least at an observer level~~;

2009/01/15
Committee: ECON

2008/2154(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Calls for multiple claims on a defendant in respect of the same damage in the framework of individual and collective law enforcement mechanisms to be excluded;

2008/11/18
Committee: ECON

2008/2154(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Takes the view that the Member States, in accordance with Article 3 of Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumer interests2 , should as a general rule give the power to prosecute in representative actions to qualified entities, and that authorisations to pursue such actions should primarily be considered for associations which arrang should as a general rule give the power to prosecute in representative actions only to an independent, private for ~~actions in law for damages for companies 1 2~~State ombudsman; Or. de OJ L 166, 11.6.1998, p. 51. OJ L 166, 11.6.1998, p. 51.

2008/11/18
Committee: ECON

2008/2154(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Asks that only a clearly identified group of people be allowed to take part in representative actions, and that identification must have taken place by the time the claim is brought; stresses that only the damage actually suffered may be compensated; notes that in the case of a successful claim the compensation sued for must be paid to the identified group of people and that the ~~qualified entity~~independent ombudsman may only ever be compensated for the costs ithe has incurred in the course of prosecuting the claim;

2008/11/18
Committee: ECON

2008/2154(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Stresses that a culpable act must ~~always~~ be a prerequisite for a claim for compensation for damages, and that the competition law infringement must, at the least, be negligent;

2008/11/18
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the condition set out in Rule 39(2), that no proposal should be in preparation, is duly fulfilled, apart from the review of Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC and expected proposal on Credit Rating Agencies,

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the Commission has not fully taken into account Parliament's earlier requests, including those made in its above- mentioned resolutions, the annex to this resolution therefore includes a list of possible suggestions as to how to improve the functioning of financial markets supervision,

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

Ba. whereas any suggestion made by Parliament should be principle based, details such as presented in the annex need to be developed in cooperation with the supervisory authorities, financial markets participants and other relevant bodies,

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas the current financial crisis, which was triggered by US subprime mortgages, has spread worldwide due to the increasingly integrated ~~and contagious~~ nature of markets, indicating that existing financial market regulation and supervision ~~could not cope with it and a significant reform is~~is not sufficiently integrated on either EU or international level and a significant review and the reforms being undertaken are therefore welcome,

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the crisis has led to a credit ~~crunch~~squeeze entailing a higher price of credit for ~~all~~many market players; whereas ~~long-term~~ economic growth and employment ~~are threatened by fragil~~can be put under pressure by the current turmoil on the financial markets,

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas ~~poor~~insufficiently regulated capital market s disintermediation and ~~the shadow banking system have emerged as~~new kinds of financial vehicles have emerged providing both benefits and new sources of systemic risk globally; whereas the exponential growth in derivatives has ~~increased~~followed new risk man~~d facilitated~~agement strategies also creating risks including new methods of speculation,

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas the p~~ossibility to transfer credit risk~~erception that credit risk could be transferred through an "originat~~ion and~~ e-to-distribut~~ion~~e" model has weakened incentives to evaluate and monitor risk, and has led to a breakdown in due diligence; whereas the "originate- to-distribute" model has, however, in may cases properly facilitated competition, lower prices and access to credit for less well off consumers,

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas ~~herding,~~improper practices by some actors such as inadequate risk management, irresponsible lending, and excessive debt (leverage), ~~and illiquid and complex financial instruments pose significant risks to financial stabil~~pose significant risks to financial institutions which in some cases has transferred to wider financial stability, as can market stress that leads to herding and illiquidity,

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas financial regulation ~~and innovation~~, which was designed to diminish risk at the micro level, ~~has led to risk concentration and has exacerbated risk at the macro level, thus amplifying~~and innovation may not have adequately anticipated and dispersed risk concentration and systemic risk,

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas harmful regulatory arbitrage must be prevented,

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas adequate levels of transparency towards the public, investors and supervisory authorities must be ~~resto~~ensured,

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Recital K

K. whereas many of the current ~~compens~~remuneration schemes ~~reward excessive risk at the expense of~~may create incentives that reward risk over a short time horizon at the expense of longer term performance and prudence,

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Recital L

L. whereas conflicts of interest that may arise from the business model used by some financial institutions, credit rating agencies, and audit and law firms must be addressed and monitored,

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Recital M

M. whereas failures by credit rating agencies ~~generated substantial negative externalities and market uncertainties; whereas credit rating agencies have offered un~~in respect of complex structured products and misconception of the meaning of ratings by market participants were factors leading to the illiquidity in the markets; whereas credit rating agencies have been too slow in achieving sufficiently comprehensive and satisfactory selfregulatory solutions,

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Recital N

N. whereas market integration, while generally beneficial, does not necessarily enhance financial stability and should be accompanied by an appropriately integrated approach to supervision,

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Recital O

O. whereas ~~the EU~~globally there is a needs for more coherent ~~and harmonis~~, compatible and integrated regulation and supervision in order to mitigate the risk of future financial crises and to ensure a level playing field across borders ~~and between regulated and unregulated market participants~~; whereas the EU should play a leading international role as well as reinforce consistent implementation and convergence of its own regulation and supervision,

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Recital P

P. whereas a comprehensive review and considered reform of current EU regulatory and supervisory arrangements is necessary together with ongoing measures to improve global supervisory cooperation~~; whereas such a reform should refer to the capital adequacy framework, transparency, and governance as key prerequisites for improved and effective regulatory and supervisory arrangements~~,

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Recital P a (new)

Pa. whereas the middle- to long-term goal should be to establish a European supervisory system that is similar to the European System of Central Banks (ESCB); whereas the Commission should be urged to work on proposals towards this end,

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Requests the Commission to submit to Parliament, by 30 November 2008, on the basis of Article 44, Article 47(2), Article 55, Article 95, Article 105(6), Article 202, Article 211 or Article 308 of the EC Treaty, a legislative proposal or appropriate other proposals or proposals on an EU supervisory configuration~~, credit rating agencies and other relevant issues, following the detailed recommendations below~~ following the detailed recommendations below and taking into account the body of work underway following the ECOFIN Council conclusions of October 2007, December 2007 and April 2008.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Considers that the financial implications of the requested ~~proposal or proposal~~suggestions should be covered by ~~EU budgetary allocation~~either Member States for the ~~establishment of any EU supervisory authority~~EU budgetary allocations.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the accompanying ~~detailed recommenda~~list of possible suggestions to the Commission, the Council and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – introductory part

The European Parliament considers that the proposals, legislative act(s) or recommendations to be adopted should aim to regulate:

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.1 – title

~~1.1 Measures to improve the EU financial services regulatory framework:~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.1 – introductory part

~~Capital adequacy framework: In particular:~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.1 – introductory part

Capital adequacy framework: ~~In particular~~Recognising the ongoing review of Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC promotes the following points:

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.1 – point a

~~(a) impose capital requirements on all entities operating on financial markets;~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.1 – point a

(a) ~~impose capital requirements on all entities operating on financial market~~enhance the scope of regulatory capital requirements, including a consideration as to whether to impose capital requirements on all entities operating on financial markets taking into account the level of risk and the entity exposed, systemic impact and whether there is or can be cover through related entities or counterparties;

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.1 – point b

~~(b) strengthen the resilience of the capital adequacy framework in extreme situations;~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.1 – point b

(b) ~~strengthen~~enhance the resilience of the capital adequacy framework ~~in extreme situations~~to cope with financial market disruption, whilst respecting national authorities' responsibilities for crisis management;

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.1 – point c

~~(c) ensure that the rules are anti-cyclical;~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.1 – point c

(c) en~~sure that the rules are anti-cyclical~~force the recently implemented capital rules for excessive pro-cyclicality and if need be include further measures to counter pro-cyclical behaviour at times of stress;

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.1 – point d

~~(d) reform the framework to improve risk management and not to rely excessively on mathematical models;~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.1 – point d

(d) reform the framework to improve implementation of risk management and ~~not to rely excessively~~to ensure the adequacy and appropriate use onf mathematical models and consider whether to widen the scope of stress testing of assumptions;

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.1 – point e

~~(e) require higher capital charges for complex financial products and derivatives;~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.1 – point e

(e) ~~require higher~~establish appropriate risk weighting and capital charges for complex financial products and derivatives on the basis of the principle "same risk- same capital charge";

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.1 – point f

~~(f) require disclosure of off-balance-sheet items, structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and any liquidity assistance facility, and require proper assessment of the risks that they pose.~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.1 – point f

(f) ~~requir~~improve disclosure of off-balance-sheet items, structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and any liquidity assistance facility, and require proper assessment of the risks that they pose.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.2 – title

~~1.2. Measures to improve transparency:~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.2 – point a

~~(a) Securitisation: Foster transparency, clarity, and data (quarterly) on complex financial products and the securitisation process.~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.2 – point a

(a) Securitisation: ~~Foster~~Implement and monitor the industry led initiatives from the European Securitisation Forum to foster appropriate levels of transparency, clarity, and disclosure of underlying data (quarterly) on complex financial products and the securitisation process.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.2 – point b

(b) Complex Financial Products (CFS): Require investors to evaluate and monitor risk of CFS. Consistent rating terminology that clearly differentiates rating for such products should be established and ratings should reflect the vulnerability of such products to downgrades.deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.2 – point b

(b) Complex Financial Products (CFS): Require investors to develop methodologies to evaluate and monitor risk of CFS. C~~onsistent rating terminology that clearly differentiates rating for such products should be established and ratings should reflect the vulnerability of such products to~~redit rating agencies should provide consistent and concise rating disclosures that clearly distinguish, where appropriate, how such products differ from other products especially in terms of volatility, complexity and vulnerability to market stress and downgrades.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.2 – point c – introductory part

~~(c) Accounting rules, valuation and pricing:~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.2 – point c – point i

~~(i) require rules on control to ensure that companies and financial institutions cannot artificially keep material special purpose vehicles or SIVs, etc. off their balance sheets;~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.2 – point c – point i

(i) ~~require rules on~~ secure the International Account~~rol to ensure~~ing Standards Board (IASB) review of IAS 27 and SIC-12 to ensure that material securitisation vehicles are given appropriate accounting treatment so that companies and financial institutions cannot artificially keep material special purpose vehicles or SIVs, etc. off their balance sheets;

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.2 – point c - point ii

~~(ii) require rules on valuation and pricing standards of complex financial products.~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.2 – point c – point ii

(ii) ~~require~~implement with the IASB and other competent international bodies rules on valuation and pricing standards of complex financial products in particular in the context of IAS 39.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.2 – point d

(d) Unregulated markets: Require increased transparency of over-the- counter (OTC) markets and address major sources of systemic risk (i.e. counterparty concentration risk), e.g. by requiring OTC trades to be cleared in clearing houses.deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.2 – point d

(d) Unregulated markets: ~~Require~~Establish increased transparency of over-the-counter (OTC) markets ~~and address major sources of systemic risk (i.e. counterparty concentration risk), e.g. by requiring~~where feasible and not detrimental to liquidity and promote initiatives for OTC trades to be cleared in clearing houses.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.3 – title

~~1.3. Governance measures~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.3 – point a

~~(a) Securitisation: Require originators to assess and monitor risk and retain a significant portion of the debt or mortgage backed securities originated by them on their books.~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.3 – point a

(a) Securitisation: ~~Require originators to assess and monitor risk and retain a significant portion of the debt or mortgage backed securities originated by them on their books~~Ensure and monitor the frequency with which originators and credit rating agencies reassess and monitor ongoing risk; introduce measures to align interests of originators and investors including evaluating the effect of expecting originators to retain a representative portion of the products originated by them on their books unless there are good and disclosed reasons not to.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.3 – point b

(b) Remuneration schemes: Require financial institutions to disclose their remuneration policy, remuneration of individual directors, and remuneration packages for individuals other than directors and that all elements in compensation packages are expensed. Ensure that all transactions involving management can be clearly identified in the financial statements. Require prudential supervisors to include in their assessment of risk management the influence of remuneration and bonus schemes to ensure that they contain balanced incentives and do not encourage extreme risk taking.deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.3 – point b

(b) Remuneration schemes: Require financial institutions to disclose their remuneration policy, remuneration of individual directors, and remuneration packages for individuals other than directors and that all elements in compensation packages are expensed. Ensure that all transactions involving management can be clearly identified in the financial statements. Require prudential supervisors to include in their assessment of risk management the influence of remuneration and bonus schemes to ensure that they contain balanced incentives and do not encourage extreme risk takingEncourage Member States to implement the existing Commission Recommendation 2004/913/EC on remuneration policy.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.3 – point c

(c) Corporate liability regime: Require a liability regime addressing fines and other penalties for failure to comply with financial services legislation. Ensure that executives in financial institutions in case of omission of duties or wrongful trading can be disqualified from working in the financial sector.deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.3 – point c

(c) Corporate liability regime: ~~Require a liability regime addressing~~Secure agreement from Member States to ensure national liability regime provide appropriate fines and other penalties for failure to comply with financial services legislation~~. E~~ and to widen the scope of liability regimes so as to ensure that executives in financial institutions in case of omission of duties or wrongful trading can be suspended or disqualified from working in all or relevant parts of the financial sector.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.3 – point d

(d) Credit rating agencies: Measures addressing e.g. conflicts of interests, quality assurance systems and oversight in a manner similar to those applicable to auditors. Ensure that credit rating agencies apply differentiated symbols for the rating of complex debt products, mortgage related products and traditional debt. Ensure that full transparency is practised in ratings and that credit rating agencies do not turn sub-investments into investment grade securities.deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 1 – point 1.3 – point d

(d) Credit rating agencies: Measures addressing e.g. conflicts of interests, quality assurance systems and oversight ~~in a manner similar to those applicable to auditors. Ensure that credit rating agenc~~drawing lessons where appropriate from the oversight of auditors. Particular consideration to be given to: transparency on rating methodologies, a~~pply differentiated symbols for the rating of complex debt products, mortgage related products and traditional debt. Ensure that full transparency is p~~ssumptions and stress tests; for supervisors to be able to call for an' audit trail' of the originator/credit rating agency correspondence and to be notified in the event of significant concerns over models; that the securitisation and credit racti~~sed in ratings and that credit rating agencies~~ng process does not result in an unjustified increase of the total value of the securitised product beyond the value of the underlying assets and do not turn sub- investments into investment grade securities, and the need for investors to develop comprehension of the products that they purchase.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 2 – introductory part

The European Parliament considers that the proposals, legislative act(s) and recommendations to be adopted should aim to regulate:

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 2 – point a

(a) Financial stability and systemic risks: ~~Require~~Predicate a role for the ECB to develop databases and forward-looking scenarios and policies on macro prudential supervision and financial stability. EU supervisors and central banks shwould provide ~~non-public and confidential up-to-date micro prudential~~aggregate information to the ECB for it to fulfil this function and prevent systemic risk. The extension of the jurisdiction of the ECB in particular to non-euro area Member States would need to be on a voluntary basis.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 2 – point b

(b) Leveraged institutions: Expand the EU prudential and regulatory framework to reflect all sources of systemic risk, in particular by including leveraged entities carrying systemic risk into such a framework regardless of their legal form or seat.deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 2 – point c– point i– indent 2

- ~~set up an EU~~issue guidance on early-intervention ~~mechanism~~procedures for dealing with weak and failing banks if the EU financial stability ~~is threatened. Such a mechanism should be well-defined, clear, able~~or confidence is threatened and having regard to prcomp~~t action, and financed by the financial institutions~~etition rules on state aid;

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 2 – point c– point i – indent 3

- facilitate the cross-border transfer of funds within a group in extreme situations, having due regard to updates of Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions1;

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 2 – point c – point i – indent 4

~~- discourage major financial groups from engaging in overly risky origination and distribution activities;~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 2 – point c – point i – indent 5

- ~~set clear and binding rul~~facilitate monitoring of the Memorandum of Understanding and seek updating when necessary so as to maintain clear guidelines on cross- border crisis management ~~and~~; clarify state aid rules in cases of cross-border crisis;

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 2 – point d

(d) A~~mend EU rules on deposit guarantees to introduce obligatory ex-~~ n analysis should be conducted in order to asses whether the current set-up of deposit guarantee schemes fin~~anced by contributions from financial ins~~ the EU distorts competitution~~s and administered independ~~, leads to unequal treatmently of ~~these institutions. The level of refund should be significantly increased and made available to retail clients within a clearly defined and short timeframe~~customers, negative consequences on cross-border risk management or threatens the financial stability in the European Union within a clearly defined and short timeframe. The minimum level of refund could be set with reference to purchasing price parities.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 2 – point e

~~(e) Similar rules should be developed for insurance guarantees.~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 2 – point f

~~(f) Require the setting up of a risk absorber that could be activated when financial stability is threatened.~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 2 – point g

(g) Introduce a small, special tax on financial transactions and give the Commission a mandate to strive for an international agreement committing all signatories to impose such a tax on financial transactions. Revenues should be used to finance the deposit and insurance guarantee schemes as well as risk absorbers.deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – introductory part

The European Parliament considers that the proposals, legislative act(s) and recommendations to be adopted should aim to regulate:

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.1 – point a

(a) By Autumn 2008 a rleg~~ulation~~al proposal shall require colleges of supervisors for the ~~[40 - 50]~~ largest cross-border financial groups or holdings operating in the EU~~. The regulation should conta~~, including clear criteria for identifying the cross- border financial groups or holdings for which such colleges ~~will be mandatory~~should be established.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.1 – point b

(b) The colleges should be composed of representatives of the national supervisory authorities ~~dealing with prudential supervision~~. The regulation should contain clear ~~criteria for the~~principles for deciding which national supervisors ~~that have~~have the right to be represented in the ~~mandatory~~ colleges, taking into account the group’s market size in a Member State, volume of cross border operations, volume and value of assets to reflect the importance of the group activities and also taking into account the need to involve third country supervisors.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.1 – point c

(c) The colleges should normally be chaired by the ~~lead~~consolidating supervisor from the Member State where the central administration or the main EU office of the cross border financial groups or holdings is established. The lead supervisor will host and primarily staff the secretariat. Where there is substantial third country involvement care must be taken not to cause separate parallel structures.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.1 – point d

(d) RWithin the EU require collection, exchange and access to relevant information amongst the members of the college and amongst all supervisors involved and make arrangements to maximise exchange of information with third country supervisors.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.1 – point e – introductory part

(e) ~~The colleges will~~Whilst it may be too early or not possible to be prescriptive about voting, guidelines for preferred operation where relevant within the EU should be for the colleges to decide and vote on the basis of a qualified majority voting (QMV) system ~~based~~ taking into account:

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.1 – point e a (new)

(ea) Proposals should take account of negotiations on the Solvency II proposal and the review of Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 - point 3.2

~~Point 3.2.~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution − point a
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.3−

(a) By Autumn 2008 a regulation shall require transforming the existing Lamfalussy Level 3 committees into a configuration of EU supervision and giving the Lamfalussy Level 3 committees the status of supervisory agencies with an executive board (similar to the Eurosystem) and appropriate staffing and resourcproposal shall provide ways to more fully implement the Lamfalussy procedures and options for the Lamfalussy Level 3 committees to be given a legal status commensurate with their duties.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.3 − point b

(b) In addition to the advisory tasks the ~~supervisory agenci~~Lamfalussy Level 3 committees shall be given the task (and the tools and resources) to ~~ensure~~ actively promote supervisory convergence and a level playing field in the implementation and enforcement of EU legislation.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.3 − point c

(c) An independent permanent chair as well as between one and five part-time vice-chairs (recruited from the boards of the composing authorities but with an independent mandate) should be appointed for a five year term by the Commission after consultation of the Parliament and the Council.deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.3 − point d

(d) The ~~supervisory agenci~~Lamfalussy Level 3 committees should present an annual work plan. Parliament, the Council and the Commission should approve the annual work plans and reports.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.3 − point f – introductory part

(f) The ~~supervisory~~Lamfalussy Level 3 committees should:

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.3 − point g

(g) The regulation should also provide for a presidium for the configuration of EU supervision consisting of five persons. It should be composed of the chairs of the three supervisory agencies. An independent chair should be appointed for a five-year term by the Commission after consultation of Parliament and Council. The chair of the CCMC should act as the vice chair.deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.3 − point h − introductory part

~~(h) The presidium should act as the day- to-day executive of the configuration of EU supervision and have as its main tasks to:~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.3 − point h − point i

(i) coordinate ~~between the agencies and~~with other sectors;

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.4 – title

~~3.4. EU financial stability oversight body~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.4 – point a

(a) By Autumn 2008 a regulation shall require establishing an EU financial stability oversight body that is able to collect and analyse micro and macro prudential information with the central banks. This must be linked to monetary and macro-economic information. The oversight body should also act as a rapid reaction force in crisis situations with a systemic impact for the EU.deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.4 − point a

(a) ~~By Autumn 2008 a regulation shall require~~A proposal shall issue guidelines for establishing an EU financial stability oversight body that is able to collect and analyse ~~micro~~aggregated and macro prudential information with the central banks~~. This must be~~ and linked to monetary and macro-economic information. The oversight body ~~should also act~~may also have a role as a rapid reaction ~~force~~advisory body in crisis situations with a systemic impact for the EU. Any such oversight body should be integrated with global work on financial stability.

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.4 − point b

(b) The oversight body should be composed of the chairs of the three Lamfalussy Level 3 supervisory committees, the chair of the presidium, the chair of the CCMC, a representative of the European System of Central Banks (which is composed of all EU central banks) and a representative of the Eurosystem and the (Vice)President of the ECB charged with prudential supervision. The ECB ((Vice)-President) could chair the oversight body and the chair of the presidium of the configuration of EU supervision could be vice-chair.deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.4 – point c – introductory part

~~(c) The main tasks should be to:~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.4 – point c – points i to iv

(i) establish a proper system of supervisory data collection and exchange; (ii) analyse and elaborate these data; (iii) develop procedures for provision and collection of confidential data; (iv) provide early warning signals about dynamics that can endanger the stability of the financial system;deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Wolf KLINZ, Olle SCHMIDT, Bilyana Ilieva RAEVA

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.4 – point c – point v

~~(v) act as rapid reaction force in case of a threat to financial stability;~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.4 − point c − point v

(v) act as rapid reaction ~~force~~advisory body in case of a threat to financial stability;

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.4 – point c – point vi

~~(vi ) represent the EU in international bodies of supervisors such as the Financial Stability Forum and to be the counterpart for supervisors in other parts of the world.~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2148(INI)

Sharon BOWLES, Daniel DĂIANU, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Annex – recommendation 3 – point 3.4 – point d

~~(d) The oversight body should be located within the ECB and its budget and staff should be provided by the ECB.~~deleted

2008/07/14
Committee: ECON

2008/2026(BUD)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Notes that an estimated EUR 40 billion are lost every year due to VAT fraud; calls for a pilot project to explore the potential of reducing carousel fraud and other shortcomings in the VAT payment cycle; considers that that pilot project should, in particular, explore the possibility of moving the point of taxation from the invoicing to the settlement stage, using an automated intra-EU VAT- collection system;

2008/07/16
Committee: ECON

2008/2006(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas ~~the Member States need to go further in tackling energy poverty as~~ adequate energy provision constitutes one of the key elements towards achieving citizens' successful participation in social and economic life,

2008/04/14
Committee: IMCO

2008/2006(INI)

Nickolay MLADENOV, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. Wwhereas ~~there is broad consensus that~~in markets with imperfect competition, such as the energy sector, market mechanisms alone ~~can~~do not always fully ensure consumers' best interests ~~in the energy sector; therefore, a strong focus should be put on universal public service obligations, other public service obligations (PSO) and consumer rights~~, general customer protection, in addition to energy market-specific public service obligations, must be addressed and enforced,

2008/04/14
Committee: IMCO

2008/2006(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Stresses the absolute need ~~of a more binding nature of this Charter~~to strengthen consumer protection on energy issues and to use this Charter as a guiding tool for European and national authorities, as well as private entities, in order to ensure and enforce consumer rights effectively;

2008/04/14
Committee: IMCO

2008/2006(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. P~~roposes, therefore, to transpose/turn this charter into a legislative document, or to take it up at least in~~oints to Article 3 of, and Annex A ofto, the directives on the internal market in electricity and in natural gas, as to be amended by the 'Third Package' proposals; emphasises the need for better enforcement at national level;

2008/04/14
Committee: IMCO

2008/2006(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Underlines that special attention must be paid to consumer protection and safeguards must be taken in order to pr~~ohibit any~~event grid disconnection; Member States have to appoint a supplier of last resort and inform the consumers thereof; such a mechanism must be set up by national legislation;

2008/04/14
Committee: IMCO

2008/2006(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Stresses that European electricity and gas prices must be reasonable, easily and clearly comparable, and transparent ands well as based on actual energy consumption~~. The transparency and predictability of~~; published prices, tariffs, indexation mechanisms and conditions must be ~~further improved through comprehensible and easily accessible calculation methods or through any other communications forms,~~easily accessible to the consumer by means of all existing forms of communication; they should furthermore be communicated beforehand to and monitored or approved by the independent national regulator;

2008/04/14
Committee: IMCO

2008/2006(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Highlights in this regard the development of market actors specialising in publishing comparable information regarding suppliers' prices, tariffs and conditions, as well as providing support in switching providers;

2008/04/14
Committee: IMCO

2008/2006(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Asks the Commissions to ~~develop and finance pilot projects for the provision to individual consumers of ‘smart meters’, accurately reflecting actual energy consumption and time of use~~carry out an in- depth study on the current use of ‘smart meters’ in private households with a view to promoting best practices;

2008/04/14
Committee: IMCO

2008/2006(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Calls on Member States to put in place a physical single entry point for any consumer information request, for example through national energy regulators;

2008/04/14
Committee: IMCO

2008/2006(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Is of the opinion that tariff simulators must be available on the websites of suppliers and of the independent national regulator; underlines that consumers must, on a regular basis ~~– at least every 6 months –~~, be informed about their energy consumption;

2008/04/14
Committee: IMCO

2008/2006(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Deplores that Member States have made only limited use of targeted public service obligations (PSO) to address vulnerable customers and that only a very limited number of Member States has developed any form of social default tariff; and calls Member States to set up such social default tariffe fact that energy poverty may pose a serious problem that needs to be explicitly addressed in national social security systems;

2008/04/14
Committee: IMCO

2008/2006(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Calls on the Commission to ~~take measures against Member States that have not fulfilled the PSO obligations as laid down in~~provide guidance on a common definition of public service obligations and to oversee the implementation by the Member States of the obligations as laid down in Article 3 of and Annex 1 to Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC;

2008/04/14
Committee: IMCO

2008/2006(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

22. Acknowledges the important role of consumer organisations in ensuring ~~the maximum is done to achieve~~ a high level of energy consumer rights throughout the EU;

2008/04/14
Committee: IMCO

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1

(1) Credit rating agencies play an important role in global securities and banking markets, as their ratings are used by investors, borrowers, issuers and governments toas part of makeing informed investment and financing decisions. Credit institutions, investments firms, insurance undertakings, assurance undertakings, reinsurance undertakings, undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and institutions for occupational retirement provision, may use those ratings as the reference for the calculation of their capital requirements for solvency purposes or for calculating risks in their investment activity. Consequently, credit ratings have a significant impact on the trust and confidence of investors and consumers. It is essential, therefore, that credit ratings used in the Community are independent, objective and of the highest quality.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2

(2) Currently, most credit rating agencies have their headquarters outside the Community. Most Member States do not regulate the activities of credit rating agencies or the conditions for the issuance of credit ratings. Despite their significant importance for the functioning of the financial markets, credit rating agencies are ~~only to a limited extent~~ subject to Community legislation only in limited areas, notably Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation. Moreover, Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions refer to credit rating agencies. It is therefore important to lay down rules ensuring that all ratings used by financial institutions governed by Community legislation are of high quality and issued by credit rating agencies subject to stringent requirements. The Commission will continue to work with its international partners to ensure convergence of the rules applying to credit rating agencies.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6

(6) It is necessary to lay down a common framework ~~of rules regard~~improving the quality of credit ratings to be used by financial institutions regulated by harmonised rules in the Community. Otherwise, there would be a risk that Member States would take diverging measures at national level. This would have a direct negative impact on and create obstacles to the good functioning of the internal market, since the credit rating agencies issuing credit ratings for the use of financial institutions in the Community, would be subject to different rules in different Member States. Moreover, diverging quality requirements on credit ratings could lead to different levels of investor and consumer protection.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6 a (new)

(6a) It should be possible to use credit ratings issued in third countries in the Community as long as the third-country rating activities are carried out within a framework imposing the same regulatory objectives as those set out in Articles 5 to 9 of this Regulation. For this purpose, the Commission should put forward a formal proposal before the end of 2009 to define equivalence and establish a system of equivalence in regard to third-country regimes.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6 b (new)

(6b) The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), established by Commission Decision 2001/527/EC1, should provide support and expertise to the Commission in the assessment of equivalence with the Community regime as set out in this Regulation. The CESR should propose transitional measures for existing ratings. 1 OJ L 191, 13.7.2001, p. 43.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6 c (new)

(6c) During the transitional period of an equivalence regime, the ratings of credit rating agencies established in a third country may be used within the Community on condition that those ratings are confirmed by a credit rating agency established in the Community and registered in accordance with this Regulation.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8

(8) Credit rating agencies should establish appropriate internal policies and procedures in relation to employees involved in the credit rating process and in any outsourcing of an activity having a significant role in the rating analysis in order to prevent conflicts of interest and ensure at all times the quality, integrity and thoroughness of the rating and review process.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10

(10) In order to ensure the independence of the credit rating process from the business interest of the credit rating agency as a company, the credit rating agencies should ensure that the administrative or supervisory board shall include at least three non-executive members, who should be independent along the lines of point 13 in Section III of Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board. Moreover, it is necessary that the majority of members of the administrative or supervisory board, including all independent members have sufficient expertise in financial services.deleted

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10

(10) In order to ensure the independence of the credit rating process from the business interest of the credit rating agency as a company, the credit rating agencies should ensure that the administrative or supervisory board shall include at least three nonexecutive members, who should be independent along the lines of point 13 in Section III of Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board. Moreover, it is necessary that the majority ofis independent when monitoring and reporting on proper compliance with this Regulation with regard to the maintenance of the independence and quality of credit ratings. Moreover, members of the administrative or supervisory board~~, including all independent members~~ should have sufficient expertise in appropriate areas of financial services.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11

(11) In order to avoid conflicts of interest the remuneration of ~~independent~~the members of the administrative or supervisory board should not depend on the business performance of the agency.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13

(13) Long lasting relationships with the same rated entities or its related third parties could compromise independence of analysts ~~and persons approv~~preparing credit ratings. Therefore those analysts ~~and persons~~ should be subject to a rotation mechanism.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14

(14) Credit rating agencies should use rating methodologies that are rigorous, systematic, and continuous and result in ratings that may be subject to validation based on historical experience. Credit rating agencies should ensure that methodologies, models and key rating assumptions used for determining credit ratings are properly maintained, up-to-date and subject to a comprehensive review on a periodic basis. In cases where the lack of reliable data or the complexity of the structure of a new type, in particular structured finance instruments, raises serious questions as to whether the credit rating agency can produce a credible credit rating, the credit rating agency should refrain from issuing a ~~credit rating or withdraw an existing~~new credit rating.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14 a (new)

(14a) Issuers shall make available information provided to credit rating agencies to those who request it for the purpose of independent analysis. Recipients of such information shall agree in advance neither to relay it to the public nor to trade in the relevant securities.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15

(15) In order to ensure the quality of the ratings procedure, a credit rating agency should take reasonable measures to ensure that the information it uses in assigning a rating is reliable. ~~For this purpose, a~~A credit rating agency may envisage, among other elements reliance on independently audited financial statements and public disclosures; verification by reputable third party services; random sampling examination by the credit rating agency of the information received; or contractual provisions clearly stipulating liability for the rated entity or its related third parties, if the information provided under the contract is knowingly materially false or misleading or if the rated entity or its related third parties fail to conduct reasonable due diligence regarding the accuracy of the information as specified under the terms of the contractis not an auditor of data and due diligence by issuers and third parties, but must have in place appropriate and transparent procedures for assessing the quality of data and that the sources that it relies upon justify that trust, e.g. by way of professional independence or reputation. For this purpose, a credit rating agency may envisage, among other elements reliance on independently audited financial statements and public disclosures; verification by reputable third party services; random sampling examination by the credit rating agency of the information received.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16

(16) It is necessary that credit rating agencies establish proper procedures for the regular review of methodologies, models and key rating assumptions used by the credit rating agency ~~are regularly reviewed~~ in order to be able to properly reflect the changing conditions in the underlying asset markets. With a view to ensuring transparency, disclosure of any material modification to the methodologies and practices, procedures and processes of credit rating agency should be made prior to their coming into effect, unless extreme market conditions require an immediate change in the credit rating.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18

(18) Under certain circumstances structured finance instruments may have effects which are different from traditional corporate debt instruments. It could be misleading for investors to apply the same rating categories to both types of instruments without further explanation. Credit rating agencies should play an important role in raising awareness of the users of ratings about the specificities of the structured finance products in relation to traditional ones. Therefore credit rating agencies should either use different rating categories when rating structured finance instruments, for example by carrying a supplemental annotation, or provide additional information on the different risk characteristics of these products.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 28

(28) It is appropriate to create a mechanism to ensure the effective enforcement of the provisions of this Regulation. The competent authorities of the Member States should have at their disposal necessary means to ensure that ratings for use within the Community are issued in compliance with this Regulation. Since the analytical independence of a credit rating agency in the process of issuing its credit ratings should be preserved, neither the competent authorities nor Member States should ~~not~~ interfere in relation to the substance of credit ratings and the methodologies by which a credit rating agency determines credit ratings. In the event that a credit rating agency is subjected to inappropriate pressure it should notify the Commission and the CESR.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 30

(30) In case the competent authority of the home Member State does not take the necessary measures in order to eliminate irregularities committed by a credit rating agency, competent authorities of other Member States should be able to intervene and take appropriate measures. Such interventions should be coordinated by the CESR. In appropriate circumstances the CESR should be able to recommend that joint investigations take place involving the competent authorities of the other Member States and the CESR.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 32

(32) CESR should ensure coherence in the application of this Regulation. It should enhance and facilitate the cooperation of competent authorities in supervisory activities and assume a coordination role in day-to-day supervisory practice. Therefore CESR should establish a mediation mechanism and peer review in order to facilitate a coherent approach by the competent authorities.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 37

(37) In particular the Commission should be empowered to amend Annex I and II of the Regulation which lay down the specific criteria for assessing the compliance of a credit rating agency with its duties in terms of internal organisation, operational arrangements, rules on employees, presentation of credit ratings and disclosure. Since those measures are of general scope and are designed to amend non-essential elements of this Regulation, they must be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny provided for in Article 5a of Decision 1999/468/EC. In proposing amendments, the Commission should take account of international developments.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 2

2. This Regulation ~~shall~~does not apply to private credit ratings. It shall not apply to credit ratings issued by public bodies whose credit ratings are not publicly disclosed ~~and are not~~, used for regulatory purposes, or paid by the rated entity.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point h a (new)

(ha) 'facilitator' means the competent authority of the credit rating agency home Member State;

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1

Credit institutions, investments firms, insurance, assurance and reinsurance undertakings, undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and institutions for occupational retirement provision referred to in Article 2 may only use for regulatory purposes credit ratings which are issued by credit rating agencies established in the Community and registered in accordance with this Regulation, or by credit rating agencies in third countries with an equivalent regime as referred to in Article 28a.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2

Investment firms and credit institutions referred to in Art. 1 of Directive 2004/39/EC should not execute orders on behalf of their clients with respect to financial instruments which have been rated, unless the credit rating has been issued by a credit rating agency registered in accordance with this Regulationdeleted.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 4 - subparagraph 1

4. A credit rating agency shall ensure that analysts ~~and persons approv~~preparing credit ratings shall not be involved in providing the credit rating services to the same rated entity or its related third parties for a period exceeding f~~our~~ive years. For that purpose it shall establish a rotation mechanism with regard to those analysts ~~and persons~~.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 4 - subparagraph 2

The period after which the analysts and persons approving credit ratings may be involved in providing the credit rating services to the rated entity or related third parties referred to in the first subparagraph may not be shorAny rotation must be on a phased basis of individual rating analysts, rather than on a completer t~~han two year~~eam basis.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2

2. A credit rating agency shall ensure that the credit ratings it produces and disseminates are based on an analysis of all information available to it that is of relevance according to its rating methodologies. It shall adopt all necessary and appropriate measures so that the information it uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and from reliable sources.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2

A credit rating agency shall record and make public all instances where in its credit rating process it downgrades existing credit ratings prepared by another credit rating agency with respect to underlying assets or structured finance instruments providing a justification for the downgrade.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 4

4. A credit rating agency shall monitor credit ratings and review its credit ratings ~~where necessary~~on an ongoing basis. A credit rating agency shall establish internal arrangements to monitor the impact of changes in macroeconomic or financial market conditions on credit ratings; it shall issue a warning in the event of general adverse and extreme market conditions.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 3 – point a

(a) credit rating categories that may be attributed to structured finance instruments are clearly differentiated from rating categories that may be used to rate other types of rated entities or financial instruments for example by carrying a supplemental annotation;

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Unsolicited credit ratings ~~shall~~may be identified with a ~~different credit rating category~~n annotation.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 a (new)

Article 8a Transparency of information Issuers providing information to a registered credit rating agency, for the purposes of establishing a rating, shall provide the same information on request to any bona fide analysis service which will undertake to respect confidentiality in using this information. Employees of such an analysis service shall also undertake not to trade in securities of the relevant issuer.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2

2. CRegistered credit rating agencies shall make available in a central repository established by CESR information on their historical performance data and information about past credit rating activities. The ~~repository shall be open to the public~~CESR shall provide guidance on the format, detail and period that is to be covered. The CESR shall make available to the public the information on historical performance and past credit rating activities in an appropriate form.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10

A credit rating agency shall publish annually a transparency report which includes the information on matters set out in Annex I, Section E, Part III. The credit rating agency shall publish its annual report at the latest three months after the end of each financial year and shall ensure that it remains available on the website of the agency for at least five years. Those publications and websites may be on a group basis and need not be exclusively related to Europe.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1

1. A credit rating agency or a group of credit rating agencies may apply for registration in order to ensure that its credit ratings can be used for regulatory purposes by credit institutions, investments firms, insurance, assurance and reinsurance undertakings, undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and institutions for occupational retirement provision referred to in Article 2 provided that it is a legal person established in the Community.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. The CESR shall work closely together with the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) established by Commission Decision 2004/5/EC of 5 November 20031 and the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS) established by Commission Decision 2004/6/EC of 5 November 20032, in view of the role of credit rating agencies and credit ratings in the context of capital and solvency requirements. This applies, in particular, to circumstances or recommendations for instances of withdrawal of registration of a credit rating agency. 1 OJ L 3, 7.1.2004, p. 28. 2 OJ L 3, 7.1.2004, p. 30.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 2 – introductory part

2. By ~~[within one year~~...* the CESR shall issue guidance on: * OJ please insert date: 6 months after entry into force of this Regulation~~] CESR shall issue guidance on:~~ .

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 4

4. CESR shall cooperate, where appropriate, with the Committee of European Banking Supervisors established by Commission Decision 2004/5/EC and the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors established by Commission Decision 2004/6/EC.deleted

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 2

2. Competent authorities shall be ~~adequately staffed~~staffed in sufficient capacity and expertise in order to be able to apply this Regulation.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 20 – paragraph 1

1. In carrying out their duties under this Regulation neither competent authorities of Member States nor Member States shall ~~not~~ interfere with the content of credit ratings or the methodologies by which a credit rating agency determines credit ratings.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. The competent authority of the home Member State may take the following measures in the event of a breach of this Regulation:

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) impose temporary prohibition of issuing new credit ratings with effect throughout the Community;

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – point c

~~(c) impose suspension of the use of credit ratings with effect throughout the Community;~~deleted.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Credit rating agencies should be given notice to rectify errors before implementing sanctions under points a, b or c.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

2. Competent authorities shall not make use of the powers provided for in paragraph 1 and Article 22 before communicating a motivated draft decision to CESR and to the credit rating agency. CESR shall express its views on the draft decision within 15 days of receipt of that communication.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 a (new)

In the interests of investors and market stability competent authorities shall take all possible measures to ensure the review and, where appropriate, the re-issue of ratings.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 1

Where the competent authority of a Member State has grounds for believing that a registered credit rating agency acting within its territory is in breach of the obligations arising from this Regulation, it shall inform the competent authority of the home Member State and CESR.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 2

If, after discussions between the competent authorities concerned, the competent authority of the home Member State refuses to act or is unable to adopt effective measures or if, despite the measures taken by the competent authority of the home Member State such measures prove inadequate to ~~protect the interests of the investors of the Member State concerned~~rectify breaches orf the ~~orderly functioning of markets~~Regulation, the competent authority of that Member State, after informing the competent authority of the home Member State may take all appropriate measures except for the measures referred to in point (a), (b) and (c) of Article 21(1). CESR shall be consulted before the adoption of such measures. and may coordinate further investigations

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 2

2. In case of disagreement between competent authorities of Member States on an assessment or action under this Regulation, competent authorities shall refer the matter to CESR for mediation and, where appropriate, for the coordination of further investigation. The competent authorities shall take into account the opinion of CESR.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 1

1. The obligation of professional secrecy shall apply to all persons who work or who have worked for the competent authority, the CESR or for any authority or person to whom the competent authority has delegated tasks, including auditors and experts contracted by the competent authority. Information covered by professional secrecy may not be disclosed to any other person or authority except when such disclosure is necessary for legal proceedings.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Article 28 a (new)

Article 28a Equivalence with third countries 1. The Commission shall decide on the criteria to assess equivalence of third- country regimes and establish a system of equivalence. 2. The Commission shall be assisted by the CESR. The CESR shall provide support and expertise to the Commission in the assessment of equivalence with the Community regime as set out in this Regulation, in particular Articles 5 to 9. 3. By 31 December 2009, the Commission shall adopt criteria to assess the equivalence of third-country regimes and establish a system of equivalence referred to in paragraph 1. Those measures, designed to amend non-essential elements of this Regulation by supplementing it, shall be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 33(2).

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Article 28 b (new)

Article 28b Transitional Period By way of derogation from Article 28a, credit ratings of credit rating agencies established in a third country may be used within the Community on condition that those ratings are confirmed by a credit rating agency established in the Community and registered in accordance with this Regulation. The credit rating agency established in the Community shall ensure and demonstrate to its competent authority that the policies and procedures applied to the credit rating procedure in the third country achieves comparable regulatory objectives as those set out in Articles 5 to 9. The credit rating agency established in the Community shall include a statement to this effect in its credit rating. The transitional measures referred to in the first paragraph shall apply until the Commission has established a system of equivalence as referred to in Article 28a.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Article 32 – paragraph 1

The Commission may amend the Annexes in order to take account of developments on financial markets, in particular in relation to new financial instruments and with regard to convergence of supervisory practice. In proposing amendments the Commission should take account of international developments.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Article 35 – paragraph 1

Credit rating agencies operating in the Community before ~~[the date of entry into force of this Regulation]~~...* shall adopt all necessary measures to comply with this Regulation and shall submit an application for registration by ~~[six~~...*. * OJ please insert date of entry into force of this Regulation. * OJ please insert date: nine months after the entry into force of this Regulation]. .

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Article 35 – paragraph 2 a (new)

The CESR shall issue guidance concerning the effect on existing ratings and on any further transitional measures that may be required.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – Section A – point 1 – introductory part

1. The credit rating agency or the group of credit rating agencies shall have an administrative or supervisory board that is responsible for ensuring:

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – Section A – point 2 – paragraph 3

The administrative or supervisory board of a credit rating agency shall include at least three non-executive members who shall be are independent. The remuneration of the independent members of administrative or supervisory board shall not be linked to the business performance of the credit rating agency and shall be arranged so as to ensure the independence of their judgement. The term of office of the independent members of the administrative or supervisory board shall be for a pre-agreed fixed period not exceeding five years and shall not be renewable. The dismissal of independent members of the administrative or supervisory board shall only take place in case of misconduct or professional underperformancedeleted.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – Section A – point 2 – paragraph 3

The administrative or supervisory board of a credit rating agency shall include ~~at least three non-executive members who shall be are independent. The remuneration of the independent members of administrative or supervisory board~~or be subject to an independent monitoring function by persons with responsibility for the monitoring and reporting on proper compliance with this regulation with regard to maintenance of the independence and quality of ratings. That function may be fulfilled by non-executive directors. The remuneration of the persons providing the independent monitoring function shall not be linked to the business performance of the credit rating agency and shall be arranged so as to ensure the independence of their judgement. The term of office of the ~~independent members of the administrative or supervisory board~~persons providing the independent monitoring function shall be for a pre-agreed fixed period not exceeding five years and ~~shall not be~~ renewable once. The dismissal of ~~independent members of the administrative or supervisory board~~persons providing the independent monitoring function shall only take place in case of misconduct or professional underperformance.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – Section A – point 2 – paragraph 4

The majority of members of the administrative or supervisory board, including all independent members, shall have sufficient expertise in financial services. At least one independent member of this board should have in-depth knowledge and experience at a senior level of the structured credit and securitisation marketsdeleted.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – Section A – point 2 – paragraph 4

The majority of members of the administrative or supervisory board, including all ~~independent members,~~persons providing the independent monitoring function shall have sufficient expertise in financial services. At least one ~~independent member of this board~~of the persons providing the independent monitoring function should have in-depth knowledge and, where relevant, experience at a senior level of the structured credit and securitisation markets.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – Section A – point 2 – paragraph 5

In addition to the overall responsibility of the board, the independent members of administrative or supervisory board shall have the specific task of monitoring the development of the credit rating policy, the effectiveness of the internal quality control system of the credit rating agency on the credit rating process to ensure that there are no conflicts of interest and the compliance and governance processes including the efficiency of the review function referred to in point 7 of this Section. Opinions of the independent directors issued on these matters shall be presented to the board periodically and made available to the competent authority, whenever the latter requests itdeleted.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – Section A – point 2 – paragraph 5

In addition to the overall responsibility of the board, ~~the independent members of administrative or supervisory board~~persons providing the independent monitoring function shall have the specific task of monitoring the development of the credit rating policy, the effectiveness of the internal quality control system of the credit rating agency on the credit rating process to ensure that there are no conflicts of interest and the compliance and governance processes including the efficiency of the review function referred to in point 7 of this Section. Opinions of the ~~independent directors~~persons providing the independent monitoring function issued on these matters shall be presented to the board periodically and made available to the competent authority, whenever the latter requests it.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – Section A – point 2 – paragraph 5 a (new)

A credit rating agency shall maintain arrangements for sound corporate governance. Such arrangements may be adapted in order to take into account the size of the credit rating agency, its corporate structure, and the legislative requirements and other standards of corporate governance applicable in the jurisdictions where it is incorporated or where it has its principal place of business. In determining its corporate governance arrangements, a credit rating agency shall have regard to the need to ensure that it will provide ratings that are independent, objective and high quality.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – Section A – point 5

5. A credit rating agency shall establish appropriate and effective organisational and administrative arrangements to identify, prevent ~~and~~, manage, record, and disclose conflicts of interest referred to in point 1 of Section B. ~~It shall keep a record of a~~All significant threats to its independence and that of its employees involved in the credit rating process, as well as the safeguards applied to mitigate those threats shall be recorded.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – Section B – point 3 – introductory part

3. A credit rating agency shall not issue a credit rating or shall, with~~draw~~out delay, disclose its relationship with the rated entity affecting an existing credit rating in the following cases:

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – Section B – point 3 – point c a (new)

(ca) an analyst who participated in determining a credit rating, or a person approving the credit ratings, has recently been employed or had another significant business relationship with the rated entity, which may cause or may be perceived as causing a conflict of interests;

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – Section B – point 3 – point c b (new)

(cb) an analyst who participated in determining a credit rating, or person approving the credit ratings, has had any other relationship with the rated entity or any related entity thereof that may cause or may be perceived as causing a conflict of interests.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – Section B – point 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)

Where a credit rating already exists, the credit rating agency shall immediately review and, if appropriate, revise the existing credit rating in accordance with point 1.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – Section B – point 7

7. A credit rating agency shall ~~keep records and au~~arrange for adequate records of its credit rating activities to be kept. Those records should include: (a) for each credit trails of all its activities, including records of agreements between the credit rating agency and the rated entity or related third party and all significant elements of the dialogue with the rated entity and its related third parties, as well as records in relation to the obligations set out in Articles 5, 6 and 7. ting decision, the identity of the credit analysts participating in determining the credit rating, the identity of the persons who have approved the credit rating, details of whether the credit rating was solicited or unsolicited and the date on which the credit rating action was taken; (b) the account records relating to fees received from any issuer, obligor, underwriter or other user; (c) account records for each subscriber to the credit ratings or related services; (d) records documenting the established procedures and methodologies used by the credit rating agency to determine ratings; (e) the internal records and files, including non-public information and work papers, used to form the basis of any credit rating decision taken; (f) credit analysis reports, credit assessment reports and private credit rating reports and internal records, including non-public information and work papers, used to form the basis of the opinions expressed in such reports; (g) records of the procedures maintained by the credit rating agency to comply with the provisions of this Regulation; and (h) copies of internal and external communications, including electronic communications, received and sent by the credit rating agency and its employees, that relate to initiating, determining, maintaining, changing or withdrawing a credit rating.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – Section C – point 4

4. An employee or other person directly involved in the credit rating process shall not solicit or accept money, gifts or favours from anyone with whom the credit rating agency does business.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – Section D – part I – point 3 – paragraph 1

3. A credit rating agency shall ensure that any credit rating states clearly and prominently any attributes and limitations of the credit rating. In particular, a credit rating agency shall prominently state in any credit rating whether it considers satisfactory the quality of information available on the rated entity and to what extent it has verified information provided to it by the rated entity or its related third party. A rating agency shall not be required to audit due diligence provided to it by the rated entity. If a credit rating involves a type of entity or financial instrument for which historical data is limited, the credit rating agency shall make clear, in a prominent place, the limitations of the credit rating.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – Section D – part I – point 3 – paragraph 2

In case where the lack of reliable data or the complexity of the structure of a new type of instrument or the quality of information available is not satisfactory or raises serious questions as to whether a credit rating agency can provide a credible credit rating, the credit rating agency shall refrain from issuing a credit ~~rating or withdraw an existing~~ rating.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – Section D – part I – point 3 – paragraph 2 a (new)

Changes in the quality of information available for monitoring an existing credit rating shall be made public and the credit rating shall be reviewed and, if appropriate, revised.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – Section D – part II – point 1

1. Where a credit rating agency rates a structured finance instrument, it shall provide in the credit rating information about loss and cash-flow analysis it has performed or is relying upon.

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

2008/0217(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – Section E – part II – point 2

2. On a yearly basis the following information: a) a list of the largest 20 clients of the credit rating agency by revenue; b) a list of those clients of the credit rating agency whose contribution to the growth rate in the revenue of the credit rating agency in the previous financial year exceeded the growth rate in the total revenues of the credit rating agency in that year by a factor of more than 1.5 times; each such client shall only be included on this list where in that year it accounted for more than 0.25 % of the worldwide total revenues of the credit rating agency at global level. For the purposes of the first subparagraph of point 2 "client" shall mean a company, its subsidiaries, and associated companies in which the company has holdings of more than 20 %, as well as any other entities in respect of which it has negotiated the structuring of a debt issue on behalf of a client and where a fee was paid, directly or indirectly, to the credit rating agency for the rating of that debt issue.deleted

2009/02/18
Committee: ECON

Othmar KARAS, Wolf KLINZ

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 3 – point 4 a (new)

Directive 95/59/EC
Article 9 – paragraph 1 − subparagraph 3 a (new)

(4a) In Article 9(1), the following subparagraph is added: "The second paragraph may not, however, hinder the imposition by a Member State's competent authority of a minimum retail price level to the consumer, in the interest of a tobacco prevention programme inherent to the Member State’s public health policy, provided that it is compatible with Community legislation.".

2008/12/15
Committee: ECON

2008/0095(CNS)

Proposal for a decision
Citation 5 a (new)

– having regard to its resolution of 12 July 2007 on the 2007 annual report on the eurozone1, ____________ 1 Texts Adopted, P6_TA(2007)0348.

2008/05/26
Committee: ECON

2008/0095(CNS)

Proposal for a decision
Recital A (new)

A. whereas Slovakia has complied with the Maastricht criteria as specified in the Article 121 of the EC Treaty and the accompanying Protocol on the convergence criteria,

2008/05/26
Committee: ECON

2008/0095(CNS)

Proposal for a decision
Paragraph 3

3. Notes that the ECB Convergence Report identifies risks concerning the sustainability of the low inflation ~~criterion~~rate achieved and urges the necessary steps to be taken to avoid inflation;

2008/05/26
Committee: ECON

2008/0095(CNS)

Proposal for a decision
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Notes that Article 121 of the EC Treaty defines the achievement of a high degree of sustainable convergence by reference to the fulfilment by each Member State of the following criteria: the achievement of a high degree of price stability; the sustainability of the government financial position; the observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange rate mechanism and the durability of convergence achieved by the Member State and of its participation in the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System being reflected in the long-term interest rate levels;

2008/05/26
Committee: ECON

2008/0095(CNS)

Proposal for a decision
Paragraph 3 b (new)

3b. Calls on the government of Slovakia to ensure, with the cooperation of the central bank of Slovakia, a stable low inflation environment, which can be achieved through further fiscal consolidation, and a sufficiently tight fiscal policy with the aim of balancing the budget in the medium term; calls on the social partners in Slovakia to keep wage growth in line with productivity growth in the foreseeable future;

2008/05/26
Committee: ECON

2008/0095(CNS)

Proposal for a decision
Paragraph 5

5. Reiterates its strongly held opinion that the Council and the Commission should adopt the position that any excessive deficit procedure concerning a Member State must have been closed before compliance with the Maastricht criteria is assessed as prescribed in Article 2 of the Protocol ~~No 21~~ on the convergence criteria, referred to in Article 121 of the EC Treaty; regrets that the Commission has, again, failed correctly to apply the Treaty in this regard;

2008/05/26
Committee: ECON

2008/0095(CNS)

Proposal for a decision
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Calls on the government of Slovakia to ensure the continuation of necessary structural reforms in the labour, services and product market, ensuring in particular increased labour mobility and investment in human capital; calls on the government of Slovakia to ensure competition, particularly in sensitive sectors like energy;

2008/05/26
Committee: ECON

2008/0095(CNS)

Proposal for a decision
Paragraph 6 b (new)

6b. Is concerned about low support for the euro among Slovak citizens; calls on the authorities of Slovakia, therefore, to step up public information campaign aimed at explaining the benefits of the single currency and undertake all necessary steps in order to minimise price increases during the changeover period;

2008/05/26
Committee: ECON

2008/0095(CNS)

Proposal for a decision
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Calls on the Commission and the ECB to consider all aspects when recommending the final exchange rate for the Slovak koruna;

2008/05/26
Committee: ECON

2007/2290(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

4. Urges the Commission to review urgently Directive 2003/41/EC, based on advice from the CEIOPS, in order to provide a solid solvency regime appropriate to institutions for occupational retirement provision that fall under the IORP directive; stresses that such a regime may be based on the Solvency II approach but must cater for the specificities of those institutions such as the long-term nature of the pension schemes they operate; considers that such a special solvency regime would underpin financial stability and prevent regulatory arbitrage;

2008/07/01
Committee: ECON

2007/2290(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Points out that the envisaged revision of IAS 19 could entail significant changes to pension systems that need to be carefully assessed;

2008/07/01
Committee: ECON

2007/2287(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Underlines that, while calling for EU legislation on retail financial services to always aim for ~~the~~very high~~est~~ standards of consumer protection, all market operators - including consumers/investors - need to be fully aware of the basic financial market principle that any higher return opportunity is reflected by a higher risk, and that risk is an indispensable element of any functioning financial market; stresses further that a good compromise between a high level of consumer protection and flawlessly functioning internal market mechanisms should be sought;

2008/03/12
Committee: IMCO

2007/2287(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Notes that not only private clients but also small businesses are less inclined to take up cross-border financial services; underlines the need to ensure that the advantages of the financial single market also benefit small businesses; favours, for non-legislative measures, a definition such as that in the above- mentioned Sector Inquiry on retail banking; favours, however, a distinction between private clients and SMEs for legislative measures;

2008/03/17
Committee: ECON

2007/2287(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Agrees that consumers wishing to change providers of financial services must be free to do so at any time, with minimum legal barriers and reasonable costs, and that contract clauses governing such a change of provider must be formulated in transparent, easily comprehensible language ~~and be explicitly brought to consumers' attention~~;

2008/03/12
Committee: IMCO

2007/2287(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Recognises, at the same time, the opportunities presented by opening up retail markets on the supply side; considers that this would enable the industry to achieve economies of scale by developing pan-European product platforms and thus offer products across Europe, resulting in more product diversity and competition in national markets for the benefits of consumers;

2008/03/17
Committee: ECON

2007/2287(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9

9. Supports a coherent European suggestion providing consumers access to balanced new forms of collective redress for the settlement of cross-border complaints related to retail financial products; suggests evaluating the impact of systems recently established at Member State level.

2008/03/12
Committee: IMCO

2007/2287(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Notes that the legislative approaches currently available, minimum harmonisation and full harmonisation, are in a state of tension between simplifying cross-border business and maintaining national standards for consumer protection; suggests targeted full harmonisation of financial services regulation to a large extent; considers that for those elements where harmonisation is not feasible, mutual recognition regarding different national rules should apply;

2008/03/17
Committee: ECON

2007/2287(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Reminds the Commission that effective competition between financial service providers is secured by having a large number of market participants competing under equal conditions; draws attention to its resolution on consolidation in the financial services industry, in which it ~~averred~~states that the pluralistic structure of the European banking market, where financial institutions could take on diverse legal forms in accordance with their diverse business aims, wais an asset to the European social market economy;

2008/03/17
Committee: ECON

2007/2287(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Regrets that cross-border providers of financial services incur high costs as a result of the differing legal provisions and differing practice of national supervisory authorities; calls on the Lamfalussy committees to step up their work for uniform standards; in particular, advocates agreement on simple and practical standard forms for reporting and approval procedures;

2008/03/17
Committee: ECON

2007/2239(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

~~1. Observes that a lack of due diligence by investors cannot be counteracted by more transparency;~~deleted

2008/04/15
Committee: ECON

2007/2239(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Recognises that hedge funds and private equity are distinct investment vehicles that differ as regards the nature of investment and investment strategy;

2008/04/15
Committee: ECON

2007/2239(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Considers that ~~standardisation of~~ over- the-counter (OTC) products ~~is a contradiction in terms: an OTC clear~~should be traded more using regular trading systems i~~s attractive in theory but would add to costs, so unless it is done on an international basis it could damage European competitiveness in a global market~~n order to increase mark-to-market valuation; considers also that, in order to ensure that there is a level playing field in the global context, any new system needs to be introduced on an international basis;

2008/04/15
Committee: ECON

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

~~D. whereas directives seem to be the appropriate legal instruments with which to address the different issues related to hedge funds and private equity funds,~~deleted

2008/05/08
Committee: JURI

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)

Da. whereas the hedge fund and private equity industries could make concrete proposals on transparency issues and where these initiatives already exist they should be implemented accordingly, whereas only if this is not successful should legislative measures be considered as the appropriate instrument,

2008/05/08
Committee: JURI

2007/2239(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Notes that public attention was drawn to hedge funds and private equity following high-profile cases and activity in the context of well-known companies; recognises that both hedge funds and private equity are responding to criticism by way of self-regulatory proposals incorporating a 'comply or explain' principle; considers that those codes need to spread globally and be allowed sufficient time ~~to operate, spread globally and~~ for their effects to be analysed;

2008/04/15
Committee: ECON

2007/2239(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Is aware of the fact that adequate and effective monitoring of codes of conduct remains an open question that needs to be addressed;

2008/04/15
Committee: ECON

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas the ~~primary~~ reasons for the current ~~sub-prime crisis is not the lack of regulation of investors but the failure of rating agencies; whereas t~~turmoil in financial markets are manifold and include: – negligent lending practices in the US housing market, – rapid innovation of complex structured products, – the originate-to-distribute model and the long intermediation chain, – investors' greed for ever-higher r~~ating agencies should therefore be made subject in principle to the same compliance rules as those applying to auditor~~eturns and a short-sighted incentive structure regarding remuneration, as well as – conflicts of interest of credit rating agencies and the misconception of the meaning of ratings,

2008/05/08
Committee: JURI

2007/2239(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

~~6. Asserts that additional, especially frequent, reporting requirements can induce pressure for short-term returns rather than long-term stability;~~deleted

2008/04/15
Committee: ECON

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Requests the Commission to submit to Parliament, on the basis of Articles 44, 47(2) or 95 of the EC Treaty, depending on the subject matter, a legislative proposal or proposals on the transparency of hedge funds and private equity funds; calls for such proposal(s) to be drawn up in the light of interinstitutional discussions and following the detailed recommendations below;deleted

2008/05/08
Committee: JURI

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Asks the hedge fund and private equity industries to address transparency issues by means of concrete proposals, and where these already exist, to implement them accordingly, and to keep Parliament and the Commission regularly informed about their progress on these initiatives; considers that if no real progress is made by the industry in the near future, a legislative proposal on the transparency of hedge funds and private equity might be the right way to address transparency concerns;

2008/05/08
Committee: JURI

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Urges the Commission to establish a European private placement regime in order to eliminate obstacles to cross- border distribution for alternative investments;

2008/05/08
Committee: JURI

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex

Annex to the motion for a resolution: Detailed Recommendations Regarding the Substance of the Requested Proposals The European Parliament asks the Commission to propose a directive or directives guaranteeing a common standard of transparency and to tackle the issues mentioned below related to hedge funds and private equity funds, on the basis that the directive(s) should give Member States, where necessary, enough flexibility to transpose EU rules into their existing company-law systems. On hedge funds and private equity funds The European Parliament asks the Commission to submit the appropriate legislative proposals by way of review of the existing acquis communautaire affecting the various types of investors and counterparties, and to adapt or establish rules providing for the clear disclosure and timely communication of relevant and material information so as to facilitate high-quality decision-making and transparent communication between investors and the company management; The new legislation should require shareholders to notify issuers of the proportion of their voting rights resulting from an acquisition or disposal of shares where that proportion reaches, exceeds or falls below the specific thresholds starting with 3% instead of 5%, as mentioned in Directive 2004/109/EC; it should also oblige hedge funds and private equity funds to disclose and explain – vis-à-vis the companies whose shares they acquire or own, retail and institutional investors, prime brokers and supervisors – their investment policy and associated risks; These proposals should be based on an examination of the existing EU legislation, carried out with a view to ascertaining the extent to which the existing rules on transparency can be applied to the specific situation of hedge funds and private equity funds; With a view to the above-mentioned legislative proposals, the Commission should in particular: – explore the possibility of contract terms, to be applied to alternative investments, that provide for an unambiguous limitation of risk, for measures to be taken in the event of thresholds being exceeded, for adequate disclosure, for a clear description of lock-up periods, and for explicit conditions governing cancellation and termination of the contract; – investigate the issue of money laundering in the context of hedge funds and private equity funds; On hedge funds specifically The European Parliament asks the Commission to establish rules that enhance the transparency of voting policies of hedge funds, on the basis that the addressees of Community rules should be the managers of such funds; such rules could also include a system of EU-wide shareholder identification; With a view to the above-mentioned legislative proposal(s), the Commission should in particular: – investigate the possibility of mitigating the undesirable effects of securities lending; – examine whether reporting requirements should also apply to cooperation agreements between several shareholders and to indirect acquisitions of voting rights via option arrangements; On private equity funds specifically The European Parliament asks the Commission to establish rules that forbid private equity funds to “plunder” companies (so called “asset stripping”) and thus misuse their financial power in a way that merely disadvantages the company acquired, without having any positive impact on the company’s future and the situation of its employees, creditors and business partners; With a view to the above-mentioned legislative proposal(s), the Commission should examine ways of addressing the issues arising when banks lend huge amounts of money to private equity funds and then disclaim any responsibility whatsoever as to the purpose for which that money is used or the provenance of the money used to repay the loan.deleted

2008/05/08
Committee: JURI

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – Introductory part

The European Parliament asks the ~~Commission to propose a directive or directive~~hedge fund and private equity industries to bring forward concrete proposals guaranteeing a common standard of transparency, and to tackle the issues mentioned below related to hedge funds and private equity funds, on the basis that the directive(s) should give Member States, where necessary, enough flexibility to transpose EU rules iwhere proposals already exist, to implemento the~~ir existing company-law systems~~m accordingly.

2008/05/08
Committee: JURI

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – on hedge funds and private equity funds

The European Parliament asks the ~~Commission to submit the appro~~hedge fund and private ~~legislative proposals by way of review of the existing acquis communautaire affecting the various types of investors and counterparties,~~equity fund industries to submit appropriate and concrete proposals and to adapt or establish rules providing for the clear disclosure and timely communication of relevant and material information so as to facilitate high-quality decision-making and transparent communication between investors and the company management; The new legislation should require shareholders to notify issuers of the proportion of their voting rights resulting from an acquisition or disposal of shares where that proportion reaches, exceeds or falls below the specific thresholds starting with 3% instead of 5%, as mentioned in Directive 2004/109/EC; it should also oblige hedge funds and private equity funds to disclose and explain – vis-à-vis the companies whose shares they acquire or own, retail and institutional investors, prime brokers and supervisors – their investment policy and associated risks; These proposals should be based on an examination of the existing EU legislation, carried out with a view to ascertaining the extent to which the existing rules on transparency can be applied to the specific situation of hedge funds and private equity funds; With a view to the above-mentioned legislative proposals, the Commission should in particular: – explore the possibility of contract terms, to be applied to alternative investments, that provide for an unambiguous limitation of risk, for measures to be taken in the event of thresholds being exceeded, for adequate disclosure, for a clear description of lock-up periods, and for explicit conditions governing cancellation and termination of the contract; – investigate the issue of money laundering in the context of hedge funds and private equity fundswhere proposals already exist they should be implemented accordingly; These proposals should complement existing rules on transparency;

2008/05/08
Committee: JURI

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – on hedge funds specifically

The European Parliament asks the ~~Commission~~hedge fund industry to establish rules for self- regulation that enhance the transparency of voting policies of hedge funds, on the basis that the addressees of Community rules should be the managers of such funds; such rules could also include a system of EU-wide shareholder identification; With a view to the above-mentioned legislative proposal(s), the Commission should in particular: –and to investigate the possibility of mitigating the undesirable effects of securities lending~~; – examine whether reporting requirements should also apply to coopera~~ and indirect acquisitions of voting rights via option a~~gre~~rrangements ~~between several shareholders and to indirect acquisitions of voting rights via option arrangements~~; where proposals already exist they should be implemented accordingly;

2008/05/08
Committee: JURI

2007/2239(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – on private equity funds specifically

The European Parliament asks the ~~Commission to establish rules~~private equity fund industry to establish rules for self-regulation that forbid private equity funds to “plunder” companies (so -called “asset stripping”) and thus misuse their financial power in a way that merely disadvantages the company acquired, without having any positive impact on the company’s future and the situation of its employees, creditors and business partners; With a view to the above-mentioned legislative proposal(s), the Commission should examine ways of addressing the issues arising when banks lend huge amounts of money to private equity funds and then disclaim any responsibility whatsoever as to the purpose for which that money is used or the provenance of the money used to repay the loan.where proposals already exist they should be implemented accordingly;

2008/05/08
Committee: JURI

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas there is ~~at present insufficient~~no specific EU regulation of hedge funds and private equity, many EU and national regulations cover aspects of their activities,

2008/05/19
Committee: ECON

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas the Commission has not responded positively to Parliament's ~~earlier requests, including those made in its~~all aspects of above-mentioned resolutions of 15 January 2004, 27 April 2006, 11 July 2007, 13 December 2007),

2008/05/19
Committee: ECON

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas several global, EU and national institutions have, long before the current financial crisis, ~~voiced their concerns in relation to hedge funds and private equity about financial stability, inadequate risk management, excessive debt (leverage)~~ taken steps and made recommendations in relation to:- on the one hand financial institutions' exposure to hedge funds and the framing of these exposures in institutions' overall risk management, and on the other hand the valuation of illiquid and complex financial instruments, by all financial managers,

2008/05/19
Committee: ECON

2007/2238(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Urges the Commission to ~~introduce a uniform definition of private placement in the EU~~establish a European private placement regime in order to eliminate obstacles to cross- border distribution for alternative investments.

2008/05/08
Committee: JURI

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas ~~there is empirical evidence that~~some hedge funds may engage in herding in times of market turmoil, ~~thus giving rise to~~in the EU this is largely due to counterparty pressure for deleveraging and it is also evident that the varying hedge fund strategies mean they can help mitigate financial instability ~~concerns~~,

2008/05/19
Committee: ECON

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas hedge funds and private equity in many cases provide liquidity ~~and demand for~~, help correct market inefficiencies, and foster diversification and the creation of new, innovative products,

2008/05/19
Committee: ECON

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas financial stability also requires better supervisory cooperation, including globally, which logically requires, ~~in due course, a comprehensive revision of current~~continuing improvements in EU supervisory arrangements,

2008/05/19
Committee: ECON

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital K

K. whereas ~~enhanced~~ appropriate levels of transparency towards the public, investors and supervisory authorities~~, including, in future, any new EU supervisory body,~~ are crucial to ensure ~~such~~ well-functioning and stable financial markets as well as for promoting competition between market actors and products,

2008/05/19
Committee: ECON

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital L

L. whereas excessive debt required by much of the activities of hedge funds and private equity threatens financial stability, prejudices the realisation of the long-term investment, growth and jobs agenda and is, moreover, unfairly favoured in national tax regimethe effects of high leverage may, in adverse market conditions, be dangerous; hence hedge funds and private equity fund managers should carefully assess their risks,

2008/05/19
Committee: ECON

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital M

M. whereas the recent increase in private equity transactions has significantly increased the number of employees, whose jobs are ultimately controlled by equity funds, and are covered by Community employment law (in particular, Directive 2001/23/EC) w~~as formulated when this was not so~~hich applies on a non discriminatory basis,

2008/05/19
Committee: ECON

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital N

N. whereas in the ~~event~~minority instances of extreme debt ~~loads~~, private equity leveraged buy-outs affect the viability of the target companies,

2008/05/19
Committee: ECON

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital O

O. whereas, as with other entities, the~~re a~~re mcany be conflicts of interest ~~either~~ arising from the ~~business model of~~relationships between private equity orand hedge funds ~~or from the relationships between those vehicles and other actors in financial markets,~~and other actors in financial markets, however, reiterates that while welcoming realistic efforts to enhance existing EU legislation, such efforts must not be restricted solely to hedge funds and private equity;

2008/05/19
Committee: ECON

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital P

P. whereas ~~whilst~~ there is no evidence that those vehicles caused the current financial crisis, the~~y have been involved in~~dge funds were amongst the ~~bus~~inves~~s of non-regulated and highly complex structured products; whereas not being adequately capitalised and thus volatile to turbulences, those vehicles enhance~~tors in the complex structured products that were subject to the credit crisis, and thus incurred losses as did othe ~~crisi~~r investors,

2008/05/19
Committee: ECON

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital Q

Q. whereas in order to minimise the risk of future financial crises and given the strong interactions across markets and between market participants and given the objective of a level playing field across borders and between regulated and unregulated market participants, the EU ~~needs better, more coherent and harmonised regulation across the board~~should continue to review the accuracy and coherence of its regulatory standards, taking into account developments at international level,

2008/05/19
Committee: ECON

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital Q a (new)

Qa. whereas the European Parliament welcomes the current work by the European Commission to establish a European Private Placement Regime in order to eliminate obstacles to cross- border distribution for alternative investments,

2008/05/19
Committee: ECON

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Requests the Commission to submit to Parliament by 30 November 2008, on the basis of Article 44, Article 47(2), or Article 95 of the EC Treaty, a legislative proposal or proposals on hedge funds, private equity and other relevant actors, following the detailed recommendations below;deleted

2008/05/19
Committee: ECON

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Requests the Commission to submit to Parliament by 30 November 2008, on the basis of Article 44, Article 47(2), or Article 95 of the EC Treaty, options for a legislative proposal or proposals oninclusive of hedge funds, private equity and other relevant actors, ~~following the detailed~~taking account of the recommendations below;

2008/05/19
Committee: ECON

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Considers that the financial implications of the requested proposal or proposals should be covered by EU budgetary allocations for (i) the establishment of any EU supervisory authority, (ii) the EU public credit rating agency, and (iii) the EU public certification body for structured productrequested proposal(s) has/have no financial implications;

2008/05/19
Committee: ECON

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex

ANNEX TO THE MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION: DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE CONTENT OF THE PROPOSAL 1. Recommendation 1 on Financial Stability and Better Functioning Financial Markets Measures The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate: (a) Capital requirements Investment firms, insurance companies, credit institutions, conventional funds (such as UCITS and pension funds/IORPs) have to comply with capital requirements. Whatever the legal structure of hedge fund and private equity vehicles, including limited partnerships, the Commission should ensure that an appropriate capital requirement is introduced at the level of the entity that controls the investment of the fund or funds concerned (i.e. management firm), covering all funds regardless of their place of registration. (b) EU public credit rating agency The Commission should establish an EU Public Credit Rating Agency in order to foster competition and improve transparency in that sector. The Commission should also, in its revision of the Directive 2006/48/EC, introduce a provision that, where a credit assessment of an External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI) is required for the calculation of a credit institution's risk- weighted exposure, the credit assessment of the EU Public Credit Rating Agency will also be required. (c) Liquidity The Commission should introduce risk-weighted capital adequacy requirements in respect of liquidity risk in its revision of the Directive 2006/48/EC. (d) Valuation The Commission should propose precise rules on the valuation of illiquid financial instruments in order better to protect investors and the stability of financial markets. (e) Prime brokers The capital requirement of any institution providing prime brokerage services should be increased in line with the complexity and opacity of the structure or nature of the exposures, to which their dealings with hedge funds and private equity expose them. In particular, the provisions of Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC should be amended to achieve that result. (f) Venture capital The Commission should implement, without delay, the policy proposals set out in its communication on Removing obstacles to cross-border investments by venture capital funds, including proposing legislation to provide a harmonised EU- wide framework for venture capital and so to ensure cross-border access to such capital for the SME sector in line with the Lisbon Agenda. (g) EU supervisory authority The Commission should establish a European supervisor covering all financial services sectors: capital markets, securities, insurance and banking sectors. It should further be established whether there should be two such European supervisors: one for prudential regulation and another for conduct of business regulation. 2. Recommendation 2 on Transparency Measures The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate: (a) Registration and authorisation of management companies and funds' managers The Commission should establish an EU framework for the registration and authorisation of entities that control the investment of hedge funds or private equity (i.e. management firms), which should function on a single entry point basis: once authorised, the entities concerned should have access to undertake business throughout the EU. In order to promote a well-functioning single European financial market, the Commission should ensure that management firms disclose the following: - the identity of managers, - corporate earnings and bonuses, - remuneration of directors, senior executives and other staff with investment responsibilities, and - relationships with prime brokers. That information should be set out in a uniform format (also to facilitate the proposal for a database below). (b) Notification (i.e. approval) of wholesale investment vehicles In order to encourage funds to be located onshore in the EU, the Commission should propose a separate directive along the lines of the EU-wide private placement regime, currently under discussion, to apply to the marketing and distribution in the EU of hedge funds and private equity funds. Such a regime should function on a single entry point basis: once authorised, it should be possible to offer those wholesale investment vehicles to professional, institutional investors throughout the EU. In order to promote a well-functioning single European financial market, the Commission should ensure the investment vehicle discloses the following: - general investment strategy and immediate information on any changes thereto, - leverage/debt exposure, - overall fees as well as breakdown of fees (including any stock options awarded to employees), - source and amount of funds raised, - past performance, - risk-management system and portfolio valuation methods, - information on the administrator of the fund, and - share of the fund contributed by the management company and its staff. That information should be set out in a uniform format (also to facilitate the database proposal below). (c) Database The Commission should, with the help of Level 3 Committees, establish an EU-wide registration/authorisation database recording the information on both management firms and investment vehicles as specified above. The supervisory authorities of all Member States should have unlimited access. Relevant categories of the database should be public. (d) Investors The Commission and supervisory authorities should ensure that investors in those vehicles receive not only sufficient but also relevant and comparable information (e.g. the simplified prospectus/fact sheet for UCITS). (e) Private equity and protection of employees The Commission should propose amendments to Directive 2001/23/EC so that the same protections afforded employees by that Directive, including the right to be informed and consulted, apply whenever control of the undertaking or business concerned is transferred by means of a private equity transaction. 3. Recommendation 3 on Excessive Debt Measures The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate: (a) Limits on leverage for private equity The Commission should amend Directive 77/91/EEC on capital to introduce rules to specify the appropriate level of debt at any given time in relation to the target company bearing in mind the legitimate rights of important stakeholders (including employees); in conjunction with such level, the Commission should request the Member States to introduce taxation consequences for private equity funds in cases of excessive debt; such taxation consequences could include eliminating or reducing the tax deductibility of interest payments on the debt concerned in line with best practices in Member States. (b) Capital depletion The Commission should amend Directive 77/91/EEC on capital to set minimum capital levels for the target company by reference to the long-term interests of the target company. The Commission should also, without delay, propose rules to harmonise requirements for directors of the target company (i.e. management and supervisory board members), to certify that capital outflow (including any fees paid) is in the best long-term interests of the target company, including its long- term growth and R&D needs. In particular, EU corporate governance requirements, such as the provisions of the Directive 1978/660/EEC, might be amended to achieve that result. (c) Limits on leverage for hedge funds The Commission should devise the upper limit in the debt of hedge funds in relation to preserving the stability of the EU financial system. (d) EU Registration for structured products The Commission should establish a public register of structured products in the EU. 4. Recommendation 4 on Conflicts of Interest Measures The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate: (a) Investment banks (prime brokers) - hedge funds and private equity The Commission should assess whether the strengthening of capital requirements for prime brokers (Recommendation 1) deals appropriately with the inherent conflicts of interest between: - the prime brokers and hedge funds, where the former's credit (lending) decisions are often contaminated by the prospect of earning fees from latter (via trading services), and - investment banks and private equity, where the former's credit (lending) decisions are often contaminated by the prospect of earning fees from latter (via deal related services). (b) The Commission should also introduce rules to ensure effective Chinese walls between services that investment firms provide for their clients (such as prime brokerage) and all their other business units (including asset management services, proprietary trading etc). - Private equity The Commission should formulate rules by which to deal with the conflicts of interest between the private equity partners and the management of the target company (and any others who stand to gain from the deal). Those rules should include a requirement of public disclosure of any fees or other incentives received by directors (i.e. management board and supervisory board members) or employees of the target company. - Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) The Commission should formulate rules by which to deal with the conflicts of interest inherent in their current business models, and arising from the interplay among actors in today's financial markets. - Market access and concentration: the Directorate General for Competition of the Commission should launch an inquiry into market concentration in the following financial services industry sectors: hedge funds, private equity, investment banks (with focus on prime brokerage services) and CRAs.deleted REQUESTED

2008/05/19
Committee: ECON

2007/2238(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex – Heading

ANNEX TO THE MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION: DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS ~~ON THE CONTENT OF THE PROPOSAL REQUESTED~~

2008/05/19
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 5 a (new)

(5a) It is appropriate for activities constituting management of investment funds to continue to fall within the exemption if carried out by third-party economic operators.

2008/06/17
Committee: ECON

2007/0267(CNS)

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 2

Directive 2006/112/EC
Article 135a – point 11

(11) 'management of investment funds' means activities relating to the administration and daily management of the fund aimed at realising the investment objectives of the investment fund concerned.

2008/06/17
Committee: ECON

2007/0267(CNS)

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 4 a (new)

Directive 2006/112/EC
Article 169 – point c

(4a) In Article 169, point (c) shall be replaced by the following: '(c) transactions which are exempt pursuant to points (a) to (g) of Article 135(1), where the customer is established outside the Community or where those transactions relate directly to goods to be exported out of the Community.'

2008/06/17
Committee: ECON

2007/0220(COD)