14 Amendments of Neena GILL related to 2016/0365(COD)
Amendment 224 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
Recital 10
(10) Building on the approach for bank recovery and resolution, Member States' authorities should be prepared and have adequate recovery and resolution tools at their disposal to handle situations involving CCP failures. However, due to their different functions and business models, the risks inherent in banks and CCPs are different. S, which means that the regulatory approach taken in the banking resolution framework cannot be transposed to the CCP framework. Therefore, specific tools and powers are therefore needed for CCP failure scenarios caused both by the failure of the CCP's clearing members or as a result of non- default events.
Amendment 230 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
Recital 19
(19) In order to deal in an efficient manner with failing CCPs, authorities should have the power to impose preparatory measures on CCPs. A minimum standard should be established as regards the contents and information to be included in recovery plans to ensure that all CCPs in the Union have sufficiently detailed plans for recovery should they face financial distress. Such plans should be based on realistic assumptions applicable in a range of robust and severe scenarios, including deteriorations arising from a default event or from a non-default event. The recovery plan should form part of the operating rules of the CCP agreed contractually with clearing members. Those operating rules should further contain provisions to ensure the enforceability of recovery measures outlined in the plan in all scenarios. Recovery plans should not assume access to extraordinarany public financial support or expose taxpayers to the risk of loss.
Amendment 239 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27
Recital 27
(27) Resolution authorities, on the basis of the assessment of resolvability, should have the power to require changes to the legal structure and organisation of CCPs directly or indirectly through the competent authority, to take measures which are necessary and proportionate to reduce or remove material impediments to the use of resolution tools and ensure the resolvability of the entities concerned.
Amendment 244 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 34
Recital 34
(34) The resolution framework should provide for timely entry into resolution before a CCP is insolvent. A CCP should be considered to be failing or likely to fail when it infringes or is likely in the near future to infringe the requirements for continuing authorisation, when its recovery has failed to restore its viability, when the assets of the CCP are or are likely in the near future to be less than its liabilities, when the CCP is or is likely in the near future to be unable to pay its debts as they fall due, or when the CCP requires extraordinary public financial support. However, the fact that a CCP does not comply with all the requirements for authorisation should not justify by itself the entry into resolution.
Amendment 247 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 37
Recital 37
(37) The prime objectives of resolution should be to ensure the continuity of critical functions, to avoid adverse effects on financial stability, and to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support to failing CCPs.
Amendment 257 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 48
Recital 48
(48) The recovery and resolution tools should be used to the fullest extent possible before any public sector injection of capital or equivalent extraordinary public financial support to a CCP. The use of public financial support to assist in the resolution of failing institutions should comply with the relevant State aid provisions.
Amendment 258 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 49
Recital 49
(49) An effective resolution regime should minimise the costs of the resolution of a failing CCP borne by the taxpayers. It should ensure that CCPs can be resolved without jeopardising financial stability. The loss and position allocation tools achieve that objective by ensuring that shareholders and counterparties who are among the creditors of the failing CCP suffer appropriate losses and bear an appropriate part of the costs arising from the failure of the CCP. The loss and position allocation tools therefore give shareholders and counterparties of CCPs a stronger incentive to monitor the health of a CCP during normal circumstances in accordance with the recommendations of the Financial Stability Board21 . __________________ 21 http://www.fsb.org/wp- content/uploads/r_141015.pdf
Amendment 260 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 51
Recital 51
(51) Where the loss and position allocation tools are applied with the objective of restoring the viability of the failing CCP to enable it to continue to operate as a going concern, the resolution should be accompanied by replacement of management, except where retention of management is appropriate and necessary for the achievement of the resolution objectives, and a subsequent restructuring of the CCP and its activities in a way that addresses the reasons for its failure. That restructuring should be achieved through the implementation of a business reorganisation plan, which should be compatible with the restructuring plan that the CCP might be required to submit pursuant to the State aid framework.
Amendment 262 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 60
Recital 60
Amendment 275 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 26
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 26
(26) 'extraordinary public financial support' means State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, or any other public financial support at supra- national level, which, if provided for at national level, would constitute State aid, that is provided in order to preserve or restore the viability, liquidity or solvency of a CCP or of a group of which such a CCP forms part;
Amendment 327 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1
Article 9 – paragraph 1
1. CCPs shall draw up and maintain a recovery plan providing for measures to be taken in order to restore their financial position following a significant deterioration of their financial situation or a risk of breaching their prudential requirements under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. At least once a year CCPs shall be stress tested.
Amendment 450 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – point d
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support;
Amendment 461 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e
Article 22 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e
(e) the CCP requires extraordinary public financial support.
Amendment 503 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 a (new)
Article 27 a (new)
Article 27a The possibility to compensate CCP participants shall not apply to their contractually committed losses in the default management or recovery phases.