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Activities of Thomas HÄNDEL related to 2013/0253(COD)

Shadow reports (1)

REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council PDF (768 KB) DOC (494 KB)
2016/11/22
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2013/0253(COD)
Documents: PDF(768 KB) DOC(494 KB)

Amendments (24)

Amendment 156 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 28
(28) Liquidation of a failing institution under normal insolvency proceedings could jeopardise financial stability, interrupt the provision of essential services, and affect the protection of depositors. In such a case there is a public interest in applying resolution tools. The objectives of resolution should therefore be to ensure the continuity of essential financial services, to maintain the stability of the financial system, to reduce moral hazard by minimising reliance on public financial support to failing institutions, and to protect depositors and to contribute to sustainable and balanced economic growth.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 157 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29
(29) However, the winding up of an insolvent institution through normal insolvency proceedings should always be considered before a decision could be taken to maintain the institution as a going concern. An insolvent institution shouldmay be maintained as a going concern for financial stability purposes and with the use, to the extent possible, of private funds. That may be achieved either through sale to or merger with a private sector purchaser, or after having written down the liabilities of the institution, or after having converted its debt to equity in order to do a recapitalisation.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 158 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29 a (new)
(29a) The current economic crisis was largely caused by the financial industry where many actors have become too-big- to fail and had to be bailed-out with public funds. In contrast to any market- economy logic, losses were socialised and profits privatised. It needs to be recalled that the key role of financial institutions is to channel savings into productive investments. With the invention of various toxic financial instruments and dubious business practices, which for example set exorbitantly high profit targets, this role has been squeezed out to the benefit of short-term profit maximisation with limited added value for the society. It is therefore imperative to reduce the financial sector to its core functions. Hence, institutions that have reached a size and level of interconnectedness which is likely to pose a systemic threat to the functioning of the economies of single Member States or the EU as a whole should be resolved as this will in the long term lead to more balanced and sustainable growth.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 161 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31
(31) The limitations on the rights of shareholders and creditors should comply with Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The resolution tools should therefore be applied only to those institutions that are failing or likely to fail, and only when it is necessary to pursue the objective of financial stability in the general interest. In particular, resolution tools should be applied where the institution cannot be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings without destabilizing the financial system and the measures are necessary in order to en or to institutions that have reached a critical size, and only when it is necessary to pursure the rapid transfer and continuation of systemically important functions and where there is no reasonable prospect for any alternative private solution, including any increase of capital by the existing shareholders or by any third party sufficient to restore the full viability of the institutionobjective of financial stability and sustainable and balanced economic growth in the general interest.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 162 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 32
(32) Interference with property rights should not be disproportionate and should always be in line with the protection of the general public interest. As a consequence, affected shareholders and creditors should not incur greater losses than those which they would have incurred had the institution been wound up at the time that the resolution decision is taken. In the event of partial transfer of assets of an institution under resolution to a private purchaser or to a bridge institution, the residual part of the institution under resolution should be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings. In order to protect existing shareholders and creditors of the institution during the winding up proceedings, they should be entitled to receive in payment of their claims not less than what it is estimated they would have recovered if the whole institution had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 261 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 20 a (new)
(20a) 'critical size' means the size or interconnectedness of an entity referred to in Article 2 which has reached a level that is in times of crisis beyond the possibility of orderly resolution as any resolution action or orderly insolvency would lead to significant economic disruptions and therefore public bail-out and the socialisation of losses would become unavoidable.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 330 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 4
4. The resolution plan shall provide for the resolution actions which the Commission and the Board may take where an entity referred to in Article 2 or a group meet the conditions for resolution. The resolution plan shall take into consideration a range of scenarios including that the event of failure may be idiosyncratic or may occur at a time of broader financial instability or of system wide events. The resolution plan shall not assume any extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the Fund established in accordance with this Regulation. Where this cannot be guaranteed because an entity has reached or is likely to reach a critical size, the board shall ensure that the entity adapts its business strategy accordingly so that in case of failure or crisis orderly resolution can be achieved.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 370 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 2
2. When drafting a resolution plan for entities referred to in Article 2, the Board shall assess the extent to which such an entity is resolvable in accordance with this Regulation. An entity shall be deemed resolvable if it is feasible and credible for the resolution authority to either liquidate it under normal insolvency proceedings or to resolve it by applying to it the different resolution tools and powers without giving rise to significant adverse consequences for financial systems, including circumstances of broader financial instability or system wide events, of the Member State in which the entity is situated, or other Member States, or the Union and with a view to ensuring the continuity of critical functions carried out by the entity. Entities which have reached a critical size as defined in Article 3 and which are deemed not to be resolvable with the existing tools referred to in Article 19 shall be restructured accordingly. In this case property rights shall be subordinated to the general public interest.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 415 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point a
(a) to ensure the continuity of criticalbasic banking functions;
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 423 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d
(d) to protect depositors covered by Directive 94/19/EC and investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC21. __________________ 21 Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 March 1997 on investor-compensation schemes. OJ L 084, 26.03.1997, p.22.;
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 424 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d a (new)
(da) to contribute to sustainable and balanced economic growth;
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 426 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
When pursuing the above objectives, the Commission and the Board shall seek to avoid the unnecessary destruction of value and to minimise the cominimise the cost of resolution and act in the overall general interest rather than in the interest of sharesholutionders and creditors.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 542 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 5 – introductory part
5. If allone of the conditions established in paragraph 2 areis met, the Board shall recommend to the Commission that the entity be placed under resolution. The recommendation shall include at least the following:
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 554 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 6
6. Having regard to the urgency of the circumstances in the case, the Commission shall decide, on its own initiative or taking into account, if any, the communication referred to in paragraph 1 or the recommendation of the Board referred to in paragraph 5, whether or not to place the entity under resolution, and on the framework of the resolution tools that shall be applied in respect of the entity concerned and of the use of the Fund to support the resolution action. The Commission, on its own initiative, may decide to place an entity under resolution if all the conditions referred to in paragraph 2 are met.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 587 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 a (new)
Article 16 a Resolution of systemic entities of a critical size 1. By way of derogation from Article 16 an entity or a group of entities referred to in Article 2 shall be deemed to be no longer viable if it has reached or is likely to reach a size and level of interconnectedness (critical size) that poses a threat to the economic stability of a single Member State or the Union as a whole. 2. EBA shall be empowered to specify criteria for the critical size of entities. It shall inter alia take into account the following factors: (a) size relative to national and EU GDP; (b) the total value of its assets; (b) leverage; (c) level of interconnectedness; (d) significance of cross-border activities. 3. Once an entity has been identified as having reached the critical size the relevant competent authority shall propose to the board the resolution of the relevant entities. 4. The board shall determine the appropriate resolution tools of Article 19 and the appropriate timeframe for resolution taking into account possible spill-over effects of its action. It shall cooperate closely with the ESRB.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 611 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, an entity referred to in Article 2 or a group shall be deemed to be no longer viable only if bothone of the following conditions areis met:
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 617 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 5
5. The Commission, upon a recommendation of the Board or on its own initiative, shall verify that the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 are met. The Commission shall determine whether the powers to write down or convert capital instruments shall be exercised singly or, following the procedure under Article 16(4) to (7), together with a resolution action.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 627 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 4
4. Subject to paragraph 5, the resolution tools may be applied either separately or together, except for the asset separation tool which may be applied only together with another resolution tool.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 630 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. With regard to systemic entities of a critical size referred to in Art 16a (new) the board may apply either separately or together the resolution tools (a) to (c) of paragraph 2.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 634 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 20 – paragraph 1
The resolution scheme adopted by the Board under Article 16(8) shall establish, in compliance with the decisions of the Commission on the resolution framework under Article 16(6) and with any decision on State aid where applicable by analogy the details of the resolution tools to be applied to the institution under resolution concerning at least the measures referred to in Articles 21(2), 22(2), 23(2) and 24(1) and determine the specific amounts and purposes for which the Fund shall be used. The board shall ensure that resolution tools are applied proportionally. In line with current state aid rules issued by the European Commission on 10.07.2013 the bail-in tool shall always have preference over other resolution tools.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 663 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 3 – point d
(d) liabilities to institutions, excluding entities that are part of the same group, with an original maturity of less than seven days;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 770 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 39 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) a member appointed by the ECB;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 865 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 52 – paragraph 5
5. After hearing the Board, in its plenary session, the Commission shall propose a list of candidates to the Council and the European Parliament for the appointment of the Executive Director and the Deputy Executive Director. The Council shall appoint the Executive Director and the Deputy Executive Director after thearing approval of the European Parliament.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 922 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 65 – paragraph 1
1. In a period no longer than 10 years after the entry into force of this Regulation, the available financial means of the Fund shall reach at least 1% of the amount of total liabilities excluding own funds and covered deposits of all credit institutions authorised in the participating Member States which are guaranteed under Directive 94/19/EC.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON