BETA

13 Amendments of Marie TOUSSAINT related to 2020/2133(INI)

Amendment 1 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
1. Notes that within the EU institutions different legislative measures aimed at preventing conflicts of interest contain varying definitions of the term ‘conflict of interest’; believes therefore that the term should be understood to mean a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has private- capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities; notes, however, that a definition of this kind has an evolving nature and that full transparency does not necessarily guarantee the absence of any conflict of interest, nor does it guarantee public trust; highlights that post- public employment and ‘revolving door’ conflict of interest situations are recurring concerns of a systematic nature and a problem common to institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies across the EU; considers that conflict of interest situations could jeopardise the enforcement of high ethical standards in the EU institutions and agencies, thus compromising their integrity and damaging citizens’ trust in them;
2020/11/25
Committee: JURI
Amendment 20 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
3. Is also of the opinion that for this examination to be complete and accurate, and for the possibility of a conflict of interest to be excluded, information and documents beyond the declaration of financial interests of Commissioner- designates are often essential; stresses in this regard that the future independent EU Ethics Body should be given a right to access a wider range of documents, including from national Parliaments and other elected and executive bodies, as well as tax authorities; considers that the future independent EU ethics body should have the power to request Commissioner- designates and all others falling under its scope to provide sufficiently detailed information in order to allow it to carry out well-reasoned and well-documented assessments;
2020/11/25
Committee: JURI
Amendment 28 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
5. Considers that, given the sophisticated and complex nature of this responsibility, the establishment of a possible conflict of interest should be de- politicised and performed in an independent and systematic way with the assistance of a body with the relevant expertise and experience and with the highest degree of independence in relation to its composition, its budget and its investigatory powers; notes that several similar bodies e.g. in France and Canada dispose of a staff of around 50 persons and several million euro of budget; calls on the Commission and all participating institutions to allocate the future EU ethics body sufficient staff and resources for a professional case-by-case assessment by experts of potential conflicts of interest in particular of Commissioners, Members of Parliament and high-ranking EU officials; considers that most national and EU institutions are not in the position to carry out professional and speedy assessments in each case so far;
2020/11/25
Committee: JURI
Amendment 34 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5 a. Considers in particular that the independence of the future ethics body necessarily implies the power to start investigations on its own initiative; believes in this regard that the ethics body should be equipped with mechanisms designed to facilitate reporting from whistle-blowers, in line with Directive 2019/1937, and to facilitate media reports and access to other legally available information;
2020/11/25
Committee: JURI
Amendment 41 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
6. Considers that for proper expertise to be acquired, the future ethics body should have a permanent, independent and collegiate structurebody, and that its composition could be based either on specific institutional positions, such as that of the President of the Court of Justice, or on the nomination or election of experts by each EU institution; further considers that the composition of the future ethics body should ensure gender equality and involve representatives of the civil society;
2020/11/25
Committee: JURI
Amendment 52 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
7. Recommends therefore that, while fully keeping its competence on the matter, the Committee on Legal Affairs decide on the existence of a conflict of interest after having received a non-binding recommendation by such an independent expert advisory body; body; considers that transparency requires the conclusions of investigations conducted and recommendations formulated by the future ethics body to be public;
2020/11/25
Committee: JURI
Amendment 59 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8
8. Believes furthermore thatthat, in parallel with its advisory functions in relation to potential conflicts of interests of Commissioner- designates, thise future advisoryEU ethics body cshould also be entrusted with the broader task of examining conflicts of interest within the EUuropean institutions and agencies in general, playing, in a complementary and balanced way, on the one hand a preventive role via awareness raising and ethical guidance powers, and on the one hand, and a compliance role on the other.other hand a compliance role; considers in particular that the future ethics body should be granted autonomous investigatory and sanctioning powers as to potential conflicts of interest among Members and staff of EU institutions, bodies’ and agencies; considers that the future body’s mandate should include declarations of interest, declarations of assets, conflicts of interest, revolving door cases, gifts and entertainment as well as lobby transparency rules; considers that the future EU ethics body should unite all responsibilities of the existing ethics bodies in Parliament, Commission and all other participating EU institutions, bodies and agencies and replace them to avoid conflicts and to further consolidate the implementation of the respective rules striving for the highest ethical standards;
2020/11/25
Committee: JURI
Amendment 65 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8 a. Notes that the most acute challenges in the implementation of present rules for Members and staff of EU institutions, bodies and agencies exist as regards the management of disclosure requirements, as regards revolving-door cases and the management of conflicts of interest due to side-activities and memberships; Calls on the Commission to design the future EU ethics body as the competent instance for the substantial harmonisation and the centralised enforcement of the rules on transparency, ethics and conflicts of interest applicable to the staff of EU institutions, bodies and agencies, in order to more efficiently tackle the issue the ‘revolving doors’ and generally increase the level of transparency and integrity among Members and staff of EU institutions;
2020/11/25
Committee: JURI
Amendment 73 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 b (new)
8 b. Considers that the future ethics body could make use of its future powers to start an independent investigation on the links between the European Commission and among others the ‘Big Four’ audit, consultancy and accountancy companies, in order to avoid potential conflict of interests;
2020/11/25
Committee: JURI
Amendment 74 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 c (new)
8 c. Believes that the ethics body should also be entrusted with the duty of examining conflicts of interests within the European institutions and with expert groups, advisory, facilitator and research bodies, playing a preventive role to avoid any conflicts of interests; considers that the ethics body should act as a guarantor of the general interest, especially regarding the implementation of the Green Deal, and should thus put in place particularly strong requirements when examining conflicts of interest involving fossil fuels companies;
2020/11/25
Committee: JURI
Amendment 77 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 d (new)
8 d. Calls for the establishment of a meaningful cooling-off period before joining EU institutions or bodies after a transition from a private company linked to the fossil fuels sector, and for a similar cooling-off period before joining a private company linked to the fossil fuels sector after a transition from the EU institutions or bodies; considers that the participation of fossil fuel companies and their representatives in EU policy-making activities should be strictly limited and subject to demanding monitoring requirements by the ethics body; underlines that the participation of fossil fuel companies or their representatives to advisory, facilitator or research body should not lead to any benefits for those companies, which could be considered as a conflict of interests; calls for full transparency regarding all meetings between fossil fuels companies or their representatives and public institutions and representatives; calls for a ban of events organized by fossil fuels companies or their representatives inside European institutions; recalls that BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell and Total collectively account for 7.4 % of global greenhouse gas emissions between 1988 and 20151a; further recalls that these companies spent 123,3 million euros between 2010 and 2018 to put pressure on the various European institutions, whereas their 13 lobbying companies have estimated their contribution at an additional 128 million euros; _________________ 1a https://corporateeurope.org/en/2019/10/bi g-oil-and-gas-buying-influence-brussels.
2020/11/25
Committee: JURI
Amendment 80 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 e (new)
8 e. Considers that companies convicted for environmental crimes should not be allowed to benefit from any of the measures foreseen for registrants into the transparency register; suggests, to this end, to revise the scope and the code of conduct of the transparency register in order to include provisions on the removal from it of companies convicted for environmental crimes;
2020/11/25
Committee: JURI
Amendment 82 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 f (new)
8 f. Calls on all EU institutions to make meetings of their staff working on policy drafting or policy implementation with interest representatives conditional upon their inscription in the EU Transparency Register;
2020/11/25
Committee: JURI