Activites

• 1996/07/08 Final act published in Official Journal
• 1996/06/18 Debate in Parliament
  • Debate in Parliament
  • T4-0332/1996 summary

    The European Parliament adopted the report by Mr Karl von WOGAU (PPE, D) on the exchange rate relations in the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union between the Member States to which a derogation applies and those to which it does not ('pre-in' and 'in'). *As regards stability: the EP emphasized importance of monetary relations which are as stable as possible between the countries participating and those not yet participating in the single currency, relations which will be feasible only if all pursue a credible and sound economic, financial and monetary policy and if they deal with their exchange rate policies as a joint problem. Accordingly, from the start of Monetary Union, the doctrine of stability which is already fundamental to the Treaty must be developed on the basis of the convergence criteria in order to deal with all short-term economic developments without endangering monetary stability. Nonetheless, any such development must be based on a differentiated approach to public spending, with a clear distinction being made between current expenditure and investment expenditure, so as to allow for public investment in areas where private sector investment is likely to be insufficient. *As regards the future exchange rate mechanism: the EP takes the view that the devising of a monetary system must meet a series of criteria: it must - use the euro as an anchor for those currencies which do not participate in the single currency area from the outset, - be simple, transparent and flexible, - have broad margins of fluctuation fixed by collective decision, - provide for the possibility for those Member States which so desire to fix narrower margins so as to take account of better performances as regards convergence, - provide for intervention mechanisms aimed at neutralizing speculative pressure. * As regards interventions: The future European Central Bank should have the right to engage in negotiations with a view to facilitating rapid and flexible realignment and in such way as to ensure that the system operates smoothly. The extension powers of the ECB would be balanced by a suitable mechanism to ensure democratic accountability, central to which is the European Parliament. Interventions in support of currencies experiencing difficulties would be automatic when a currency reached its fluctuation margins and possible before it did so, provided that such measures were justified by fundamental economic factors and their volume did not run counter to the objective of price stability. With regard to the EP, it is essential for the guidelines both for the strengthening of convergence and for the future exchange rate mechanism to be drawn up before the end of 1996 in order to ensure that the preparatory work for the transition to EMU is fully credible and consistent. �

• 1996/06/05 Committee referral announced in Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
• 1996/05/30 Vote in committee, 1st reading/single reading
  • A4-0186/1996
• 1995/12/15 Non-legislative basic document published
  • CSE(1995)2108 summary

    OBJECTIVE: to adopt certain general guidelines in order to define the nature of future exchange relations between Member States participating and Member States not participating in EMU. CONTENT: the Commission concludes its interim report to the European Council by pointing out that, according to the Treaty, as long as there are Member States which are not taking part in the third stage of EMU, there will be an exchange agreement between these Member States and the Member States taking part. Reaching a consensus on the main features of this agreement would help to reduce uncertainty and stabilize the market. An exchange agreement between the monetary union and the non-participating countries should help to prevent excessive fluctuations in exchange rates between the single currency and the other currencies in the Community which would affect trade. Under this measure, exchange rate stability could be considered essential for the single market to realize all its potential in terms of efficiency and growth. An exchange agreement would foster the adoption of policies geared to stability in non-participating countries and would boost their credibility and increase exchange rate stability. An exchange agreement between the single currency and the non-participating currencies should be defined on the basis of the following principles: - the exchange agreement should provide a framework in which non-participating countries can prepare for full membership of EMU; - the exchange agreement should not upset the markets or hamper the application of the single monetary policy; - the agreement should be credible and viable and should be seen as such by the markets. It should also help to foster expectations of stability; - the agreement should be a Community mechanism, i.e. designed and managed within a Community framework (ESCB, Council, Commission).�

Documents

• Non-legislative basic document published: CSE(1995)2108
• Committee report tabled for plenary, single reading: A4-0186/1996
• Debate in Parliament: Debate in Parliament
• Decision by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading: T4-0332/1996

History

(these mark the time of scraping, not the official date of the change)