Procedure completed
| Role | Committee | Rapporteur | Shadows |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lead | ECON | MCCARTHY Arlene (S&D) | PIETIKÄINEN Sirpa (PPE), KLINZ Wolf (ALDE), BESSET Jean-Paul (Verts/ALE), SWINBURNE Kay (ECR), MATIAS Marisa (GUE/NGL) |
| Opinion | JURI | THEIN Alexandra (ALDE) | |
| Opinion | LIBE | BOZKURT Emine (S&D) |
Legal Basis TFEU 083-p2
Activites
- 2014/06/12 Final act published in Official Journal
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2014/04/16
Final act signed
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2014/04/16
End of procedure in Parliament
- #3309
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2014/04/14
Council Meeting
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2014/04/14
Act adopted by Council after Parliament's 1st reading
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2014/02/04
Results of vote in Parliament
- Results of vote in Parliament
- Debate in Parliament
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T7-0057/2014
summary
The European Parliament adopted by 618 votes to 20, with 43 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation. Parliament adopted its position at first reading following the ordinary legislative procedure. The amendments adopted in plenary are the result of an agreement reached between the European Parliament and the Council. They amended the proposal as follows: Criminal offences: in order to ensure the integrity of financial markets in the Union and to enhance investor protection and confidence in those markets, Member States should take the necessary measures to ensure that insider dealing, recommending or inducing another person to engage in insider dealing constitute criminal offences at least in serious cases and when committed intentionally. Criminal penalties for natural persons: Member States should take the necessary measures to ensure that the following offences are punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least four years: (1) Insider dealing, recommending or inducing another person to engage in insider dealing: Insider dealing arises where a person possesses inside information and uses that information by acquiring or disposing of, for his own account or the account of a third party, either directly or indirectly, financial instruments to which that information relates. The use of inside information by cancelling or amending an order concerning a financial instrument to which the information relates where the order was placed before the person concerned possessed the inside information, shall also be considered as insider dealing. (2) Market manipulation: market manipulation shall comprise the following activities: entering into a transaction, placing an order to trade or any other behaviour which: (i) gives false or misleading signals as to the supply of, demand for, or price of, a financial instrument or a related spot commodity contract; or (ii) secures the price of one or several financial instruments or a related spot commodity contract at an abnormal or artificial level; adopting any other behaviour which manipulates the calculation of a benchmark such as EURIBOR and LIBOR benchmarks for interbank lending rates by a number of banks. Member States should take the necessary measures to ensure that the offences relating to the unlawful disclosure of inside information are punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least two years. Sanctions for legal persons: Member States should take the necessary measures to ensure that a legal person held liable pursuant to the Directive is subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, which shall include criminal or non-criminal fines and may include other sanctions, such as: exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid; temporary or permanent disqualification from the practice of commercial activities; placing under judicial supervision; judicial winding-up; temporary or permanent closure of establishments which have been used for committing the offence. Jurisdiction: Member States should take the necessary measures to establish their jurisdiction over the offences referred to in Articles 3 (insider dealing) and 5 (inciting, aiding and abetting, and attempt) where the offence has been committed: (a) in whole or in part within their territory; or (b) by one of their nationals, at least in cases where the act is an offence where it was committed. Training: Member States should request those responsible for the training of judges, prosecutors, police, judicial and those competent authorities' staff involved in criminal proceedings and investigations to provide appropriate training with respect to the objectives of this Directive. This Directive should be applied taking into account the legal framework established by the Regulation on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) [MAR] and its implementing measures.
- #3195
- 2012/10/25 Council Meeting
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2012/10/19
Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading
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A7-0344/2012
summary
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted the report by Arlene McCARTHY (S&D, UK) on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation. The committee recommends that the position of the European Parliament in first reading following the ordinary legislative procedure should amend the commission proposal as follows: Subject matter and scope: Members consider that the Directive should ensure the integrity of financial markets in the Union and enhance investor protection and confidence in those markets. It should also apply to interest rates, currencies, benchmarks, inter bank offer rates, indexes and types of financial instruments, including any derivative contracts or derivative instruments, which derive their value from the value of interest rates, currencies or indexes. Insider dealing and market manipulation: since many financial instruments are priced by reference to benchmarks, it necessary to complement the general prohibition of insider dealing and market manipulation by prohibiting the manipulation of the benchmark itself and any transmission of false or misleading information, provision of false or misleading inputs, or any other action that manipulates the calculation of a benchmark, including the benchmark's methodology. The mere transmission of false or misleading information relating to an interbank offer rate or other benchmark should be covered by the definition of market manipulation. Criminal sanctions: Members consider that the imposition of criminal sanctions for the most serious market abuses will have an increased deterrent effect on potential offenders. To ensure that sanctions have a dissuasive effect on the public at large, they shall, where appropriate, be published, without undue delay, including at least information on the type and nature of the crime and the identity of persons responsible for it, unless such publication would seriously jeopardise the stability of financial markets. Where publication would cause disproportionate damage to the parties involved, competent authorities shall publish the measures and sanctions on an anonymous basis. The criminal offences referred to in the directive should be punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of between two and five years, depending on the offence committed. In assessing the proportionality of sanctions, Member States shall take into account the profits made or losses avoided by the persons held liable as well as the damage resulting from the offence to other persons and, where applicable, the damage to the functioning of markets or the wider economy. Disclosure of information in the media: Members consider that where information is disclosed or disseminated for the purpose of journalism, such disclosure or dissemination of information should be assessed taking into account the rules governing the freedom of expression, the freedom and pluralism of the media and the rules or codes governing the journalist profession. Jurisdiction: in order to ensure effective prosecution of cross-border cases, Member States should take the necessary measures to establish their jurisdiction over offences, where the offence has been committed in whole or in part within their territory or for the benefit of a natural or legal person residing or established in the territory of a Member State. Member States should also take the necessary measures to ensure that law enforcement and judicial authorities or other services responsible for investigating offences have sufficient resources and are appropriately trained.
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A7-0344/2012
summary
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2012/10/09
Vote in committee, 1st reading/single reading
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2012/05/24
Referral to associated committees announced in Parliament
- #3162
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2012/04/26
Council Meeting
-
3162
summary
The Council reached a partial general approach on a directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation ("market abuse directive"). The partial general approach serves as a base for future discussion on the draft directive. It concerns in particular provisions on "inciting, aiding and abetting, and attempt" (Art. 5), "criminal sanctions" (Art. 6), "liability of legal persons" (Art. 7), "sanctions for legal persons" (Art. 8) and the report on the application of the directive (Art. 9). During the discussions, some delegations expressed the necessity that the directive should also approximate the types and levels of penalties, while some other delegations opposed to this view. The proposed compromise establishes that by four years after the entry into force of the directive, the European Commission shall report on the application of the directive and, if necessary, on the need to review it, including with regard to the appropriateness of introducing common minimum rules on types and levels of criminal sanctions. Since many elements in the draft directive depend directly or indirectly from the content of other instruments (in particular the regulation on insider dealing and market manipulation - "MAR"), the Council will await the result of the discussions in the preparatory bodies to properly address the remaining parts (Articles 1 to 4). It has to be noted that the partial general approach does not prejudice further discussions on such remaining parts and may in the future need further elaboration if necessary, before enter into negotiations with the European Parliament, co-legislator in this matter.
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3162
summary
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2011/11/15
Committee referral announced in Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
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2011/10/20
Legislative proposal published
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COM(2011)0654
summary
PURPOSE: to lay down minimum rules on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation.PROPOSED ACT: Directive of the European Parliament and the Council.BACKGROUND: adopted in early 2003, the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) 2003/6/EC introduced a comprehensive framework to tackle insider dealing and market manipulation practices, jointly referred to as "market abuse". However, experience has shown that the objective of the Directive, to increase investor confidence and market integrity, has not been achieved. The report by the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU recommended that a sound prudential and conduct of business framework for the financial sector must rest on strong supervisory and sanctioning regimes. To this end, the Group considers that supervisory authorities must be equipped with sufficient powers to act and should be able to rely on equal, strong and deterrent sanctions regimes against all financial crimes, sanctions which should be enforced effectively. However, the High-Level Group considers that none of these is currently in place" and Member States sanctioning regimes are regarded as in general weak and heterogeneous. The Commission has published a Communication with regard to sanction regimes in the financial sector. It concluded that the Commission will assess whether the introduction of criminal sanctions, and the establishment of minimum rules on the definition of criminal offences and sanctions may prove to be essential in order to ensure the effective implementation of EU financial services legislationFollowing the approach set out in the Communication of 20 September 2011 "Towards an EU criminal policythe Commission considers that minimum rules on criminal offences and on criminal sanctions for market abuse, which would be transposed into national criminal law and applied by the criminal justice systems of the Member States, can contribute to ensuring the effectiveness of this Union policy. IMPACT ASSESSMENT: the Commission conducted an impact assessment of policy alternatives. Policy options related to criminal sanctions were considered as part of this preparatory work. One of the problems identified in the impact assessment is the fact that the sanctions currently in place to fight market abuse offences are lacking impact and are insufficiently dissuasive, which results in ineffective enforcement of the Directive. In addition, the definition of which insider dealing or market manipulation offences constitute criminal offences diverges considerably from Member State to Member State. For example, five Member States do not provide for criminal sanctions for disclosure of inside information by primary insiders and eight Member States do not do so for secondary insiders.Since market abuse can be carried out across borders, this divergence undermines the internal market and leaves a certain scope for perpetrators of market abuse to carry such abuse in jurisdictions which do not provide for criminal sanctions for a particular offence. The impact assessment concluded that requiring Member States to introduce criminal sanctions for the most serious market abuse offences was essential to ensure the effective implementation of the Union policy on market abuse. LEGAL BASIS: Article 83 (2) of the TFEU.CONTENT: proposals to strengthen and ensure the coherence of administrative sanctions are included in the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on insider dealing and market manipulationthat also intends to remedy other major problems in the existing system.This proposal lays down a requirement for Member States to provide for minimum rules on the definition of the most serious market abuse offences and on minimum levels of criminal sanctions attached to them. The main points are as follows:Criminal offences: two forms of market abuse conduct, namely insider dealing and market manipulation, should be regarded as criminal offences if committed intentionally. The attempt to commit insider dealing and market manipulation should also be punishable as a criminal offence. The offence relating to inside information should apply to persons who possess inside information of which they know that it is inside information. The offence relating to market manipulation is applicable to anybody.Inciting, aiding and abetting and attempt: the proposal provides that inciting as well as aiding and abetting the defined criminal offences are also punishable in Member States. The attempt to commit one of the offences defined in the Directive is also covered, with the exception of improper disclosure of inside information and dissemination of information which gives false or misleading signals, as it does not seem appropriate to define attempts to commit these offences as criminal offences. Criminal sanctions: the proposal requires Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure that the criminal offences identified in the text are subject to criminal sanctions. These sanctions should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Liability of legal persons: the proposal requires Member States to ensure that legal persons can be held liable for the criminal offences defined in the directive. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS: the proposal has no implications for the Union budget.
- DG {'url': 'http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/internal_market/', 'title': 'Internal Market and Services'}, BARNIER Michel
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COM(2011)0654
summary
Documents
- Legislative proposal published: COM(2011)0654
- Debate in Council: 3162
- Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading: A7-0344/2012
- Debate in Council: 3195
- Results of vote in Parliament: Results of vote in Parliament
- Debate in Parliament: Debate in Parliament
- Decision by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading: T7-0057/2014
- : Directive 2014/57
- : OJ L 173 12.06.2014, p. 0179
| Amendments | Dossier |
| 82 |
2011/0297(COD)
2012/05/10
JURI
12 amendments...
Amendment 10 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – point 1 a (new) 1a. The definitions provided in Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No... of the European Parliament and the Council on insider dealing and market manipulation shall also apply to this Directive.
Amendment 11 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – point 2 2. ‘Inside information’ means information within the meaning of Article 6(1)(a) to 6(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) No
Amendment 12 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – introductory part Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the following conduct constitutes a criminal offence, when committed intentionally by a natural person:
Amendment 13 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – introductory part Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the following conduct constitutes a criminal offence, when committed intentionally or through gross negligence:
Amendment 14 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – point a (a) when
Amendment 15 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – point b (b) when the person concerned is in possession of inside information and knows that the information is inside information, disclosing inside information to any other person, unless such disclosure is made in the lawful course of the exercise of duties resulting from employment or profession.
Amendment 16 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – point b a (new) (ba) when the person concerned is in possession of inside information and knows that the information is inside information, recommending or inducing another person, on the basis of inside information, to acquire or dispose of financial instruments to which that information relates.
Amendment 17 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 1 a (new) Points (a) and (ba) of paragraph 1 shall not apply unless the inside information had a material influence on the decision of the person concerned to acquire or dispose of the financial instruments or to recommend or induce another person to do so.
Amendment 18 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the following conduct constitutes a criminal offence,
Amendment 7 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 1 (1) An integrated and efficient financial market and stronger investor confidence requires market integrity. The smooth functioning of securities markets and public confidence in markets are prerequisites for economic growth and wealth. Market abuse harms the integrity of financial markets and public confidence in securities and derivatives.
Amendment 8 #
Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 1 1. This Directive establishes minimum rules for criminal sanctions for the most serious market abuse offences, namely insider dealing and market manipulation. This Directive shall only apply to transactions, orders or behaviours which would fall within Regulation (EU) No. ... of the European Parliament and the Council on insider dealing and market manipulation and which would be prohibited under that Regulation.
Amendment 9 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – point 1 source: PE-489.433
2012/06/05
LIBE
15 amendments...
Amendment 10 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 12 a (new) (12a) In order for the sanctions for the offences referred to in Articles 3 and 4 to be effective and dissuasive, a minimum of the maximum term of imprisonment should be set in this Directive.
Amendment 11 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 13 a (new) (13a) Member States should fully respect the ne bis in idem and the favor rei principles and ensure that if an administrative sanction has already been applied, no criminal sanction shall be applied in relation to the same facts, in case the administrative and the criminal sanctions are of the same nature.
Amendment 12 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 14 a (new) (14a) Member States should take the necessary measures to ensure that law enforcement and judicial authorities or other services responsible for investigating or prosecuting the offences referred to in Articles 3 and 4 are appropriately trained. Member States should take the necessary measures to ensure that effective investigative tools are available for law enforcement and judicial authorities or other services responsible for investigating or prosecuting the offences referred to in Articles 3 and 4.
Amendment 13 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 16 a (new) (16a) Every conviction imposed according to this Directive should be promptly made public and include at least information on the type and nature of the offence, of the sanction and the identity of the convicted natural or legal person, to the extent that this would not seriously jeopardise the stability of financial markets or cause disproportionate damage to the parties involved.
Amendment 14 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 17 (17)
Amendment 15 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 17 a (new) (17a) In order to ensure effective prosecution of cross-border cases, Member States should take the necessary measures to establish their jurisdiction over the offences referred to in Articles 3 and 4, where the offence has been committed in whole or in part within their territory or for the benefit of a natural or legal person residing or established in the territory of a Member State.
Amendment 16 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 19 (19) The Commission should assess the implementation of this Directive in the Member States, also with a view to assessing a possible future need for introducing minimum harmonisation of the types and levels of criminal sanctions. In particular, the Commission should seek to obtain information on the cross-border nature of many of the transactions constituting an offence according to this Directive, thus strengthening the implementation of the subsidiarity principle.
Amendment 17 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – point 2 a (new) 2a. ‘Spot commodity contract’ means any contract as defined in point (5) of Article 5(10) of Regulation (EU) No...of the European Parliament and the Council on insider dealing and market manipulation shall also apply to this Directive.
Amendment 18 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – point 2 b (new) 2b. ‘Emission allowance’ means a financial instrument as defined in point (11) of Section C of Annex I of Directive 2012/.../EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of [...] on the market in financial instruments.
Amendment 19 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that inciting, aiding and abetting and attempting to commit the criminal offences referred to in Articles 3 and 4 are punishable as criminal offences.
Amendment 20 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that criminal offences referred to in Articles 3
Amendment 21 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 a (new) Article 8a Jurisdiction Member States shall take the necessary measures to establish their jurisdiction over the offences referred to in Articles 3 and 4, where : (a) the offence has been committed in whole or in part within their territory; or (b) the offence has been committed for the benefit of a natural or a legal person residing or established in the territory of a Member State.
Amendment 22 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 b (new) Amendment 23 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 c (new) Article 8c Training and investigative tools 1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that law enforcement and judicial authorities or other services responsible for investigating or prosecuting the offences referred to in Articles 3 and 4 are appropriately trained. 2. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that effective investigative tools are available for law enforcement and judicial authorities or other services responsible for investigating or prosecuting the offences referred to in Articles 3 and 4.
Amendment 9 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 7 (7) Not all Member States have provided for criminal sanctions for some forms of serious breaches of national legislation implementing Directive 2003/6/EC. These different approaches undermine the uniformity of conditions of operation in the internal market and may provide an incentive for persons to carry out market abuse in Member States which do not provide for criminal sanctions for these offences. In addition, until now there has been no Union-wide understanding on which conduct is considered to be such a serious breach. Therefore, minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences committed by natural and legal persons and of sanctions should be set. Common minimum rules would make it also possible to use more effective methods of investigation and effective cooperation within and between Member States. In light of the aftermath of the financial crisis, it has been evident that market manipulation has a potential for widespread damage on the lives of millions of people. The absence of harmonised criminal sanctions is rightly seen by citizens as creating an environment of impunity where market manipulators can thrive, taking advantage of a borderless market while operating from jurisdiction that are not prosecuting them or have deficient penal frameworks in dealing with these matters. In turn, this creates reasons for an increased societal perception of corruption, with its subsequent pernicious effects on the legitimacy of institutions. Convictions for market abuse offences under criminal law often result in extensive media coverage, which helps to deter potential offenders, as it draws public attention to the commitment of competent authorities to tackling market abuse.
source: PE-490.975
2012/07/13
ECON
55 amendments...
Amendment 10 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 9 (9) In order for the scope of this Directive to be aligned with that of Regulation (EU) No…of the European Parliament and the Council on insider dealing and market manipulation, trading in own shares and other financial instruments for stabilisation and buy-back programmes, as well as transactions, orders or behaviours carried out for the purposes of monetary and public debt management activities and activities concerning emission allowances in pursuit of the Union's climate policy, should be exempt from this Directive.
Amendment 11 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 9 a (new) (9 a) It is possible for the use of inside information to consist of the acquisition and disposal of financial instruments by a person. Since the acquisition or disposal of financial instruments necessarily involves a prior decision on the part of that person, the carrying out of such acquisition or disposal should not be deemed in itself to constitute the use of inside information.
Amendment 12 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 9 b (new) (9 b) Having access to inside information relating to another company and using it in the context of a public takeover bid for the purpose of gaining control of that company or proposing a merger with that company should not in itself be deemed to constitute insider dealing
Amendment 13 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 9 c (new) (9 c) Research and estimates developed from publicly available data should not be regarded as inside information and, therefore, any transaction carried out on the basis of such research or estimates should not be deemed in itself to constitute insider dealing within the meaning of this Directive.
Amendment 14 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 9 d (new) (9 d) The mere fact that market-makers, bodies authorised to act as counterparties, or persons authorised to execute orders on behalf of third parties with inside information confine themselves, in the first two cases, to pursuing their legitimate business of buying or selling financial instruments or, in the last case, to carrying out an order dutifully, should not in itself be deemed to constitute use of such inside information
Amendment 15 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 11 a (new) (11 a) Deliberate manipulation of financial indexes as LIBOR or EURIBOR should be included in the scope of this legislation, as well as hiding information on the near term future viability of a company before its IPO.
Amendment 16 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 11 b (new) (11 b) Deliberate selling of complex financial products to private investors with no financial experience that may endanger their lifetime saving should be included in the scope of this legislation.
Amendment 17 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 14 (14) In order to ensure effective implementation of the European policy for ensuring the integrity of the financial markets set out in Regulation (EU) No…of the European Parliament and the Council on insider dealing and market manipulation, Member States should also extend liability to legal persons, including,
Amendment 18 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 18 (18) This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as enshrined in the Treaty. Specifically, it should be applied with due respect for the freedom of expression and information (Article 11), the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16), the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial (Article 47), the presumption of innocence and right of defence (Article 48), the principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties (Article 49), and the right not to be tried or punished twice for the same offence (Article 50). This Directive does not in any way prevent Member States from applying their constitutional rules relating to freedom of the press and freedom of expression in the media as well as self-regulatory instruments which apply to journalistic professions.
Amendment 19 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 18 (18) This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as enshrined in the Treaty. Specifically, it should be applied with due respect for the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16), the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial (Article 47), the presumption of innocence and right of defence (Article 48), the principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties (Article 49), and the right not to be tried or punished twice for the same offence (Article 50). In this respect, Member States should ensure that the same offence is not punished by both criminal and administrative sanctions.
Amendment 20 #
Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 1 1. This Directive establishes minimum rules for criminal sanctions for the most serious market abuse offences, namely insider dealing and market manipulation, to ensure the integrity of financial markets in the Union and to enhance investor protection and confidence in those markets.
Amendment 21 #
Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 1 1. This Directive establishes minimum rules for criminal sanctions for the most serious market abuse offences, namely insider dealing and market manipulation in financial instruments as referred to in Article 2 of the Regulation [MAR].
Amendment 22 #
Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3 a. This Directive shall also apply to interest rates, currencies or indexes and types of financial instruments, including derivative contracts or derivative instruments, which derive their value from the value of interest rates, currencies or indexes.
Amendment 23 #
Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3 a. This Directive shall not apply to information which is disseminated for the purposes of journalism.
Amendment 24 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 1. ‘Financial instrument’ for the purpose of this Directive, and the Market Abuse Regulation [MAR] means any instrument within the meaning of Article 2(1)(8) of Regulation (EU) No…of the European Parliament and the Council on markets in financial instruments (MiFIR); and additionally it includes any inter-bank offer rate, index, benchmark, estimate or indicator used - directly or indirectly - in financial markets, insurance or banking for, or assisting with, pricing, rate-setting, or which has an influence or effect on market participants, supervisors or compliance.
Amendment 25 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 1.
Amendment 26 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 a (new) 1 a. "commodity" means a commodity within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1287/2006.
Amendment 27 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 b (new) 1 b. "spot commodity contract" means any contract for the supply of a commodity traded on a spot market which is promptly delivered when the transaction is settled including any derivative contract that must be settled physically.
Amendment 28 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 c (new) 1 c. "buy-back programme" means trading in own shares in accordance with Articles 19 to 24 of Council Directive 77/91/EEC.
Amendment 29 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2 2. ‘Inside information’ means information within the meaning of Article 6 of Regulation
Amendment 30 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2 a (new) 2 a. "competent authority" means the competent authority designated in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation [MAR].
Amendment 31 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2 b (new) 2 b. "person" means any natural or legal person.
Amendment 32 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – title Insider dealing and improper disclosure of inside information
Amendment 33 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) whe
Amendment 34 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) when in possession of inside information, using that information to acquire or dispose of financial instruments to which that information relates for one's own account or for the account of a third party. This also includes using inside information to cancel or amend an order concerning a financial instrument to which that information relates where that order was placed before entering into possession of that inside information or to influence the value of interest rates, currencies or indexes; or
Amendment 35 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) when in possession of inside information, using that information to
Amendment 36 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) when in possession of inside information, using that information to acquire or dispose of financial instruments to which that information relates for one's own account or for the account of a third party, either directly or indirectly. This also includes using inside information to cancel or amend an order concerning a financial instrument to which that information relates where that order was placed before entering into possession of that inside information; or
Amendment 37 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new) (a a) where a person recommends or induces another person to engage in insider dealing if the person possesses inside information and recommends or induces another person, on the basis of inside information, to acquire or dispose of financial instruments to which that information relates.
Amendment 38 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) where a person possesses inside information and disclos
Amendment 39 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point a (a)
Amendment 4 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 2 (2) Directive 2003/6/EC13
Amendment 40 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) giving, or being likely to give, false or misleading signals as to the supply of, demand for, or price of, a financial instrument or a related spot commodity contract;
Amendment 41 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new) (a a) giving false or misleading information on the value of interest rates, currencies or indexes or otherwise manipulating interest rates, currencies or indexes;
Amendment 42 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new) (a a) securing the value of an index upon which the prices of other financial instruments depend at an abnormal or artificial level;
Amendment 43 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new) (a a) deliberate manipulation of financial indexes by market participants
Amendment 44 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) securing, or being likely to secure, the price of one or several financial instruments or a related spot commodity contract at an abnormal or artificial level;
Amendment 45 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) - it secur
Amendment 46 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point c (c) entering into a transaction, placing an order to trade
Amendment 47 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point c (c) entering into a transaction, placing an order to trade, or any other activity in financial markets affecting or likely to affect the price of one or several financial instruments or a related spot commodity contract, which employs a fictitious device or any other form of deception or contrivance;
Amendment 48 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point c (c) entering into a transaction, placing an order to trade, or any other
Amendment 49 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) disseminati
Amendment 5 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 3 (3) The report by the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU recommended that a sound prudential and conduct of business framework for the financial sector must rest on strong supervisory and sanctioning regimes. To this end, the Group considered that
Amendment 50 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) dissemination of information which, directly or indirectly, gives false or misleading signals as to financial instruments or related spot commodity contracts, where those persons derive, for themselves or another person, an advantage or profit from the dissemination of the information in question or which brings about a concealment.
Amendment 51 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) dissemination of information which gives false or misleading signals as to financial instruments or related spot commodity contracts, where those persons aim at deriv
Amendment 52 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) dissemination of information which gives, or is likely to give, false or misleading signals as to financial instruments or related spot commodity contracts, where those persons derive, for themselves or another person, an advantage or profit from the dissemination of the information in question.
Amendment 53 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new) (d a) Participation in IPO on a financial institution where the management of the firm or the IPO underwriters are aware of near term financial problems which endanger the future viability of the company.
Amendment 54 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point d b (new) (d b) Deliberate selling of complex financial products to private investors with no financial experience that may endanger their lifetime savings.
Amendment 55 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 2 2. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the attempt to commit any of the offences referred to in Articles 3(a) and 4(a), (b), (ba) and (c) is punishable as a criminal offence.
Amendment 56 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 1 Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that legal persons held liable pursuant to Article 7 are punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. In assessing the proportionality of sanctions, Member States shall take into account the profits made or losses avoided by the persons held liable as well as the damage resulting from the offence to other persons and, where applicable, the damage to the functioning of markets or the wider economy.
Amendment 57 #
Proposal for a directive Article 10 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 Member States shall adopt and publish, by [24 months after entry into force of this Directive] at the latest, the laws,
Amendment 58 #
Proposal for a directive Article 10 – paragraph 2 2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this
Amendment 6 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 4 (4) A well-functioning legislative framework on market abuse requires effective enforcement. An evaluation of the national regimes for administrative sanctions under Directive 2003/6/EC showed that not all national competent authorities had a full set of powers at their disposal to ensure that they could respond to market abuses with the appropriate sanction. In particular, not all Member States had pecuniary administrative sanctions available for insider dealing and market manipulation, and the level of these sanctions varied widely among Member States. A new legislative instrument is also needed to ensure uniform rules and clarity of key concepts and to ensure a single rulebook in line with the conclusions of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision.
Amendment 7 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 5 (5) The adoption of administrative sanctions by the Member States has so far proven insufficient to ensure compliance with the rules on preventing and fighting market abuse.
Amendment 8 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 6 a (new) (6 a) The scope of this Directive, and the framing of the prohibitions, is deliberately broad, so as to capture wider behaviour or conduct which may, directly or indirectly, have an effect on financial instruments. It is not necessary for competent authorities to demonstrate the precise link between the misconduct of one or more individuals and the end effect on one or more financial instruments; it is sufficient that there is a relationship, even if indirect, between the abusive behaviour and a financial instrument. For example, the dissemination of false or misleading information relating to an interbank offer rate or other benchmark, as this would be covered as a result of related instruments, such as interest rate swaps, being traded on venues which are within the scope. It would not be necessary for the competent authority to demonstrate that the dissemination of false or misleading information actually had influenced the relevant interbank offer rate or bench mark, or that this actually had influenced the price of a financial instrument; it is enough that these were likely consequences of the dissemination of the false or misleading information. Similarly, the likely impact on the price of a financial instrument should be applied broadly, to encompass not only situations where the transaction or behaviour might influence the price of a traded financial instrument but also, for example, where it might influence the profit or advantage gained on a derivative contract.
Amendment 9 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 7 (7) Not all Member States have provided for criminal sanctions for some forms of serious breaches of national legislation implementing Directive 2003/6/EC. These different approaches undermine the uniformity of conditions of operation in the internal market and may provide an incentive for persons to carry out market abuse in Member States which do not provide for criminal sanctions for these offences. In addition, until now there has been no Union-wide understanding on which conduct is considered to be such a serious breach. Therefore, minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences committed by natural
source: PE-489.420
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