2015/2344(INI) | [ParlTrack]

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Observes that the European Economic and Monetary Union lacks the fundamental requirements of an optimal currency area and the adjustment mechanisms required in order to absorb asymmetric shocks, ~~as the crisis has demonstrated that self-corrective market forces alone cannot be relied on to prevent Member States from becoming over-indebted~~thereby leading to the build-up of unsustainably large macroeconomic imbalances; points out that,as the crisis has demonstrated, in the absence of the self-corrective mechanism of a flexible exchange rate, the weaker euro area economies have to bear disproportionately high costs of adjustment through internal devaluation and fiscal austerity in order to maintain a currency that is overvalued, while stronger economies can benefit from the competitive advantage of an undervalued currency to expand their exports and accumulate large current account surpluses;

Amendment 10 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. ~~Recalls Parliament’s position that~~Believes that the proposal on the establishment of a fiscal capacity should go hand in hand with a proper discussion at the institutional level about the need to provide for democratic withdrawal and opt-out mechanisms for any country that wishes to leave or remain outside the EMU; stresses that any further deepening of European institutional and economic integration ~~is necessary to ensure the st~~should be done on a voluntary basis and following a democratic consultation through a referendum to be held in each Member State, in order to ensure the political and social sustainability of the eEuro~~zone and of the~~pean Union as a whole;

Amendment 11 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Is concerned that the instruments developed in recent years to tackle the crisis ~~are intergovernmental in nature, are not integrated into the Community acquis, and~~ lack democratic oversight and accountability to Parliament;

Amendment 12 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Emphasises that the establishment of a budgetary and fiscal capacity within the eurozone is necessary to complete the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); believes that the stabilisation function of a fiscal capacity is the most feasible of the fiscal policy functions, while a redistribution function could be envisaged in a more integrated polineeds massive permanent fiscal transfers from countries running excessive current account surpluses to economically depressed areas; believes nevertheless that such fiscal capacity based on a more integrated political and economic union is not politically acceptable nor economically efficient; stresses therefore that alternative options, such as an orderly and coordinated break- up of the monetary union, shall be urgently explored in order to protect the EU cooperation from effects of a chaotical and euncon~~omic union~~trolled break-up of the Euro Area;

Amendment 13 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. ~~Emphasises that the establishment of a budgetary and fiscal~~Rejects macroeconomic conditionality for the budgetary capacity ~~with~~in the eurozone is necessary to complete the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); believes that the stabilisation function of a fiscal capacity is the most feasible of the fiscal policy functions, while a redistribution function could be envisaged in a more integrated political and economic unionform of labour market reforms, social security cuts, liberalisation/deregulation and privatisations. Such "structural reforms" deepen the economic crisis and prevent recovery, recognised now even by the IMF;

Amendment 14 #

Ingeborg GRÄSSLE

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. ~~Emphasise~~Considers that the establishment of a budgetary and fiscal capacity within the eurozone ~~is necessary to~~would be a further step towards completeing the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); believes that the stabilisation function of a fiscal capacity is the most feasible of the fiscal policy functions, while a redistribution function cwould ~~be envisaged in a more~~presuppose a fully integrated political and economic union;

Amendment 15 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Stresses that such a capacity should be established as part of the Union budget, outside the multiannual financial framework (MFF), and implemented by the Commission; recalls its position that any fiscal or budgetary capacity developed specifically for the eurozone must be developed within the Union frameworkany proposed budgetary capacity for the eurozone should be delayed until such time as the above examination is complete;

Amendment 16 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. ~~Stress~~Believes that such a capacity should be established as part of the Union budget, outside the multiannual financial framework (MFF), and implemented by the Commission; recalls its position that any fiscal or budgetary capacity developed specifically for the eurozone must be developed within the Union frameworkMember States could accept an European fiscal capacity only after public consultation in every Member State with a referendum;

Amendment 17 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6 a. Emphasises that whatever recommendations emerge from the above examination must be considered, even if this means a new Treaty and a new direction for the entire EU;

Amendment 18 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 b (new)

6 b. Points out that the Eurozone has an internal problem with competitiveness, i.e. the gap between Germany and the rest. This cannot be addressed by a fiscal capacity alone but must be addressed primarily by Germany (through strong nominal wage growth/public investment spending) or if not, then given that this is contributing to the eurozone macroeconomic imbalance, the Commission and the Council need to consider practical measures to assist Germany in correcting this imbalance; this would have the added bonus of reducing the need for permanent transfers and allow Member States to finance temporary deficits via domestic saving;

Amendment 19 #

Patricija ŠULIN, Tomáš ZDECHOVSKÝ

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 c (new)

6 c. Points out that any budgetary capacity needs a strong focus on public investment, aiming at social and economic goals, e.g. full employment, social and regional convergence;

Amendment 2 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Observes that the European Economic and Monetary Union lacks the fiscal or budgetary adjustment mechanism required in order to absorb asymmetric shocks, as the crisis has demonstrated that self-corrective market forces alone cannot be relied on to prevent Member States from becoming over- indebted;

Amendment 20 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 d (new)

6 d. Points out that regarding financing, the budgetary capacity needs to be included in the EU budget. Possible sources of financing could be measures against tax avoidance and evasion or national wealth levies.

Amendment 3 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1 a. Observes that since the launch of the euro currency, five eurozone countries (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Cyprus) have had to enter rescue programmes, with at least one other major economy, Italy, on the brink;

Amendment 4 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1 b. Observes additionally that since the launch of the euro currency, the debt/GDP ratio of all eurozone countries has escalated, in most cases well beyond what had been formerly been seen as the redline 80% level;

Amendment 5 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 c (new)

1 c. Observes also that even of those countries that followed all the rules, some – Finland especially – are now nevertheless also facing major economic challenges, challenges in which they too, because of the lack of the requisite country-specific tools in a common currency, find themselves stymied in the corrective measures they can take;

Amendment 6 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 d (new)

1 d. Observes that in the case of Ireland and Greece especially, the ECB stretched (at least) its official remit, in Ireland's case by forcing the government to fully bail out even non-systemic banks, including full payment (with full coupon) on even unsecured unguaranteed bonds, an act which now sees the Central Bank of Ireland now destroying borrowed billions every year;

Amendment 7 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. ~~Considers that, as illustrated by the crisis, a common currency cannot~~ Stresses that further fiscal, economic and political integration necessarily entails further loss of fiscal, economic and political sovereignty, therelby ~~solely on a central bank to control the money supply, without further fiscal, economic and political integration~~depriving Member States of the democratic control over fundamental macroeconomic policy instruments strongly believes that respecting the national sovereignty on monetary and fiscal policy is the only way to ensure that Member States have the economic and political power to react in times of crisis;

Amendment 8 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Considers that, as illustrated by the crisis, the euro has failed as a common currency can~~not rely sole~~d thus the entire exercise needs to be fully, o~~n a central bank to control the money supply, without further fiscal, economic and political integration~~bjectively and independently examined with a view to either a) scrapping the whole idea or b) reducing the number of countries in the eurozone to those whose economies are suited to a common currency;

Amendment 9 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

~~3. Recalls Parliament’s position that deepening European economic integration is necessary to ensure the stability of the eurozone and of the Union as a whole;~~deleted

source: 584.158

2016/06/09 BUDG, ECON 1021 amendments...

Amendment 1 #

Motion for a resolution
Heading 1

on a budgetary capacity for the Eeuro~~zone~~ area

Amendment 1 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Points out that ~~the success of the eurozon~~meeting the expectations of the people of Europe is dependent on increasing the welfare of all ~~its~~ citizens, and on well- functioning labour markets and welfare systems, based on decent work with rights, a strong role for the social partners, social dialogue, collective bargaining and collective agreements, and preventing individual Member States from trying to gain an unfair competitive advantage by infringing workers’ rights or promoting social dumping;

Amendment 1 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph -1 (new)

-1. Recalls that, although still a young currency and despite having experienced a serious crisis over recent years, the euro is solidly established as a global reserve currency;

Amendment 10 #

Neoklis SYLIKIOTIS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Fabio DE MASI

Motion for a resolution
Citation 4

~~– having regard to the McDougall report (1977),~~deleted

Amendment 10 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Points out that the success of the eurozone is dependent on increasing the welfare of all its citizens, and on well- functioning labour markets and welfare systems, based on decent work with rights, a strong role for the social partners, social dialogue, collective bargaining and collective agreements, and preventing individual Member States from trying to gain an unfair competitive advantage by infringing workers’ rights or,by promoting social dumping, by dismantling collective agreements, or by lowering the workers' social protection;

Amendment 10 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Believes that the euro crisis ~~enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be progressive~~has shown that the EMU is not functioning, and calls, to that end, for the current Monetary Union not to be continued or supposedly completed;

Amendment 100 #

Dariusz ROSATI, Siegfried MUREŞAN, Jan OLBRYCHT

Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)

Ga. whereas the euro area lacks a fiscal instrument capable of upholding the strategic priorities which the euro area shares with the European Union, i.e. the priorities of the Europe 2020 Strategy, together with a reduction in inequalities of income and wealth, the recovery of internal consumption, and the energy transition;

Amendment 101 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)

Ga. whereas some Member States dramatically lack the willingness to implement the Country Specific Recommendations, given on the yearly basis by the Commission, and, hence, undermine the economic growth that the EU currently strives for;

Amendment 102 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)

Ga. whereas the question of upholding the existing convergence criteria, and of their flexibility, is a question worth asking;

Amendment 103 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Sylvie GOULARD, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas the Community method was ~~abandon~~suspended in favour of intergovernmental agreements in order to allow for ~~rapid~~urgent and timely responses during the crisis; whereas ~~this has made the European Council the leading actor in the crisis, while the European Parliament and its national counterparts have been sidelined~~instruments such as the ESM were not possible to be established inside the Treaties due to its limits given Article 125 TFEU; whereas decisions had to be taken outside the existing institutions as later confirmed by the Pringle case; whereas in the long-term all of the instruments established during the crisis and the actions being taken now to prevent future crises should be inserted within the Community framework;

Amendment 104 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas the Community method was abandoned in favour of intergovernmental agreements in order to allow for rapid responses in the crisis; whereas this has made the European Council the leading actor in the crisis, while the European Parliament and its national counterparts have been side-lined and the European Commission relegated to a role of secretariat of the European Council;

Amendment 105 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas the Community method was abandoned in favour of intergovernmental agreements in order to allow for rapid responses in the crisis; whereas this has made the European Council the leading actor in the crisis, while the European Parliament has been sidelined, and its national counterparts have ~~been sidelin~~always been excluded;

Amendment 106 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas ~~the Community method was abandoned in favour of intergovernmental agreements~~intergovernmental agreements instead of the Community method have been used in order to allow for rapid responses in the crisis; whereas this has made the European Council the leading actor in the crisis, while the European Commission, the European Parliament and its national counterparts have been sidelined;

Amendment 107 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas the Community method was ~~abando~~undermined in favour of intergovernmental agreements in order to allow for rapid responses in the crisis; whereas this has made the Euro~~pean Council~~group the leading actor in the crisis, while the European Parliament and its national counterparts have been sidelined;

Amendment 108 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas the Community method was largely abandoned in favour of intergovernmental agreements in ~~order to allow for rapid responses in~~the context of the crisis; whereas this has made the European Council the leading actor in the crisis, while the European Parliament and its national counterparts have been sidelined;

Amendment 109 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)

Ha. whereas the Council internally has organised itself to reflect the reality of the existence of a Eurozone, while the European Parliament will eventually also need to reflect the reality that not all EU Member States will adopt the euro in the foreseeable future and are prepared to accept responsibilities that come with such membership;

Amendment 11 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 4 a (new)

– having regard to the Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community (Delors report, 1989),

Amendment 11 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Stresses that the integration of economies and markets at European level enhances the efficiency, competitiveness and economic solidity of the Member States, thereby contributing to economic growth and job creation;

Amendment 11 #

Fabio DE MASI, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Recalls that 26 Member States are committed to joining the euro area and that in the Treaties the euro is recognised as the currency of the economic and monetary union (article 3(4) TEU); underlines that this single currency is the reason for the current single institutional framework which means that all MEPs, Commissioners and European judges participate fully in decisions concerning the euro area;

Amendment 110 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)

Ha. whereas Member States under duress have been forced to adopt harsh adjustment programs at enormous social and economic costs; whereas several national governments resigned after financial assistance was withheld; whereas this has severely damaged the reputation of the EU, its institutions and some Member States;

Amendment 111 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Gunnar HÖKMARK, Luděk NIEDERMAYER, Dariusz ROSATI

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas, a ~~great deal of trust has been lost in the process, both between Member States and on the part of citizens and the markets in the EU institutions and the Union as a who~~s the disaster spread and deepened, some Member States have revealed the hypocrisy of a European project which claims to favour solidarity but in which some countries fiercely defend their own interests while others naively serve a fantasy 'European interest'; whereas people have become aware that the European project is not viable;

Amendment 112 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas Member States that failed to adhere to the SGP and enforce fiscal rules at national level have lost credibility of financial markets and herewith the possibility to finance themselves and a great deal of trust has been lost in the process, both between Member States and on the part of citizens ~~and the markets in the EU institutions and the Union as a whole~~;

Amendment 113 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas, especially since the crisis broke at the end of 2007, the shortcomings and weaknesses highlighted within the EU have meant that a great deal of trust has been lost ~~in the process~~, both between Member States and on the part of citizens and the markets in the EU institutions and the Union as a whole;

Amendment 114 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas ~~a great deal of trust has been lost in the process, both between Member States and on the part of citizens and the markets in the EU institutions and the Union as a whol~~the EU institutions and the Union as a whole have not in any way taken into account the devastating effects of their political and economic choices for citizens and small businesses in Europe;

Amendment 115 #

Fabio DE MASI, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Recital Θ

I whereas it is to be deplored that a great deal of trust has been lost ~~in the process~~, both between Member States and on the part of citizens ~~and the markets~~ in the EU institutions and the Union as a whole;

Amendment 116 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas a great deal of trust has been lost in the process, both between Member States and on the part of citizens ~~and the markets~~ in the EU institutions and the Union as a whole;

Amendment 117 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)

Ia. whereas the principles of unity and completeness of the EU budget laid down in article 310(1) TFEU require all items of revenue and expenditure of the Union to be shown in the EU budget and therefore prohibit any type of separate budget;

Amendment 118 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I b (new)

Ib. whereas articles 121(6) and 136 TFEU would provide an appropriate legal basis for a mechanism the scope of which would cover the euro area and which would aim to provide financial incentives to structural reforms and to national policies fostering EU-wide economic convergence if the objectives of such a mechanism do not go beyond what is needed to achieve the proper implementation of the multilateral surveillance procedure set out in article 121 TFEU; whereas, should the objectives of the fiscal capacity be broader and more ambitious, it would be necessary to make use of the so-called ‘flexibility provision’ of article 352 TFEU;

Amendment 119 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas the ECJ ruled in the Pringle case that the ESM is consistent with the TFEU and opened the door to a possible integration of that mechanism into the acquis communautaire within the current limits of the Treaties;deleted

Amendment 12 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 a (new)

– having regard to the European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 on amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro,

Amendment 12 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Regrets the low proportion of the budget in relation to the EU GDP which prevents too much a more efficient policy towards employment and labour markets;

Amendment 12 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Notes that already existing supranational components of the EMU, such as the Stability and Growth Pact, have not encouraged greater convergence between the eurozone Member States;

Amendment 120 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

Amendment 121 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

Amendment 122 #

Bernd KÖLMEL, Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas the ECJ ruled in the Pringle case that ~~the ESM is consistent with the TFEU and opened the do~~due to the limits of the Treaties no new decision powers can be conferred to the institutions of the European Union; whereas under the current framework t~~o a possible integration of that mechanism into the acquis communautaire~~he EU institutions and the ESM are limited to decisions taken by the finance ministers of the euro area; whereas the European Commission is able to participate in the administrative work in relation with in ~~the current limits of the Treaties~~struments such as the ESM; whereas the incorporation of the ESM into Community law would require Treaty change;

Amendment 123 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas the ECJ ruled in the Pringle case that the ESM is consistent with the TFEU ~~and opened the door to a possible integration of that mechanism into the acquis communautaire within the current limits of the Treaties~~;

Amendment 124 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas the ECJ ruled in the Pringle case that the ESM ~~is consistent with the TFEU and opened the door to a possible integration of that mechanism into the acquis communautaire within the current limits of th~~cannot be incorporated into the Community framework without a complete Ttreat~~ies~~y change;

Amendment 125 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas the E~~CJ ruled in the Pringle case that the ESM is consistent with~~U Budget could be reinforced with the ECB’s surpluses, or the surplus of the TFEU ~~and opened the door to a possible integration of that mechanism into the acquis communautaire within the current limits of the Treaties;~~Budget, discounted to the Member States every year in their national contributions.

Amendment 126 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)

Ja. whereas article 310 of the TFEU does not prohibit the issuance of bonds by the Commission, as confirmed in particular by article 2 of Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism;

Amendment 127 #

Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)

Ja. whereas there is little public support for permanent fiscal transfers and federal decision making structures within the Economic and Monetary Union;

Amendment 128 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)

Ja. whereas Art. 21 of the Financial Regulation allows for assigned revenues to be used to finance specific items of expenditure;

Amendment 129 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)

Ja. whereas this ruling is highly controversial and subject to harsh criticism by legal experts;

Amendment 13 #

Maria João RODRIGUES, Jutta STEINRUCK, Brando BENIFEI, Elena GENTILE, Sergio GUTIÉRREZ PRIETO, Joachim SCHUSTER

Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 a (new)

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism;

Amendment 13 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Notes that the protracted Eurozone crisis has shown that the lack of a common budgetary capacity worsens economic adjustment processes within the currency union, leading to unnecessary social hardship and undermining fundamental social standards; points out that contractionary economic policies undertaken in many Eurozone countries in the absence of greater risk-sharing have translated into substantial shortages of public and private investment, leading to a dangerous divergence in Member States' longer-term growth potential, manifested also by high rates of long-term unemployment and emigration from crisis-hit countries; highlights the importance of the automatic stabilisation function of welfare systems, both in the economic sense and to absorb social shock-waves caused by recessions; stresses that high quality welfare systems and social investments are extremely important if Europe wants to maintain its main competitive advantage - highly skilled workers and productive companies;

Amendment 13 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. ~~Consider~~Notes that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone is ~~necessary to complete the EMU~~regarded as necessary so as to protect the existing EMU crisis regime against economic shocks in the longer term, by making it mandatory for all eurozone members, regardless of whether or not a country is in economic crisis, and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework;

Amendment 130 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)

Ja. whereas the ESM is not formally under parliamentary control;

Amendment 131 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J b (new)

Jb. whereas the crisis revealed considerable democratic deficits in economic and financial policies, areas of European policy of particular significance for the citizens; whereas some Member States now see themselves subject to austerity policies which their parliaments would never have decided on their own, while other Member States see themselves forced to grant sizeable loans or guarantees in order to avoid a breakup of the euro; whereas, because of the spill over effects of national economic and fiscal policy decisions on the economies of other Euro area Member States, their national parliaments are thus effectively deprived of their budgetary autonomy;

Amendment 132 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J b (new)

Jb. whereas according to art. 311 TFEU the EU budget shall be financed wholly from own resources without prejudice to other revenue;

Amendment 133 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J c (new)

Jc. whereas the abovementioned provisions allow euro area Member States to assign a financial contribution or a specific revenue to a specific item of expenditure within the EU budget; whereas euro area Member States can do that both by establishing a new own resource that is to be financed by them, and by classifying their financial contributions as ‘other revenue’;

Amendment 134 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J c (new)

Jc. whereas any reform of the EMU economic governance structure should respect the will of the EU Member States that have an opt-out from having to introduce the euro currency to retain their respective currencies;

Amendment 135 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J d (new)

Jd. whereas art. 175.3 TFEU allows the Union to adopt, under the ordinary legislative procedure, specific actions outside the existing Structural Funds which are considered necessary to coordinate the Member States’ economic policies, and whereas the ECJ in the case C-166/07 has clarified that nothing prevents those actions to address a specific part of the Union, as the euro area is;

Amendment 136 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J d (new)

Jd. whereas due consideration should be given to the mutual spill-over effects of the EMU and non-euro area members;

Amendment 137 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J e (new)

Je. whereas Union and national policy makers and parliamentarians should continuously explain to their citizens the benefits and possible downsides of a single currency, including the costs and risks linked to a break-up of the euro area;

Amendment 138 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J e (new)

Je. whereas article 136 TFEU offers a proper legal basis for the adoption of convergence guidelines and, in combination with art. 175.3 of an European Unemployment Benefit Scheme or a Rainy Day fund;

Amendment 139 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J f (new)

Jf. whereas there is no wide public support for establishing a formal system of fiscal transfers within the Economic and Monetary Union;

Amendment 14 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 b (new)

– having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism of 2 February 2012;

Amendment 14 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Considers that the existing mechanisms have not been able to tackle the increasing employment and social imbalances in the euro zone (the unemployment rate ranges from around 5% in Germany and Austria to very high, 23% in Spain and 26% in Greece 1a ), since, as stated by the European Commission 1b , employment and social divergences within and between Member States persist and social developments still point to further divergence hindering growth, employment and cohesion; recalls that based on art. 3.3 TEU the EU "shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress" 1aEU Employment and Social Situation, quarterly review March 2015 1b Joint Employment Report 2016, page 2

Amendment 14 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the euro~~zone~~ area is a necessary milestone to complete the EMU, coherently with the McDougall and the Delors reports and that it is highly recommendable and feasible to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework;, notably through articles 136, 175, and 352 TFEU

Amendment 140 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 1

Historical background ~~and shortcomings of~~of the EMU

Amendment 141 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Recalls that the Werner Report in 1970 highlighted the fact that a ~~monetary union~~n EMU would require ~~all~~ ‘the essential features of ~~national public budgets to~~the whole of the public budgets, and in particular variations in their volume, the size of balances and the methods of financing or utilizing them, will be decided at Community level’;

Amendment 142 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Recalls that the Werner Report in 1970 highlighted the fact that a monetary union would require all the essential features of national public budgets to be decided at Community level, which is not politically desirable;

Amendment 143 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Recalls with regret that the Werner Report in 1970 highlighted the fact that a monetary union would require all the essential features of national public budgets to be ~~decid~~centrally planned at Community level;

Amendment 144 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Recalls that ~~the Werner Report in 1970 highlighted the fact that a monetary union would require all the essential features of national public budgets to be decided at Community level~~several Member States failed to comply with the Maastricht Criteria, both regarding their annual budgets and their total indebtedness;

Amendment 145 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Recalls that the McDougall Report in1977 stressed that the establishment of a monetary union would require a significant Community budget amounting to 5-7 % of GDP in order to absorb economic shocks and provide a minimum degree of income convergence;deleted

Amendment 146 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Recalls that the MacDougall Report in 1977 ~~stressed that the establishment of a monetary union would require a significant Community budget amounting to 5-7 % of GDP in order to absorb economic shocks and provide a minimum degree of incom~~explores the idea of a Community budget amounting to 2-2.5% of GDP in a pre-federal integration stage, with Community action taken in the areas of structural and cyclical policies, and 5-7 % of GDP at a later stage, to ensure that the benefits of closer integration favour all and that there is growing convergence in the econ~~vergence~~omic performance of Member States;

Amendment 147 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

Amendment 148 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Recalls that the Delors Report (1989) already stressed that a monetary union without a sufficient degree of convergence of economic policies is unlikely to be durable and could be damaging to the Community, and recommended to set up a financial assistance mechanism to provide support to countries experiencing temporary difficulties;

Amendment 149 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Notes that if Member States are able to obtain budget surpluses in economic upturn, a shock absorbing mechanism of over 3% of GDP would be available to Member States to implement countercyclical fiscal policies in times of economic downturn without breaking the rules set out in the Stability and Growth Pact;

Amendment 15 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 8

~~– having regard to the judgment of the European Court of Justice in Case C- 370/12 Pringle v Ireland [2012],~~deleted

Amendment 15 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Emphasises the need to consolidate the eurozone by giving it a specific own-resources budget;

Amendment 15 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone is necessary to complete the EMU ~~and that it i~~, within the framework of the Treaties and with the aim of promoting the eurozone’s reco~~mmendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework~~nomic and social convergence and sustainable structural reforms, enhancing the eurozone’s competitiveness and resilience and absorbing asymmetric shocks;

Amendment 150 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Luděk NIEDERMAYER, Brian HAYES, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)

2b. Recalls that the EU budget was not reconsidered following the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union and the adoption of the euro to take account of the major impact of the associated changes on the functioning of the EU and its internal market;

Amendment 151 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Considers, against this background, that s~~hortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception und~~tronger enforcement of existing fiscal rules such as the SGP, the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack is necessary, and not the transfer of more financial means; whereas the SGP is a set of rules designed to ensure that EU Member States pursue sound public finances and coordinate their fiscal policies, however, the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policiesmain shortcoming is the non-implementation of existing rules as well as the underestimation of macroeconomic imbalances, which were not addressed in a sufficient and timely manner; whereas governments of euro countries are required by European economic governance rules to submit their draft budgetary plans for the following year to the European Commission by October 15 each year to ensure the coordination of fiscal and economic policies among euro countries and that EU economic governance rules are respected, but the implementation rate of the guidelines put forward by the European Commission subsequently has to be improved;

Amendment 152 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Considers, against this background, that shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policies, supplemented by a no-bailout clause that is not fully operational in practice for as long as no permanent and democratically legitimate procedure to enforce a good debt equilibrium for Member States confronted with a liquidity problem and no credible procedure for the orderly bankruptcy of an insolvent member are in place that would allow for a fresh start;

Amendment 153 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Sylvie GOULARD, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Considers, against this background, that shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policies, which already represent infringements of national sovereignty which are hard for peoples to tolerate, thus demonstrating that any step forward is politically inconceivable;

Amendment 154 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Considers, against this background, that shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policies; recalls that the Stability and Growth Pact is a necessary set of rules allowing Member States to share a single currency but is not, per se, a European economic policy;

Amendment 155 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Considers, against this background, that shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty, with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level~~, while~~ and budgetary policyies remainsing within the competencies of the Member States ~~and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policie~~, including weak enforcement of the provisions of Stability and Growth, lack of effective banking regulation at European level, lack of euro area-wide stability mechanism and absence of strong incentives to implement necessary structural reforms;

Amendment 156 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

Amendment 157 #

Tibor SZANYI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

Amendment 158 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Considers~~, against this background, that~~ that structural shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policdue to the fact that it is not an optimal currency area and has, over the years, generated unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances especially for many peripheral countries;

Amendment 159 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

Amendment 16 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)

– having regard to the Commission Communication ‘A Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU – Launching a European Debate’ of 28 November 2012,

Amendment 16 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Points out that an adequate fiscal capacity to deal with asymmetrical shocks, based on automatic mechanisms and consolidated indicators could strengthen the confidence in the future of the EMU;

Amendment 16 #

Fabio Massimo CASTALDO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone ~~is necessary to complete the EMU and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework;~~ would be detrimental to the harmonious development of the EU, given that it would confirm a significant gap between countries that have adopted the single currency and those that have kept their own currencies, leading to the emergence of a 'two-speed' Europe;

Amendment 160 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. CRightly considers, against this background, that shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policies;

Amendment 161 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Considers, ~~against this background,~~ that shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policies;

Amendment 162 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Notes that during the creation of the euro, the choice was made not to have an economic government for the euro but a clear set of rules; notes that the rules have been systematically infringed; notes that, in the current institutional and political set-up, deprived of the necessary legitimacy, sanctions have never been and cannot be applied; deplores that, as a result, we neither have respect for the rules, nor the economic government to enforce them;

Amendment 163 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

Amendment 164 #

Dariusz ROSATI, Siegfried MUREŞAN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

Amendment 165 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuation; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix; emphasises however that the three percent deficit rule under the enhanced Stability and Growth Pact provides sufficient fiscal space to cope with asymmetric shocks, under condition that EU Member States strictly observe the structural budgetary balance rule in the medium term;

Amendment 166 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

Amendment 167 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Brian HAYES, Elmar BROK, Burkhard BALZ, Luděk NIEDERMAYER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated ~~tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctua~~fluctuation risks, exchange costs as well as risks and lack of transparency in cross- border transactions; ~~reiterat~~stresses that the ~~relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mech~~benefits of the euro are interconnected, as economic stability creates trust and credibility, reduces uncertainty for businesses and encourages companismes to ~~cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix~~invest, creates more employment and better-quality jobs for citizens and allows for long-term planning of governments; stresses that the need for convergence and competitiveness are conditions for the functionality of a common currency area, since a country cannot restore its competitiveness in a sustainable manner by simply devaluating its currency;

Amendment 168 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuation; also notes that, although the agreed rules are mandatory, many Member States have increased debt levels without, however, generating effects that would allow the economy to overcome negative cycles; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms t~~o cope~~hat are able to deal with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix;

Amendment 169 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuation; reminds, however, that in addition to these policy options, sovereign bond issuances on international capital markets were also possible before the introduction of the euro; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix;

Amendment 17 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 b (new)

– having regard to the Four Presidents’ Report ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’ of 5 December 2012,

Amendment 17 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Calls for launching a roadmap towards the creation of an Unemployment Insurance Scheme, and points out that this scheme would limit moral hazard by providing funds only to countries experiencing large increases in cyclical unemployment and should be balanced over the cycle;

Amendment 17 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone is necessary to complete the EMU and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework as a stopgap measure until such time as an enhanced legal basis is established through reform of the Treaties;

Amendment 170 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuation replacing them with measures of internal devaluation that cause social disruptions and injustices, leading to a loss of social cohesion and encouraging political extremism; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix;

Amendment 171 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate devaluation; acknowledges that the Euro in itself is a shield against exchange rate fluctuations; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix;

Amendment 172 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuation; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix to achieve real and social convergence priorities under full democratic control;

Amendment 173 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuation; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix, and that the costs of this latter alternative would be astronomical;

Amendment 174 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

Amendment 175 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency ~~has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuation~~required the carrying out of structural reforms to compensate for the loss of monetary policy as a stabilisation tool; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix;

Amendment 176 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Urmas PAET, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Notes that the creation of the Euro led to the establishment of a European Central Bank of federal essence; deplores that Member States did not draw the political and institutional consequences of the creation of a single currency by creating a democratic economic, budgetary and fiscal government for the Eurozone; is convinced that without a genuine Economic government the euro area will always be deprived of the necessary tools to implement a proper policy mix;

Amendment 177 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Points out that the introduction of permanent and democratically legitimate procedure to enforce a good debt equilibrium for Member States confronted with a liquidity problem and a credible bankruptcy procedure for the euro area will need to be preceded by a transition regime in order to avoid a destabilisation of Member States under pressure from the financial markets;

Amendment 178 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Stresses that private risk-sharing, e.g. through capital and financial markets, alleviates the burden on governments to provide insurance and furthermore has a smoothing potential; regrets, therefore, that private risk- sharing in the EMU is still relatively limited due also to the outstanding completion of the Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union;

Amendment 179 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Burkhard BALZ, Dariusz ROSATI, Brian HAYES, Luděk NIEDERMAYER, Markus FERBER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that ~~EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalanc~~the causes of the sovereign debt crisis were mainly unsustainable levels of public and private debt, lack of competitiveness and proper regulation in the banking and financial sectors; underlines, t~~riggered by capital flows f~~hat high levels of debt limited the space of manoeuvre for eurom co~~re euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States, aggravated and led to a sovere~~untries and led to an increase in financing costs, which impeded the repayment of debt at maturity; stresses that high costs of servicing debt due to high interest rates were too big of a burden given the overall debt level of some euro countries; whereas too hignh debt ~~crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the mere~~levels entail high interest rates which have to be served instead of being able to invest in growth enhancing measures, social spending, healthcare and education; whereas the causes of the crises differed in existen~~ce of the~~t among euro area Member States;

Amendment 18 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 9

– having regard to Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area, Regulation (EU) no 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, Regulation 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, Regulation (EU) no 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, Regulation (EU) no 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure;

Amendment 18 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Urges the Commission to focus EFSI investments on strategic sectors, in particular R&D&i and infrastructure, taking into account the specific features of the regions in which they are carried out;

Amendment 18 #

Pascal DURAND

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone ~~is necessary to complete the EMU and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under~~, under the current Treaty framework, is a sine qua non for remedying the serious shortcomings that have had mutually reinforcing effects and exacerbated the overall fragility of the ceur~~rent Treaty framework~~ozone and, in particular, for dealing with asymmetric shocks;

Amendment 180 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalances, triggered by capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States, aggravated by the entanglement of banks, financial markets and governments and led to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, ~~in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop~~without a proper crisis mechanism such as a European Monetary Fund to deal with illiquidity and without an orderly insolvency procedure for a Member State with unsustainable debt levels, the mere existence of the euro area;

Amendment 181 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalances~~, triggered by capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States,~~ aggravated and led to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the ~~mere existence of the euro area~~economies of those countries;

Amendment 182 #

Nils TORVALDS, Michael THEURER, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

Amendment 183 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when ~~unsustainable imbalances, triggered by capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member State~~in the light of excessive public and private debt levels, unsustainable imbalances, triggered by a lack of structural reforms to foster competitiveness, aggravated and led to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, ~~the mere~~and the lack of consolidation of public finances, partly due to non-adherence to agreed budgetary rules, the very existence of the euro area;

Amendment 184 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalances, ~~triggered by capital flows from~~caused by beggar-thy-neighbour policies in core euro ~~area~~ nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States, aggravated and led to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member Stateand by capital flows to the periphery leading to elevated debt levels (private or public), which caused a dramatic increase in government borrowing costs in some Member States, following the rise in public spending due to bank bailouts and initial counter- cyclical policy responses to the crisis, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the mere existence of the euro area;

Amendment 185 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability, in the context of the global financial and economic crisis, wh~~en unsustainable imbalances, triggered by capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising~~ich arose from an excessive public spending ratio in some Member States~~, aggravated~~ and led to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the mere existence of the euro area;

Amendment 186 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that the EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalances, triggered by capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising p~~ublic spending~~rivate and public debt ratio in some Member States, aggravated and led to a financial sector crisis across the EU as a whole and subsequently to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the mere existence of the euro area;

Amendment 187 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalances, triggered by capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery that were actually facilitated and encouraged by the very existence of the euro, and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States, aggravated and led to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the mere existence of the euro area;

Amendment 188 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

Amendment 189 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

Considers that EMU exposed its 5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalances, triggered by unsustainable capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery ~~and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States,~~due to the existence of the single currency, were aggravated and led to a ~~sovereign debt~~balance of payments crisis, in which ~~government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the mere existence of the euro area~~required Member States to intervene and led to a perilous increase in public debt in a context where states can no longer have recourse to borrowing from their central banks;

Amendment 19 #

Maria João RODRIGUES, Jutta STEINRUCK, Brando BENIFEI, Elena GENTILE, Sergio GUTIÉRREZ PRIETO, Joachim SCHUSTER

Motion for a resolution
Citation 11

– having regard to its resolution of 102 June 2013 on strengthening European democracy in the future4 , __________________ 4 OJ C 65, 19.2.2016, p. 96. OJ C 65, 19.2.2016, p. 96.

Amendment 19 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Takes note of the relevance of existing instruments such as the European Structural and Investment Funds, the European Stability Mechanism, the European Fund for Strategic Investments and the Structural Reforms Support Programme; highlights, however, that the modalities of their intervention are not sufficiently adapted to enable timely recovery in investment levels and renewed economic catching-up process in countries most hit by the Eurozone crisis; considers that the Youth Employment Initiative comes conceptually closest to what is needed for re- convergence, by providing targeted grant support for the implementation of the Youth Guarantee, which is a comprehensive set of structurally relevant measures that also give some short-term relief; calls for accelerated and improved implementation of the YEI and its further funding with € 20 billion in the period 2017-20;

Amendment 19 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone is ~~necessary to complete~~unacceptable for the EMU and ~~that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework~~will provoke controversies and divisions between Member States; believes that EU has sufficient tools like ESM for financial emergency intervention to perform stabilization function;

Amendment 190 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalances, ~~triggered by capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States,~~caused by the introduction of the single currency, and massive public interventions to rescue the financial sector aggravated and led to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of ~~a proper fiscal backstop, the mere existence of the euro area~~democratic mechanisms to exit the eurozone, the very survival of the EU;

Amendment 191 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Points out that the narrow focus on public deficit and debt level does not address the main causes of the euro crisis; stresses that unsustainable current account imbalances had developed before the crisis, due to beggar-thy-neighbour policies in some Member States, which led to increasing debt levels (public and private) in deficit countries;

Amendment 192 #

Bernd KÖLMEL, Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER, Bernd LUCKE, Bas BELDER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Amendment 193 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Amendment 194 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Werner LANGEN, Brian HAYES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that the crisis has proved that, in the context of a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks, compliance with and enforcement of the common fiscal rules and the rules of economic governance are crucial;

Amendment 195 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy ~~without a common fiscal policy cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area~~alone cannot lead to balanced growth or counter the lack of competitiveness of some euro countries, but supports cyclical recovery which facilitates the introduction of structural policies, as has repeatedly been called for by the President of the ECB; reiterates that ~~mere~~ coordination of national fiscal policies wi, notably throut credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economgh adhering to the fiscal rules such as the SGP and transposing relevant reforms as outlined in the country specific recommendations (CSRs), is necessary to boost competitiveness and structural convergence, making Member States more resilient against asymmetric shocks;

Amendment 196 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy can~~not address a~~ lead to economic divergences in the Eurozone and cannot address asymmetric and symmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without ~~credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap,~~proper and democratic legitimated cooperation at Eurozone level including the absence of credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks, Points out that the European Semester has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms ~~and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks~~;;

Amendment 197 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a ~~common monetary policy without a common fiscal~~'one-size-fits-all' common monetary policy cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shock and that the inability to devalue the currency shifts the burden of adjustment to the weaker eurozone economies which are forced to perform the most painful internal devaluation to restore competitiveness;

Amendment 198 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy that organises risk sharing and clearly attributes the responsibility between Member States and the euro area as whole so as to address problems of moral hazard cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks;

Amendment 199 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that beyond the inherent instabilities generated by the gaping structural divergences embedded in the euro area (such as the ‘north’-‘south’ divide), the crisis has also proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks;

Amendment 2 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 1

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), especially Article 3 thereof, ~~which establishes the creation of the single market, whose currency is the euro,~~

Amendment 2 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Points out that the success of the eurozone is dependent on efforts by the Member States to implement sustainable economic policies and reduce their debt, on increasing the welfare of all its citizens, and on well- functioning labour markets and welfare systems, based on decent work with rights, a strong, independent role for the social partners, social dialogue, collective bargaining and collective agreements, and preventing individual Member States from trying to gain an unfair competitive advantage by infringing workers’ rights or promoting social dumping;

Amendment 2 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Believes that the crisis enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance ~~and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be progressively completed;~~ – with the proviso that this must not in any way undermine the EU’s democracies – and that before the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is progressively completed, the first stage must be to revise the geography of the eurozone, which should not be allowed to extend beyond those countries that, taken together, would correspond to an optimal currency area (ZMO), this being a sine qua non for any currency to work, failing which the euro will continue to reduce flexibility, an intolerable situation in an economy open to what is in some cases unfair competition and one that would apply whatever the reforms and however many billions in financial transfers were channelled towards the southern countries, to quote the view that has long been held by many economists, including the five Nobel Prize winners, Maurice Allais, Milton Friedman, Amartya Sen, Paul Krugman, and Joseph Stiglitz;

Amendment 20 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 12

~~– having regard to the Five Presidents’ Report ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’ of 22 June 2015,~~deleted

Amendment 20 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Recalls that together with the four pillars of the Economic and Monetary Union set out in the Five Presidents´ Report there should be a strong social pillar aimed at preserving Europe´s social market economy including a European Framework on minimum wages, as a mechanism that while respecting national practices allows converging at the level of wages at European level to the 28 Member States;

Amendment 20 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the new eurozone, comprising the optimal currency area (ZMO) only, is necessary to complete the EMU and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework;

Amendment 200 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. ~~Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; r~~Reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks;

Amendment 201 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy ~~without a common fiscal policy~~ cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that ~~mere~~ coordination of national fiscal policies ~~without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap,~~ has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks;

Amendment 202 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Amendment 203 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Amendment 204 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that ~~the crisis has proved that~~ a common monetary policy with~~out a common~~in the monetary union is generally able to deal with symmetric shocks; insists that it is up to national fiscal policy can~~not address~~d flexible national labour markets to accommodate asymmetric shocks to the euro area Member States; reiterates that ~~mere~~weak coordination of national ~~fiscal~~ policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has ~~not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb~~led to large fiscal deficits and growing public debt, thus depriving Member States of the necessary fiscal space and structural flexibility required to absorb asymmetric economic shocks;

Amendment 205 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a ~~common~~ monetary ~~policy~~union without a c~~ommon~~redible fiscal surveillance framework, common economic and fiscal policy can~~not address~~d in the absence of full capital and labour mobility cannot absorb asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national economic and fiscal policies without credible enforcement ~~mechanisms~~ has not prevented ~~an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks~~;

Amendment 206 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a com~~mon fiscal~~plementary fiscal, industrial, social and cohesion policyies cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that ~~mere coordination of national fiscal policies wi~~the fiscal policy response, especially throu~~t credible enforcement mechanis~~gh the fiscal adjustment programs, has ~~not prevent~~caused an investment gap~~, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced~~ depressing growth, and severely hampering the national capacity to absorb economic shocks;

Amendment 207 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Amendment 208 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustCommon monetary policy can only play a limited role in reaction to various shocks that the EU and the eurozone may face. It is therefore important to increase resilience of Member States’ economies via implementing structural reforms on one hand, and to conduct such a fiscal policy on national level that allows governments to react to such shocks on the other. The instruments avainlable a~~nd socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks;~~t the European level including the ESM should only play a complementary role.

Amendment 209 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Amendment 21 #

Maria João RODRIGUES, Brando BENIFEI, Elena GENTILE, Sergio GUTIÉRREZ PRIETO, Joachim SCHUSTER, Jutta STEINRUCK

Motion for a resolution
Citation 12

~~– having regard to the Five Presidents’ Report ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’ of 22 June 2015,~~deleted

Amendment 21 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 c (new)

1c. Considers that a 'convergence instrument' should be put in place to foster a gradual process of renewed structural convergence within the Eurozone by providing incentives and support for sustainable and growth- friendly structural reforms and investments based on a 5-year 'convergence code', enabling better implementation of the Integrated Guidelines and relevant country-specific recommendations; notes that this instrument could be of temporary nature and should be targeted at countries whose growth potential has been most eroded by the long financial crisis; considers that, after a long period of macroeconomic adjustment, focus should be put on delivering structural reforms and investments with the aim of strengthening growth potential based on quality jobs and productivity, of promoting fair, robust, efficient and fiscally sustainable welfare systems based on solidarity, social justice and a fair wealth distribution, and of fostering a sustainable transition of Member States' economies towards greater resource efficiency;

Amendment 21 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Considers that the e~~stablishment~~xistence of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone ~~is necessary to complete the EMU and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity,~~ albeit limited is needed, under the current Treaty framework;

Amendment 210 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy cannot address ~~asymmetric~~major shocks to the euro area; reiterates that the mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks;

Amendment 211 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Considers that, where a Member State whose currency is the euro is unwilling to further surrender its budgetary sovereignty, it should be given the option of leaving the euro area without leaving the EU; invites the Commission and the Eurogroup – acting in liaison with the ECB – to assist in such a scenario the Member State concerned with practical steps to make a withdrawal from the euro area feasible and as smooth as possible;

Amendment 212 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Believes that the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure has not been used to its full potential to prevent imbalances and to foster greater convergence;

Amendment 213 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Burkhard BALZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Amendment 214 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. ~~Observes that the stabilisation of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively on~~Recalls first and foremost that the primary objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability, laid down in Article 127 (1) TFEU, and thereby contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 TEU; recalls that the ECB, a~~nd that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional monetary policy measures~~ims at inflation rates of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term; recalls that when inflation rates dropped below 0% in December 2014, the ECB acted by introducing its asset purchase programme in 2015, in addition to fighting possible deflation and slowing growth by reducing the three key interest rates, which had the collateral effect of slightly increasing growth; stresses that the ECB pursued its mandate of price stability with the instruments defined in the Treaties to tackle weak growth and low inflation in the euro area, making use of all instruments at its disposal to steer inflation closer to 2%; recalls that the President of the ECB has called for integrated institutions, for a stronger and proactive fiscal policy on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reforms to improve the resilience and competitiveness of their economies, pursuing growth enhancing policies while at the same time pursuing fiscal consolidation and budget discipline;

Amendment 215 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Observes that the stabilisation of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively on the ECB, and that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional monetary policy measures; ~~recalls that the President of the ECB has~~notes that, despite these measures, investment levels remain low; points to the criticism by the ECB Governing Council regarding the consistency of the EMU’s fiscal policies; welcomes its call for growth enhancing fiscal policies while maintaining the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact; believes that restoring trust in the EMU’s future evolution and a proper balance between monetary and fiscal tools requires the set- up of more investment-stimulating tools; recalls that the Presidents of the ECB and the Eurogroup have both called for integrated institutions, for a stronger and proactive fiscal policy on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reform;

Amendment 216 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Observes that the stabilisation of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively on the ECB, and that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional monetary policy measures; recalls that the President of the ECB has called for integrated institutions, for a stronger and proactive fiscal policy on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reformRegrets the fact that since the beginning of the crisis the ECB has initiated unconventional monetary policy measures that have not had any effect in stabilising the economic cycle and have triggered a cycle of deflation which is dangerous for the real economy;

Amendment 217 #

Nils TORVALDS, Siegfried MUREŞAN, Michael THEURER, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Observes that the stabilisation efforts of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively on the ECB, while this responsibility should rather lie with democratically elected institutions, and that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional monetary policy measures; recalls that the President of the ECB has called for integrated institutions, for a stronger and proactive fiscal policy on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reform; alerts that monetary policy by its own is unable to reignite the economy and risks to end with speculative bubbles;

Amendment 218 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Observes that in the absence of the willingness of euro area Member States’ governments to take action to rapidly consolidate their public finances and modernise their economies the stabilisation of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively on the ECB, and that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional monetary policy measures; recalls that the President of the ECB has called for integrated institutions, for a stronger ~~and proactive fiscal policy~~fiscal surveillance framework on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reform;

Amendment 219 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Observes that the stabilisation of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively on the ECB, as well as on some factors in the world economic situation, and that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional monetary policy measures; recalls that the President of the ECB has called for ~~integrated institutions, for a stronger and proactive fiscal policy on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reform~~an increase in public investments in the euro area;

Amendment 22 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 12 a (new)

– having regard to its resolution of 16 December 1998 on the adjustment mechanism in cases of asymmetric shocks,

Amendment 22 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 c (new)

1c. Considers that the governance mechanisms introduced with the implementation of the 2-pack and 6-pack have not been able to ensure a balance between the social pillar of EMU (art. 148 TFEU) and the economic pillar (art. 121 TFEU) therefore it is essential to ensure a social dimension of economic governance at multiple levels of the Union, as provided for in Article 9 TFEU;

Amendment 22 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. ~~Consider~~Notes that the ~~establishment of a~~idea of a single budgetary capacity ~~within the eurozone is necessary to complete the EMU and~~is contrary to the Treaties and points out that, i~~t i~~n 2012, the previous Pre~~commendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework~~sident of the European Commission, Mr Barroso, stated that a fiscal capacity for the EMU could not can be achieved without detailed treaty adjustments;

Amendment 220 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Amendment 221 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Amendment 222 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Amendment 223 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Amendment 224 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Emphasises that the division of labour between monetary and fiscal policy for the euro area as currently enshrined in the treaties simply did not anticipate that monetary policy would ever reach the zero lower bound, and shortcoming that urgently needs to be corrected;

Amendment 225 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Amendment 226 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Amendment 227 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Acknowledges the poor results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening coordination of national fiscal policies, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two- Pack Regulations; welcomes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary control, and hence ownership;

Amendment 228 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Amendment 229 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Amendment 23 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 15

~~– having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2015 on completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union2, __________________ 2 Texts adopted, P8_TA(2015)0469.~~deleted

Amendment 23 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 c (new)

1c. Recalls that the economic and financial crisis revealed great economic imbalances between Member States;

Amendment 23 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Recalls that the asymmetry of the EMU, with the Monetary Union not coupled with an Economic Union is one of the main structural reasons for the euro area's slow recovery after the 2008 crisis;

Amendment 230 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Acknowledges the results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to ~~address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by~~ strengthen~~ing~~ coordination of national fiscal policies, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack Regulations; welcomes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); ~~underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary~~notes that due to the constraints of the Treaties the ESM had to be established at intergovernmental level with parliamentary control primarily taking place at national level, national governments being responsible vis-à-vis their national parliaments, within the limits set by the Constitutional Court of each countr~~ol, and hence ownership;~~ y; stresses that in the long- term all of the established instruments shall be inserted within the Community framework in order to also ensure parliamentary control through the European Parliament;

Amendment 231 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Acknowledges the ~~result~~institutional reforms achieved since the crisis ~~broke~~ in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening coordination of national fiscal ~~policies, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two- Pack Regulations;~~and economic policies, regrets however that strengthened fiscal coordination has failed to deliver on a speedy economic recovery; deplores the asymmetry in the correction of imbalances between surplus and deficit countries welcomes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary control, and ~~hence~~ ownership; recalls its resolution on the role and operations of the Troika] and stresses the need to follow up on the recommendations made;

Amendment 232 #

Nils TORVALDS, Michael THEURER, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Acknowledges the results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points ~~in particular~~ to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis ~~by strengthening coordination of national fiscal policies, in particular via the adop~~, and in particular the creation of banking union and the ESM; recalls that the well-intentioned creation of the Six-Pack ~~and~~, the Two- Pack Regulations; welcomes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor,and the Fiscal Compact have created more complexity, less credibility and less macro-economic cohesion than needed, stresses that further steps are required to create a credible and sustainable architecture of the Eeuro~~pean Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary control, and hence ownership~~, including a euro area budgetary capacity, a euro treasury and a democratic decision making body specific to the euro area;

Amendment 233 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Acknowledges the results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening ~~coordination of national fiscal policie~~fiscal surveillance frameworks, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack Regulations, but is concerned by the lack of compliance and enforcement of the revised rule set; welcomes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms ~~dramatically lack~~lack full democratic oversight and parliamentary control, and hence ownership;

Amendment 234 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Acknowledges the results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; ~~points in particular to the many~~notes the measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening coordination of national fiscal policies~~, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two- Pack Regulations~~; welcomes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary control, and hence ownership;

Amendment 235 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Amendment 236 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Acknowledges~~Expresses its dissatisfaction at the results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the ~~many~~inadequate measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening coordination of national fiscal policies, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack Regulations; ~~welcomes further the fact~~notes that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary control, and hence ownership;

Amendment 237 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Acknowledg~~Values the results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening coordination of national fiscal policies, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack Regulations; welcomes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary control, and hence ownership;

Amendment 238 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Amendment 239 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Acknowledges~~Takes into account the results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening coordination of national fiscal policies, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack Regulations; ~~welcom~~notes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary control~~, and hence ownership~~;

Amendment 24 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 15 a (new)

– having regard to the declaration ‘Greater European Integration : the way forward’ signed by the Presidents of the Italian Camera dei deputati, the German Bundestag, the French National Assembly and Luxembourg’s Chamber of Deputies;

Amendment 24 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 d (new)

1d. Takes the view that the smooth operation of the EMU, and the eurozone in particular, requires that the common monetary policy be accompanied by greater political, fiscal and economic integration, and that the Member States make use of the flexibility allowed under the Stability and Growth Pact to guarantee the sustainability of public finances and the financial stability of the EU as a whole;

Amendment 24 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 b (new)

2b. Expresses its worry that postponing crucial necessary decisions to better times is creating the condition for extremism rise, thus making those decisions even more difficult in the future;

Amendment 240 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Recalls that in 2012 the Commission introduced in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ the idea of a Convergence and Competitiveness instrument for euro area Member States, whereby euro area Member States could get financial support for ‘reform packages that are agreed and important both for the Member States and for the good functioning of the euro area’, and that this financial support ‘could be set up in principle as part of the EU budget’ and be established by secondary law on the basis of Article 352 TFEU and financed by either a commitment on the part of the euro area Member States or a legal obligation to that effect enshrined in the EU’s own resources legislation as ‘assigned revenues’; considers the review by the Commission of the European Semester, including the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), as a follow-up to this approach;deleted

Amendment 241 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Amendment 242 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Burkhard BALZ, Nils TORVALDS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Recalls that in 2012 the Commission introduced in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ the idea of a Convergence and Competitiveness ~~instrument for euro area Member States,~~Instrument (CCI) for euro area Member States, whereby ‘the implementation of structural reforms in the euro area Member States would be facilitated by the set-up of contractual arrangements to be agreed between them and the Commission’, building on the existing EU surveillance framework and the CSRs; states further that ‘by promoting structural reforms that enhance the adjustment capacity of a Member State the CCI would improve the economy’s capacity to absorb asymmetric shocks through enhancing market functioning’; whereby euro area Member States could get financial support for ‘reform packages that are agreed and important both for the Member States and for the good functioning of the ~~euro area~~EMU’, and that this financial support ‘could be set up in principle as part of the EU budget’ and be established by secondary law on the basis of Article 136 or alternatively Article 352 TFEU and financed by either a commitment on the part of the euro area Member States or a legal obligation to that effect enshrined in the EU’s own resources legislation as ‘assigned revenues’; considers the review by the Commission of the European Semester, including the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), as a follow-up to this approach; demands from the European Commission to reflect upon further measures to improve the implementation rate of CSRs, as currently only 4% of CSRs are fully implemented while nearly half of the recommendations have not been implemented at all or only in a limited manner due to the non-binding character of CSRs, and should be followed up within the European Semester;

Amendment 243 #

Dariusz ROSATI, Siegfried MUREŞAN, Janusz LEWANDOWSKI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. ~~Recall~~Notes that in 2012 the Commission introduced in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ the idea of a Convergence and Competitiveness instrument for euro area Member States, whereby euro area Member States could get financial support for ‘reform packages that are agreed and important both for the Member States and for the good functioning of the euro area’, and that this financial support ‘could be set up in principle as part of the EU budget’ and be established by secondary law on the basis of Article 352 TFEU and financed by either a commitment on the part of the euro area Member States or a legal obligation to that effect enshrined in the EU’s own resources legislation as ‘assigned revenues’; considers the review by the Commission of the European Semester, including the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), as a follow-up to this approach; however, points out in this context to the serious risk of moral hazard and to potentially distorted incentives, in fact encouraging Member States to wait with necessary reforms until financial support from the EU is secured; therefore, if this idea is to be implemented, strong safeguards against potential moral hazard need to be included;

Amendment 244 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Recalls that in 2012 the Commission introduced in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ the idea of a Convergence and Competitiveness instrument for euro area Member States, whereby euro area Member States could get financial support for ‘reform packages that are agreed and important both for the Member States and for the good functioning of the euro area’, and that thise financial support ‘could be set up in principle as part of the EU budget’ and be established by secondary law on the basis of Article 352 TFEU and financed by either a commitment on the part of the euro area Member States or a legal obligation to that effect enshrined in the EU’s own resources legislation as ‘assigned revenues’scal capacity of the Eurozone should be established outside the EU budget and should be fiscally neutral; considers the review by the Commission of the European Semester, including the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), as a follow- up to this approach;

Amendment 245 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Amendment 246 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Recalls that in 2012 the Commission introduced in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ the idea of a Convergence and Competitiveness instrument for euro area Member States, whereby euro area Member States could get financial incentives support for ‘reform packages that are agreed and important both for the Member States and for the good functioning of the euro area’, and that this financial support ‘could be set up in principle as part of the EU budget’ and be established by secondary law on the basis of Article 352 TFEU and financed by either a commitment on the part of the euro area Member States or a legal obligation to that effect enshrined in the EU’s own resources legislation as ‘assigned revenues’; considers the review by the Commission of the European Semester, including the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), as a follow-up to this approach; the fiscal capacity should play a role in providing these financial incentives.

Amendment 247 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Recalls that in 2012 the Commission introduced in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ the idea of a Convergence and Competitiveness instrument for euro area Member States, whereby euro area Member States could get financial support for ‘reform packages that are agreed and important both for the Member States and for the good functioning of the euro area’, and that this financial support ‘could be set up in principle as part of the EU budget’ and be established by secondary law on the basis of Articles 136 or 352 TFEU, if necessary by enhanced cooperation, and financed by either a commitment on the part of the euro area Member States or a legal obligation to that effect enshrined in the EU’s own resources legislation, with inclusion in the EU budget as ‘assigned revenues’; considers the review by the Commission of the European Semester, including the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), as a follow-up to this approach;

Amendment 248 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Nils TORVALDS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Recalls that in 2012 the Commission introduced in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ the idea of a Convergence and Competitiveness instrument for euro area Member States, whereby euro area Member States could get financial support for ‘reform packages that are agreed and important both for the Member States and for the good functioning of the euro area’, and that this financial support ‘could be set up in principle as part of the EU budget’ and be established by secondary law on the basis of Article 352 TFEU and financed by either a commitment on the part of the euro area Member States or a legal obligation to that effect enshrined in the EU’s own resources legislation; believes that any such contributions should be entered into the EU budget as ‘assigned revenues’; considers the review by the Commission of the European Semester, including the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), as a follow-up to this approach;

Amendment 249 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Recalls the four pillars of an Economic Union of convergence, growth and jobs, set out in the Five Presidents’ Report: cthe creation of a euro area system of Completi~~ng the economic, financial and fiscal Union and~~tiveness Authorities, a strengthened implementation of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, a greater focus on employment and social performance, and on stronger coordination of economic policies within a revamped European Semester; recalls the content of the Five Presidents’ Report on completing the economic, financial and fiscal Union, strengthening democratic accountability, legitimacy and the institutional setting as well as the social dimension of the EMU; emphasises that this report reiterates the view set out in the Blueprint of the Commission and the Four Presidents’ Report, coordinated by then President of the European Council Mr Herman van Rompuy, that a ~~shock absorption capacity at euro area level is needed to complement automatic stabilisers at national level, whose functioning is limited, as was shown during the crisis;~~ ny fiscal capacity ‘should not lead to permanent transfers between countries or to transfers in one direction only, which is why converging towards Economic Union is a precondition for participation. It should also not be conceived as a way to equalise incomes between Member States’, it should further prevent moral hazard by being tightly linked to compliance with the EU governance framework, ‘be open and transparent vis-à-vis all EU Member States’, and not fulfil the function of the ESM as a crisis management instrument, but ‘improve the overall economic resilience of the EMU’;

Amendment 25 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 15 a (new)

– having regard to its resolution of 13 March 2014 on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to the euro area programme countries;

Amendment 25 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Amendment 25 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Takes note of different proposals for this purpose, with different designs and assigning different functions; points out that some options are possible under the current Treaties, whereas others would require Treaty change; stresses the importance of examining this issue from a holistic perspective - a budgetary capacity of the euro area is a tool which can complement others, notably a greater focus on convergence, or the completion of the Single Market, in order to reinforce both the euro area and the European Union - as an isolated measure it cannot be a panacea;

Amendment 250 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Recalls the four pillars set out in the Five Presidents’ Report: completing the economic, financial and fiscal Union and strengthening democratic accountability, legitimacy and the institutional setting; emphasises that this report reiterates the view set out in the Blueprint of the Commission and the Four Presidents’ Report, coordinated by then President of the European Council Mr Herman van Rompuy,Stresses that a shock absorption capacity at euro area level is needed to complement automatic stabilisers at national level, whose functioning ~~is limited, as was shown~~has been limited by the imposition of deficit constraints on Member States budgets and austerity policies during the crisis;

Amendment 251 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Recalls the four pillars set out in the Five Presidents’ Report: completing the economic, financial and fiscal Union and strengthening democratic accountability, legitimacy and the institutional setting; emphasises that this report reiterates the view set out in the Blueprint of the Commission and the Four Presidents’ Report, coordinated by then President of the European Council Mr Herman van Rompuy~~, that a shock absorption capacity at euro area level is needed to complement automatic stabilisers at national level, whose functioning is limited, as was shown during the crisis~~;

Amendment 252 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Recalls the four pillars set out in the Five Presidents’ Report: completing the economic, financial and fiscal Union and strengthening democratic accountability, legitimacy and the institutional setting; emphasises that this report reiterates the view set out in the Blueprint of the Commission and the Four Presidents’ Report, coordinated by then President of the European Council Mr Herman van Rompuy, that a shock absorption capacity at euro area level is needed to complement automatic stabilisers at national level, whose functioning is limited, as was shown during the crisis (i.e. they are insufficient and need to be complemented by the monetary tool);

Amendment 253 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Recalls the four pillars set out in the Five Presidents’ Report: completing the economic, financial and fiscal Union and strengthening democratic accountability, legitimacy and the institutional setting; emphasises that this report reiterates the view set out in the Blueprint of the Commission and the Four Presidents’ Report, coordinated by then President of the European Council Mr Herman van Rompuy, that a shock absorption capacity at euro area level is needed to complement automatic stabilisers at national level, whose functioning is limited, a~~s was shown~~nd was further restricted as a result of the fiscal consolidation measures during the crisis;

Amendment 254 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. ~~Recall~~Notes the four pillars set out in the Five Presidents’ Report: completing the economic, financial and fiscal Union and strengthening democratic accountability, legitimacy and the institutional setting; ~~emphasis~~notes that this report reiterates the view set out in the Blueprint of the Commission and the Four Presidents’ Report, coordinated by then President of the European Council Mr Herman van Rompuy, that a shock absorption capacity at euro area level is needed to complement automatic stabilisers at national level, whose functioning is limited, as was shown during the crisisand calls for a shock absorption capacity at euro area level; stresses that any such mechanism, by its mere institutional set-up, risks to lack accountability and democratic legitimacy if it becomes just a new layer of governance which risks to cause moral hazard;

Amendment 255 #

Nils TORVALDS, Michael THEURER, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Makes it clear that rapid action is needed to ensure the sustainability of the euro; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens and markets;deleted

Amendment 256 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Makes it clear that rapid action is needed to ensure the sustainability of the euro by pursuing structural reforms and sound fiscal policies; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to implement and enforce structural reforms, ensure compliance with fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance frameworks, to complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens and markets;

Amendment 257 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Makes it clear that ~~rapid~~further action is needed to ensure the sustainability of the euro; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens and markets; stresses that the responsibility of transposing reforms to complete the EMU lies primarily with the Member States;

Amendment 258 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Makes it clear that rapid action is needed to ensure the sustainability of the euro; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to complete the EMU, act meaningfully to reduce structural divergences between and within economies of the euro area, and to restore the trust of citizens and markets;

Amendment 259 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Makes it clear that rapid a~~ction~~nd far reaching action, including changes to the Treaties, is needed to ensure the sustainability of the euro; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens and markets;

Amendment 26 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 17 a (new)

– having regard to the rapporteurs’ study visits to Berlin, Paris and Rome and to the meetings held with national parliaments, Finance Ministers and sherpas,

Amendment 26 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Amendment 26 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Takes note of the different proposals ~~for this purpose~~, with different designs and assigning different functions, all of which involve, however, a central component for coordinating and monitoring 'fiscal discipline' and 'fiscal risk-sharing' in the eurozone;

Amendment 260 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Makes it clear that rapid action is needed to ensure the sustainability of the ~~euro~~Member States afflicted by Merkelian austerity policies; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens ~~and markets~~;

Amendment 261 #

Sylvie GOULARD, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Lieve WIERINCK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Makes it clear that rapid action is needed to ~~ensure the sustainability of the euro~~abolish the euro and save the peoples who are its victims; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to ~~complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens and markets~~work together;

Amendment 262 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Makes it clear that ~~rapid action is needed to ensure the sustainabil~~a well-defined roadmap is needed to realise the full benefitys of the ~~euro~~common currency; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens and markets;

Amendment 263 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Makes it clear that rapid action is needed to ensure the sustainability of the euro providing proper living conditions for all citizens; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to ~~complete the EMU and to~~ restore the trust of citizens ~~and markets~~;

Amendment 264 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Makes it clear that ~~rapid~~ action is needed to ensure th~~e sustainability of the euro; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of~~at Member States wishing to leave the euro may do so; stresses furthermore that the EU and ~~its~~ Member States ~~to complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens and markets~~should start to provide for measures and plans for a coordinated dismantling of EMU;

Amendment 265 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

11a. Is of the opinion that the current threat to the Schengen agreement on free movement of persons raises a particular challenge to the euro area given the importance of labour mobility within a currency zone;

Amendment 266 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Elmar BROK, Werner LANGEN, Burkhard BALZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Amendment 267 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. ~~Believ~~Stresses that ~~in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this ent~~the introduction of the euro led to closer economic and monetary cooperation that allowed the internal market to develop further, for the whole European economy to perform better, bringing more jobs and greater prosperity for European citizens benefiting individuals, businesses and whole economies in the euro area, including greater choice and stable prices for consumers and citizens, greater security and more opportunities for businesses and markets, promoting trade and investment, improving economic stability and growth, more integrated financial markets and stronger priese~~, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked t~~nce for the EU in the global economy; underlines that the single currency brings new strengths and opportunities arising from integration and scale of the euro are~~sponsibilit~~a economy, m~~ean~~aking th~~at financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria;~~ e single market more efficient and doing business in the euro area more cost-effective and less risky; stresses that the euro remains an attractive reserve currency for third countries and a trustworthy currency for new Member States, which was proven by the fact that, despite the economic crisis, several countries recently decided to join the euro area: Cyprus and Malta in 2008, Slovakia in 2009, Estonia in 2011, Latvia in 2014 and Lithuania in 2015;

Amendment 268 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a ~~vital~~possible element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if ~~solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria~~moral hazard is prevented and responsibility and solidarity are closely linked, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of adherence to the fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance framework, the CSRs and to commitments that are being made under specific programmes;

Amendment 269 #

Sylvie GOULARD, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Lieve WIERINCK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria; considers that it should go hand in hand with completion of the internal market, with an EU budget funding European and future oriented investments;

Amendment 27 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 18 a (new)

– having regard to articles 33.1.a) and 40.1 of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank Statute, and article 129.3 of the TFEU;

Amendment 27 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Points out that in order to stabilise the social situation in Member States, ~~economic stabilisers such as a European Unemployment Insurance (EUI) scheme~~their sovereignty as nations and their national currencies should be restore~~ngthen the welfare state and fight social deprivation caused by one- sided fiscal discipline measures taken under the European economic governance framework~~d without delay in order to free up national economies and allow a return to full employment;

Amendment 27 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. ~~Takes note of different proposals for this purpose, with different designs and assigning different func~~Strongly opposes the idea of a single fiscal capacity for the EMU, since this would further erode the powers of the Member States and amount to debt mutualisations;

Amendment 270 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards ~~a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning tha~~compliance with its own set of rules as a vital element fin~~ancial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria~~ this enterprise;

Amendment 271 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that ~~in order to regain trust, the euro must~~the euro has failed to deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a ~~vital element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria~~further failed attempt to save an economic and monetary approach which has failed;

Amendment 272 #

Bernd KÖLMEL, Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER, Bernd LUCKE, Bas BELDER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility~~, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria~~; stresses further that, in the medium and long term, achieving the above objective is conditional on progress towards a genuine economic and monetary union, which will be possible only through the creation of a single treasury;

Amendment 273 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of cleariterates that the Member States whose currency is the euro must comply with the Maastricht criteria;

Amendment 274 #

Fabio DE MASI, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as aone vital element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria and if linked directly to meaningful action to reduce structural divergences;

Amendment 275 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro and the European economic project must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, social justice, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this enterprise~~, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria~~;

Amendment 276 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that in order to regain trust from citizens and workers, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria;

Amendment 277 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards ~~a fiscal capacity a~~enhanced fiscal sustainability and structural reforms as vital elements in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility~~, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria~~;

Amendment 278 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. ~~Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element~~ Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national and European level are needed, as well as fighting tax avoidance, halting th~~is enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial supp~~e fiscal devaluation race among Member States, and taking into account that a morte i~~s provided on the basis of clear criteria~~ntegrated European economy needs some kind of new common fiscal figures;

Amendment 279 #

Clare MOODY, Anneliese DODDS, Neena GILL, Cătălin Sorin IVAN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Considers that the achievement of EMU needs to be supported by a strong political narrative rather than debates on specific instruments; warns against piecemeal technical reforms without a clear contribution to this objective; believes that the settlement of a fiscal capacity for the euro area is only one piece of the puzzle that needs to go hand in hand with a clear re-foundation spirit among its members and the ones to join;

Amendment 28 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 18 a (new)

– having regard to the Council conclusions, 18th and 19th February 2016;

Amendment 28 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Points out that ~~in order~~the European Semester is a new but strong instrument to stabilise the social situation in Member States~~, economic stabilisers~~ and that further measures, such as a European Unemployment Insurance (EUI) scheme ~~should strengthen the welfare state and fight social deprivation caused by one- sided fiscal discipline measures taken under the Europe~~, are neither politically justified nor effective in structural terms. On the contrary: they serve to hide structural problems, provide negative incentives and e~~conomic governance framework~~ntrench social inequality more deeply;

Amendment 28 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. ~~Takes note of different proposals for this purpose, with different designs and assigning different functions~~Warns that the idea of a single fiscal capacity is an infringement of no bail-out clause (Art. 125 TEU);

Amendment 280 #

Sylvie GOULARD, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Lieve WIERINCK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Argues that Member States have to improve their own tax collection capacities and their cooperation, notably in terms of exchanges of information, transparency, and the gradual harmonisation of rates and tax bases; calls upon the Commission to come with proposals and, when appropriate, country-specific recommendations;

Amendment 281 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Argues that convergence, good governance and conditionality enforced through institutions being held democratically accountable at the euro-area and national level are key, notably to preventing permanent transfers and moral hazard; states that responsibilities must be assigned at the level where decisions are taken or implemented, with national parliaments scrutinising national governments and the European Parliament scrutinising the European executives; believes that this is the only way to ensure the required increased accountability of decision-making;

Amendment 282 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Brian HAYES, Gunnar HÖKMARK, Nils TORVALDS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Argues that convergence, good governance and conditionality enforced through institutions being held democratically accountable at the euro-area and national level are key, notably to preventing permanent ~~transfers~~and moral hazard; stresses the need to safeguard these institutions by restoring the no-bail-out clause and a democra~~l hazard~~tically founded right to withdraw from the Eurozone; points out that exclusion from the Eurozone for serious infringements could be appropriate;

Amendment 283 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Argues that ~~convergence, good governance and conditionality enforced through institutions being held democratically accountable at the euro- area and national level are key, notably to preventing~~the enforcement of fiscal rules, the implementation of CSRs and good governance at euro area and national level are key to pursue sound fiscal responsibility, address macroeconomic imbalances, implement structural reforms and boost investment, in addition there is a need for monitoring and evaluating transposed reforms, notably to prevent and avoid any form of permanent transfers and moral hazard;

Amendment 284 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Argues that convergence, good governance and conditionality enforced through institutions being held democratically accountable at the euro-area and national level ~~are key, notably to preventing permanent transfers and moral hazard~~is not the only way forward and poses a high risk of moral hazard; emphasizes that enforcing a credible no bail-out clause would also lead to these ends without requiring a burdening coordination and enforcement effort;

Amendment 285 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

Amendment 286 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Argues that convergence, and good governance ~~and conditionality~~ enforced through institutions being held democratically accountable at the euro-area and national level are key, notably to preventing ~~permanent transfers and~~ moral hazard;

Amendment 287 #

Fabio DE MASI, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Argues that convergence, good governance and conditionality enforced through institutions being held democratically accountable at the euro-area and/or national level are key, notably to preventing permanent transfers and moral hazard;

Amendment 288 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Argues that ~~convergence, good governance and conditionality enforced through~~social and regional convergence pursued by institutions being held democratically accountable at ~~the euro- area~~EU, national and ~~nat~~regional level are ~~key, notably~~needed, also to prevent~~ing~~ permanent transfers and moral hazard;

Amendment 289 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

13a. Takes the view that financial instruments such as the ESM model pose several problems to the EU economy functioning and stability; as public investment is conditioned by the interests of private investment; as decision making is determined by the most powerful Member States providing the biggest contributions; and it is less redistributive than a model based in progressive taxes; finally, that the public guarantee system means that any losses in the projects will be taken in charge by public institutions while main profits go to the private sector.

Amendment 29 #

Clare MOODY, Neena GILL, Anneliese DODDS, Cătălin Sorin IVAN

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes the creation of ~~the single market~~an economic and monetary union, whose currency is the euro; whereas ~~the European Monetary Union currently consists of 19 members, two of whom have opt-out clauses,~~of the 28 Member States of the EU, 19 have already adopted the single currency, seven are under a derogation which applies until the Council decides that the conditions are met for its abrogation, and two Member States have, pursuant to Protocols No 15 and No 16 annexed to the Tre~~maining seven EU Member States having yet to join~~aties, respectively no obligation to adopt the euro or an exemption from doing so (‘opt-outs’); whereas no financial liability will be incurred by th~~e two~~ose countries with opt-outs from EMU in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area;

Amendment 29 #

Thomas MANN

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Amendment 29 #

Fabio DE MASI, Marisa MATIAS, Ernest MARAGALL

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. ~~Takes note of different proposals for this purpose, with different designs and assigning different functions~~Opposes firmly any further extension of supranational budgetary policy;

Amendment 290 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

13a. Stresses the need for a truly symmetric Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure that effectively targets chronic current account surpluses; points out that balanced current accounts of Member States are necessary to mitigate the need for permanent transfers; underlines that Member States may finance government deficits primarily by domestic household savings without need for arbitrary fiscal rules such as the Stability and Growth Pact if external balance is effectively pursued.

Amendment 291 #

Paul TANG, Jakob von WEIZSÄCKER, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance at or close to the zero lower bound, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; emphasises that a mechanism to achieve an aggregate fiscal stance in the future especially at or close to the zero lower bound as well as incentives for symmetric as opposed to asymmetric adjustment for accelerated macro-economic convergence in response to crises are essential for a proper functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocks;

Amendment 292 #

Nils TORVALDS, Michael THEURER, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that while manoeuvring space of domestic fiscal policy must play prominent role, a fiscal capacity should~~, moreover,~~ address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocks;. Member States with close to balanced budgets at the moment of adverse economic shock have significant space available for use of automatic stabilizers as well as for eventual discretional fiscal support of their economy within existing European rules.

Amendment 293 #

Hugues BAYET, Maria João RODRIGUES, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ, Andrea COZZOLINO, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Cătălin Sorin IVAN, Alfred SANT, Roberto GUALTIERI, Udo BULLMANN, Costas MAVRIDES, Olle LUDVIGSSON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance and ensuring, that all Eurozone countries contribute to macroeconomic adjustment towards real convergence, including those who have greater fiscal space to be used to the benefit of the monetary union as a whole, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that beyond a proper use of the MIP between deficit and surplus countries, a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocks;

Amendment 294 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that ~~incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for address~~compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact and pursuing structural ~~weaknesses~~reform at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocksare core elements for the functioning of the euro area;

Amendment 295 #

Bernd KÖLMEL, Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER, Bernd LUCKE, Bas BELDER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocksare core elements for the functioning of the euro area;

Amendment 296 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level~~, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance,~~ are core elements for the well-functioning of the euro area; ~~considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocks;~~

Amendment 297 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Gérard DEPREZ, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. ~~Takes the view~~Notes that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are c~~ore~~urrent elements for the functioning of the euro area, but that the convergence criteria and the implementation of the measures for ensuring compliance with them must now be revised; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocks;

Amendment 298 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns forthat the role of a fiscal capacity should be to absorb shocks, support sound fiscal and macroeconomic policies at national level and provide the eEuro ~~area in the case of absorbing shocks~~zone with a fiscal backstop;

Amendment 299 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; ~~considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocks;~~

Amendment 3 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 1

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), especially Article ~~3 thereof, which establishes the creation of the single market, whose currency is the euro~~s 3 and 50 thereof,

Amendment 3 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Points out that the success of the eurozone is dependent on increasing the welfare of all its citizens~~, and on well- functioning labour markets and~~; is convinced that growth and prosperity go hand in hand with labour markets which react to supply and demand and with properly functioning welfare systems, based on decent work with rights, a strong role for the social partners, social dialogue, collective bargaining and collective agreements~~, and~~; emphasises that European minimum standards are an effective way of preventing individual Member States from trying to gain an unfair competitive advantage by infringing workers’ rights or promoting social dumping;

Amendment 3 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Dariusz ROSATI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Believes, however, that the crisis enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be progressively completed; considers that public confidence will only be rebuilt through the development of a progressive and comprehensive roadmap; calls for this roadmap to be urgently established;

Amendment 30 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes the creation of the single market, whose currency is the euro; whereas the E~~urope~~conomic and Monetary Union of the European Union currently consists of ~~19 m~~28 Member~~s, two of whom~~ States, out of these only 19 Member States shavre ~~opt-out clauses, the remaining seven EU Member States having yet to join; whereas~~the common currency and form part of the euro area; whereas of the nine Member States whose currency is not the euro, one Member has an opt-out and one Member has an opt-in from joining the common currency and no financial liability will be incurred by the ~~two~~se countries ~~with opt-outs from EMU~~ in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area; whereas the remaining seven EU Member States are bound by their Treaties of Accession to the European Union to join the common currency once they fulfil the necessary criteria;

Amendment 30 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Amendment 30 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Takes note of different proposals ~~for this purpose,~~ with different designs and assigning different functions;

Amendment 300 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should~~, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in~~ be an instrument of last resort, and be activated only in case of large asymmetric shocks theat ca~~se of absorbing shocks~~nnot be fully absorbed by responsible national fiscal policy;

Amendment 301 #

Sylvie GOULARD, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Lieve WIERINCK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that a revived non bail-out clause might provide sufficient incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; ~~considers that a fiscal capacity for absorbing shocks should, relate to address specific Eurozone concerns;~~

Amendment 302 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro ~~area in the case of absorbing shocks~~to prevent shocks and in order to enable daily political management;

Amendment 303 #

Fabio DE MASI, Matt CARTHY, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that ~~incentives for sound~~sound and progressive fiscal policymaking and ~~for~~ addressing structural weaknesses at national and cross-border level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocks;

Amendment 304 #

Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, ~~taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance,~~ are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, ~~address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shock~~strengthen the resilience of the Member States' economies by increasing competitiveness;

Amendment 305 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shockand European level, fighting tax avoidance, halting the fiscal devaluation race among Member States, and taking into account that a more integrated European economy needs some kind of new common fiscal figures;

Amendment 306 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are ~~core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocks~~elements that are detrimental to the sovereignty of the Member States; considers that a fiscal capacity is not politically viable given that the concept is so firmly rejected by the peoples of Europe;

Amendment 307 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specia fiscal capacity for the euro area would be absolutely incapable of solving the very serious structural problems of EMU and the resultant internal macroeconomic imbalances; considers that such a system would run the risk of transforming deficit co~~ncerns for the eur~~untries on the periphery into are~~a in the case of absorbing shock~~gions structurally dependent on transfers from the central creditor countries;

Amendment 308 #

Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)

14a. Stresses that the euro area needs to diminish the risk for the public budgets and to financial stability by creating an environment conducive to private risk- sharing and, in that regard, by achieving a genuine Banking Union and Capital Markets Union, which together with the shock absorbing function of the fiscal capacity will enable trade-offs in shock absorption;

Amendment 309 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)

14a. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national and European level, are core elements for fighting tax avoidance, halting the fiscal devaluation race among Member States, and taking into account that a more integrated European economy needs some kind of new common fiscal figures;

Amendment 31 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes the creation of the single market, and a European Monetary Union whose currency is the euro; whereas the ~~European Monetary Union currently consists of 19 members, two of whom~~Single Market consists of the 28 members of the EU and the European Monetary Union currently consists of 19 members; whereas all but two Member States are bound to join the euro; whereas the two Member States not bound to join the euro have ‘opt-outs’ clauses, th~~e remaining seven EU Member States having yet to join;~~at are different in nature and scope as only the United Kingdom is not committed to join the euro whereas no financial liability will be incurred by the two countries with opt-outs from EMU in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area;

Amendment 31 #

Maria João RODRIGUES, Jutta STEINRUCK, Brando BENIFEI, Elena GENTILE, Sergio GUTIÉRREZ PRIETO, Joachim SCHUSTER

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Points out that in order to stabilise the social situation in Member States during future cyclical downturns, economic stabilisers such as a European Unemployment Insurance (EUI) scheme should ~~strengthen the welfare state~~be considered as an instrument helping to uphold growth levels and fight social deprivation otherwise caused by one- sided fiscal discipline measures taken under the European economic governance framework; stresses that an EUI scheme must include safeguards to prevent a lowering of national unemployment insurance standards, it should be financed by taxes (e.g. corporate taxation), should be complementary to national schemes and address cyclical unemployment only; looks forward to the publication of the final report of the study on Feasibility and Added Value of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme, conducted for the Commission under a Pilot Project initiated by the European Parliament and expects the Commission swiftly to follow up on this study with legislative proposals, also in the context of the roadmap envisaged by the Five Presidents' Report;

Amendment 31 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Reiterates that the approaches taken to date to bring eurozone countries' economic cycles more into line with each other and reduce macroeconomic imbalances, inter alia through welfare cuts, more flexible labour markets, public- infrastructure cuts and other so-called structural reforms, have failed to a large degree to meet their targets, have been counter-productive to some extent and, as a result, have plunged the economies concerned into a deep recession;

Amendment 310 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)

14a. Recalls the objective of full employment stipulated in Article 3.3 of the Treaty on the European Union; considers that a Eurozone budgetary capacity is an important instrument for achieving this goal, as well as for fostering convergence among EMU members, and for the stabilization and the sustainable development of the Eurozone economy.

Amendment 311 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)

14a. Stresses that a sufficient degree of wage and price flexibility, and labour mobility need to be guaranteed to ensure that a fiscal capacity is sustainable and does not lead to permanent transfers between Member States;

Amendment 312 #

Nils TORVALDS, Michael THEURER, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Amendment 313 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Amendment 314 #

Bernd KÖLMEL, Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER, Bernd LUCKE, Bas BELDER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Amendment 315 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Stresses that if a fiscal capacity ~~must~~is to be created, it should be in addition and on top of the existing EU ~~funding ins~~budget and without any detruiments, to it, and within its legal framework, in order to ensure consistent development between euro and non-euro Member States; Emphasizes that the planned EU funding instruments should be addressed to all EU Member States so that they are consistent with the fundamental values of the European integration such as the Single Market and should not undermine the competitiveness of the EU Member States as well as the EU as a whole;

Amendment 316 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Stresses that a fiscal capacity must be created on top of and next to existing EU funding instruments, within ~~its~~the EU legal framework, in order to ensure consistent ~~development~~synergies and complementarity between euro and non-euro Member States; stresses that, in the long run, genuine own resources in the form of taxation will have to abound a budget of the Eurozone; Such specific budget could go hand-in-hand with a transfer of competences exercised today at national level that could be best dealt with at Eurozone level;

Amendment 317 #

Sylvie GOULARD, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Lieve WIERINCK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Stresses that, while seeking complementarities and avoiding overlaps, a fiscal capacity must be created on top of existing EU funding instruments, within its legal framework, in order to ensure consistent development between euro and non-euro Member States; considers however that the option of an ad-hoc Euro area Treaty should not be disregarded, as this has been the tool chosen for the UK settlement;

Amendment 318 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Stresses that a fiscal capacity must be created on top of existing EU funding instruments, within its legal framework, in order to ensure consistent development between euro and non-euro Member States; emphasizes that for any new instrument, payments have to be carried out on the basis of an automatic mechanism to avoid escalating payment backlogs;

Amendment 319 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Stresses that a fiscal capacity ~~mus~~cannot be created on top of existing EU funding instruments, within its legal framework~~, in order to ensure consistent development between euro and non-euro Member States~~;

Amendment 32 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Treaty on European Union ~~establishes the creation of the single market~~contains the objective, inter alia, to establish an internal market and an economic and monetary union, whose currency is the euro; whereas the European Monetary Union currently consists of 19 members, two of whom have opt-out clauses, the remaining seven EU Member States having yet to join; whereas no financial liability will be incurred by the two countries with opt-outs from EMU in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area;

Amendment 32 #

Enrique CALVET CHAMBON

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Points out that ~~in order to stabilise the social situation in Member States, economic stabilisers such as a~~economic, cultural and social situation differs greatly across and within Member States; while stressing the importance of continuing with "ad hoc" structural reforms, economic stabilisers could help some Member States in a situation of an adverse shock. One of the targets of the budget should be financing important tools (for example an European Unemployment Insurance (EUI) scheme ~~should strengthen the welfare~~ to enhance cohesion); takes note of the numerous administrative and ~~fight social deprivation caused by one- sided fiscal discipline measures taken under the European economic governance framework~~political burdens that the establishment of these tools would face and calls therefore on the Commission to evaluate the feasibility of such an instrument like EUI;

Amendment 32 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Recalls it permanent call for the insertion of the European Stability Mechanism within the EU legal framework and requests it to be done as soon as possible; recommends its transformation into a European Monetary Fund, acting as a specific shock- absorption instrument within the Eurozone budgetary capacity, which could thus reach about the dimension indicated by the MacDougall and Delors Reports as necessary to sustain the Economic and Monetary Union;

Amendment 320 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Stresses that a fiscal capacity ~~mus~~cannot be created ~~on top of existing EU funding instruments, within its legal framework,~~ without the backing o~~rder to ensure consistent development between euro and non-euro Member States~~f the peoples of Europe concerned;

Amendment 321 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Stresses that a Eurozone fiscal capacity must be created on top of existing EU funding instruments, and within its legal framework~~, in order to ensure consistent development between euro and non-euro Member States~~; however it must be ring fenced from contributions from countries with euro currency 'opt-outs';

Amendment 322 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Stresses that a fiscal capacity must be created on top of existing EU funding instruments, within ithe Union's legal framework, ~~in order to~~and ensure consistent development between eEurozone and non-e Eurozone Member States;

Amendment 323 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Stresses that creating a fiscal capacity ~~must be created on top of existing EU funding instruments, within its legal framework, in order to ensure consistent development between euro and non-euro~~for the euro area would set the seal on a definitive split between those countries that adopt the single currency and those that have kept their own currencies, undermining the principles of social and territorial cohesion and solidarity between Member States;

Amendment 324 #

Isabelle THOMAS, Constanze KREHL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)

15a. Upholds that this instrument should be used to invest in public goods, with an Eurozone added value and taking into account national contexts; underlines that the access to a fiscal capacity involves an agreement that incentivizes the investment in these domains; asks the Commission to explore the potential fields where a fiscal capacity can have such an Eurozone added value and how synergy with the Eurozone budget can be brought about; underlines that the access to a fiscal capacity involves an agreement that incentivizes the investment in these domains;

Amendment 325 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)

15a. Considers that the budgetary capacity and the incentive measures for convergence within the euro area are additional tools dedicated to the euro area;

Amendment 326 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 b (new)

15b. Points to out that some crisis management mechanisms, such as European Stability Mechanism (ESM), are not covered by the EU budget, whereas other lending and guarantee instruments are indeed protected by the EU budget either directly or by the Guarantee Fund; insist that any lending operation of which the risk is covered by the EU budget, should not lead to cuts in EU budget lines that are not linked to national envelopes, particularly in heading 1a;

Amendment 327 #

Nils TORVALDS, Michael THEURER, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

~~16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resources;~~deleted

Amendment 328 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

~~16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resources;~~deleted

Amendment 329 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Burkhard BALZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires ~~sufficient resources;~~ more resources than a fiscal capacity could provide, thus it is too small to address shocks of this dimension and will not be able to rescue large euro area Member States, just as little as the ESM would be on its own merits; stresses that Member States are responsible for servicing their own debt and that the fiscal capacity should not have the task of rescuing euro countries in difficulties, which is explicitly forbidden by Article 125 TFEU; adds that the scope of any potential fiscal capacity should be to increase the competitiveness and resilience of an economy, therefore limit the extent of shocks that hit the economy and prevent future crises;

Amendment 33 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes the creation of the single market, whose currency is the euro; whereas the European Monetary Union currently consists of 19 members~~, two of whom have opt-out clauses, the remaining seven EU Member States having yet to join~~; whereas no financial liability will be incurred by the two countries with opt-outs from EMU in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area;

Amendment 33 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Amendment 33 #

Sylvie GOULARD, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Jean ARTHUIS, Michael THEURER, Lieve WIERINCK

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Points out in this connection that a European unemployment insurance scheme, which would complement rather than replace national unemployment insurance systems, could help cushion asymmetric economic shocks, increase labour market convergence, strengthen EMU's social pillars, and establish a direct link between the EU level and European citizens;

Amendment 330 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires ~~sufficient resources~~adequate own resources, drawing lessons from one of the main failures of the EU budget coming from the expectation of a "fair return", calculated only in numerical terms; recalls the creation of the interinstitutional group on own resources (the Monti group), whose creation in itself reveals an awareness of this problem;

Amendment 331 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resources and that the reflection on new own resources for the EU should be deepened and pursued; awaits with great interest the findings and recommendations of the final report of the High Level Group on Own Resources due for December 2016;

Amendment 332 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Urmas PAET, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Points out that ~~effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resource~~in order to access the fiscal capacity, Eurozone members will have to qualify for it and converge the way they did in the run-up to the euro; Notes that the creation of the fiscal capacity must go hand-in-hand with the democratisation and strengthening of the governance structure of the Eurozone as well as the harmonisation of national public accounts;

Amendment 333 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. ~~Points out~~Acknowledges that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries may requires sufficient resources;. These resources can be made available via mix of domestic fiscal policy, existing instruments (including the ESM) and potentially newly considered tools such as a budgetary capacity for the eurozone.

Amendment 334 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resources; considers that in this respect and in accordance with historical texts on the subject, the future budget of the euro area must be equivalent to a minimum of 3% of the GDP of this area;

Amendment 335 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resources; stresses that the stabilization function of the fiscal capacity should not be undermined by fiscal rules;

Amendment 336 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resources, and that the huge scale of the task makes it politically impracticable to carry it out;

Amendment 337 #

Bernd KÖLMEL, Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER, Bernd LUCKE, Bas BELDER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires ~~sufficient resourc~~an enormous amount of resources at the expense of taxpayers in other countries;

Amendment 338 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires ~~sufficient resources~~a direct link between decision making and accountability;

Amendment 339 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires ~~sufficient resources~~a credible no bail-out clause;

Amendment 34 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes the creation of the single market, whose currency is the euro; whereas the European Monetary Union referred to in TEU article 3.4 currently consists of 19 members~~, two of whom~~ having the Euro, two members haveing opt-out clauses, and the remaining seven EU Member States ~~having yet~~bound to join; whereas no financial liability will be incurred by the two countries with opt-outs from EMU in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area;

Amendment 34 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Points out that in order to stabilise the social situation in Member States and drastically to reduce unemployment, economic stabilisers such as a European Unemployment Insurance (EUI) scheme should strengthen the welfare state and fight social deprivation caused by one- sided fiscal discipline measures taken under the European economic governance framework;

Amendment 34 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Marisa MATIAS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Points out that a budgetary capacity aiming to provide conditional incentives for structural reforms can be established on the basis of the current Treaties, if need be through enhanced cooperation;

Amendment 340 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Takes the view that the European Investment bank (EIB) supported by guarantees from the European Central Bank (ECB) can complement a fiscal capacity and play a key role in promoting public investment programs in the EU;

Amendment 341 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Notes the complexity and lack of credibility of the EU economic governance; urges the Commission to work towards EU fiscal framework with a better economic and social rationale;

Amendment 342 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3

~~Three pillars of the fiscal capacity~~deleted

Amendment 343 #

Sylvie GOULARD, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Nils TORVALDS, Lieve WIERINCK

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3

~~Three pillars of the fiscal capacity~~deleted

Amendment 344 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Considers that, in opposition to the ESM, EFSF, EFSM which were conceived as emergency tools, the budgetary capacity of the euro area should be seen as a permanent governance tool and fund the stability of the Euro area, labour mobility, investment to bring prosperity, in order to make it an optimal currency area;

Amendment 345 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Brian HAYES, Dariusz ROSATI, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 346 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Considers that three different functions have to be fulfilled; argues, first, that in order to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’' structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that ~~differences in th~~more efforts have to be made to stabilise business cycle movements of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a wholeover time, since business cycle fluctuations across euro countries are highly correlated, but differ in variance, which explains why shocks in the euro area are of a more symmetric nature with differences in the boom-bust dynamics of growth rates in individual Member States, especially experienced by euro countries of the periphery; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed at national level, while respecting the SGP and maintaining budgetary discipline, by making economies more competitive so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole; adds that in the reform of the SGP in 2005, the European Council asked EU Member States to strengthen their domestic fiscal governance through fiscal rules and institutions at national level and further reinforced national fiscal frameworks following the adoption of the Budgetary Frameworks Directive, the Fiscal Compact and the Two-Pack;

Amendment 347 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 348 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Considers that th~~ree different~~e theoretical founcdations have to be fulfilled; argues, first, that in order to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’ structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a wholefor macroeconomic "imbalances" and "shocks" are insufficiently specified, prone to confusing cause and effect, and too vague to shape the new economic governance structure of the EMU;

Amendment 349 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Considers ~~that three different functions have to be fulfilled; argues, first,~~ that in order to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’ structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole;

Amendment 35 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes the creation of the single market, whose currency is the euro; whereas the European Monetary Union currently consists of 19 members, t~~wo of whom~~hat have adopt~~-out clauses, the remaining seven EU Member States~~ed the euro as their currency, seven that hav~~ing~~e yet to join and two that have opt-out clauses; whereas no financial liability will be incurred by the two countries with opt-outs from EMU in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area;

Amendment 35 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Amendment 35 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 b (new)

3b. Underlines the fact that real convergence between eurozone members, which is necessary, is possible, in particular through strengthened social cohesion brought about by bringing differing standards of living more into line with each other in the medium term and expanding social welfare systems; reaffirms that that requires public investment and stronger domestic demand across the board; in this connection, regards the proposed budgetary capacity as one of a variety of possible tools for funding such investment;

Amendment 350 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Considers that ~~three different functions have to be fulfilled; argues, first, that in order~~a sound management of the Euro area must include notably the following elements: to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’ structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so asto address asymmetric shocks, to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole;

Amendment 351 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Considers that ~~three~~ different functions have to be fulfilled~~; argues, first, that in order~~ to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic ~~competitiveness and~~ resilience of the euro area, Member States’ structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for; argues that structural differences of euro area Member States create the need for coherent, cohesion and industrial, policies as well as an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers~~, thirdly,~~ that symmetric shocks should be addressed so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole;

Amendment 352 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 353 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Considers that three different functions have to be fulfilled by the Eurozone fiscal capacity, which requires the setting up of a Euro area treasury ; argues, first, that in order to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’ structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole;

Amendment 354 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Considers that ~~three~~ different ~~func~~conditions have to be fulfilled; argues, first, that in order to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’ structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole before a fiscal capacity can be established, particularly compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact, compliance with the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and effective implementation of the country specific recommendations; argues, that to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’ need to step up efforts to effectively implement structural reforms;

Amendment 355 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 356 #

Tibor SZANYI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 357 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Considers that the following three different functions have to be fulfilled even without fiscal capacity; argues, first, that in order to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’ structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole;

Amendment 358 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 359 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 36 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes the creation of the single market, whose currency is the euro; whereas the European Monetary Union currently consists of 19 members, two ~~of whom~~Member States have opt-out clauses, the remaining seven EU Member States having yet to join the euro; whereas no financial liability will be incurred by the two countries with opt-outs from EMU in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area;

Amendment 36 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Takes the view that the Member States should be provided with incentives and expertise to help them implement agreed structural reforms designed to enhance their competitiveness and their ability to withstand crises; points out that, if such incentives take the form of financial assistance, they should be linked to requirements such as compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact, in order not to undermine the principle of national responsibility and responsibility vis-à-vis the other Member States and to rule out deadweight effects;

Amendment 36 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 b (new)

3b. Points out that if a budgetary capacity would aim to provide support for adjustment to asymmetric or symmetric shocks, mechanisms to strengthen economic integration and convergence will need to develop from decentralized national fiscal policies towards further sovereignty sharing within common institutions, with increased democratic control at EU level, implying also a general use of the ordinary legislative procedure where this is not yet the case;

Amendment 360 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 361 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

17a. Emphasises that resilience to external shocks is increased by Member States implementing structural reforms which increase the flexibility and market orientation of the economy, emphasizes that such reforms also reduce the likelihood of large imbalances; emphasizes that the link between democratic decision-making and financial accountability must not be severed;

Amendment 362 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

17a. Insists that if a fiscal capacity is to be created, it could be activated to address symmetric shocks only when national fiscal policies have been used to its full potential and only when Member States observe the EU fiscal rules, including the Medium Term Objective;

Amendment 363 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 364 #

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Michael THEURER, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 365 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 366 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Argues in consequence that three pillars of a fiscal capacity should be distinguished, wherein action should be undertaken in the framework of a common toolbox to address the different functions, i.e. incentivising convergence and sustainable structural reforms, absorbing asymmetric shocks, and absorbing symmetric shocks; understands that all this needs to depart from a prior recognition of the political, economic, and social realities concretely characterizing each member state and then to be designed in terms of these realities, in the respect of the values of subsidiarity, transparency and accountability; takes note of the various proposals regarding designs put forward on this matter by politicians and academia;

Amendment 367 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Argues in consequence that three pillars of a fiscal capacity should be distinguished, wherein action should be undertaken in the framework of a common toolbox to address the different functions, i.e. incentivising convergence and sustainable structural reforms, absorbing asymmetric shocks, and absorbing symmetric shocks; takes note of the various proposals regarding designs put forward on this matter by politicians and academiathe current Treaties, especially considering the subsidiarity principle laid down in Article 5 TEU;

Amendment 368 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Argues in consequence that three pillars of a fiscal capacity should be distinguished, wherein action should be undertaken in the framework of a common toolbox to address the different functions, i.e. incentivising convergence and sustainable structural reforms, absorbing asymmetric shocks, and absorbing symmetric shocks; takes note of the various proposals regarding designs put forward on this matter by politicians and academia; repeats that full compliance with existing fiscal rules grants significant space for fiscal reaction to adverse developments within national budgets.

Amendment 369 #

Ernest MARAGALL, Bas EICKHOUT

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Argues in consequence that three pillars of a fiscal capacity should be distinguished, wherein action should be undertaken in the framework of a common toolbox ~~to address the different functions, i.e. incentivising~~with complementary but distinct instruments to support convergence and ~~sustainable~~ structural reforms~~, absorbing asymmetric shocks, and absorbing symmetric shocks; takes note of the various proposals regarding designs put forward on this matter by politicians and academia~~ and to address crises;

Amendment 37 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes the creation of the single market, whose currency is the euro; whereas the European Monetary Union currently consists of 19 members, two of whom have opt-out clauses, the remaining seven EU Member States having yet to join; whereas no financial liability ~~will~~is expected to be incurred by ~~the two countries with opt- outs from EMU~~non-euro area Member States in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area;

Amendment 37 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Takes the view that the Member States should be provided with financial support to help them implement agreed structural reforms designed to enhance their competitiveness and their ability to withstand crises; points out that this financial assistance should be linked to requirements such as compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact, in order not to undermine the principle of national responsibility and rule out deadweight effects stemming from a switch to a transfer union;

Amendment 37 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 c (new)

3c. Considers furthermore that in such case the integration of the ESM in the EU legal framework is recommendable and that consideration must be given to the establishment of a Treasury within the Commission to manage and supervise the common resources and policies related to them;

Amendment 370 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Argues in consequence that three pillars of a fiscal capacity – each clearly identifying and attributing European and national responsibilities – should be distinguished, wherein action should be undertaken in the framework of a common toolbox to address the different functions, i.e. incentivising convergence and sustainable structural reforms, absorbing asymmetric shocks, and absorbing symmetric shocks; takes note of the various proposals regarding designs put forward on this matter by politicians and academia;

Amendment 371 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 372 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Argues in consequence that three pillars of a fiscal capacity should be distinguished, wherein action should be undertaken in the framework of a common toolbox to address the different functions, i.e. ~~incentivising convergence and sustainable~~promoting convergence and deeper coordination as regards fiscal, macroeconomic policies and sustainable and outcome-oriented structural reforms, absorbing asymmetric shocks, and absorbing symmetric shocks; takes note of the various proposals regarding designs put forward on this matter by politicians and academia;

Amendment 373 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 374 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 375 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 376 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Amendment 377 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Argues in consequence that three pillars of a fiscal capacity should be distinguished, wherein action should be undertaken in the framework of a ~~common~~ toolbox to address the different functions, i.e. incentivising convergence and sustainable structural reforms, absorbing asymmetric shocks, and absorbing symmetric shocks; takes note of the various proposals regarding designs put forward on this matter by politicians and academia;

Amendment 378 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)

18a. Believes that real convergence should be incentivised through a better use of existing funds from the EU budget, while asymmetric and symmetric shocks should be addressed, notably by the ESM and a special fund providing targeted financial assistance in accordance with Articles 136, 175 and 352 TFEU;

Amendment 379 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)

18a. Calls for the creation of a euro area fiscal capacity within the EU budget and over and above the ceilings of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MMF) to be considered as an assigned revenue according to art. 21 of Regulation 966/2012;

Amendment 38 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Aa. whereas the Treaty requires the Union to foster sustainable development based on economic growth, aiming at full employment and social progress and promoting economic, social and regional cohesion and solidarity between Member States;

Amendment 38 #

Joachim SCHUSTER

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Welcomes the Commission's announcement to extend the European Fund for Strategic Investments until 2018; demands, however, that the investment capacity for the Eurozone be considerably expanded and suggests a further evolution of the European Fund for Strategic Investments enabling the expansion of public investments in order to react adequately to economic downturns and to overcome more swiftly future economic crises;

Amendment 38 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

~~4. Recalls that such capacity should be part of the EU budget as laid down in Article 310(1) TFEU and should comply with the provisions of Articles 310(4) and 312(1) TFEU;~~deleted

Amendment 380 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)

18a. Calls for the fiscal capacity to be financed by recurrent Member States contributions and a common borrowing capacity, while a roadmap to increase own resources at either the EU or the Euro Area level shall be established;

Amendment 381 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)

18b. Stresses that a revision of the existing fiscal rules based on the introduction of simpler, countercyclical and transparent rules would complement this framework by enhancing its credibility and its consistency, by increasing national ownership and by reducing moral hazard;

Amendment 382 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)

18b. Considers that such a fiscal capacity should be open to participation of Member States with a temporary derogation from adopting the euro;

Amendment 383 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 c (new)

18c. Underlines that such a fiscal capacity can be, as a first step, financed by contributions from participating Member States or specific revenues classified as "other revenues", and in a second step by establishing, in the Own Resources Decision, a new own resource that is to be financed by participating Member States; considers that in a steady state a revision upwards of the own resources ceiling should be agreed in order to be adapted to a multitier budget, and that appropriate provisions to better manage such a multitier budget should be finally incorporated into the Treaties;

Amendment 384 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 d (new)

18d. Stresses that the fiscal capacity should be financed by additional resources and not by redeployments within the current Union budget and Multiannual Financial Framework;

Amendment 385 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Demands that the ESM be integrated into the Union’s legal framework and evolve towards a Community mechanism, as provided for in the ESM Treaty and as constantly requested by the European Parliament and foreseen in the Five Presidents’ report; underlines that the ECJ Pringle case-law and jurisprudence open up the possibility of bringing the ESM within the Union’s framework, within the existing Treaties, on the basis of Article 352 TFEU; calls, therefore, on the Commission to bring forward as a matter of urgency a legislative proposal to that end; demands that the ESM be made fully accountable to the European Parliament;deleted

Amendment 386 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Amendment 387 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Amendment 388 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Amendment 389 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Demands that the ESM be integrated into the Union’'s legal framework and evolve towards a Community mechanism, as provided for in the ESM Treaty and as constantly requested by the European Parliament and foreseen in the Five Presidents’' report; underlines that the ECJ Pringle case-law and jurisprudence open up the possibility of bringing the ESM within the Union’s framework, within the existing Treaties, on the basis of Article 352 TFEU; calls, therefore, on the Commission to bring forward as a matter of urgency a legislative proposal to that endwith respect to the ESM Treaty concluded inter alia that the ESM does not fall within the remit of the exclusive competence of the EU over monetary policy, that the conferral of new tasks on the Commission and ECB is compatible with their powers as those do not entail any powers to make decisions of their own and that the operation of the ESM is not precluded by general principle of effective judicial protection, as EU treaties do not establish a specific competence for the EU to set up the ESM and hence this is not an implementation of EU law to which the EU Charter of Fundamental rights would be applicable; emphasises that the ECJ further ruled that stability support is only granted subject to strict conditionality and when such support 'is indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole'; demands that the ESM be made ~~fully~~ accountable to the European Parliament in the long-term by inserting the established instrument into the Community framework;

Amendment 39 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Aa. whereas the Member States of the Eurozone should comply with the Maastricht criteria;

Amendment 39 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Points out that a Rainy Day Fund featured prominently in the academic literature could be established within the current Treaty;

Amendment 39 #

Pascal DURAND

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Recalls that such capacity should be part of the EU budget ~~as laid down in Article 310(1) TFEU and should comply with the provisions of Articles 310(4) and 312(1) TFEU~~, outside the ceilings of the multiannual financial framework (MFF);

Amendment 390 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Amendment 391 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. ~~Demands that~~Questions whether the ESM could be integrated into the Union’s legal framework and evolve towards a Community mechanism, as provided for in the ESM Treaty and as constantly requested by the European Parliament and foreseen in the Five Presidents’ report; underlines that the ECJ Pringle case-law and jurisprudence does not open up the possibility of bringing the ESM within the Union’s framework, within the existing Treaties, on the basis of Article 352 TFEU; calls, therefore, on the Commission to bring forward as a matter of urgency a legislative proposal to that end; demands that the ESM be made fully accountable to the European Parliamentout a complete treaty change;

Amendment 392 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Demands that the ESM be integrated into the Union’s legal framework and evolve towards a Community mechanism, as provided for in the ESM Treaty and as constantly requested by the European Parliament and foreseen in the Five Presidents’ report; underlines that the ECJ Pringle case-law and jurisprudence open up the possibility of bringing the ESM within the Union’s framework, within the existing Treaties, on the basis of Article 352 TFEU; calls, therefore, on the Commission to ~~bring forward as a matter of urgency~~firstly conduct a complex study on that issue as well as start a deep and fact-based political discussion on the matter, and only then bring forward a legislative proposal to that end; demands that the ESM be made fully accountable to the European Parliament;

Amendment 393 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Demands that the ESM be integrated into the Union’s legal framework and evolve towards a Community mechanism, as provided for in the ESM Treaty and as constantly requested by the European Parliament and foreseen in the Five Presidents’ report; underlines that the ECJ Pringle case-law and jurisprudence open up the possibility of bringing the ESM within the Union’s framework, within the existing Treaties~~, on the basis of Article 352 TFEU~~; calls, therefore, on the Commission to bring forward as a matter of urgency a legislative proposal to that end; ~~demands that the ESM be made fully accountable to the European Parliament;~~

Amendment 394 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Amendment 395 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Demands that the ESM be integrated into the Union’s legal framework and evolve towards a Community mechanism, ~~as provided for in the ESM Treaty and~~ as constantly requested by the European Parliament and ~~foreseen~~called for in the Five Presidents’ report; underlines that the ECJ Pringle case-law and jurisprudence open up the possibility of bringing the ESM within the Union’s framework, within the existing Treaties~~, on the basis of Article 352 TFEU~~; calls, therefore, on the Commission to bring forward as a matter of urgency a legislative proposal to that end; demands that the ESM be made fully accountable to the European Parliament;

Amendment 396 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Demands that the ESM be integrated into the Union’'s legal framework ~~and evolve towards a Community mechanism~~, as provided for in the ESM Treaty and as constantly requested by the European Parliament and foreseen in the Five Presidents’' report; underlines that the ECJ Pringle case~~-law~~ and jurisprudence open up the possibility of bringing the ESM within the Union’'s framework, within the existing Treaties, on the basis of Article 352 TFEU; calls, therefore, on the Commission to bring forward as a matter of urgency a legislative proposal to that end; demands that the ESM be made fully accountable to the European Parliament;

Amendment 397 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Demands that the ESM be integrated into the Union’s legal framework and evolve towards a Community mechanism, ~~as provided for in the ESM Treaty and~~ as constantly requested by the European Parliament and foreseen in the Five Presidents’ report; underlines that the ECJ Pringle case-law and jurisprudence open up the possibility of bringing the ESM within the Union’s framework, within the existing Treaties, on the basis of Article 352 TFEU; calls, therefore, on the Commission to bring forward as a matter of urgency a legislative proposal to that end; demands that the ESM be made fully accountable to the European Parliament;

Amendment 398 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affected;deleted

Amendment 399 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affected;deleted

Amendment 4 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 a (new)

– having regard to the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), in particular Article 5 thereof;

Amendment 4 #

Daciana Octavia SÂRBU, Cătălin Sorin IVAN

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Points out that the success of the eEurozone is dependent on increasing the welfare of all its citizens, and on well- functioning labour markets and welfare systems, based on ~~decent work with rights, a strong role for the social partners, social dialogue, collective bargaining and collective agreements, and preventing individual Member States from trying~~boosting economic growth and job creation, on aiming to full employment with permanent increase of high added value jobs; recalls the creation as quick as possible of an European Labour market, as a frame, with full and fair mobility which should complement the EMU, increasing its shock absorbing capacity and give citizens the opportunity to seek employment or employees in other Member States allowing more individuals to gafind a~~n unfair competitive advantage by infr~~ decent job; takes note that a strong role of social partners, fair bargainging ~~workers’ rights or promoting social dumping~~, negotiations and agreements should also be allowed by the budgetary capacity;

Amendment 4 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Believes that the crisis enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be progressively completed, while the European treaties have not provided the instruments necessary to tackle shocks in the eurozone;

Amendment 40 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)

Ab. whereas Article 5 TEU lays down the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality which apply to the exercise of Union competences;

Amendment 40 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. ~~Regrets the fact that the current~~Notes that the still new system of European economic governance is highly unbalanced and focuses almost exclusively on fiscal stability and wage competitiveness, while concerns about economic recovery, public investment policies and more and better jobs and social cohesion are largely ignoredmust continue to prove its worth and that monitoring of its effectiveness is important as the basis for positive further development;

Amendment 40 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Recalls that such capacity should be part of the EU budget as laid down in Article 310(1) TFEU and should comply with the provisions of Articles 310(4) and 312(1) TFEU, but outside the Multi- Annual Financial Framework;

Amendment 400 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affected;deleted

Amendment 401 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affected;deleted

Amendment 402 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affected;deleted

Amendment 403 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affected;deleted

Amendment 404 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affected;deleted

Amendment 405 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity and its responsibility for ensuring that, after the necessary transition period all necessary conditions are in place for – if and when needed - an orderly restructuring of national sovereign debt to restore fiscal sustainability and allow an overly indebted member state a fresh start; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affected; underscores the own responsibility Member States have in managing their national budgets;

Amendment 406 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity; sStresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affected;

Amendment 407 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate~~, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity~~; stresses that an EMF should bhave man~~aged by the Commission an~~ independent board held democratically accountable by the European Parliament and whose financial assistance programme should be submitted to a consent vote by this institution; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affected; argues that the EMF should include a debt restructuring settlement mechanism consistent with the recently adopted UN principles

Amendment 408 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that an EMF should be managed and owned by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; ~~emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affected;~~

Amendment 409 #

Bernd LUCKE, Bernd KÖLMEL, Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affected; calls for the possibility of also including the candidate countries in the ESM;

Amendment 41 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A c (new)

Ac. whereas Article 123 TFEU prohibits the monetary financing of governments;

Amendment 41 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Regrets the fact that the current system of European economic governance is highly unbalanced and focuses almost exclusively on fiscal stability and wage competitiveness, while concerns about economic recovery, public investment policies and more and better jobs and social cohesion are largely ignoredvoluntary economic coordination arrangements are inadequate and that most of the country-specific recommendations are not implemented; is convinced that structural reforms can help to boost economic recovery and thus generate more investment and more jobs, which will in turn enhance social cohesion;

Amendment 41 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Recalls that such capacity should be part of the EU budget and be financed through own resources as laid down in Article 310(1) TFEU and should comply with the provisions of Articles 310(4) and 312(1) TFEU;

Amendment 410 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and held democraticallyto be further developed and consolidated into a fully- fledged European Monetary Fund (EMF) for countries in difficulties within the Euro area; stresses that, just like the ESM, an EMF should be held accountable by the European Parliament; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affected;

Amendment 411 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities ~~and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity~~; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affected;

Amendment 412 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the Members of the European Parliament elected in the contributing Member States; emphasises that national parliaments would be adequately involved in the process, ~~given that~~if their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources ~~could~~were to be affected;

Amendment 413 #

Fabio DE MASI, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the European Parliament as well as national Parliaments; emphasises that national parliaments would be fully involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affected;

Amendment 414 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ~~ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into~~creation of a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities, equipped with a banking license, and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that an EMF should be ~~managed by the Commission and~~ held democratically accountable by the European Parliament~~; emphasises that~~ with the involvement of national parliaments ~~would be involved~~ in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affected; insists that access to funding by the EMF is not subject to any recessionary macroeconomic conditionality;

Amendment 415 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate~~, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity~~; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affected;

Amendment 416 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Werner LANGEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission ~~and~~, who is held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding ~~financial resource~~the adoption of budgetary decisions could be affected;

Amendment 417 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to aAdds that the mandate and limitations of the ESM are clearly defined in the ruling of the ECJ Pringle case (C- 370/12) and the European Council Decision of 25 March 2011; stresses that the creation of any European Monetary Fund is not possible under the current Treaty framework; any euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affecthould have a clear mandate, not fulfilling the same function as the ESM as a crisis instrument, and be subject to strict conditionality, with a concrete but limited funding source and amount yet to be defined;

Amendment 418 #

Werner LANGEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)

20a. Calls for all Member States of the European Union to be required to contribute to the new European Monetary Fund and to be eligible for assistance from it; rejects any restriction of the European Monetary Fund to Eurozone countries only;

Amendment 419 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)

20a. Suggests that the Commission can take advantage of the zero interest rate to issue bonds in order to finance the purchase of ESM shares back from Member States;

Amendment 42 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A d (new)

Ad. whereas according to Article 125 TFEU it is illegal for a Member State to be liable for the liabilities of another Member State;

Amendment 42 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Regrets the fact that the current ~~system of European economic governance is highly unbalanced and focuses almost exclusively on fiscal stability and wage competitiveness, while concerns abou~~, loose economic coordination arrangements in Europe have not made it possible to implement most of the country- specific recommendations; is convinced that structural reforms can help to boost economic recovery, ~~public~~generate more investment ~~policies~~ and more and better jobs and enhance social cohesion ~~are largely ignored;~~ ;

Amendment 42 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Recalls that ~~such capacity~~any stabilization mechanism should be part of the EU budget as laid down in Article 310 (1) TFEU and should comply with the provisions of Articles 310(4) and 312(1) TFEU;

Amendment 420 #

Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)

20a. Believes that any EMF financial assistance program with a Member State should be based on strict reform conditionality as well as a sustainable debt path.

Amendment 421 #

Bernd KÖLMEL, Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER, Bernd LUCKE, Bas BELDER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Insists that once it is integrated into Community law, the fiscal capacity for the euro area should be integrated into the EU budget, but over and above the ceilings of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF);deleted

Amendment 422 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

Amendment 423 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

Amendment 424 #

Paul TANG, Eider GARDIAZABAL RUBIAL, Isabelle THOMAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. IConsistders that ~~once it is integrated into Community law, the fiscal capacity for~~, apart from the problems of economic sustainability and the consequent macroeconomic imbalances, EMU is suffering from a serious and profound democratic deficit; stresses that the governance institutions of the euro area, s~~hould be integrated into the EU budget, but over and above the ceilings of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)~~uch as the ECB and the Euro Group, have shown, particularly at times of crisis, that they act without even the most basic democratic control and, by means of blackmail and through their actions, control the decisions of the democratically elected governments of the Member States; considers furthermore that intergovernmental arrangements such as ESM are a further threat to democracy;

Amendment 425 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Insists that ~~once it is integrated into Community law,~~ the fiscal capacity ~~for~~, including the eEuro ~~area should be integrated into the EU~~pean Monetary Fund, should be part of the union budget, ~~but~~ over and above the ceilings of the M~~ultiannual Financial Framework (MFF);~~ FF, and should be financed by euro area and participating members via a new specific additional resource to be agreed between participating Member States and to be considered as new assigned revenue; considers that eventually in a steady state a revision to upward the current own resources ceiling should be agreed in order to be adapted to a multitier budget;

Amendment 426 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Insists that ~~once it is integrated into Community law,~~the instruments under the second and third pillar of the fiscal capacity for the euro, including the EMF, area should be integrated into the EU budget, but over and above the ceilings of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF); believes that they should be financed through assigned revenue;

Amendment 427 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Insists that once it is integrated into Community law, the fiscal capacity for the euro area should be integrated into the EU budget, provided control and accountability is the responsibility of those contributing to it, but over and above the ceilings of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF);

Amendment 428 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

Amendment 429 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Insists that ~~once it is integrated into Community law, the~~a fiscal capacity for the euro area should ~~be integ~~coexist but be kept separated ~~into~~from the EU budget~~, but over and above the ceilings of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)~~; underlines however that in no circumstances should the volume of the EU budget fall victim to the creation of budgetary capacity for the Eurozone;

Amendment 43 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A e (new)

Ae. whereas Protocols 12 and 13 to the TEU and TFEU lay down the so-called Maastricht criteria;

Amendment 43 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. ~~Regrets the fact~~Stresses that the ~~current~~ system of ~~European~~ economic governance ~~is highly un~~must be balanced and ~~focuses almost exclusively on~~that, while ensuring fiscal stability and ~~wage~~ competitiveness, ~~while concerns about economic recovery, public investment policies and more and better jobs and social cohesion are largely ignored~~it should also support social cohesion and the creation of quality jobs;

Amendment 43 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. ~~Recall~~Notes that such capacity should be part of the EU budget as laid down in Article 310(1) TFEU and should comply with the provisions of Articles 310(4) and 312(1) TFEU;

Amendment 430 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Insists that once it is integrated into Community law, the fiscal capacity for the euro area should be integrated into the EU budget in the form of a fund, but over and above the ceilings of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF);

Amendment 431 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Insists that once it is integrated into Community law, the fiscal capacity for the euro area should be integrated into the EU budget, but over and above the current ceilings of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF);

Amendment 432 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Insists that once it is integrated into Community law, the fiscal capacity for the euro area ~~should~~must be rin~~tegrated into the EU budget, but over and above the ceilings of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)~~g fenced from contributions from countries with euro currency 'opt-outs';

Amendment 433 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Insists that once it is integrated into Community law, the ~~fiscal capacity for the euro area~~EMF should be integrated into the EU budget, but over and above the ceilings of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF);

Amendment 434 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Insists that once it is integrated into Community law, the fiscal capacity for the euro area should be ~~integrated into the EU budget, but over and above the ceilings of the Multiannu~~established outside the EU budget and fiscal capacity mechanism should be fiscally neutral Fin~~ancial Framework (MFF)~~ long term;

Amendment 435 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)

21a. Points out, further, that there is the need to identify how the Community law could increase the fiscal capacity by creating funds that the newly proposed EMF/ESM could use for the purpose of the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP); Underlines that past imbalances have not been addressed except through counter-productive austerity measures and those that are contributing to the imbalances through the surplus side should also make a contribution to regain equilibrium;

Amendment 436 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)

21a. Calls for the ESM to be dismantled, and for the funds used until now as public guarantees for the bond issuing to be transferred to the EU budget, over and above the ceilings of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), and thus put under democratic control by the Parliament;

Amendment 437 #

Hugues BAYET, Maria João RODRIGUES, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ, Andrea COZZOLINO, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Cătălin Sorin IVAN, Tibor SZANYI, Roberto GUALTIERI, Olle LUDVIGSSON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)

21a. Considers that the fiscal capacity for the euro area should be funded by own resources of the EMU, including revenues from a financial transaction tax, and new financing instruments as Eurobonds;

Amendment 438 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)

21a. Considers that the fiscal capacity for the euro area should be funded not only by contributions, but also by own resources of the EMU, including revenues from a financial transaction tax and ECB profits;

Amendment 439 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)

21a. Notes that the euro currency was supposed to contribute to more unity in Europe, but instead led to more divisiveness because of tensions between creditor and debtor countries of the euro area;

Amendment 44 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the European Monetary Union established under the Maastricht Treaty was not complemented by a genuine European Economic Union; whereas this has created a situation of incompleteness of the EMU where too much has been done to take the blame but not enough to take the credit;

Amendment 44 #

Enrique CALVET CHAMBON

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Regrets the fact that the current system of European economic governance is ~~highly~~ unbalanced and focuses almost exclusively on fiscal stability and wage competitiveness, while concerns about economic recovery, public investment policies ~~and~~, more ~~and better~~ jobs and social cohesion are largely ignored; takes note that convergence should be achieved through reduction of destabilizing budgetary surplus;

Amendment 44 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Recognises the need to avoid imposing an even heavier tax burden on taxpayers and hence that 1) no European tax should be created and 2) European budget expenditure should be subject to a ceiling not exceeding 1% of GDP; 3) calls on the Commission and the Council to propose a reform aimed at rationalising the European budget, not least with a view to stamping out everything conducive to fraud, disorder, cronyism, and propaganda, cutting the Structural Funds, and complying more exactly with the recommendations in the annual reports of the Court of Auditors, which have been very critical in the last 20 years;

Amendment 440 #

Hugues BAYET, Maria João RODRIGUES, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ, Andrea COZZOLINO, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Cătălin Sorin IVAN, Roberto GUALTIERI, Costas MAVRIDES, Olle LUDVIGSSON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)

21b. Stresses that current expenditures from the euro area capacity should routinely be met by current revenues but also highlights the need for a euro area borrowing capacity in order to deal with large symmetric shocks not least as a fiscal backstop to the banking union and in order to facilitate the transition to sustainable public finances in crisis countries in the context of operations of the European Monetary Fund;

Amendment 441 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)

21b. Stresses that a euro area fiscal capacity should be complemented by a long term strategy for debt sustainability and reduction of eurozone countries, including partial pooling and common management of sovereign debt, which would bring down overall re-financing costs and debt/GDP ratios to give more margin for growth enhancing policies and investment;

Amendment 442 #

Jonás FERNÁNDEZ, Pablo ZALBA BIDEGAIN, Paul TANG, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)

21b. Considers that the ECB profits should feed into the Eurozone fiscal capacity, once discounted the current percentage set for reserves; points out that to this effect, OLP applies to the reform of Article 33.1.a) of the ECB Statute; believes that this is particularly relevant in a period of quantitative easing;

Amendment 443 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)

21b. Stresses that adequate mechanisms must be built for the equilibrium to be achieved through symmetrical measures for both ends of the disequilibrium, so that structural BoP countries should make automatically triggered fiscal contributions to the ESM/EMF;

Amendment 444 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

Amendment 445 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

Amendment 446 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

Amendment 447 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

22. Considers that the EFSM and the balance of payment facility should be integrated into the same budgetary chapter as the ESM once the latter is integrated into Community law, thereby providing resources for financial assistance to countries outside the euro area but committed to joining on the basis of the agreed rules; points out that the that the said facilities are under the Commission, thus its integration in the ESM cannot result in its funding and assets becoming intergovernmental as it is the case with the current set-up of the ESM:

Amendment 448 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

22. Considers that the ~~EFSM and the~~ existing balance of payment facility should ~~be integrated into the same budgetary chapter as the ESM once the latter is integrated into Community law, thereby~~remain to provid~~ing~~e resources for financial assistance to countries outside the euro area but committed to joining on the basis of the agreed rules;;

Amendment 449 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

22. Considers that the EFSM and the balance of payment facility should be integrated into the same budgetary chapter as the ESM once the latter is integrated into Community law, for which a Treaty change is necessary, thereby providing resources for financial assistance to countries outside the euro area but committed to joining on the basis of the agreed rules;

Amendment 45 #

Maria João RODRIGUES, Jutta STEINRUCK, Brando BENIFEI, Elena GENTILE, Sergio GUTIÉRREZ PRIETO, Joachim SCHUSTER

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the European Monetary Union established under the Maastricht Treaty whas ~~not complemented by a genuine European Economic Union~~in fact blocked the development of Member States and is the reason why they are now in a recession and face deflation and soaring unemployment rates;

Amendment 45 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Regrets the fact that the current system of European economic governance is highly unbalanced and focuses ~~almost exclusive~~too heavily on fiscal stability and wage competitiveness, while ~~concerns about~~not paying enough attention to economic recovery, to public investment ~~policies and more and better jobs and social cohesion are largely ignored~~s needed for renewed convergence in growth potential and to strengthening quality employment and social cohesion within the Eurozone; calls for the EMU governance framework to ensure stronger policy response by giving binding force to employment and social indicators such as poverty rates, household incomes and various forms of inequality, also in the context of the Europe 2020 Strategy and the EU's commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals for 2030; stresses the need to implement measures improving job quality in order to reduce labour market segmentation combined with measures raising minimum wages to a decent level and strengthening collective bargaining and workers' position in wage- setting systems in order to reduce wage dispersion; warns about the fact that in recent decades, shareholders and corporate management have been taking a greater share of economic output while real wages have stagnated or have been reduced; considers that falling labour share of income and excessive dispersion in wages increase inequalities and damage productivity and competitiveness of companies;

Amendment 45 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Burkhard BALZ, Markus FERBER

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Takes the view that budgetary capacity should be funded as far as possible through own resources instead of from Member State contributions; calls in this connection for Article 33.1(a) of the Statute of the European Central Bank (ECB) to be amended with a view to using the ECB's annual profit as EU own resources for the EU budget;

Amendment 450 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)

22a. Emphasises that the current design of the EMU foresees the prohibition of monetary financing (Article 123 TFEU), the prohibition of privileged access to financial institutions (Article 124 TFEU), the no-bail-out clause (Article 125 TFEU), the fiscal provisions to avoid excessive government deficits (Article 126 TFEU, including the excessive deficit procedure), and the Stability and Growth Pact (secondary legislation based on Articles 121 and 126 TFEU) and any fiscal capacity should be set up under the current Treaty framework;

Amendment 451 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

Amendment 452 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Sylvie GOULARD, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

Amendment 453 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

Amendment 454 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

Amendment 455 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

Amendment 456 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Believes that compliance with a convergence code should be the condition for access to funding from the ESM/EMF; believes that conditions for access to funding from the ESM/EMF should have a link to the EU budget via the existing SRSP mechanism; reiterates its call on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal to this end;

Amendment 457 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Believes that compliance with a convergence code should be the condition for access to funding from the ESM/EMF; ~~reiterates its call on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal to this end;~~

Amendment 458 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Believes that compliance with a convergence code based on the country- specific-recommendations should be the condition for access to funding from the ESM/EMF; reiterates its call on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal to this end;

Amendment 459 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Believes that compliance with a convergence code should be the condition for access to f~~unding from the ESM/EMF~~inancial assistance from the fiscal capacity; reiterates its call on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal to this end;

Amendment 46 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the European Monetary Union established under the Maastricht Treaty was not complemented by a genuine European Economic Union and whereas there can be no true economic union without monetary union;

Amendment 46 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Regrets the fact that the current system of European economic governance is highly unbalanced ~~and focuses almost exclusively on fiscal stability and wage competitiveness, while concerns about~~, benefitting only certain Member States, and points out that problems in relation to economic recovery, public investment policies and more and better jobs and social cohesion are the largely ignored consequences of this system;

Amendment 46 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Points out that, pursuant to Article 311 TFEU, it is possible to raise the own resources ceilings, to establish new categories of own resources (even if only from a limited number of Member States) and to assign certain revenue to finance specific items of expenditure, as provided for in Article 21 of the Financial Rules1; , under a special legislative procedure requiring the Council to act unanimously and Member States to give their approval in accordance with their constitutional rules, to lay down ‘the provisions relating to the system of own resources’, to establish new categories of own resources (there is nothing in the above article to prevent these from coming only from a limited number of Member States, subject to an objective criterion), to abolish an existing category, and to assign certain revenue to finance specific items of expenditure, as provided for in Article 21 of the Financial Rules1; considers that it would be desirable to do away with VAT-based resources, as this system is too complex, and rely instead on a single annual national contribution based on a percentage of GNI; __________________ 1 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002.

Amendment 460 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Believes that compliance with a convergence code should be the condition for access to funding from the ~~ESM/EMF~~fiscal capacity; reiterates its call on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal to this end;

Amendment 461 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Believes that compliance with a convergence code should be the condition for access to ~~fund~~borrowing from the ESM/EMF; reiterates its call on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal to this end;

Amendment 462 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Believes that compliance with a convergence code should be the condition for access to funding from the ESM/EMF; reiterates its call on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal to this end;Implementation of structural reforms, particularly those highlighted in country specific recommendations, should be the condition for access to funding from the ESM/EMF.

Amendment 463 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4

~~Pillar 1: A convergence code to promote convergence and incentivise the implementation of structural reforms~~deleted

Amendment 464 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4

~~Pillar 1: A convergence code to promote convergence and incentivise the implementation of structural reforms~~deleted

Amendment 465 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4

Pillar 1: A convergence code to promote convergence ~~and~~, incentivise the implementation of structural reforms and facilitate the provision of euro area public goods

Amendment 466 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4

Pillar 1: ~~A convergence code to promote convergence and incentivise the implementation of structural reform~~Restoring their liberty to the Member States

Amendment 467 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4

Pillar 1: ~~A convergence code to promote convergence and incentivise the implementation of structural reforms~~Strategic investments across the euro area

Amendment 468 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4

Pillar 1: A convergence code to promote convergence and incentivise the implementation of outcome oriented structural reforms

Amendment 469 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4

Pillar 1: A convergence code to promote ~~convergence and incentivise the implementation of structural reforms~~social and regional convergence

Amendment 47 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the European Monetary Union established under the Maastricht Treaty was not complemented by a genuine European Economic Union, which is impossible to implement politically;

Amendment 47 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Regrets the fact that the current system of European economic governance ~~is highly unbalanced and focuses almost exclusively~~focuses on fiscal stability and wage competitiveness,; w~~hile concerns about economic recovery, public investment policies and more and better jobs and social cohesion are largely ignored~~elcomes the Commission’s intention to extend and strengthen the European Fund for Strategic Investments beyond 2018, with a view to creating new, good-quality employment;

Amendment 47 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

Amendment 470 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4

Pillar 1: A convergence code to promote convergence and ~~incentivise the implementation of~~support structural reforms

Amendment 471 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4

~~Pillar 1:~~ A convergence code to promote convergence and incentivise the implementation of structural reforms

Amendment 472 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Stresses that significant progress in convergence and sustainable structural reforms is needed in order to reconcile fiscal consolidation, growth, jobs, productivity, competitiveness and the European social model so as to effectively prevent asymmetric shock; considers that financial support from the European level for the implementation of agreed structural reforms in the Member States, while keeping the responsibility for implementation at the national level, is therefore indispensable;deleted

Amendment 473 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Stresses that significant progress in ~~convergence and~~ sustainable structural reforms is needed in order to ~~reconcile fiscal consolidation, growth, jobs~~, on the one hand, achieve fiscal consolidation and a high level of growth, job creation, innovation, productivity, and competitiveness ~~and~~while preserving the European social m~~odel~~arket economy model and, on the other hand, reduce economic disparities across Member States and foster convergence so as to effectively prevent asymmetric shocks; considers that, in view of the, by any standard of measurement, very poor implementation of Country-specific Recommendations over the past years, additional mechanisms to foster economic coordination and convergence are necessary; takes the view that financial support from the European level for the implementation of agreed structural reforms in the Member States, while keeping the responsibility for implementation at the national level, ~~is therefore indispensable~~would offer valuable incentives for Member States to set the right policies;

Amendment 474 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

Amendment 475 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Stresses that significant progress in ~~convergence and~~ sustainable structural reforms is needed in order to reconcile fiscal consolidation, growth, jobs, productivity, competitiveness and the European social model so as to effectively prevent asymmetric shock; considers that financial support from the European level for the implementation of agreed structural reforms in the Member States, while keeping the responsibility for implementation at the national level, is therefore indispensable and competitiveness;

Amendment 476 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Stresses that significant progress in ~~convergence and sustainable~~genuine fiscal and macroeconomic policy coordination and as regards overall social and economic convergence within the EMU as well as in the implementation of sustainable and democratically scrutinized structural reforms is needed in order to reconcile fiscal ~~consolidation,~~sustainability, sustainable growth, jobs, productivity, competitiveness and the European social model so as to effectively prevent and tackle asymmetric shock; considers that financial ~~support~~incentives from the European level for the implementation of agreed outcome oriented structural reforms ~~in the Member Stat~~and recommendations in the area of fiscal and macroeconomic policies, while keeping the responsibility for implementation at the national level, is therefore indispensable;

Amendment 477 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Stresses that significant progress in convergence ~~and~~, sustainable structural reforms ~~is needed in order~~and the provision of euro area public goods can contribute to reconcile fiscal consolidation, growth, jobs, productivity, competitiveness and the European social model so as to effectively prevent asymmetric shock; considers that financial support from the European level for the implementation of agreed structural reforms in the Member States, while keeping the responsibility for implementation at the national level, is therefore indispensable; stresses this support is conditional to the agreement and must be linked to technical support to national authorities aimed at reforming institutions, governance, administration, economic and social sectors;

Amendment 478 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Stresses that significant progress in ~~convergence and sustainable structural reforms is needed in order to reconcile fiscal consolidation,~~social and regional convergence is needed in order to promote growth, jobs, productivity, ~~competitiveness and~~and to strengthen the European social model across all Member States so as to effectively prevent asymmetric shock; considers that financial support from the European level for the implementation of agreed structural reforms in the Member States, while keeping the responsibility for implementation at the national level, is therefore indispensable;

Amendment 479 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

Amendment 48 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the ~~European Monetary Union established under the Maastricht Treaty was not complemented by a genuin~~Maastricht Treaty established the Economic and Monetary Union of the European ~~Economic~~ Union;

Amendment 48 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Amendment 48 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Points out that, pursuant to Article 311 TFEU, it is possible to raise the own resources ceilings, to establish new categories of own resources ~~(even if only from a limited number of Member States)~~ and to assign certain revenue to finance specific items of expenditure, as provided for in Article 21 of the Financial Rules1 ; The decision shall not enter into force until it is approved by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements; __________________ 1 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002.

Amendment 480 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

Amendment 481 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Stresses that significant progress in convergence and sustainable structural reforms is needed in order to reconcile fiscal consolidation, growth, jobs, productivity, competitiveness and the European social model so as to effectively prevent asymmetric shock; considers that financial support from the European level for the implementation of agreed and socially balanced structural reforms in the Member States, while keeping the responsibility for implementation at the national level, is therefore indispensable;

Amendment 482 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Stresses that significant progress in convergence and ~~sustainable~~ structural reforms is needed in order to ~~reconcile fiscal consolidation, growth, jobs, productivity, competitiveness and the European social model so as to~~ effectively prevent asymmetric shock; considers that financial support from the European level for the implementation of ~~agre~~effectively implemented structural reforms in the Member States, while keeping the responsibility for implementation at the national level, ~~is therefore indispensable~~could be envisaged on the basis that these reforms enhance growth and create employment;

Amendment 483 #

Clare MOODY, Neena GILL, Anneliese DODDS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Stresses that significant progress in convergence and sustainable structural reforms is needed in order to reconcile fiscal consolidation, growth, jobs, productivity, and competitiveness and the ~~European~~different national social models so as to effectively prevent asymmetric shock; considers that financial support from the European level for the implementation of agreed structural reforms in the Member States, while keeping the responsibility for implementation at the national level, is therefore indispensable;

Amendment 484 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Stresses that significant progress in convergence and sustainable structural reforms is needed in the Eurozone in order to reconcile fiscal consolidation, growth, jobs, productivity, competitiveness ~~and the European social model~~ so as to effectively prevent asymmetric shock; considers that financial support from the Euro~~pean~~zone level for the implementation of agreed structural reforms in thEurozone Member States, while keeping the responsibility for implementation at the national level, is therefore indispensable;

Amendment 485 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Dariusz ROSATI, Markus FERBER, Brian HAYES, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)

24a. Suggests that reforms advocated in the CSRs can be incentivised through financial and technical assistance facilitated by a fiscal capacity without Treaty change and therefore be realisable in the short-term; considers that fundamental attention should be given to the CSRs, which already emphasize thoroughly the areas in need of reform, however, since the implementation rate of these measures is not satisfactory and recent reflections have not yielded to any significant tools able to improve it, the fiscal capacity could leverage the transposition of CSRs by providing positive incentives in form of financial assistance for Member States to implement reforms, especially in years of economic growth; stresses that no compensation should be granted to countries that did not pursue budgetary discipline and postponed necessary reforms; emphasizes that convergence towards the level of the most competitive countries in the euro area should be fostered through reforms that are conducive to more investment, profitable projects, productivity enhancing and have the objective of reaching full employment;

Amendment 486 #

Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)

24a. The EU must to change this approach, taking seriously into account an investment plan for Europe based in a reinforced EU budget under a progressive model of contributions, from national contributions keeping in mind the personal income average and the population of each Member State; leaving aside the rebates and unfair discounts, and establishing new own resources as the Financial Transactions Tax, a harmonised Corporation Tax and an environmental tax on the emission of greenhouses gases;

Amendment 487 #

Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)

24a. Stresses that structural reforms will only be successfully implemented if a Member State is convinced that these are beneficial to the country and its population, thus rejects the idea to provide financial support from the EU for structural reforms which a country would not enact on its own;

Amendment 488 #

Hugues BAYET, Maria João RODRIGUES, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ, Andrea COZZOLINO, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Cătălin Sorin IVAN, Tibor SZANYI, Alfred SANT, Roberto GUALTIERI, Udo BULLMANN, Costas MAVRIDES, Jakob von WEIZSÄCKER, Olle LUDVIGSSON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)

24a. Considers that structural reforms should be ecologically and socially balanced and aim at strengthening growth potential towards a fully sustainable new growth model, promoting fair and sustainable welfare systems and reducing social inequalities;

Amendment 489 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 b (new)

24b. The real convergence needed by the EU should be based on the increases of direct and indirect wages in those Member States with external surplus, and the fostering of investment, including a European public investment plan in the long term, focused on the most damaged regions more damaged by austerity policies and their dependent position in the European chain of value.

Amendment 49 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

Ba. whereas economic convergence is a condition for forming a stable common currency, and cohesion policy has not been sufficient in its aim to decrease the divergence between Member States;

Amendment 49 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Regrets the fact that the current system of European economic governance is highly unbalanced and focuses ~~almost~~ exclusively on fiscal stability, violent fiscal adjustment, austerity and wage competitiveness, while concerns about economic recovery, public investment policies and more and better jobs, the very high unemployment rates in some EU Member States and social cohesion are largely ignored;

Amendment 49 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Marisa MATIAS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Points out that, pursuant to Article 311 TFEU, it is possible to raise the own resources ceilings~~, to~~ and establish new categories of own resources ~~(even if only from a limited number of Member States) and to~~; notes that making use of the possibility, under Article 21 of the Financial Regulation, of assigning certain revenue ~~to finance specific items of expenditure, as provided for in Article 21 of the Financial Rules1~~s from some Member States in order to fund specific items of expenditure does not breach the principle of budget universality; __________________ 1 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002.

Amendment 490 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 c (new)

24c. A crucial challenge to highlight is how to advance in the field of financial and fiscal regulation in order to halt the boost of rentist practices in the banking system;

Amendment 491 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

25. Reiterates its call for the adoption of a ‘convergence code’, as a legal act resulting from the ordinary legislative procedure, to streamline the existing coordination of economic policies into a more effective convergence of economic policies within the European Semester;deleted

Amendment 492 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

Amendment 493 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

Amendment 494 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

Amendment 495 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

25. Reiterates its call for the adoption of a ‘'convergence and responsibility code’', as a legal act resulting from the ordinary legislative procedure, as a first step to streamline the existing coordination of economic policies into a more effective convergence of economic policies within the European Semester points out that in order to create a credible and sustainable architecture of the euro area based on solidarity and responsibility changes to the Treaties will be required;

Amendment 496 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

25. Reiterates its call for the adoption of a ‘convergence code’ based on the country-specific recommendations, as a legal act resulting from the ordinary legislative procedure, to streamline the existing coordination of economic policies into a more effective convergence of economic policies within the European Semester;

Amendment 497 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

25. Reiterates its call for the adoption of a ‘'convergence code’', as a legal act resulting from the ordinary legislative procedure, to streamline the existing coordination of economic policies, such as the CSRs, into a more effective convergence of economic policies within the European Semester;

Amendment 498 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

25. ~~Reiterates its call for the adoption of a ‘convergence code’, as a legal act resulting from the ordinary legislative procedure, to~~Calls on the Member States to respect the country specific recommendations and implement structural reforms based on these recommendations to better streamline the existing coordination of economic policies into a more effective convergence of economic policies within the European Semester;

Amendment 499 #

Sylvie GOULARD

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

25. Reiterates its call for the adoption of a ‘convergence code’, based on the MIP, as a legal act resulting from the ordinary legislative procedure, to streamline the existing coordination of economic policies into a more effective convergence of economic policies within the European Semester;

Amendment 5 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 1221, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 136, 310, 311, 329 and 352 thereof,

Amendment 5 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Points out that the success of the eurozone is dependent on the fair distribution of the wealth produced, increasing the welfare of all its citizens, and on well- functioning labour markets, social security systems and welfare systems, based on decent work with rights, a strong role for the social partners, social dialogue, collective bargaining and collective agreements, and preventing individual Member States from trying to gain an unfair competitive advantage by infringing workers’ rights or promoting social dumping;

Amendment 5 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Believes that the crisis enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance and that national parliaments must play an important role to ensure legitimacy, and accountability in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) ~~must be progressively completed~~;

Amendment 50 #

Neoklis SYLIKIOTIS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Fabio DE MASI

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

Ba. whereas repetitive currency devaluations brought trade wars and economic instability in the past, jeopardizing the European Economic Community and its successor, the single market;

Amendment 50 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Regrets the fact that the current system of European economic governance is highly unbalanced and focuses almost exclusively on fiscal stability and wage competitiveness, while concerns about economic recovery, public investment policies and more and better jobs and social cohesion are largely ignored; notes that the economic governance framework has proven to be counter-productive as it forces Member States to adopt pro- cyclical measures; points out that the narrow focus on public deficit and debt numbers along with austerity measures pursued among others through MoUs promoted the distortion of social security and wage levels in several Member States;

Amendment 50 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Points out that, pursuant to Article 311 TFEU, it is possible to raise the own resources ceilings, to establish new categories of own resources ~~(even if only from a limited number of Member States)~~ and to assign certain revenue to finance specific items of expenditure, as provided for in Article 21 of the Financial Rules1; __________________ 1 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002.

Amendment 500 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

25. ~~Reiterates its call for~~Considers unnecessary the adoption of a ‘convergence code’, as a legal act resulting from the ordinary legislative procedure, to ~~stream~~further centralinse the existing coordination of economic policies into a more effective convergence of economic policies within the European Semester;

Amendment 501 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

Amendment 502 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. Suggests that the convergence code define criteria to be reached within five years, building on the merits of the Maastricht criteria and focusing for the first period on convergence requirements regarding: – taxation: base and rate of corporate tax, – labour market, including minimum wages, – investment, notably in research and development; This five-year period should in exchange allow for a phasing-in of the new tasks attributed to the ESM/EMF;deleted

Amendment 503 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. Suggests that the convergence code define criteria to be reached within five years, building on the merits of the Maastricht criteria and focusing for the first period on convergence requirements regarding: - taxation: base and rate of corporate tax, - labour market, including minimum wages, - investment, notably in research and development; This five-year period should in exchange allow for a phasing-in of the new tasks attributed to the ESM/EMF;deleted

Amendment 504 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. Suggests that the convergence code define criteria to be reached within five years, building on the merits of the Maastricht criteria and focusing for the first period on convergence requirements regarding: - taxation: base and rate of corporate tax, - labour market, including minimum wages, - investment, notably in research and development; This five-year period should in exchange allow for a phasing-in of the new tasks attributed to the ESM/EMF;deleted

Amendment 505 #

Bernd KÖLMEL, Bernd LUCKE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. Suggests that the convergence code define criteria to be reached within five years, building on the merits of the Maastricht criteria and focusing for the first period on convergence requirements regarding: - taxation: base and rate of corporate tax, - labour market, including minimum wages, - investment, notably in research and development; This five-year period should in exchange allow for a phasing-in of the new tasks attributed to the ESM/EMF;deleted

Amendment 506 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. Suggests that the convergence code define criteria to be reached within five years, building on the merits of the Maastricht criteria and focusing for the first period on convergence requirements regarding: - taxation: base and rate of corporate tax, - labour market, including minimum wages, - investment, notably in research and development; This five-year period should in exchange allow for a phasing-in of the new tasks attributed to the ESM/EMF;deleted

Amendment 507 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – introductory part

26. Suggests that the convergence code defines criteria to be reached ~~within five years, building on~~in a realistic time frame without the need for a Treaty change, building on Articles 121 and 126 TFEU and the merits of the Maastricht criteria, and ~~focusing for the first period on convergence requirements regarding:~~ taking into account the CSRs as a basis; calls on the European Commission to explore and make concrete proposals on the possibilities and limits of implementing this first pillar, based on the principle of conditionality and conceivable within the current Treaty framework; suggests the following areas for reform for Member States, based on the CSRs with no or only limited progress in their transposition, which should attain further progress in their implementation through the support of a fiscal capacity on top of existing instruments; stresses that existing policies should not be replaced but complemented by a fiscal capacity in the short term:

Amendment 508 #

Fabio DE MASI, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – introductory part

26. Suggests that the convergence code ~~define criteria to be reached within five years, building on the merits of the Maastricht criteria and focusing for the first period on convergence requirements regarding:~~be abandoned;

Amendment 509 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – introductory part

26. Suggests that the ~~convergence code~~method to define criteria to be reached ~~within five years, building on the merits of the Maastricht criteria and~~should be built on the principles of transparency, democratic accountability ensuring the participation of social partners and civil society at the core of the decision making process,, focusing for the first period on convergence requirements regarding:

Amendment 51 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

Ba. whereas, therefore, the introduction of the single currency was a serious error;

Amendment 51 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Points to the need to develop the social dimension of the EMU based on the EU’s social acquis in order to guarantee fair, properly functioning labour markets and the welfare state in participating Member States;

Amendment 51 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Points out that, pursuant to Article 311 TFEU, it is possible and necessary to raise the own resources ceilings, to establish new categories of own resources (even if only from a limited number of Member States) and to assign certain revenue to finance specific items of expenditure, as provided for in Article 21 of the Financial Rules1; __________________ 1 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002.

Amendment 510 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – introductory part

26. Suggests that the convergence code define criteria to be reached within five years, building on the merits of the Maastricht criteria ~~and focusing for~~; believes that theis fi~~rst period on convergence requirements regarding:~~ve- year period should in exchange allow for a phasing-in of the new tasks attributed to the ESM/EMF;

Amendment 511 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – introductory part

26. Suggests that the convergence and responsibility code define criteria to be reached within five years, building on the merits of the Maastricht criteria and focusing for the first period on convergence and responsibility requirements regarding:

Amendment 512 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – introductory part

26. Suggests that the convergence code define ~~criteria~~outcomes to be reached within five years, ~~building on the merits of the Maastricht criteria~~ and focusing for the first period on convergence requirements regarding:

Amendment 513 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – introductory part

Amendment 514 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – introductory part

26. Suggests that the convergence code define criteria to be reached within five years, building on the ~~merits of the~~ Maastricht criteria and focusing for the first period on convergence requirements regarding:

Amendment 515 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 1

~~– taxation: base and rate of corporate tax,~~deleted

Amendment 516 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 1

~~– taxation: base and rate of corporate tax,~~deleted

Amendment 517 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 1

~~– taxation: base and rate of corporate tax,~~deleted

Amendment 518 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 1

~~– taxation: base and rate of corporate tax,~~deleted

Amendment 519 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 1

~~– taxation: base and rate of corporate tax,~~deleted

Amendment 52 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)

Bb. whereas rapid technological development risk benefitting different parts of the Eurozone to different degrees leading to further cementing divergence between Member States in the Eurozone;

Amendment 52 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Stresses that economic convergence within the Eurozone is essential to reach more efficient labour markets in the Union, therefore the Eurozone Member States' specific economic and labour market features should be taken into account when setting down the budgetary capacity; points out that large concentrations of unemployment in certain regions in the Eurozone harm the European economy and distort labour markets; underlines that convergence should also be achieved through reduction of disequilibria induced by high public surpluses;

Amendment 52 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Notes that articles 121(6) and 136 TFEU would provide the appropriate legal basis for a mechanism the scope of which would cover the euro area and which would aim to provide financial incentives to structural reforms and to national policies fostering EU-wide economic convergence if the objectives of such a mechanism do not go beyond what is needed to achieve the proper implementation of the multilateral surveillance procedure set out in article 121 TFEU while, should the objectives of the fiscal capacity be broader and more ambitious, it would be necessary to make use of the so-called "flexibility provision" of article 352 TFEU;

Amendment 520 #

Bernd KÖLMEL, Bernd LUCKE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 1

~~– taxation: base and rate of corporate tax,~~deleted

Amendment 521 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 1

~~– taxation: base and rate of corporate tax,~~deleted

Amendment 522 #

Fabio DE MASI, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 1

– taxation: ~~base and rate of corporate tax~~improve the balance and fairness of the overall tax system and prepare a comprehensive tax reform that will allow shifting taxes away from labour, especially away from low-income earners, towards more growth friendly bases, simplify the tax system, fight tax evasion, close loopholes, increase VAT efficiency, broaden tax bases, reduce tax expenditures, reduce fiscal disincentives to work,

Amendment 523 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 1

– taxation: ~~base and rate of corporate tax~~especially corporate tax base reflective of economic substance as well as corporate tax rates, including minimum rates, and progressive inheritance and wealth taxation,

Amendment 524 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 1

– taxation: ~~base and rate of corporate tax~~implementation of a CCCTB and modification of fiscal rules detrimental to the optimal allocation of capital as underlined in the Werner report,

Amendment 525 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 1

– taxation: base and rate of corporate tax, in the Eurozone

Amendment 526 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 1

– taxation: base ~~and rate~~ of corporate tax,

Amendment 527 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2

~~- labour market, including minimum wages,~~deleted

Amendment 528 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2

~~– labour market, including minimum wages,~~deleted

Amendment 529 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2

~~– labour market, including minimum wages,~~deleted

Amendment 53 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas contrary to the budgetary arrangements in all other federations, the EU budget is dependent on contributions from Member State level to EU level and has been maintained relatively constant (in % of the EU Gross National Income) despite the increasing number of objectives assigned to the Union by the Treaties;

Amendment 53 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Considers that the policies needed at European level so as to promote an upward convergence should be funded with European Union own resources; in this sense recalls the repeated calls of the European Parliament for the establishment of the financial transaction tax;

Amendment 53 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Underlines that the EU budget also offers guarantees for specific lending operations and that several instruments, such as the EFSM and the EGF, allow for funds to be mobilised over and above the MFF expenditure ceilings;deleted

Amendment 530 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2

~~– labour market, including minimum wages,~~deleted

Amendment 531 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2

~~– labour market, including minimum wages,~~deleted

Amendment 532 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2

~~– labour market, including minimum wages,~~deleted

Amendment 533 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2

~~– labour market, including minimum wages,~~deleted

Amendment 534 #

Fabio DE MASI, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2

– labour market~~, including minimum wages~~: strive for full employment, improve the functioning of the labour market by reducing financial disincentives to work, increase labour market participation, increase labour market access for disadvantaged groups such as the young and people with a migrant background, provide flexible forms of employment for elderly people, facilitate female labour market participation, improve professional mobility and address skills shortages and mismatches as well as early school leaving; strengthen partnerships of public authorities, public employment services and education institutions to provide early and tailor-made support to the young; training of personnel,

Amendment 535 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2

– labour market, including ~~minimum wag~~public employment programs to actively fight unemployment, promote collective bargaining, labour and union rights, decent minimum wages, and improvement of social protection schemes,

Amendment 536 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2

– labour market, including minimum wages within sectors (within the Member State), and pension systems,

Amendment 537 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2

– labour market, including minimum wages and social harmonisation,

Amendment 538 #

Marita ULVSKOG, Olle LUDVIGSSON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2

– labour market, including minimum wages, in the Eurozone

Amendment 539 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2

– labour market, including minimum ~~wages~~income,

Amendment 54 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas, contrary to othe ~~budgetary arrangements in all other federations, the EU budget is dependent on contributions from Member State level to EU level~~r economic and monetary unions, the EU budget represents barely 1% of EU GDP and is dependent on contributions from Member States, meaning that it is proving to be unable to address the effects of recessionary shocks;

Amendment 54 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 b (new)

3b. Reminds that some structural reforms can produce constrictive effects in the short term; therefore insists that a compensation fund must encourage competitiveness mitigating its cost on the economy and social policies; recalls that socially responsible reforms must be based on solidarity, integration, social justice and a fair wealth distribution - a model that ensures equality and social protection, protects vulnerable groups and improves the living standards for all citizens;

Amendment 54 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Underlines that the EU budget also offers guarantees for specific lending operations, which in principle, however, should not be used to finance the EU budget, and that several instruments, such as the EFSM and the EGF, allow for funds to be mobilised over and above the MFF expenditure ceilings;

Amendment 540 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2

– labour market, ~~including minimum wages,~~

Amendment 541 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2 a (new)

– competitiveness: improve the investment climate, restore competitiveness by reforming the wage- setting system, including wage indexation, in consultation with the social partners and in accordance with national practice, ensure that wage evolutions are in line with productivity developments at sectorial and/or company levels as well as economic circumstances and to provide for effective automatic corrections when needed; strengthen competition in the retail sectors, remove excessive restrictions in services, including professional services and addressing the risk of further increases of energy distribution costs; improve the business environment, in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises, by cutting red tape, promoting e- government, streamlining insolvency procedures and implementing the legislation on late payments, improve SMEs access to bank credit and non-bank finance; improve the public procurement system by taking concrete steps for the implementation of e-procurement; enhance the quality and independence of the judiciary and step up the fight against corruption,

Amendment 542 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2 b (new)

– pension: contain future public expenditure growth relating to ageing, in particular from pensions and long-term care, by stepping up efforts to reduce the gap between the effective and statutory retirement age; promote active ageing and lifelong learning, align the retirement age to changes in life expectancy, improve the cost-effectiveness of public spending on long-term care, equalise the statutory retirement age for men and women,

Amendment 543 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2 c (new)

– health care: ensure cost effective provision of healthcare including by improving the pricing of healthcare services while linking hospitals' financing to outcomes, accelerate the optimisation of the hospital network,

Amendment 544 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2 d (new)

– public administration: balance local government revenues against devolved responsibilities, improve the efficiency of local governments and ensure the provision of quality public services at local level, especially social services complementing activation measures,

Amendment 545 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3

~~– investment, notably in research and development; This five-year period should in exchange allow for a phasing-in of the new tasks attributed to the ESM/EMF;~~deleted

Amendment 546 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3

~~– investment, notably in research and development; This five-year period should in exchange allow for a phasing-in of the new tasks attributed to the ESM/EMF;~~deleted

Amendment 547 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1

~~– investment, notably in research and development;~~deleted

Amendment 548 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1

~~– investment, notably in research and development;~~deleted

Amendment 549 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1

~~– investment, notably in research and development;~~deleted

Amendment 55 #

Sergio GUTIÉRREZ PRIETO, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas contrary to the budgetary arrangements in all other federations, the EU budget is dependent on contributions from Member State level to EU level, and whereas this situation encourages the emergence of selfishness of states;

Amendment 55 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 c (new)

3c. Points out that the ECB profits could feed in to the proposed fiscal capacity of the Eurozone, thereby increasing the resources available for the EUI and to increase investments and to fight poverty;

Amendment 55 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Underlines that, while the EU budget ~~also~~ offers sufficient guarantees for specific lending operations ~~and that~~, several instruments, such as the EFSM and the EGF, allow for funds to be mobilised over and above the MFF expenditure ceilings;

Amendment 550 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1

~~– investment, notably in research and development;~~deleted

Amendment 551 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1

~~– investment, notably in research and development;~~deleted

Amendment 552 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1

– in~~vestment, notably in research and development~~novation: investment in research, development, innovation, digitalisation and e-governance; promote innovation through streamlined incentive schemes and reduced administrative barriers, ;

Amendment 553 #

Hugues BAYET, Maria João RODRIGUES, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ, Andrea COZZOLINO, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Cătălin Sorin IVAN, Jakob von WEIZSÄCKER, Tibor SZANYI, Roberto GUALTIERI, Udo BULLMANN, Costas MAVRIDES, Olle LUDVIGSSON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1

– investment, notably in research and development; and in the transition to a sustainable economy

Amendment 554 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Matt CARTHY, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1

– investment, notably inpublic investment especially in infrastructure, research and development;

Amendment 555 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1

– investment, notably in research and development;, healthcare and education,

Amendment 556 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)

– social progress (the main indicators included in the social progress index)

Amendment 557 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)

– Social cohesion, including EMU- wide minimum social standards;

Amendment 558 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)

– public goods with European relevance

Amendment 559 #

Dariusz ROSATI, Jan OLBRYCHT

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 2

~~This five-year period should in exchange allow for a phasing-in of the new tasks attributed to the ESM/EMF;~~deleted

Amendment 56 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas contrary to the budgetary arrangements in ~~all other~~federations and understanding that the EU is not a federations per se, the EU budget, is dependent on contributions from Member State level to EU level;

Amendment 56 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

Amendment 56 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Underlines that the EU budget also offers guarantees for specific lending operations and that several instruments, such as the EFSM ~~and the EGF~~, allow for funds to be mobilised over and above the MFF expenditure ceilings;

Amendment 560 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 2

~~This five-year period should in exchange allow for a phasing-in of the new tasks attributed to the ESM/EMF;~~deleted

Amendment 561 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 2

~~This five-year period should in exchange allow for a phasing-in of the new tasks attributed to the ESM/EMF;~~deleted

Amendment 562 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 2

~~This five-year period should in exchange allow for a phasing-in of the new tasks attributed to the ESM/EMF;~~deleted

Amendment 563 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 2

~~This five-year period should in exchange allow for a phasing-in of the new tasks attributed to the ESM/EMF;~~deleted

Amendment 564 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 2

~~This five-year period should in exchange allow for a phasing-in of the new tasks attributed to the ESM/EMF;~~deleted

Amendment 565 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 2

This five-year period, which would start after the entry into force of the new treaty, should in exchange allow for a phasing-in of the new tasks attributed to the ESM/EMF;

Amendment 566 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 2

This five-year period should in exchange allow for a phasing-in of the new tasks attributed to the ~~ESM/EMF~~fiscal capacity;

Amendment 567 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 2

This five-year period should in exchange allow for a phasing-in of ~~the new tasks attributed to the ESM/EMF;~~a fiscal capacity for the EMU

Amendment 568 #

Clare MOODY, Anneliese DODDS, Neena GILL, Cătălin Sorin IVAN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 2

This five-year period should in exchange allow for a phasing-in of the ~~new tasks attributed to the ESM/EMF~~fiscal capacity;

Amendment 569 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – subparagraph 1 (new)

Notes that investment in areas such as research and development is best done at an EU level, funded by the MFF which all Member States contribute towards, and not by a Eurozone fiscal capacity headed by a Eurozone Treasury; any reduction in scale of such programmes to Eurozone only countries will certainly damage the prosperity and competitiveness of the EU as a whole including Eurozone countries; optional additional contributions from Member States wishing to do more should however be possible as under EFSI;

Amendment 57 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas ~~contrary to the budgetary arrangements in all other federations,~~ the EU budget is dependent on contributions from Member State level to EU level;

Amendment 57 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Asks the Member States to respect and promote the autonomy of collective bargaining on wages and working conditions, and to ~~restore balance with the economic governance pillar by urgently moving ahead on the social dimens~~modernise their labour markets where this is necessary in order to facilitate job creation;

Amendment 57 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Considers it necessary to integrate the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) into the EU’s legal framework and to consider developing it into a Community mechanism as repeatedly called for by the European Parliament, and as the ESM treaty itself provides; considers that this would make it possible to endow the mechanism with democratic accountability and greater legitimacy, fostering the EMU’s institutional consolidation;

Amendment 570 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 a (new)

– reduction in income inequalities and asset ownership and fairer taxation;

Amendment 571 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

Amendment 572 #

Bernd KÖLMEL, Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER, Bernd LUCKE, Bas BELDER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

Amendment 573 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

Amendment 574 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

Amendment 575 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

Amendment 576 #

Isabelle THOMAS, Constanze KREHL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Considers that a financial instrument ~~is needed to~~which works as an incentive- based mechanism for convergence and sustainable structural reforms with clear conditionality; believes that the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), which is designed to provide technical support to national authorities for measures aimed at reforming institutions, governance, administration, and economic and social sectors with a view to enhancing growth and jobs, can be further developed as a contribution to this function of the fiscal capacity is a means of blackmailing European countries with their own money; emphasises that this is unacceptable;

Amendment 577 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Considers that a dedicated financial instrument is needed to work as an incentive-based mechanism for convergence and sustainable structural reforms with clear conditionality; believes that the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), which is designed to provide technical support to national authorities for measures aimed at reforming institutions, governance, administration, and economic and social sectors with a view to enhancing growth and jobs, can b, this instrument is specific to member states of the euro area and must not interfere with the fEur~~ther developed as a contribution to this function of the fiscal capacity~~opean structural funds;

Amendment 578 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Considers that a financial instrument is needed to work as an incentive-based mechanism for convergence and sustainable structural reforms with clear conditionality; stresses the need for strong efforts at national and regional level to eliminate persistent legal and administrative obstacles to investment and to accelerate procedures altogether; believes that the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), which is designed to provide technical support to "national authorities for measures aimed at reforming institutions, governance, administration, and economic and social sectors"1a with a view to enhancing growth and jobs, can be further developed as a contribution to this function of the fiscal capacity; __________________ 1aRecital 23 of the Commission’s proposal for the Structural Reform Support Programme (COM(2015)0701)

Amendment 579 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

Amendment 58 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas ~~contrary to the budgetary arrangements in all other federations,~~ the EU budget is dependent principally on contributions from Member State level to EU level;

Amendment 58 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Asks the EU and the Member States to respect and promote the autonomy of collective bargaining on wages and working conditions, and to ~~restore~~maintain balance with the economic governance pillar by ~~urgently moving ahead on the social~~ensuring that in this area as well the social market economy has a European dimension;

Amendment 58 #

Jan OLBRYCHT, Dariusz ROSATI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Calls on the Commission to submit specific information to Parliament as to what extent it is intended to make available EU budget funds for a budgetary capacity, and in what form, and what consequences that will have for the current and prospective structure of the budget and for the development, as is necessary, of new EU own resources;

Amendment 580 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

Amendment 581 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Considers that a financial instrument is needed to work as an incentive-based mechanism for convergence and sustainable structural reforms with clear conditionality in the Eurozone; believes that the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), which is designed to provide technical support to national authorities for measures aimed at reforming institutions, governance, administration, and economic and social sectors with a view to enhancing growth and jobs, can be further developed as a contribution to this function of the fiscal capacity of the Eurozone;

Amendment 582 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Considers that a financial instrument ~~is needed to work as an incentive-based mechanism for convergence and sustainable structural reforms with clear co~~under the form of discounts of Member States contributions to a fiscally neutral budgetary capacity in the medium-term could be devised as an incentive-based mechanism for ensuring Member States compliance with the recommendiation~~ality; believes that the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), which is designed to provide technical support to national authorities for measures aimed at reforming institutions, go~~s on the Euro area aggregate fiscal stance, outcome-based recommendations to reduce EU macroeconomic imbalances and progress towards outcome-based convernagence, a~~dministration, and economic and social sectors with a view to enhancing growth and jobs, can be further developed as a contribution to this function of the fiscal capac~~nd sustainable structural reforms; stresses that these recommendations should be characterised by full democratic accountability;

Amendment 583 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

Amendment 584 #

Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Considers that a financial instrument is needed to work as an incentive-based mechanism for convergence and sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms with clear conditionality; believes that the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), which is designed to provide technical support to national authorities for measures aimed at reforming institutions, governance, administration, and economic and social sectors with a view to enhancing growth and jobs, can be further developed as a contribution to this function of the fiscal capacity;

Amendment 585 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Considers that a financial instrument is needed to work as an incentive-based mechanism for convergence and sustainable structural reforms with clear conditionality; believes that the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), which is designed to provide technical support to national authorities for measures aimed at reforming institutions, governance, administration, and economic and social sectors with a view to enhancing growth and jobs, can be further developed as a contribution to this function of the fiscal capacis are limited and problematic tools, insofar they include private investors, which could indirectly condition the use or the success of the fund. Their guarantees on the bond issuing are based in national and intergovernmental contributions putting in risk decision making in fully democratic terms on how to apply the fund. The well-known financial instruments put already in practice have been imposing unfair, hard and counterproductive conditionalities for entire Member States, eroding their sovereignty;

Amendment 586 #

Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)

27a. The EU needs to establish an automatic fiscal mechanism in order to correct imbalances of the payment balance among the Member States, based in higher wage evolution indicators for those Members with recurrent external surpluses and further investment plans in the most deprived regions within Members States with external deficits. Searching for real convergence has to be understood as a path towards fiscal harmonisation, measures against unemployment in those regions with a higher rate, a higher minimum wage standard, a European unemployment benefit scheme, among other measures to foster European public investment.

Amendment 587 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)

27a. New paragraph after Pillar 2: Absorption of asymmetric shocks: Risk of asymmetric shock is declining with growing convergence of the Member States' economies. Economic policies of Member States should analyse risk of domestic asymmetric shock and adjust its fiscal policy to be ready to act appropriately in the case of such shocks. The ESM can serve as the last resort. In case of external asymmetric shock, it is more difficult to rely on domestic fiscal capacity. The possibility to introduce a support mechanism suitable for such a situation should be considered.

Amendment 588 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 5

~~Pillar 2: Absorption of asymmetric shocks~~deleted

Amendment 589 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 5

~~Pillar 2: Absorption of asymmetric shocks~~deleted

Amendment 59 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas contrary to the budgetary arrangements in all other federations, the EU budget is mostly dependent on contributions from Member State level to EU level;

Amendment 59 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Asks the Member States to respect ~~and promote~~ the autonomy of collective bargaining on wages and working conditions, ~~and to restore balance with the economic governance pillar by urgently moving ahead on the social dimension~~in line with Member States' practices and laws and to always take into account the social dimension when improving economic governance;

Amendment 59 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Calls for a swift inclusion of the substance of the Treaty Establishing the ESM into the EU legal framework;

Amendment 590 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 5

Pillar 2: Absorption of asymmetric shocks using the monetary policy tool

Amendment 591 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 5

Pillar 2: Absorption of external and internal asymmetric shocks

Amendment 592 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Werner LANGEN

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 5

~~Pillar 2:~~ Absorption of asymmetric shocks

Amendment 593 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Is convinced that increased convergence within the euro area will significantly increase the capacity of its Member States to absorb asymmetric shocks; believes, however, that ~~no matter how great the efforts regarding convergence and sustainable structural reforms, asymmetric~~shocks with an impact on the stability of the euro area as a whole cannot be ruled out completely, given the strong integration of the euro area Member States; notes, in addition, that given the economic and financial interrelation of the European economy with global markets and other economic areas, there will always be a risk that the European Union and the euro area in particular are hit by economic, often exogenous, shocks, withich can ~~impact on the stability of the euro area as a whole cannot be ruled out completely, given the strong integration of the euro area Member States; stresses~~never be fully anticipated, prevented or avoided, nor can their size be; notes that shocks affect countries differently, due to the diverse economic structures and strengths of individual countries, which cannot be made equal; stresses that no instrument or mechanism, like the ESM or any fiscal capacity, has sufficient means to stabilise the euro area as a whole in face of shocks that endanger the solvency of countries or the euro area as a whole, therefore, the ~~need to have an instrument available~~ best way to prepare, prevent and minimize shocks is to strengthen the economy at national level; stresses, therefore, th~~is emergency~~at introducing a fiscal capacity as a support mechanism for structural reforms which improv~~ides an immediate stabilisation effect~~e the competitiveness of economies in the long-term can increase the resilience against symmetric and asymmetric shocks;

Amendment 594 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Is convinced that ~~increased convergence within the euro area will significantly increase the capacity of its Member States~~, with a view to absorbing asymmetric shocks; believes, however, that no matter how great the efforts regarding convergence and sustainable structural reforms, asymmetric shocks with an impact on the stability of the euro area as a whole cannot be ruled out completely, given the strong integration of the euro area Member States; stresses, therefore, the need to have an instrument available for this emergency which provides an immediate stabilisation effect, monetary adjustment is the simplest, most flexible and least costly tool;

Amendment 595 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Is convinced that increased convergence and policy coordination within the euro area ~~will~~might significantly increase the capacity of its Member States to absorb asymmetric shocks and will reduce the need and the resources needed to cope with these shocks; believes, however, that no matter how great the efforts regarding policy coordination, convergence and sustainable structural reforms, asymmetric shocks with an impact on the stability of the euro area as a whole cannot be ruled out completely, given the strong integration of the euro area Member States; stresses, therefore, the need to have an instrument available for t~~his emergency which provides an immediate stabilisation effect~~ackling future shocks with significant spill-over effect which provides a stabilisation effect; underlines that that the high carbon intensity of current economic production and undertakings' balance sheets represents very large systemic risks which will inevitably trigger and intensify shocks of macroeconomic relevance;

Amendment 596 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Is convinced that increased convergence within the euro area and abiding by the rules set out in the Stability and Growth Pact will significantly increase the capacity of its Member States to absorb asymmetric shocks; believes, however, that no matter how great the efforts regarding convergence and sustainable structural reforms, asymmetric shocks with an impact on the stability of the euro area as a whole cannot be ruled out completely, given the strong integration of the euro area Member States; stresses, therefore, the need to have an instrument available for this emergency which provides an immediate stabilisation effect;

Amendment 597 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. ~~Is convinced that increased convergence within the euro area will significantly increase the capacity of its Member States to absorb asymmetric shocks; believes, however, that~~Believes that, no matter how great the efforts regarding convergence and sustainable structural reforms, asymmetric shocks with an impact on the stability of the euro area as a whole cannot be ruled out completely, given the ~~strong integration of the euro area Member States~~neglected preconditions for an optimal currency area; stresses, therefore, the need to have an instrument available ~~for this emergency which provides an immediate stabilisation effect~~to make possible a withdrawal from the euro area without withdrawing from the EU;

Amendment 598 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Notes that shocks in the Eurozone do differ in intensity rather than in occurrence; Is convinced that increased convergence within the euro area will significantly increase the capacity of its Member States to absorb asymmetric shocks; believes, however, that no matter how great the efforts regarding convergence and sustainable structural reforms, asymmetric shocks with an impact on the stability of the euro area as a whole cannot be ruled out completely, given the strong integration of the euro area Member States; stresses, therefore, the need to have an instrument available for this emergency which provides an immediate stabilisation effect;

Amendment 599 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Is convinced that increased convergence within the euro area will significantly ~~increase the capacity of its Member States to abs~~reduce the scope forb asymmetric shocks within the euro area; believes, however, that no matter how great the efforts regarding convergence and sustainable structural reforms, asymmetric shocks with an impact on the stability of the euro area as a whole cannot be ruled out completely, given the strong integration of the euro area Member States; stresses, therefore, the need to ~~have an instrument availabl~~maintain fiscal position close to balance for ~~this emergency which provides an immediate stabilisation effect~~in surplus in the medium term, in order to ensure the necessary fiscal buffers are available to address this emergency;

Amendment 6 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 122, 136, 175, 310, 311, 329 and 352 thereof,

Amendment 6 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Points out that the success of the eurozone is dependent on increasing the welfare of all its citizens, and on well- functioning labour markets and welfare systems, based on decent work with rights, a strong role for the social partners, social dialogue, collective bargaining and collective agreements, and ~~preventing individual Member States from trying to gain an unfair competitive advantage by infringing workers’ rights or promoting~~effective action to combat social dumping;

Amendment 6 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Believes that the crisis enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be progressively completed, following a clear and predictable roadmap;

Amendment 60 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas ~~contrary to the budgetary arrangements in all other federations,~~ the EU budget is dependent on contributions from Member State level to EU level; and shall be in balance, as laid down in Article 310 TFEU;

Amendment 60 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Asks the Member States to respect and promote the autonomy of collective bargaining on wages and working conditions, and to ~~restore balance with the economic governance pillar by urgently moving ahead~~make sure that economic governance takes sufficient account onf the social dimension;

Amendment 60 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Reiterates the need for democratic legitimacy and accountability, implying the adoption of the community method, namely with the involvement of Parliament in the shaping, implementation and oversight of a budgetary capacity, dovetailing with, and without encroaching on, the prerogatives of the national parliaments; also points out that the own resources system is a hybrid system: some revenue – traditional own resources – is of a fiscal nature, since it results from the fact that the EU has and exercises a genuine power to levy taxes directly on the taxpayers concerned, but the bulk is generated by automatic sharing of national budget resources, followed by automatic transfer of the proportion due to the EU, which is index-linked to macroeconomic statistical aggregates;

Amendment 600 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Is convinced that increased social and regional convergence within the euro area will significantly increase the capacity of its Member States to absorb asymmetric shocks; believes, however, that ~~no matter how great the efforts regarding convergence and sustainable structural reforms~~, asymmetric shocks with an impact on the stability of the euro area as a whole cannot be ruled out completely, given the strong integration of the euro area Member States; stresses, therefore, the need to have an instrument available for this emergency which provides an immediate stabilisation effect;

Amendment 601 #

Nils TORVALDS, Michael THEURER, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

Amendment 602 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

Amendment 603 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

Amendment 604 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 a (new)

28a. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that the EMF should be managed by the Commission, evolve in its governance and voting rules, and be held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; emphasises that national parliaments should be involved in the process to respect their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources;

Amendment 605 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 a (new)

28a. Stresses that full financial market integration is paramount in EMU to foster financial stability and to facilitate adjustment to asymmetric shocks; welcomes in this regard initiatives such as the Capital Markets Union;

Amendment 606 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

~~29. Notes that the two models for the shock absorption function are featured most prominently in the academic literature: a Rainy Day Fund and a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme;~~deleted

Amendment 607 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

~~29. Notes that the two models for the shock absorption function are featured most prominently in the academic literature: a Rainy Day Fund and a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme;~~deleted

Amendment 608 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

~~29. Notes that the two models for the shock absorption function are featured most prominently in the academic literature: a Rainy Day Fund and a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme;~~deleted

Amendment 609 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

~~29. Notes that the two models for the shock absorption function are featured most prominently in the academic literature: a Rainy Day Fund and a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme;~~deleted

Amendment 61 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas ~~contrary to the budgetary arrangements in all other federations,~~ the EU budget is largely dependent on contributions from Member State level to EU level, which is different to fully fledged federations;

Amendment 61 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Asks the Member States to respect and promote the autonomy of collective bargaining on wages and working conditions, and to ~~restore~~maintain balance with the economic governance pillar ~~by urgently moving ahead on the social dimension~~;

Amendment 61 #

Pascal DURAND

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Reiterates the need for democratic legitimacy and accountability, implying the ~~adoption of the community method, namely with the involvement of Parliament in the shaping, implementation and oversight of a budgetary capacity~~use of the ordinary legislative procedure, as set out in Article 289 TFEU, for the implementation and oversight of a budgetary capacity; also suggests that the Commission Vice-President responsible for the euro should head the Eurogroup and be given wide-ranging powers over Economic and Monetary Union;

Amendment 610 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

~~29. Notes that the two models for the shock absorption function are featured most prominently in the academic literature: a Rainy Day Fund and a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme;~~deleted

Amendment 611 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Burkhard BALZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

29. Notes that the two models for the shock absorption function are featured most prominently in the academic literature: a Rainy Day Fund and a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme; Underlines that according to the IMF an effective shock absorbing budgetary capacity needs to be endowed with annual resources in a range of 1.5%-2.5% of EU GDP as a minimum, in order to ensure meaningful stabilisation. Emphasizes the need to define a roadmap towards a Fiscal and Budgetary Union including inter alia the establishment of an EMU-wide unemployment insurance scheme requiring in the medium to long term a Treaty change as well as a certain harmonisation on national labour market regulations and transfer to the EA level of part of the national resources earmarked for national unemployment benefits; Points out that this scheme would limit moral hazard by providing funds only to countries experiencing large increases in cyclical unemployment and should be balanced over the cycle; emphasizes the role of social partner in this process;

Amendment 612 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

29. Notes that ~~the two models for the shock absorption function are featured most prom~~shocks in the euro area are of a less asymmetric nature than assumed, but rather symmetric with a high correlation of business cycles of euro area Member States and stronger differences in the intensity of the business cycles, some countries experiencing more inten~~tly i~~se boom-bust cycles than othe ~~academic literature: a Rainy Day Fund and a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme~~rs; stresses that countries with high levels of debt, high liabilities in the banking sector or countries that postponed the transposition of relevant reforms, were hit harder by the crisis and recover more slowly; concludes that in this case a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme creates at the same time an economic and a political problem, by forcing Member States in recession to transfer resources to Member States experiencing stronger recessions; notes that these developments have led to an increase of euro-sceptics and the emergence of right-wing parties in the recent past and should be avoided;

Amendment 613 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

29. Notes that the ~~two~~multiple models for the shock absorption function are featured most prominently in the academic literature: a Rainy Day Fund ~~and~~, a European Unemployment ~~Benefit Scheme~~Insurance or Reinsurance Scheme, a full-fledged capital market union and national budgets; stresses however that Member States remain responsible for the sustainability of their national budget;

Amendment 614 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

29. ~~Notes that~~Considers that the stabilisation provided through the ESM should be complemented by at least one of the two models for ~~the~~automatic shock absorption function ~~are~~ featured most prominently in the academic literature: a Rainy Day Fund ~~and a~~or the European Unemployment Benefit Scheme;

Amendment 615 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

29. Notes that ~~the two models for the shock absorption function are featured most prominently in the academic literature: a Rainy Day Fund and a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme~~States have always used the monetary tool to absorb shocks;

Amendment 616 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

Amendment 617 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

Amendment 618 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

29. Notes that ~~the~~ two models for the shock absorption function are ~~featured most prominently in the academic literature:~~ a Rainy Day Fund and a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme;

Amendment 619 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

29. Notes that the two models for the shock absorption function are featured most prominently in the academic literature: a Rainy Day Fund a~~nd a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme~~t Member State level;

Amendment 62 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas it became apparent during the sovereign debt crisis that the EMU framework did not provide the euro area with the instruments to deal effectively with shocks;

Amendment 62 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Asks the Member States to respect and promote the autonomy of collective bargaining and collective agreements in particular on wages and working conditions, and to restore balance with the economic governance pillar by urgently moving ahead on the social dimension;

Amendment 62 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Reiterates the need for democratic legitimacy and accountability, ~~implying the~~which can be ensured by adopti~~on of~~ng the community method~~, namely with the involvement of Parliament~~; points up the key position of the European Parliament, as one arm of the budgetary authority, in the shaping, implementation and oversight of a budgetary capacity;

Amendment 620 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29 a (new)

29a. Notes that proposals for a shock absorption function at euro area level reflect the dominance of macro-managing than curing structural problems; believes that, while it may be tempting at first sight to allow counter-cyclical policies via a euro area treasury for highly indebted countries that would otherwise face market pressure, this possibility would reduce the need for consolidation since the ability to conduct counter-cyclical policies is a good reason to seek for fiscal space; considers therefore that a euro area fiscal capacity would make it even harder to reach the goals of the Stability and Growth Pact as amended by the Six- Pack and the Two-Pack;

Amendment 621 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29 a (new)

29a. warns that a fiscal capacity at EU level counteracts incentives for structural reforms and fiscal consolidation and will drive debt financing of government expenditures beyond reasonable levels;

Amendment 622 #

Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29 a (new)

29a. Warns that the set-up of a euro area fiscal capacity even in the form of an insurance system could result in permanent transfers ;

Amendment 623 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

30. Points out that the Rainy Day Fund should be funded by all the Member States on the basis of a cyclically sensitive economic indicator and used for payments to all Member States suffering from economic downturns;deleted

Amendment 624 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

Amendment 625 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

Amendment 626 #

Bernd KÖLMEL, Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER, Bernd LUCKE, Bas BELDER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

Amendment 627 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

Amendment 628 #

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Michael THEURER, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

Amendment 629 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

30. Points out that ~~the~~a Rainy Day Fund ~~should be funded by all~~ could be established within the current Treaty as a first step of the roadmap towards a genuine Fiscal and Budgetary Union and should be funded by Euro Area Member States through national contributions composed of two parts: 1. A contribution aimed at ensuring other Members States ~~on the basis of a cyclically sensitive economic indicator and used for~~from possible spill overs arising from lack of policy coordination and convergence 2. A countercyclical contribution on the basis of a cyclically sensitive economic indicator; Considers that in order to incentivise policy coordination and compliance, Member States should be offered discounts or full exemptions from paying the first contribution referred to above on the basis of their degree of compliance with the convergence code and the fiscal and macroeconomic recommendations; Stresses that these contributions should be used for automatic payments to all Euro Area Member States suffering from economic downturns;

Amendment 63 #

Maria João RODRIGUES, Jutta STEINRUCK, Brando BENIFEI, Elena GENTILE, Sergio GUTIÉRREZ PRIETO, Joachim SCHUSTER

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

Amendment 63 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Asks the Member States to respect and promote the autonomy of collective bargaining on wages and working conditions, and to restore balance with the economic governance pillar by urgently moving ahead on the social dimension; and all institutions involved in European economic governance and financial assistance programmes to respect and promote the autonomy of collective bargaining on wages and working conditions; emphasises the importance of non-cost determinants of competitiveness, such as productivity, quality, innovation, natural resource efficiency, good governance, modern public administration and a predictable business environment; highlights that all these factors depend on a skilled workforce, ethical and socially responsible management, workers' participation in company matters, high quality jobs and robust welfare systems;

Amendment 63 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Reiterates the need for democratic legitimacy and accountability, implying the ~~adoption of the community method, namely with the involvement of~~principles of subsidiarity and proportionality with the involvement of national parliaments and the European Parliament in the shaping, implementation and oversight of athe EU budget~~ary capacity~~;

Amendment 630 #

Reimer BÖGE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

30. Points out that ~~the~~a Rainy Day Fund (RDF) would increase the flexibility of government budgets in the short term without compromising the long-term sustainability of public finances; believes that the RDF should be funded by all ~~the~~euro area Member States and non-euro area countries willing to participate, with contributions on the basis of a cyclically sensitive economic indicator, and be used for payments to ~~all~~contributing Member States suffering from economic downturns; based on strict conditionality in line with Article 136 TFEU; is convinced that, in order to effectively prevent permanent redistribution and to keep long-term net contributions close to zero, an ex post clearing mechanism should be included in the RDF design; considers that the RDF can initially be set up without Treaty change but should eventually be integrated into the Community framework to ensure proper democratic accountability;

Amendment 631 #

Clare MOODY, Anneliese DODDS, Neena GILL, Cătălin Sorin IVAN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

30. Points out that the Rainy Day Fund must be aimed at restoring the stability of the EU and the eurozone. It should be funded by all the Member States on the basis of a cyclically sensitive economic indicator and used for payments to all Member States suffering from economic downturns;. The fund must play anti- cyclical role, and the position of member states vis-à-vis the fund must be neutral in medium term.

Amendment 632 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

30. Points out that the Rainy Day Fund should be funded by ~~all the Member States~~countries in the Eurozone and those intending to join the Eurozone on the basis of a cyclically sensitive economic indicator and used for payments ~~to all Member States~~to countries in the Eurozone and those intending to join the Eurozone suffering from economic downturns;

Amendment 633 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

30. Points out that the Rainy Day Fund should be ~~funded by all the Member States on the basis of a cyclically sensitive economic indicator and~~ used for payments to all Member States suffering from economic downturns;

Amendment 634 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

30. Points out that ~~the~~a Rainy Day Fund should be funded by all thEurozone Member States on the basis of a cyclically sensitive economic indicator and used for payments to all Member States suffering from economic downturns; suggests that such fund should be managed by the EMF;

Amendment 635 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

30. Points out that the Rainy Day Fund should be funded by ~~all the~~the euro area Member States on the basis of a cyclically sensitive economic indicator and used for payments to all Member States suffering from economic downturns;

Amendment 636 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

30. ~~Points out~~Takes the view that the Rainy Day Fund should not be funded by all the Member States on the basis of a cyclically sensitive economic indicator and used for payments to all Member States suffering from economic downturns;

Amendment 637 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

30. Points out that ~~the~~a Rainy Day Fund shcould be ~~funded by all the~~put in place by Member States themselves on the basis of a cyclically sensitive economic indicator ~~and used for payments to all Member States suffering from economic downturn~~s in order to protect their economies from potential shocks;

Amendment 638 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

~~31. Acknowledges that the model of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme would foster convergence of labour markets in the medium term;~~deleted

Amendment 639 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Marian-Jean MARINESCU, Luděk NIEDERMAYER, Dariusz ROSATI, Ivana MALETIĆ, Danuta Maria HÜBNER, Nils TORVALDS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

~~31. Acknowledges that the model of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme would foster convergence of labour markets in the medium term;~~deleted

Amendment 64 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas ~~keeping the Balance of Payments Facility for non-euro~~Article 123 and 125 TFEU were put in place to avoid and prevent moral hazard and ensure fiscal sustainability and prudency of euro area Member States; wh~~ile depriving euro area Member States of this instrument as a consequence of the no-bail-out clause reflects one of the original flaws of EMU~~ereas the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) constitutes the crisis resolution mechanism for countries of the euro area and has the function of a shock absorbent; whereas non-euro area Member States are not covered by the ESM but by the Balance of Payment Facility which supports non- euro countries in difficulties or when seriously threatened with difficulties as regards its balance of payments, as laid down in Article 143 TFEU, as non-euro countries experience higher risks due to exchange rate fluctuations;

Amendment 64 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Asks the Member States to respect and promote the autonomy of the social partners, particularly in terms of collective bargaining on wages and working conditions, and to restore balance with the economic governance pillar by urgently moving ahead on the social dimension;

Amendment 64 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Reiterates the need for democratic legitimacy, clarity and accountability, implying the ~~adop~~creation of ~~the community method, namely with the involvement of Parliam~~a Euro area Treasury Minister, acting also as Vice President inof the ~~shaping, implementation and oversight of a budgetary capacity;~~Commission and President of the Eurogroup, and the adoption of the community method,

Amendment 640 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

~~31. Acknowledges that the model of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme would foster convergence of labour markets in the medium term;~~deleted

Amendment 641 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

~~31. Acknowledges that the model of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme would foster convergence of labour markets in the medium term;~~deleted

Amendment 642 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

~~31. Acknowledges that the model of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme would foster convergence of labour markets in the medium term;~~deleted

Amendment 643 #

Nils TORVALDS, Sylvie GOULARD, Michael THEURER, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

~~31. Acknowledges that the model of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme would foster convergence of labour markets in the medium term;~~deleted

Amendment 644 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

~~31. Acknowledges that the model of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme would foster convergence of labour markets in the medium term;~~deleted

Amendment 645 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

31. Acknowledges that the model of a European Unemployment ~~Benefit~~Insurance Scheme would foster convergence of labour markets in the medium term; believes that a balance has to be found, in reflecting on such a system, between the need to address a common issue through a common instrument and this of respecting national political and social preferences; draws attention, in order to reconcile these needs, to the example offered by the US three-tiered unemployment insurance scheme as well as to the possibility of an EU scheme providing reinsurance to national systems;

Amendment 646 #

Maria João RODRIGUES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

31. Acknowledges that the model of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme would foster convergence of labour markets in the medium term while playing a useful role in supporting economic and social stabilisation of Member States during future cyclical downturns with asymmetric impact; stresses that an such a scheme should include safeguards to prevent a lowering of national unemployment insurance standards, it should be financed by taxes, should be complementary to national schemes and address cyclical unemployment only;

Amendment 647 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

31. Acknowledges that the model of a complementary European Unemployment Benefit Scheme would include an anti- cyclical component in the Eurozone economic policy, foster convergence of labour markets in the medium ~~term~~run, introduce a social dimension to the EMU, and establish a direct link between the European institutions and citizens;

Amendment 648 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

31. Acknowledges that the model of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme would foster convergence of labour markets in the medium term; Notes that this option would require a Eurozone Treasury based on genuine own resources and the relevant transfer of competence to the Eurozone level;

Amendment 649 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

31. ~~Acknowledges that the model of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme would foster con~~Points out that an Unemployment Benefit Scheme should address short term cyclical unemployment supporting national schemes in case of severe downturns; underlines that such a function would prevent structural divergence ofs in labour markets and foster convergence in the medium term;

Amendment 65 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas keeping the Balance of Payments Facility for non-euro Member States while depriving euro area Member States of this instrument as a consequence of the no-bail-out clause reflects one of the original flaws of EMU; whereas the creation of the EFSM, followed by the EFSF and the ESM, was a first step to correct it in urgency;

Amendment 65 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Asks the Member States to respect and promote the autonomy of collective bargaining on wages and working conditions, and to rest~~ore~~ablish balance with the economic governance pillar by urgently moving ahead on the social dimension;

Amendment 65 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Reiterates the need for democratic legitimacy and accountability, implying the adoption of the community method, namely with the mandatory involvement of Parliament in the shaping, implementation and oversight of a budgetary capacity;

Amendment 650 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

31. Acknowledges that the model of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme would foster convergence of labour markets in the medium term; it must be consistent with the key role of Member States in social policy and must not provide base for permanent transfers between Member States.

Amendment 651 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

31. Acknowledges that the model of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme wcould foster convergence of labour markets in the medium term; insists that the a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme must be complemented by policies that enhance the creation of decent employment;

Amendment 652 #

Pervenche BERÈS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

31. ~~Acknowledges that the model of~~Points out that a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme ~~would fos~~complementary to national schemes and addressing short term conyclical unemployment would prevent divergence ofs in labour markets and foster real convergence in the medium term;

Amendment 653 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

31. Acknowledges that the model of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme would foster convergence of labour markets in the medium term and assist European citizens who are unemployed or in long-term unemployment;

Amendment 654 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

31. ~~Acknowledges that the model of~~Stresses that a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme w~~ould foster~~ith debt- based funding would be a Ponzi scheme and that it would not be able to foster true and sustainable convergence of labour markets ~~in the medium term;~~ ;

Amendment 655 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

31. Acknowledges that the model of a European Unemployment ~~Benefit Scheme would~~Insurance or Reinsurance Scheme might be used to foster convergence of labour markets in the medium term;

Amendment 656 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

31. Acknowledges that the model of a Euro~~pean~~zone Unemployment Benefit Scheme would foster convergence of labour markets in the medium term;

Amendment 657 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

Amendment 658 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

Amendment 659 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

Amendment 66 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas keeping the Balance of Payments Facility for non-euro Member States while depriving euro area Member States of this instrument as a consequence of the no-bail-out clause reflects one of the original flaws of EMUthe introduction of the single currency, sold with promises – later proved false – of exponential growth in trade between the participating states, was a mistake of which those responsible should be ashamed given the amount of suffering it has caused in Europe;

Amendment 66 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Urges the Commission to leave the Member States entirely free to determine their own policies on wages and working conditions;

Amendment 66 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Stresses that democratic legitimacy requires the full involvement of the Parliament in the shaping, implementation and oversight of a euro area budgetary capacity;

Amendment 660 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

Amendment 661 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. ~~Considers that the EMF should provide the financial resources for either of these models, which could require increasing the amount of~~Stresses that each of these models need a financial backstop which can be ensured either by developing a second arm of the EMF or by making the fiscal capacity able to borrow; considers that both instruments would require additional amount of paid-in and callable capital; points out that the fund should avoid long- term redistribution effects by ensuring that Member States’' contributions ~~are balanced over the cycle;~~ made on the basis of their cyclical position are balanced over the cycle; calls for an additional safeguard clause implying that Member States whose gap between all contributions and all payments received exceeds a pre-determined level over a certain period of time shall provide additional contributions to reduce the gap below the fixed threshold; considers that the parameters of the gap have to be chosen on the basis of a detailed technical analysis;

Amendment 662 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. Considers that the E~~MF should provid~~SM could also manage the financial resources for either of these models~~, which could require increa~~; points to the necessity, should this management model be chosen, to ensure that its amount of capital is adequate to its tasks, singce the ~~amount of capital~~paid-in capital is an indispensable security buffer guaranteeing the fund's creditworthiness; points out that the fund should avoid long- term redistribution effects by ensuring Member States’' contributions are balanced over the cycle;

Amendment 663 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. Considers that the ~~EMF should provide the~~ financial resources for ~~either~~both of these models~~, which could req~~ should come from genuirne ~~increasing the amount of capital; points out that the fund should avoi~~own resources, that repeatedly have been called for by the European Parliament; calls for a system of own resources based lon~~g-term redistribution effects by ensuring Member States’ contributions are balanced over the cycle~~ taxes, ECB dividends, or common bonds, instead of GNI-based contributions; point out that this would reduce the net-payer debate and would create a clearer link between EU policy objectives and its financing sources;

Amendment 664 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. ~~Considers that the EMF should provide the financial resources for either of these models, which could require increasing the amount of capital; p~~Points out that ~~the~~a fund should avoid long-term redistribution effects by ensuring Member States’ contributions are balanced over the cycle;

Amendment 665 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. ~~Considers that the EMF should provide the financial resources for either of these models, which could require increasing the amount of capital; p~~Points out that the ~~fund~~EMF should avoid long-term redistribution effects by ensuring Member States’ contributions are balanced over the cycle;

Amendment 666 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. Considers that ~~the EMF should provide the financial resources for either of these models, which could require increasing the amount of capital; points out that the fund~~either of these models should avoid long-term redistribution effects by ensuring Member States’' contributions are balanced over the cycle;

Amendment 667 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. Considers that the ~~EMF should provide the~~fiscal capacity should be endowed with sufficient financial resources for either of these models, which could require increasing the amount of capital; points out that the fund should avoid long-term redistribution effects by ensuring Member States’ contributions are balanced over the cycle effective stabilisation of Member States whose currency is the euro;

Amendment 668 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. ~~Considers that the EMF should provide the financial resources f~~Notes that if a fiscal capacity is created, it could support either of these models, which cwould, however, require increasing the amount of capital; ~~points out that the fund should avoid long-term redistribution effects by ensuring~~insists that in any case long-term redistribution effects between Member States should be avoided, and Member States’' contributions arshould be balanced over the cycle;

Amendment 669 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. Considers that the ~~EMF~~fiscal capacity should provide the financial resources for either of these models, which could require increasing the amount of capital; points out that the fund should avoid long-term redistribution effects by ensuring Member States’ contributions are balanced over the cycle;

Amendment 67 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

~~E. whereas it became apparent during the sovereign debt crisis that the European Treaties do not provide the euro area with the instruments to deal effectively with shocks;~~deleted

Amendment 67 #

Mercedes BRESSO, Roberto GUALTIERI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Stresses the importance of ~~not linking any~~making the link between unemployment benefit system ~~with~~s and economic conditionality for the Member States, particularly when it leads to austerity, and of promoting social policies which fight poverty, and social exclusion a~~nd social dumping~~mong nationals, while combating social dumping, which is a consequence of harmful EU policies;

Amendment 67 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 b (new)

7b. Recalls that the European Parliament is the Parliament of the Economic and Monetary Union. Considers that the establishment of a fully-fledged euro area fiscal capacity and its incorporation into the treaties shall require, without prejudice to Article 14(2) TEU and notwithstanding Article 231 TFEU, specific provisions in order to limit the corresponding budgetary prerogatives to Members elected in euro area and participating Member States constituencies.

Amendment 670 #

Bernd KÖLMEL, Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER, Bernd LUCKE, Bas BELDER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

Amendment 671 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. Considers that the EMF should provide the financial resources for either of these models, which could require increasing the amount of capital; points out that the fund should avoid long-term redistribution effects by ensuring Member States’ contributions are balanced over the cycle;long-term redistribution effects should be avoided by ensuring that the Member States' contributions to the EU budget are balanced over the cycle; reiterates that no Member State can be liable for the liabilities of another Member State nor for their commitments.

Amendment 672 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32 a (new)

32a. EMF should avoid provision of financing for structural reforms in Member States. EMF should not be used for fiscal stimulation of Member State economies as there are existing mechanisms for the purposes, e.g. ECB's monetary policy instruments and the flexibility of the Stability and Growth Pact;

Amendment 673 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 6

~~Pillar 3: Absorption of symmetric shocks~~deleted

Amendment 674 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 6

~~Pillar 3: Absorption of symmetric shocks~~deleted

Amendment 675 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 6

~~Pillar 3: Absorption of symmetric shocks~~deleted

Amendment 676 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 6

~~Pillar 3:~~ Absorption of symmetric shocks

Amendment 677 #

Nils TORVALDS, Michael THEURER, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33

33. Warns that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole since the currency area is not endowed with the instruments to cope with another crisis of the extent of the previous one; is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks depends on the nature of the shock; recalls that the EMF should be used as an appropriate financial resource;deleted

Amendment 678 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33

33. Warns that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole since the currency area is not endowed with the instruments to cope with another crisis of the extent of the previous one; is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks depends on the nature of the shock; recalls that the EMF should be used as an appropriate financial resource;deleted

Amendment 679 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33

33. Warns that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole ~~since the currency area is not endowed with the instruments to cope with another~~if Member States do not adhere to the SGP and only make limited progress in transposing the CSRs; notes that since the crisis of 2009, the European Union has introduced several new instruments in order to increase resilience against possible crisies ~~of the extent of the previous one; is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks depends on the nature of the shock~~in the future, notably the ESM, the Six-Pack, the Two-Pack, the Fiscal Compact, the Euro-Plus Pact, launched the Banking Union and introduced the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) to further complete the EMU; is further convinced that symmetric shocks should be addressed at national level, while respecting the SGP and maintaining budgetary discipline; recalls that the ~~EMF~~fiscal capacity should be used as an appropriate financial resource; to incentivise structural reforms;

Amendment 68 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

~~E. whereas it became apparent during the sovereign debt crisis that the European Treaties do not provide the euro area with the instruments to deal effectively with shocks;~~deleted

Amendment 68 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Stresses th~~e importance of not linking any unemployment benefit system with economic conditionality for the Member States, and of promoting~~at unemployment benefit systems are a Member State matter, and highlights the need for social policies which fight poverty, social exclusion and social dumping;

Amendment 68 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

8. Recalls that the protocols on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on the role of national parliaments offer ample opportunities for national parliaments’ involvement in this respect; points out that it is profoundly anxious to preserve the eminent budgetary prerogative of the national parliaments of the countries from which so-called own resources originate and that it is committed to the fundamental democratic principle of ‘no taxation without representation’, which should not be gradually yoked together with, let alone replaced by, the principle of ‘no representation without taxation’; warns against the real danger that the EU might move in the two unwelcome directions referred to above;

Amendment 680 #

Bernd KÖLMEL, Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER, Bernd LUCKE, Bas BELDER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33

33. Warns that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole since the currency area is not endowed with the instruments to cope with another crisis of the extent of the previous one; warns that there also might be shocks which are symmetric but still affect countries to a different degree and result in disruptive capital flows between Member States, growing economic divergences and increasing imbalances, in which cases action at the EU level is needed; is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks depends on the nature of the shock; recalls that the EMF should be used as an appropriate financial resource;

Amendment 681 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33

33. Warns that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole since the currency area is not endowed with the instruments to cope with another crisis of the extent of the previous one; ~~is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks depends on the nature of the shock; recalls that the EMF should be used as an appropriate financial resource;~~

Amendment 682 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33

33. Warns that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole since the currency area is not endowed with the instruments to cope with another crisis of the extent of the previous one; is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks depends on the nature of the shock; recalls that ~~the EMF should be used as an appropriate financial resource~~EU own resources would be the optimal solution to ensure appropriate financial resources together with common borrowing capacity;

Amendment 683 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33

33. Warns that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole since the currency area is not endowed with the instruments to cope with another crisis of the extent of the previous one; is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks depends on the nature of the shock; recalls that the EMF should be used as an appropriate financial resource, hence as an instrument of the Eurozone treasury;

Amendment 684 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33

33. Warns that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole since the currency area is not endowed with the instruments to cope with another crisis of the extent of the previous one; is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks depends on the nature of the shock; ~~recalls that the EMF should be used as an appropriate financial resource;~~

Amendment 685 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33

33. ~~Warn~~Notes that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole since the currency area is not endowed with the instruments to cope with another crisis of the extent of the previous one; is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks depends on the nature of the shock; ~~recalls that the EMF should be used as an appropriate financial resource;~~

Amendment 686 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33

33. Warns that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole ~~since the currency area is not endowed with the instruments to cope with another crisis of the extent of the previous one~~, the EMF can be considered as a tool in cases where monetary policy and fiscal room in a national budget are not sufficient to address the problem; is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks depends on the nature of the shock; recalls that the EMF should be used as an appropriate financial resource;

Amendment 687 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33

33. ~~Warns~~Is convinced that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole since the currency area is not endowed with the instruments to cope with another crisis of the extent of the previous one; is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks depends on the nature of the shock; recalls that the EMF should be used as an appropriate financial resourcehave to be addressed by a combination of common monetary policy and national fiscal policies; is confident that recent reforms of the economic governance in the EU together with increased national ownership of EU fiscal rules provide strong safeguards against irresponsible fiscal policies;

Amendment 688 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33

33. Warns that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole since the currency area is not endowed with the instruments to cope with another crisis of the extent of the previous one; is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks depends on the nature of the shock; recalls that the EMF shcould be used as a first step towards an appropriate financial resource;

Amendment 689 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33

33. Warns that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole since the currency area is not endowed with the instruments to cope with another crisis of the extent of the previous one; is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks ~~depends on the nature of the shock~~are the monetary mechanisms exercised by the ECB; recalls that the EMF should be used as an appropriate financial resource;

Amendment 69 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Burkhard BALZ, Markus FERBER, Elmar BROK, Werner LANGEN, Dariusz ROSATI, Luděk NIEDERMAYER, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas it became apparent during the sovereign debt crisis that ~~the European Treaties do not provide the euro area with the instruments to deal effectively with shocks;~~ countries which did not comply with the fiscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which did not budget responsibly but triggered large budget deficits through high spending and had postponed relevant reforms of their labour markets and public administration, were more vulnerable and could not effectively handle economic shocks; whereas it became apparent that the lack of responsibility of one Member of the euro area is a risk for the euro area as a whole, meaning that one country not adhering to the rules can affect the economy of all Member States of the Union; whereas the currency union is only as strong as its Members, which requires all participating countries to respect economic and financial rules at national level and at the same time to strengthen their economies in their own interest and in that of the whole euro area, thus guaranteeing the well-being of all citizens in the long-term, as the consequences of irresponsible policies at national level have to be borne by the Union as a whole;

Amendment 69 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Stresses the importance of ~~not linking any unemployment benefit system with economic conditionality for the Member States, and of~~ promoting social policies which fight poverty, social exclusion and social dumping;

Amendment 69 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

8. Recalls that the protocols on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on the role of national parliaments offer ample opportunities for national parliaments’ involvement in this respect; states that responsibilities must be assigned at the level where decisions are taken or implemented, with national parliaments scrutinising national governments and the European Parliament scrutinising the European executives; believes that this is the only way to ensure the required increased accountability of decision- making;

Amendment 690 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33

33. Warns that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole since the currency area is not yet endowed with the instruments to cope with another crisis of the extent of the previous one; is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks depends on the nature of the shock; recalls that the EMF should be used as an appropriate financial resource;

Amendment 691 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33

33. Warns that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole since the currency area is not endowed with the instruments to cope with another crisis of the extent of the previous one; is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks depends on the nature of the shock; recalls that the EMF shcould be used as a~~n appropriate financial resource~~ borrowing capacity;

Amendment 692 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33 a (new)

33a. proposes that the Euro be dissolved in an orderly manner before external shocks force a disorderly exit of Member States from the Euro;

Amendment 693 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34

Amendment 694 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34

34. Considers that in the case of symmetric shocks brought about by a lack of internal demand, monetary policy alone cannot reignite the economy, ~~particularly in a context of zero lower bound~~on these grounds the President of the ECB has repeatedly demanded from Member States to complement monetary policy by implementing structural reforms; is therefore convinced that public and private investment must be increased, the administrative burden reduced and a proper regulatory framework developed, with a view to stimulating potential growth; considers that the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) launched by the European Investment Group and the European Commission already constitutes an initiative at European level to overcome the current investment gap in the European Union by mobilising private financing for strategic investments reduced and thereby reaching the objective of growth and more jobs in the European Union;

Amendment 695 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34

34. Considers that in the case of symmetric shocks brought about by a lack of internal demand, monetary policy alone cannot reignite the economy, particularly in a context ~~of z~~characterized by veroy low~~er bound~~ nominal interest rates; is therefore convinced that ~~public and private investment must be increased, the~~mutualized fiscal tools and mechanism are in such context instrumental for effectively fostering future oriented and sustainable direct EU investment as well as public and private investments at national level; in combination with a reduced administrative burden ~~reduced~~ and a proper regulatory framework developed, with a view to stimulating potential ~~growth~~sustainable growth and a swift transition towards a low-carbon economy;

Amendment 696 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34

34. Considers that ~~in the case of~~ symmetric shocks brought about by a lack of internal demand, monetary policy alone cannot reignite the economy, particularly in a context of zero lower bounds; is therefore convinced that public and private investment must be increased, the administrative burden reduced and a proper regulatory framework developed, with a view to stimulating potential growththat are caused by a lack of confidence must be diminished by addressing the flaws of the EMU´s economic governance structure;

Amendment 697 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34

Amendment 698 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34

34. Considers that in the case of symmetric shocks brought about by a lack of internal demand, monetary policy alone cannot reignite the economy, particularly in a context of zero lower bounds; is therefore convinced that public ~~and private~~ investment must be increased, withe a~~dministrative burden reduced and a proper regulatory framework developed, with a view to stimulating~~ view to stimulating potential growth and crowding-in private investment; is also convinced that public policies oriented to directly increase internal demand should be pursued by Member States and supporte~~ntial growth~~d at EU level;

Amendment 699 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34

Amendment 7 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 a (new)

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 123, 125, 126 and 140 thereof;

Amendment 7 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Points out that the success of the eurozone is dependent on increasing the welfare of all its citizens, and on well- functioning labour markets and welfare systems, based on decent work with rights, a strong role for the social partners, social dialogue, collective bargaining and collective agreements, and preventing and deterring individual Member States from trying to gain an unfair competitive advantage by infringing workers’ rights or promoting social dumping;

Amendment 7 #

Nils TORVALDS, Siegfried MUREŞAN, Michael THEURER, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Believes that the crisis enhanced the need for improvement in coordinated EU economic governance and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be progressively, but fully, completed;

Amendment 70 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas it became apparent during the sovereign debt crisis that the European Treaties do not provide the euro area with the instruments to deal effectively with shocks in the absence of Member States’ compliance with fiscal surveillance frameworks and structural reforms to increase competitiveness and resilience of their economies, and full labour and capital market integration, both of which play an important shock absorbing function in a monetary union;

Amendment 70 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

Amendment 70 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

8. Recalls that the protocols on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on the role of national parliaments offer ample opportunities for national parliaments’ involvement in this respect; also exploiting all the potentiality of the instruments provided by art. 13 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union and by title II of protocol 1;

Amendment 700 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34

34. Considers that in the case of symmetric shocks ~~brought about by a lack of internal demand~~, monetary policy alone cannot reignite the economy, particularly in a context of zero lower bounds; is therefore convinced that ~~public and~~ private investment must be increased, structural reforms that increase the euro area's competitiveness must be implemented, the administrative burden reduced and a proper regulatory framework developed, with a view to stimulating potential growth;

Amendment 701 #

Nils TORVALDS, Michael THEURER, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34

Amendment 702 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34

34. Considers that in the case of symmetric shocks ~~brought about by a lack of internal demand~~, monetary policy alone cannot reignite the economy, particularly in a context of zero lower bounds; is therefore convinced that ~~public and private~~ investment must be inc~~rea~~entivised, the administrative burden reduced and a proper regulatory framework developed, with a view to stimulating potential growth;

Amendment 703 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34

34. Considers that in the case of symmetric shocks ~~brought about by a lack of internal demand~~, monetary policy alone cannot ~~reignit~~be relied upon to stabilise the economy, ~~particular~~especially in a context of the zero lower bounds; is therefore convinced that public and private investment must be increased, the administrative burden reduced and a proper regulatory framework developed, with a view to stimulating potential growth;

Amendment 704 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34 a (new)

34a. Stresses that SGP rules should be made more flexible to exclude infrastructural investments co-financed by Member States with the EIB who would have thus satisfied themselves about the economic feasibility of the projects financed to grow the economy much more than the debt being incurred;

Amendment 705 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34 a (new)

34a. Considers that monetary policy cannot reignite the economy, particularly in a context of zero lower bounds;

Amendment 706 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

Amendment 707 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

Amendment 708 #

Bernd KÖLMEL, Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER, Bernd LUCKE, Bas BELDER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

Amendment 709 #

Sylvie GOULARD, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Jean ARTHUIS, Michael THEURER, Lieve WIERINCK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

35. Considers that symmetric shocks that are caused by a lack of supply must be diminished by improving the competitiveness of the euro area via appropriate financial incentives, including via the financing of professional training or financial incentives for R&D spending, Member States should be further incentivised to increase public and private investment in R&D and innovation, also in light of accomplishing the goals set out in the Europe 2020 strategy;

Amendment 71 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas it became apparent during the sovereign debt crisis that the European Treaties do not provide the euro area with the instruments to deal effectively with shocks; whereas the rules-based system, with loose adherence to the rules by the Member States, and mere coordination of national economic policies failed to provide the required resilience during the crisis;

Amendment 71 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

Amendment 71 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Recall~~Insists that the protocols on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on the role of national parliaments ~~offer ample opportunities fo~~empower national parliaments’ to be involve~~ment in this respect~~d in coordination and scrutinising of the EU economic policy;

Amendment 710 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

35. Considers that symmetric shocks that are caused by a lack of supply must be diminished by improving the competitiveness of the euro area via appropriate financial incentives, including ~~via~~for the financing of professional training or financial incentives for R&D spending, by the reduction of administrative burden, the simplification and acceleration of procedures and the development of a proper regulatory framework;

Amendment 711 #

Nils TORVALDS, Michael THEURER, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

35. Considers that symmetric shocks that are caused by ~~a lack of supply must be diminished by improving the~~structural factors affecting the 'supply side' of the economy must be tackled by improving energy and resource efficiency, productivity and overall cost and non-cost competitiveness of the euro area via appropriate financial incentives, including via the financing of professional training or financial incentives for R&D spending;

Amendment 712 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

35. Considers that symmetric shocks that are caused by a lack of supply must be diminished by improving the competitiveness of the euro area via appropriate ~~financial incentives, including via the financing of professional training or financial incentives for R&D spending~~structural reforms;

Amendment 713 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

35. Considers that symmetric shocks that are caused by a lack of supply must be diminished by improving the competitiveness of the euro area ~~via~~primarily via ambitious structural reforms and, possibly, appropriate financial incentives, including via the financing of professional training or financial incentives for R&D spending;

Amendment 714 #

Bas BELDER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

Amendment 715 #

Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

Amendment 716 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

35. Considers that symmetric shocks that are caused by a lack of supply must be diminished by improving the c~~ompetitiveness~~apacity of the eEuro ~~area via appropriate financial incentives, including via the financing of professional training or financial incentives for R&D spending~~pean economy, through a crucial and democratic public action in strategic sectors at European, national and regional level;

Amendment 717 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

35. Considers that symmetric shocks ~~that are caused by a lack of supply must be diminished by improv~~also need to be tackled by means of fostering the competitiveness of the euro area via appropriate financial incentives, including via the financing of professional training or financial incentives for R&D spending;

Amendment 718 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. Considers that instability in the financial sector could also pose severe challenges for the euro area as a whole; urges completion of the Banking Union in order to lessen these challenges; calls for the fiscal capacity to operate as a fiscal backstop for the Banking Union, as agreed in the SRM;deleted

Amendment 719 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. Considers that a renewed instability inand fragmentation of the financial sector could a~~lso~~gain pose severe challenges for the euro area as a whole; urges completion of the Banking Union, including a meaningful BSR, in order to lessen these challenges~~; calls for the~~ and recalls that the shock absorption capacity of financial institutions remains low and fragile; calls, thus, for accelerated balance sheet repair and significantly higher levels of capital and bailinable instruments as well as a sufficient fiscal capacity to operate as a fiscal backstop for the Banking Union, as agreed in the SRM;

Amendment 72 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas it became apparent during the ~~sovereign debt~~financial crisis that the European Treaties do not provide the euro area with the instruments to deal effectively with shocks; whereas the economic governance framework has, in fact proven to be counter-productive as it forces Member States to adopt pro-cyclical measures;

Amendment 72 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

Amendment 72 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Recall~~Notes that the protocols on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on the role of national parliaments offer ample opportunities for national parliaments’ involvement in this respectidea of a single budgetary capacity would necessitate an additional federalist or tax structure and regards this as contrary to every principle of subsidiarity;

Amendment 720 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. Considers that instability in the financial sector could also pose severe challenges for the euro area as a whole; ~~urges completion of the Banking Union in order to lessen these challenges; calls for the fiscal capacity to operate as a fiscal backstop for the Banking Union, as agreed in the SRM;~~

Amendment 721 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. Considers that instability in the financial sector could also pose severe challenges for the euro area as a whole; urges completion of the Banking Union in order to ~~lessen~~mitigate these challenges; calls for the fiscal capacity to operate as a fiscal backstop for the Banking Union, ~~as agreed in the SRM~~including backstop to the Single Resolution Fund, backstop to the Deposit Insurance Fund and direct recapitalisation of financial institutions under an appropriate conditionality, as agreed when the SRM was established;

Amendment 722 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. Considers that instability in the financial sector ~~could also~~ poses severe challenges for the euro area as a whole; ~~urges completion of the Banking Union in order to lessen these challenges; calls for the fiscal capacity to operate as a fiscal backstop for the Banking Union, as agreed in the SRM;~~

Amendment 723 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. Considers that instability in the financial sector could also pose severe challenges for the euro area as a whole; urges ~~completion of the Banking Union in order to lessen these challenges; calls for the fiscal capacity to operate as a fiscal backstop for~~for a new financial regulation across Europe, establishing a banking tax for those practices qualified as rentist, demanding full compliance with the social function of credit, and the reinforcement of balance sheets of the Bbanking ~~Union, as agreed in the SRM;~~system through resources coming from dividends, shareholders and senior financial creditors

Amendment 724 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. Considers that instability in the financial sector could also pose severe challenges for the euro area as a whole; urges completion of the Banking Union in order to lessen these challenges; ~~calls for the fiscal capacity to operate as a fiscal backstop for the Banking Union, as agreed in the SRM;~~

Amendment 725 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

Amendment 726 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. Considers that instability in the financial sector could also pose severe challenges for the euro area as a whole; urges completion of the Banking Union in order to lessen these challenges; ~~calls for the fiscal capacity to operate as a fiscal backstop for the Banking Union, as agreed in the SRM;~~

Amendment 727 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. Considers that instability in the financial sector could also pose severe challenges for the euro area as a whole; urges ~~completion~~strengthening of the Banking Union in order to lessen these challenges; ~~calls for the fiscal capacity to operate as a fiscal backstop for the Banking Union, as agreed in the SRM;~~

Amendment 728 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. Considers that instability in the financial sector could also pose severe challenges for the euro area as a whole; urges completion of the Banking Union in order to lessen these challenges; calls for the fiscal capacity to operate as a fiscal backstop, which should be fiscally neutral over the medium term for the Banking Union, as agreed in the SRM;

Amendment 729 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. C~~onsiders that instability in the financial sector could also pose severe challenges for~~alls for the Banking Union project to be abandoned, because it has not so far proved itself effective for the purpose of increasing the resilience of the eEuro ~~area as a whole; urges~~pean financial system; calls on the European Institutions to complet~~ion of~~e the Bbanking ~~Union in order to lessen these challenges; calls for the fiscal capacity to operate as a fiscal backstop for the Banking Union, as agreed in the SRM;~~ separation project, which, by means of a genuine and compulsory division of investment operations from retail operations, is the only way of gaining the confidence of European consumers;

Amendment 73 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas it became apparent during the sovereign debt crisis that the European Treaties do not provide the euro area with the instruments – first and foremost an economic policy – to deal effectively with shocks;

Amendment 73 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Stresses the importance of ~~not linking any unemployment benefit system with economic conditionality for the Member S~~financing policies to achieve better social cohesion and full employment, to reduce structural unemployment, to erase poverty, to fight economic inequalities that hamper economic growth, to strengthen the welfare states, and ~~of promoting social policies which fight poverty, social exclusion and social dumping~~to help attain all the social objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy;

Amendment 73 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

8. Recalls that the protocols on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on the role of national parliaments offer ~~ample~~ opportunities for national parliaments’ involvement in this respect;

Amendment 730 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. Considers that instability in the financial sector could also pose severe challenges for the euro area as a whole; ~~urges~~emphasizes that the completion of the Banking Union ~~in order to lessen these challenges; calls for the fiscal capacity to oper~~aims at improving the confidence in the financial sector in some Member States a~~s a fiscal backstop for the Banking Union, as agreed~~t the expense of the perception of the financial sector stability in othe ~~SRM~~rs;

Amendment 731 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. Considers that financial instability ~~in the financial sector could also~~ pose severe challenges for the euro area as a whole; urges the completion of the Banking Union in order to lessen these challenges; calls for the ~~fiscal capacity~~EMF to operate as a fiscal backstop for the Banking Union, as agreed in the SRM;

Amendment 732 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36 – subparagraph 1 (new)

Does not consider the sources of instability and systemic risk in the financial sector to have been adequately addressed by means of an ambitious reform based on the lessons learned from the crisis; notes with concern, in this context, the proposal to establish a Capital Markets Union, intended to promote the further financialisation of the economy and the restoration of the shadow banking system and securitisation, in other words the same perverse systems and instruments which caused the crisis; recalls furthermore that the further development of the financial sector adversely affects the functioning of the real economy, as demonstrated by much empirical research;

Amendment 733 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

37. Points out that the fiscal capacity has to be of significant size in order to be able to address these euro-area-wide shocks and to finance its functions; insists that in order to provide sufficient financial resources, the euro area fiscal capacity, including the EMF, should be able to increase the issuance of equities via a rise in guarantees; considers that these common issued equities should have the highest credit rate;deleted

Amendment 734 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

Amendment 735 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

Amendment 736 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

Amendment 737 #

Nils TORVALDS, Michael THEURER, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

Amendment 738 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

Amendment 739 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Herbert REUL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

Amendment 74 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas, following real convergence in the run-up to the introduction of the common currency, the euro area witnessed structural divergence between 1999 and 2009, which made the euro area as a whole less resilient to shocks; whereas regulatory adjustments and structural reforms aimed at reducing risks and improving convergence have been introduced since 2009 at both European and national level, but some euro area Member States still require solidarity and sustainable reforms in their catching- up process; re has been no process of real convergence among the countries that adopted the euro between 1999 and 2009, due to the fact that some countries did not sufficiently reform to improve their productivity and competitiveness, but increased public spending without investing in a sustainable manner; whereas the causes of structural divergence between euro area Member States were numerous: convergence of government bond yields led to an artificially low level of interest rates, which disclosed discrepancies in competitiveness between countries and eliminated incentives to reform, improve competitiveness and budget responsibly; whereas low interest rates triggered irresponsible behaviour on the part of some euro countries, which took advantage of the free rider effect of low interest rates and increased salaries and public expenditure without simultaneously increasing productivity, and therefore worsened the competitiveness of their economies; whereas not respecting and enforcing the rules of the SGP left several euro countries without fiscal margins to counter the crisis, in addition to macroeconomic imbalances accumulating inside several euro countries over decades, both being crucial elements leading to the sovereign debt crisis; whereas weak institutions, structural rigidities, weak productivity growth and insufficient policies to address asset price booms made the euro area as a whole less resilient to shocks; whereas economic mismanagement at national level was a reason for the worsening of the crisis, not the euro as a currency; whereas regulatory adjustments and structural reforms aimed at reducing risks and improving convergence have been introduced since 2009 at both European and national level, but several factors still appear crucial for ensuring real convergence in the EMU, such as macroeconomic stability, sound fiscal policy, a high degree of flexibility in product and labour markets, favourable conditions for an efficient use of capital and labour in the economy, supporting total factor productivity growth, economic integration within the euro area, and a more active use of national policy tools to prevent asset price and credit boom-bust cycles; whereas some euro area Member States still require solidarity and sustainable reforms in their catching-up process, provided by the European Union through European structural and investment funds to foster convergence in addition to the implementation of instruments during the crisis, which prevented the collapse of the economy, in an effort of securing jobs, fostering investment and growth as well as safeguarding the savings of citizens;

Amendment 74 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Stresses the importance of ~~not linking any~~the unemployment benefit system ~~with economic conditionality for the Member States,~~being effective and of promoting social policies which fight poverty, social exclusion and social dumping;

Amendment 74 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Stresses that using own resources specifically linked to the euro area would ensure the necessary clarity, transparency and democratic legitimacy concerning control and accountability, as these resources would be generated and controlled at the European level;

Amendment 740 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

37. Points out that this pillar of the fiscal capacity has to be of significant size in order to be able to address these euro- area-wide shocks and to finance its functions the optimal solution would be to rely on additional own resources such as a new carbon tax, the financial transaction tax, a share of the corporate tax based on the CCCTB approach, ECB and ESM profits; insists that in any case in order to ~~provid~~secure sufficient financial resources, the euro area fiscal capacity, ~~including~~or the second arm of the EMF, should be able to ~~increase~~allow the issuance of common equities via a rise in guarantees; considers that these common issued equities should have the highest credit rate;

Amendment 741 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

37. Points out that the fiscal capacity has to be of significant size in order to be able to address, t~~hese euro-area-wide shocks and to finance its functions; insists that in order to provide sufficient financial resourc~~ogether with the Member States, these euro -area ~~fiscal capacity, including the EMF, should be able~~-wide shocks and to fin~~crease the issuance of equities via a rise in guarantees; considers that these common issued equities should have the highest credit rate~~ance its functions;

Amendment 742 #

Bernd KÖLMEL, Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER, Bernd LUCKE, Bas BELDER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

37. Points out that ~~the~~any fiscal capacity ~~has~~would have to be of significant size in order to be able to address ~~these~~ euro-area-wide shocks and to finance its functions; ~~insists th~~warns against creat in order to provide sufficient financial resources, the euro area fiscal capacity, including the EMF, should be able to increase the issuance of equities via a rise in guarantees; considers that these common issued equities should have the highest credit rateg net contributor and net receiver countries out overstretching solidarity and seeding tension;

Amendment 743 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

37. ~~Points out that the fiscal capacity has to be of significant size in order to be able to address~~To cope with economic issues in the EU and in these euro-area-wide shocks and to finance its functions; insists that in order to provide sufficient financial resources, the euro area fiscal capacity, including the EMF, should be able to increase the issuance of equities via a rise in guarantees; considers that these common issuzone, balanced combination of available measure should be used. Monetary policy, domestic fiscal space, ESM fund and eventually newly considered tools should be used adequ~~ities should have the highest credit rate;~~ately to the risks faced by the EU and eurozone economies.

Amendment 744 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

Amendment 745 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

Amendment 746 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

37. Points out that the fiscal capacity has to be of significant size ~~in order~~ to be able to address these euro- area- wide shocks and to finance its functions; insists that in order to provide sufficient financial resources, the euro area fiscal capacity~~, including the EMF, should be able to~~ should be financed by own resources such as taxes, ECB dividends, and the increase ~~the~~d issuance of equities of the ESM/ESF via a rise in guarantees; considers that these common issued equities should have the highest credit rate;

Amendment 747 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

37. Points out that the fiscal capacity has to be of s~~igni~~ufficaient size in order to be able to address these euro-area-wide shocks and to finance its functions; insists that in order to provide sufficient financial resources, the euro area fiscal capacity, including the EMF, should be able to increase the issuance of equities via a rise in guarantees; considers that these common issued equities should have the highest credit rate;

Amendment 748 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

37. Points out that if the fiscal capacity ~~has to be of significant size in order~~is to be able to address ~~these~~ euro-area-wide shocks and to finance its functions, it has to be of significant size; insists that in order to provide sufficient financial resources, the euro area fiscal capacity~~, including the EMF,~~ should be able to increase the issuance of ~~equities~~debt via a rise in guarantees; considers that these commonly issued ~~equities~~debt should have the highest credit rate;

Amendment 749 #

Maria João RODRIGUES, Jutta STEINRUCK, Brando BENIFEI, Elena GENTILE, Joachim SCHUSTER, Sergio GUTIÉRREZ PRIETO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 a (new)

37a. Stresses that the European Fund for Strategic Investment is in its current form is unable to fully address the structural Investment Gap of the European Economy; calls for additional measures to ensure sufficient levels of investment; underlines that investments to foster energy transition, meeting the COP21 goals and generating new quality jobs should be prioritised;

Amendment 75 #

Maria João RODRIGUES

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

Amendment 75 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Stresses the importance of ~~not link~~promoting social policies that fight poverty, social exclusion and social dumping, a~~ny unemployment benefit system with economic conditionality for the Member States, and of promoting social policies which fight poverty, social exclusion and social dumping;~~ s well as investing in formal education systems and active employment policies helping to shorten unemployment spells and improve skill levels while ensuring decent living conditions for unemployed people; considers that limited macroeconomic risk-sharing within a European Unemployment Insurance scheme, complementary to national schemes and addressing cyclical unemployment only, should be underpinned by relevant ex ante conditionality on the accessibility and quality of support provided to job-seekers, but would not require harmonisation of national labour market policies; calls for social partners to be appropriately involved in establishing and overseeing a complementary European Unemployment Insurance scheme, taking into account their responsibilities in this field at national level;

Amendment 75 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Calls for the European Parliament and national parliaments to be given a stronger role in the new economic governance framework in order to strengthen democratic accountability;

Amendment 750 #

Sylvie GOULARD, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Nils TORVALDS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 a (new)

37a. Believes that the establishment of a budgetary capacity for the euro area has to be accompanied by adequate institutional reforms in order to ensure its democratic accountability and legitimacy as well as its credibility;

Amendment 751 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38

38. Stresses that the Community method should prevail in the development of economic governance for the euro area; urges that no reinforcement of intergovernmental structures should take place in parallel with existing structures;deleted

Amendment 752 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38

38. Stresses that the Community method should prevail in the development of economic governance for the euro area; urges th~~at no reinforcement of intergovernmental structures should take place in parallel with existing structures~~e intergovernmental structures and mechanisms created over the crisis to be integrated in the community acquis as soon as possible; is of the opinion that genuine Fiscal and Budgetary Union requires a comprehensive and convention driven Treaty revision as a necessary condition for ensuring a appropriate level of democratic legitimacy and accountability;

Amendment 753 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38

Amendment 754 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38

38. Stresses that the Community method should not prevail in the development of economic governance for the euro area; ~~urges that no reinforcement of intergovernmental structures should take place in parallel with existing structures;~~

Amendment 755 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38

38. Stresses that the ~~Community method~~subsidiarity and proportionality principles should prevail in the development of economic governance for the euro area; ~~urges that no reinforcement of intergovernmental structures should take place in parallel with existing structures;~~

Amendment 756 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38

38. Stresses th~~at the Community method should prevail in the development of~~e need to review the existing economic governance rules for the euro area~~; urges that no reinforcement of intergovernmental structures should take place in parallel with existing structures~~, to ensure that Member States can implement the economic and fiscal policies necessary to promote recovery and combat growing unemployment and poverty;

Amendment 757 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI, Urmas PAET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38

38. Stresses that the ~~Community~~a new federal method should prevail in the development of economic governance for the euro area; urges that no reinforcement of intergovernmental structures should take place in parallel with existing structures;

Amendment 758 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38

Amendment 759 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 a (new)

38a. Highlights that in case a budgetary capacity as developed in this report is established, the European Parliament needs to establish a specific committee composed of MEPs from participating Member States – mirrored in form of a specific plenary configuration - to act as budgetary and oversight authority.

Amendment 76 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas, following real convergence in the run-up to the introduction of the common currency, the euro area ~~witnessed~~as established and enlarged was still far from being an optimal monetary zone, with growing structural disparities between the original members themselves, and later with the inclusion of new members; and whereas subsequently the euro area witnessed continuing and growing structural divergence between 1999 and 2009, which made the euro area as a whole less resilient to shocks; whereas regulatory adjustments and structural reforms aimed at reducing risks and improving convergence have been introduced since 2009 at both European and national level, but some euro area Member States still require solidarity and sustainable reforms in their catching- up process;

Amendment 76 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Stresses the importance of not linking any unemployment benefit system with economic conditionality for the Member States, and of promoting social policies which fight poverty, ~~social exclus~~the very high unemployment rates in some EU Member States, social exclusion, gender discrimination and social dumping;

Amendment 76 #

Jonás FERNÁNDEZ, Jakob von WEIZSÄCKER

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9

~~9. Believes that non-eurozone Member States should be involved, if they so desire, although in a differentiated way and depending on the design of the budgetary capacity.~~deleted

Amendment 760 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 a (new)

38a. Insists that euro area decision making both at the level of the Council and Parliament needs to be organised according to the principles of "no taxation without representation" and "no representation without taxation";

Amendment 761 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. Calls urgently for the European Parliament and national parliaments to be given a strengthened role in the renewed economic governance framework in order to reinforce democratic accountability; calls in this respect to subject the analysis and the recommendations on the Euro Area aggregate fiscal stance to consent in the EMU committee; considers that the Annual Growth Survey should include detailed policy guidelines which should underpin the formulation of outcome- oriented policy recommendations to address macroeconomic imbalances and foster the implementation of sustainable structural reforms, calls for the Commission to be fully accountable to the European Parliament regarding the Annual Growth Survey and for increased national ownership in the European Semester in order to improve ~~compliance with~~the democratic accountability of the CSRs;

Amendment 762 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. Calls urgently for the European Parliament and national parliaments to be given a strengthened role in the renewed economic governance framework in order to reinforce democratic accountability; calls for increased national ownership in the European Semester in order to improve compliance with the CSRs; suggests, based on the model of the European Interparliamentary Week, to foresee one week per quarter in the calendars of the European Parliaments and the national parliaments of all Member States for joint parliamentary sessions, thereby allowing for a substantial discussion throughout the cycle of the European Semester and promoting a European public debate;

Amendment 763 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. Calls urgently for the European Parliament ~~and national parliaments~~ to be given a strengthened role in the renewed economic governance framework in order to reinforce democratic accountability; calls for ~~increased national ownership in the European Semester in order to improve compliance with the CSR~~a greater involvement of the national parliaments as long as national contributions are the basis of the fiscal capacity; notes that this participation will have to be phased out once genuine own resources in the form of taxation will be agreed on at Eurozone level; stresses, however, that a continued dialogue will have to take place between the European Parliament and the national parliaments;

Amendment 764 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. Calls urgently for the European Parliament ~~and national parliaments~~not to be given a strengthened role in the renewed ~~economic governance framework in order to reinforce democratic ac~~centrally count~~ability; calls for increased national ownership in the European Semester in order to improve compliance with the CSRs~~rolled governance framework;

Amendment 765 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. Calls urgently for ~~the European Parliament and national parliaments to be given a strengthened role in the renewed economic governance framework in ord~~comprehensive decision-making powers to ~~reinforce democratic accountability; calls for increased national ownership in the European Semester in order to improve compliance with the CSRs~~be restored to Nations in the area of budgetary policy;

Amendment 766 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. Calls urgently for the European Parliament and national parliaments to be given a strengthened role in the renewed economic governance framework in order to reinforce democratic accountability; calls for increased national ownership in the European Semester in order to improve compliance with the CSRsstrict enforcement of the no bail-out clause in order to reinforce democratic accountability;

Amendment 767 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

Amendment 768 #

Fabio DE MASI, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

Amendment 769 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. Calls urgently for the European Parliament and national parliaments to be given a strengthened role in the renewed economic governance framework in order to reinforce democratic accountability~~; calls for increased national ownership in the European Semester in order to improve compliance with the CSRs~~, participation and transparency;

Amendment 77 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas, following nominal and increased real convergence in the run-up to the introduction of the common currency, the euro area witnessed structural divergence between 1999 and 2009 with the economies at the centre relying more on exports and tradable activities and the economies in the periphery on non- tradable activities and construction, which made the euro area as a whole less resilient to shocks; whereas regulatory adjustments and structural reforms aimed at reducing risks and improving convergence have been introduced since 2009 at both European and national level, but some euro area Member States still require ~~solidarity and sustainable~~far reaching structural reforms in their catching- up process;

Amendment 77 #

Daciana Octavia SÂRBU, Cătălin Sorin IVAN

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Stresses the importance of not linking any unemployment benefit system with any other economic conditionality for the Member States than those oriented to increase the employability of the unemployed and jobs creation, and of promoting social policies which fight poverty, social exclusion and social dumping;

Amendment 77 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9

9. Believes that non-eurozone Member States, both those with an opt-out and those wishing to join, should be involved, if they so desire, although in a differentiated way and depending on the design of the budgetary capacity.

Amendment 770 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. Calls urgently for the European Parliament and national parliaments to be given a strengthened role in the renewed economic governance framework in order to reinforce democratic accountability; calls for increased national ownership inUrges that a democratic decision making body in the form of a Eurozone Parliament (EZP) specific to the euro area is created on which the democratic accountability for the new institutional architecture of the Eeuro~~pean Semester in order to improve compliance with the CSRs~~ would be based; the decision making should involve Parliamentarians at the European and national level;

Amendment 771 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

Amendment 772 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

Amendment 773 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

Amendment 774 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

40. Argues that national ownership could be improved by including national parliaments in the procedures; insists, however, that the competences of the EP and the national parliaments conferred upon these institutions by the Treaties should be respected and that mixing of these competences be avoided; takes the view that a Eurozone Parliament (EZP) is needed to restore democratic oversight over the Eurozone economic governance; underlines that a Eurozone Parliament, composed of members of the European and National Parliaments, can reinvigorate the public debate on economic policy making and budgetary strategies of the Eurozone 1a ; __________________ 1aSee: Piketty, Thomas (2012) Le Capital au XXIe siècle, pp. 690

Amendment 775 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

40. Argues that national ownership could be improved by including national parliaments in the procedures, notably by formalising the inter-parliamentary conference foreseen by Article 13 of the Fiscal compact, following the integration of the latter within the EU legal framework; insists, however, that the competences of the EP and the national parliaments conferred upon these institutions by the Treaties should be respected and that mixing of these competences be avoided;

Amendment 776 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

40. ~~Argues that national ownership could be improved by including national parliaments~~ Points out that, historically, it was by claiming the procedures; insists, however, that the competences of the EP and the national parliaments conferred upon these institutions by the Treaties should be respected and that mixing of these competences be avoidedright to exercise scrutiny over budgets that parliaments became fully-fledged democratic institutions;

Amendment 777 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

40. Argues that national ownership could be improved by including national parliaments in the procedures and allowing a genuine and timely dialogue between them and the EP; insists, however, that the competences of the EP and the national parliaments conferred upon these institutions by the Treaties should be respected and that mixing of these competences be avoided;

Amendment 778 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

40. Argues that national ~~ownership could be improved by including national parliaments in the procedures~~parliaments have an important role to play in helping improve national ownership; insists, however, that the competences of the EP and the national parliaments conferred upon these institutions by the Treaties should be respected and that mixing of these competences be avoided;

Amendment 779 #

Fabio DE MASI, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

40. Argues that national ~~ownership could be improved by including national parliaments in the procedures~~parliaments should endorse the National reform programme and the Stability Programme; insists, however, that the competences of the EP and the national parliaments conferred upon these institutions by the Treaties should be respected and that mixing of these competences be avoided;

Amendment 78 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

Amendment 78 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Stresses that the Member States must ensure they have an effective unemployment benefit system. At the same time, they must make use of all the possibilities available under the various EU programmes;

Amendment 78 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9

9. Believes that non-eurozone Member States should be involved, if they so desire, although in a differentiated way and depending on the design of the budgetary capacity, subject to retention of their national sovereignty.

Amendment 780 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 a (new)

40a. Believes that making the ESM fully accountable to the European Parliament as a consequence of this communitarisation would upgrade and streamline the parliamentary control compared to the existing situation characterised by uncoordinated scrutiny by 19 national Parliaments; calls for this streamlining of accountability to be also applied in the field of auditing;

Amendment 781 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41

Amendment 782 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41

Amendment 783 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41

Amendment 784 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41

Amendment 785 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41

Amendment 786 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41

Amendment 787 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41

Amendment 788 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41

41. Considers that in order to provide for a genuine EMU, a euro area treasury should be created for collective decision- making, supervision and management of the budgetary capacity for the euro area; calls ~~for~~on the ~~inclusion of this treasury within the European Commission with full macroeconomic, fiscal~~Commission to come forward with options as to how this treasury could be resourced, and how it would interact with existing Union institutions, in such a way as to ensure democratic accountability and financial competences; calls for a vice-president of the European Commission to head the treasury and simultaneously to act as president of the Eurogroup; urges full accountability of this treasury to the European Parliament particular to guarantee that, on the one hand, Member States not participating in the further deepening of the EMU cannot create obstacles to such further deepening, while on the other hand respecting the rights and competences of the non-participating Member States; calls on the Commission to ensure that the creation of a euro area treasury is consistent with the continued coexistence of different perspectives within the single institutional framework ensuring both the effective operability of Union mechanisms and the equality of Member States before the Treaties;

Amendment 789 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41

Amendment 79 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas, ~~following real convergence in the run-up to the introduction of the common currency, the euro area witness~~by adopting a common currency, the euro area reduced the ability of each participant member to react to a crisis, since the monetary tool, which had hitherto normally been the tool used to adjust one economy against another, had disappeared; whereas the euro, as a common currency for economies with differing needs, also created structural divergences between 1999 and 2009, which made it~~he euro area~~ as a whole less resilient to shocks; whereas regulatory adjustments and structural reforms aimed at reducing risks and improving convergence have been introduced since 2009 at both European and national level, but some euro area Member States still require solidarity and sustainable reforms in their catching-up proceshaving the same monetary policy for the countries in the South of the euro area and those in the North led inexorably to a balance of payments crisis;

Amendment 79 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

Amendment 79 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9

9. Believes that non-eurozone Member States should be involved, if they so desire, although in a differentiated way, and with no decision-making capacity, and depending on the design of the budgetary capacity.;

Amendment 790 #

Bernd KÖLMEL, Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER, Bernd LUCKE, Bas BELDER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41

41. Considers that ~~in order to provide for a genuine EMU,~~ a euro area treasury should be created for collective decision- making, supervision and management of the budgetary capacity for the euro area; calls for the inclusion of this treasury within the European Commission with full macroeconomic, fiscal and financial competences; calls for a vice-president of the European Commission to head the treasury and simultaneously to act as president of the Eurogroup; urges full accountability of this treasury to the European Parliament with appropriate accountability;

Amendment 791 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41

41. Considers that in order ~~to provide~~ for a genuine EMU~~, a euro area treasury should be created for collective decision- making, supervision and management of the budgetary capacity for the euro area; calls for the inclusion of thi~~ to be in equilibrium, a country which considers that the costs tare~~asury wit~~ outweighing the ~~European Commission with full macroeconomic, fiscal and financial competences; calls for a vice-president~~benefits of a membership of the Eeuro~~pean Commission to head the treasury and simultaneously to act as president of the Eurogroup; urges full accountability of this treasury to the European Parliament~~ area should be able to choose to leave;

Amendment 792 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41

41. Considers that in order to provide for a genuine EMU, a euro area treasury should be created, with the ability to issue common Euro bonds on a shared basis and with a socially acceptable risk weighting to spread the cost of borrowing in a market oriented but socially just manner, for collective decision- making, supervision and management of the budgetary capacity for the euro area; calls for the inclusion of this treasury within the European Commission with full macroeconomic, fiscal and financial competences; calls for a vice-president of the European Commission to head the treasury and simultaneously to act as president of the Eurogroup; urges full accountability of this treasury to the European Parliament;

Amendment 793 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41

Amendment 794 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41

Amendment 795 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41

Amendment 796 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41

Amendment 797 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41

41. Considers that in order to provide for a genuine EMU, a euro area treasury should be created ~~for collective decision- making, supervision and management of the budgetary capacity for the euro area~~in order to give the Euro area the capacity to borrow, spend and raise taxes; calls for the inclusion of this treasury within the European Commission with full macroeconomic, fiscal and financial competences; calls for a vice- president of the European Commission to head the treasury and simultaneously to act as president of the Eurogroup; urges full accountability of this treasury to the European Parliament;

Amendment 798 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Sylvie GOULARD, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI, Urmas PAET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41 a (new)

41a. Is convinced that the macroeconomic governance of the euro area should evolve towards a system of surveillance centred on a limited number of fiscal indicators with clear and simple rules; considers that a strong enforcement of these rules coupled with an ambitious fiscal capacity should allow for less intrusion from the European level into policy-making at national level; stresses that such an application of the subsidiarity principle would allow for a more credible and more democratic governance of the euro area, which would foster ownership by citizens;

Amendment 799 #

Bernd LUCKE, Bernd KÖLMEL, Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41 a (new)

41a. Takes the view that the governance of the ESM has to be improved, possibly on the occasion of the integration of the ESM into the legal framework of the Union, for instance through an extension of the use of Qualified Majority Voting within the Board of Governors to new issues; also calls for the inclusion of the provisions relating to the Direct Recapitalisation Instrument into the Treaty establishing the ESM;

Amendment 8 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 b (new)

– having regard to the Protocols 12 and 13 to the TEU and TFEU;

Amendment 8 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Points out that the success of the eurozone is dependent on increasing the welfare of all its citizens, and on well- functioning labour markets and welfare systems, based on decent work with rights, ~~a strong role for the social partners,~~ social dialogue, collective bargaining and collective agreements, and preventing individual Member States from trying to gain an unfair competitive advantage by infringing workers’ rights or promoting social dumping;

Amendment 8 #

Fabio Massimo CASTALDO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Believes that the crisis ~~enhanced the need for improvement in~~has demonstrated the failure of EU economic governance as projected and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be ~~progressively complet~~extensively reviewed and improved;

Amendment 80 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas, following ~~real~~the forced convergence in the run-up to the introduction of the common currency, the euro area witnessed an increase in structural divergence between 1999 and 2009, which ~~made~~reduced the euro area a's a ~~whole less resilient~~bility to respond to shocks; whereas the regulatory adjustments and structural reforms aimed at reducing risks and improving convergence have been introduced since 2009 at both European and national level, but some euro area Member States still require solidarity and sustainable reforms in their catching-up processimposed since 2009 at both European and national level have, furthermore, aggravated the already difficult economic and social situation;

Amendment 80 #

Enrique CALVET CHAMBON

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

Amendment 80 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9

9. Believes that non-euro~~zone~~ area Member States should be involved, if they so desire, although in a differentiated way and depending on the design of the budgetary capacity.

Amendment 800 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Sylvie GOULARD, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41 a (new)

41a. Considers that any Member State should be free to join the euro area or to choose to leave it;

Amendment 801 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41 b (new)

41b. Notes that the European Parliament should review its internal organisation so as to allow an expression of these MEPs elected in the euro area;

Amendment 802 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42

Amendment 803 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42

Amendment 804 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42

Amendment 805 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42

Amendment 806 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Dariusz ROSATI, Luděk NIEDERMAYER, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Marian-Jean MARINESCU, Danuta Maria HÜBNER, Ivana MALETIĆ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42

Amendment 807 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42

42. ~~Considers that those non-euro countries that do not have an opt-out will eventually become part of the EMU and therefore may join the governance framework on a voluntary basis with a special statu~~Emphasizes that the seven EU Member States that do not have an opt-out or opt-in from joining the common currency, but are bound to join the euro area by their Treaties of Accession to the European Union, should have full rights of participating in the governance structure of any fiscal capacity, be able to contribute and benefit financially, receive technical and financial assistance in transposing needed structural reforms in their countries, thereby making their economies more competitive especially vis-à-vis current euro area Member States, increasing resilience, thus ensuring the sound transition into the euro area and avoid economic and financial crises in the future by fostering a stronger euro area with stronger Member States;

Amendment 808 #

Sylvie GOULARD, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Lieve WIERINCK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42

42. Considers that those non-euro countries that do not have an opt-out will eventually become part of the EMU and therefore may join the governance framework on a voluntary basis with a special status; considers it essential to differentiate between discussion concerning policies for the euro area and related decision making; modalities must be found to allow all Member States who are committed to joining the euro area to participate in discussions concerning the euro area, if they so wish, however only Member States who are members of the euro area should be able to vote on these decisions;

Amendment 809 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42

Amendment 81 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital ΣΤ

Amendment 81 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Stresses that fiscal capacity should not be merely a responsive tool in the event of country-specific shocks, but should actively enable Member States to achieve social cohesion and full employment, to erase poverty, to strengthen the welfare state and to help attain all the social objectivbe used, in particular, for financing strategic investments in the general interest, as a basis for sustainable and inclusive growth, and for establishing a mutual support system among the eurozone Member States so that economic shocks specific to the individual countries of the Eeuro~~pe 2020 strateg~~zone can be absorbed more effectively.

Amendment 81 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 – subparagraph 1 (new)

Emphasises that EU Member States' economies are linked and believes that all Member States should be involved, to ensure the long-term economic sustainability of the eurozone.

Amendment 810 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42

Amendment 811 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42

42. Considers ~~that those non-euro countries that do not have an opt-out will eventually become part of the EMU and therefore may join the governance framework on a voluntary basis with a special statu~~it necessary to allow an opt-out for all countries that do not wish to belong to the euro area and EMU, with complete regard for the principle of respect for the sovereignty of peoples;

Amendment 812 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42

42. Considers that those non-euro countries that do not have an opt-out will eventually become part of the ~~EMU~~euro area and therefore may join the governance framework on a voluntary basis with a special status;

Amendment 813 #

Urmas PAET

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42 – subparagraph 1 (new)

Stresses that the non-euro countries, who do not have an opt-out need to make further effort to fulfil the criteria needed for the adoption of Euro, furthermore the relevant EU institutions must help them to achieve this goal;

Amendment 814 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43

Amendment 815 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43

Amendment 816 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43

43. Acknowledges that the current political climate characterised by deep inequality, mistrust and uncertainty is not conducive to proper reforms to achieve and complete EMU; believes, ~~therefore, that a comprehensive roadmap, including clear milestones withi~~however, that the various crises and referenda require the euro area to make, as soon as possible, a qualitative leap of integration; consequently calls for a comprehensive, binding roadmap to be proposed by the Commission and a~~greed timetable and taking into account the political situation, should be urgently adopted with a clear commitment by euro area Heads of State and Government to achieving a genuine and complete EMU~~dopted by euro area Heads of State and Government in December 2016, with the aim to finalize all legislative measures that do not require Treaty change by the end of the current mandate of the Commission and the European Parliament and to set the stage for the necessary Treaty changes to allow for a sustainable euro area;

Amendment 817 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43

43. Acknowledges that the current political climate characterised by deep inequality, mistrust and uncertainty is not conducive to proper ~~reforms~~policy to achieve and complete EMU; believes, therefore, that a comprehensive roadmap, including clear milestones within an agreed timetable and taking into account the political situation, should be urgently adopted with a clear commitment by euro area Heads of State and Government to achieving a genuine and completeprogressive and democratic EMU;

Amendment 818 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43

43. Acknowledges that recently there has been a high level of scepticism among European citizens as to the ability of the European institutions and of the European project itself to solve serious problems, and that the current political climate characterised by deep inequality, mistrust and uncertainty is not conducive to proper reforms to achieve and complete EMU; believes, therefore, that a comprehensive roadmap, including clear milestones within an agreed timetable and taking into account the political and economic situation, should be urgently adopted with a clear commitment by euro area Heads of State and Government to achieving a genuine and complete EMU;

Amendment 819 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43

43. Acknowledges that the current political climate is characterised by ~~deep inequality, mis~~low levels of trust and that uncertainty is not conducive to ~~proper~~ reforms to ~~achieve and complet~~deepen the EMU; believes, therefore, that ~~a comprehensive roadmap, including clear milestone~~it is wvithin an agreed timetable and taking into account the political situation, should be urgently adopted with a clear commitment by euro area Heads of State and Government to achieving a genuine and complete EMUal to first abide by the present set of rules before any further deepening of the EMU is warranted;

Amendment 82 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas, following realative convergence in the run-up to the introduction of the common currency, the euro area witnessed structural divergence between 1999 and 2009, which made the euro area as a whole less resilient to shocks; whereas regulatory adjustments and ~~structural~~ reforms aimed at reducing risks and improving convergence have been introduced since 2009 at both European and national level, but ~~some euro area Member States still require solidarity and sustainable reforms in their catching- up process;~~only addressed unsustainable high demand in some countries while lacking of demand in other Member States was not corrected leading to a lack of demand and deflation at the aggregate EMU level.

Amendment 82 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Stresses that fiscal capacity, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, should not be merely a responsive tool in the event of country-specific shocks, but should actively enable Member States to achieve social cohesion and full employment, to erase poverty, to strengthen the welfare state and to help attain ~~all the social~~the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy.

Amendment 82 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 a (new)

9a. Considers it essential to differentiate between discussion concerning policies for the euro area and related decision making; modalities must be found to allow all Member State who are committed to joining the euro area to participate in discussions concerning the euro area, if they so wish, however only Member States who are members of the euro area and contribute to rescue funds and the budgetary capacity should be able to vote on these decisions;

Amendment 820 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43

43. Acknowledges that ~~the current political climate characterised by deep inequality, mistrust and uncertainty is not conducive to proper reforms to achieve and complet~~EMU has been a serious source of division and conflict within the EMU; believes, therefore, that a comprehensive roadmap, including clear milestones within an agreed timetable and taking into account the political situation, ~~should~~must be urgently adopted with a clear commitment by ~~euro area~~EU Heads of State and Government to ~~achieving a genuine and complete EMU~~get through this phase and return to a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect, guaranteeing the various specific characteristics, so as to return to the path of growth which was interrupted by the creation of the single currency;

Amendment 821 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43

43. Acknowledges that the current political climate characterised by deep inequality, mistrust and uncertainty ~~is not conducive to proper reforms to achieve and complete EMU~~has been caused, among others, by pursuing the completion of the EMU regardless of economic objections; believes, therefore, that a comprehensive roadmap, including clear milestones within an agreed timetable and taking into account the political situation, should be urgently adopted ~~with a clear commitment by euro area Heads of State and Government to achieving a genuine and complete EMU~~;

Amendment 822 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43

43. ~~Acknowledges that the current political climate characterised by deep inequality, mistrust and uncertainty is not conducive to proper reforms to achieve and complete EMU; believes, therefore,~~Believes that a comprehensive roadmap, including clear milestones and convergence criteria within an agreed timetable and taking into account the political situation, should be urgently adopted with a clear commitment by euro area Heads of State and Government ~~to achieving a genu~~; considers that the roadmap should also address the issue of sovereign debt stock ine an~~d complete EMU~~ appropriate manner;

Amendment 823 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43

Amendment 824 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43

43. ~~Acknowledges that~~Reckons that given the current political climate characterised by deep inequality, mistrust and uncertainty ~~is not conducive to proper~~the only way to reforms to achieve and complete EMU; believes, therefore, that a comprehensive roadmap, including clear milestones within an agreed timetable and taking into account the political situation, should be urgently adopted with a clear commitment by euro area Heads of State and Government to achieving a genuine and complete EMhe Eurozone is to discuss its future in an open and democratic way; notes that the only way to show citizens and economic actors we are serious about the future of the euro is to modify the European Union treaties; Therefore calls for the opening of a Convention in accordance with the article 48 TEU;

Amendment 825 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43

43. Acknowledges that the current political climate ~~characterised by deep inequality, mistrust and uncertainty is not conducive to proper reforms~~is not yet conducive to achieve and complete the EMU; believes, therefore, that a comprehensive roadmap, including clear milestones within an agreed timetable and taking into account the political situation, as laid out in the Five Presidents' Report, should be urgently adopted with a clear commitment by euro area Heads of State and Government to achieving a genuine and complete EMU;

Amendment 826 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43 – subparagraph 1 (new)

Takes the view that any proposal to that effect must be submitted to the European peoples concerned for approval;

Amendment 827 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43 a (new)

43a. Calls for all Member States without a derogation that have yet to adopt the Euro to make all necessary efforts to meet the conditions before 2020.

Amendment 828 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44

44. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the Council, the Commission, the Eurogroup and the ECB, the Managing Director of the ESM and the national parliaments.

Amendment 829 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44

44. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Council, the Eurogroup ~~and~~, the ECB, and the national parliaments.

Amendment 83 #

Maria João RODRIGUES, Jutta STEINRUCK, Brando BENIFEI, Elena GENTILE, Sergio GUTIÉRREZ PRIETO, Joachim SCHUSTER

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas, following renominal convergence in the run-up to the introduction of the common currency, the euro area witnessed structural divergence between 1999 and 2009, which made the euro area as a whole less resilient to shocks; whereas regulatory adjustments and structural reforms aimed at reducing risks and improving convergence have been introduced since 2009 at both European and national level, but some euro area Member States still require solidarity and sustainable reforms in their ~~catching- up~~real convergence process;

Amendment 83 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Stresses that the Eurozone fiscal capacity should not be merely a responsive tool in the event of country-specific shocks, but should actively enable Member States to strengthen their economic recovery and catching-up process after the long crisis in order to achieve social cohesion and full employment, to erase poverty, to strengthen the welfare state and to help attain all the social objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy.;

Amendment 83 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 a (new)

9a. Takes the view that, as the process of building a genuine EMU advances, it is becoming increasingly necessary to create a eurozone treasury for collective decision-making, supervision and management of the budgetary capacity of the eurozone;

Amendment 830 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44

44. Instructs its President not to forward this resolution to the President of the Council, the Commission, the Eurogroup and the ECB, and the national parliaments.

Amendment 831 #

Clare MOODY, Neena GILL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44 – subparagraph 1 (new)

Member States outside the Eurozone (wish to create new heading after paragraph 44)

Amendment 832 #

Clare MOODY, Neena GILL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44 a (new)

44a. Recognises that the Treaties allow an evolution towards a deeper degree of integration among the Member States that share such a vision of their common future, whilst other Member States are not committed to further integration; coexistence and respect for differing perspectives must be maintained under the single institutional framework;

Amendment 833 #

Clare MOODY, Neena GILL, Anneliese DODDS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44 a (new)

44a. Deplores the fact that measures taken to date by the EU institutions have not resulted in financial stability or bank rationalisation but have instead driven certain EU Member States even more deeply into recession.

Amendment 834 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44 b (new)

44b. Recognises that Member States have the right to decide the fundamental principles of their social security systems and enjoy a broad margin of discretion to define and implement their social and employment policy; believes that any proposals for social or employment policy should be open to all participation 28 Member States and discussion of such matters to include the full European Parliament and Council not only representatives from Eurozone countries;

Amendment 835 #

Clare MOODY, Neena GILL, Cătălin Sorin IVAN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44 c (new)

44c. Emphasises that advances in consumer, employee, health, and environmental protection must be open to all Member States and discussion must include representatives from all Member States and the full European Parliament so as not to discriminate between EU citizens and maintain a level playing field for businesses and citizens across the EU;

Amendment 836 #

Clare MOODY, Neena GILL, Cătălin Sorin IVAN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44 d (new)

44d. Underlines that prosperity of the EU is improved by the continuing universality of many EU programmes and policies such as Horizon 2020, EFSI, COSME, and ERDF; EU wide cooperation and solidarity in this respect must be protected;

Amendment 84 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas, following real convergence in the run-up to the introduction of the common currency, the euro area witnessed structural divergence between 1999 and 2009, which made the euro area as a whole less resilient to shock the lack of necessary fiscal discipline, weak compliance with, and weak enforcement of, EU fiscal rules have led to excessive borrowing and sovereign debt crisis in some Member States; whereas regulatory adjustments and structural reforms aimed at ~~reducing risks and improv~~improving compliance and enhancing convergence have been introduced since 2009 at both European and national level, but some euro area Member States still require solidarity and sustainable reforms in their catching- up process;

Amendment 84 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Stresses that fiscal capacity should not be merely a responsive tool in the event of country-specific shocks, but should actively enable Member States to achieve a reduction in social inequalities, social cohesion and full employment, to erase poverty, to strengthen the welfare state and to help attain all the social objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy.

Amendment 84 #

Sylvie GOULARD, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Jean ARTHUIS, Michael THEURER, Lieve WIERINCK

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 b (new)

9b. Considers that, in parallel to the euro area decision-making body within the European Parliament, it will also be essential to foresee an equivalent decision-making structure within the Council of Ministers; suggests that the Euro Group could be the appropriate formation, with its accountability improved;

Amendment 85 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)

Fa. whereas the Euro acted as a shield during the financial crisis and whereas many Member States would have experienced a worse situation without it; whereas improvements are however required for the Euro to really meet its promises and potential;

Amendment 85 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Stresses that fiscal capacity in the form in which it is imposed on the eurozone Member States will do nothing to enable them to achieve social cohesion and full employment and to eradicate poverty: quite the reverse.

Amendment 85 #

Sylvie GOULARD, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Nils TORVALDS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 c (new)

9c. Believes that a clearly defined role for the European Court of Justice will be crucial in order to guarantee fairness and efficiency in the implementation of the new framework;

Amendment 86 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F b (new)

Fb. whereas any budgetary capacity for the euro area should not be seen independently from the other necessary evolutions required for the euro area to be an optimal currency area, nor from other tools that already exist (inter alia EIB/EIF), nor from existing rules;

Amendment 86 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Stresses that the premise for the creation of the Eurozone was the promise that there would be no fiscal transfers between Member States; reminds that fiscal transfers within Europe would be carried out by EU institutions such as the European Social Fund;

Amendment 86 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 d (new)

9d. Underlines that improvements of the euro area can already be implemented under the current Treaties; considers, however, that Treaty revision or an ad- hoc euro area Treaty should not be excluded; recalls that recourse to an intergovernmental agreement was the option chosen for the UK settlement; considers that the current single institutional framework is no longer justified; considers that any evolution would need to respect the "Community" framework and its spirit, for example maintaining the existing institutions but modifying their structure to reflect the new reality rather than creating new ones, as much as possible;

Amendment 87 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas progress has been achieved in addressing the flaws of EMU through legislation such as the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack regulations, as well as through the introduction of the European Semester and the creation of new instruments such as the ESM;deleted

Amendment 87 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Herbert REUL, Markus FERBER, Luděk NIEDERMAYER

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6α. Stresses the need to establish a European guaranteed minimum income, a European minimum wage and a European unemployment benefit in order to combat the high rates of unemployment, poverty and social exclusion that plague the EU.

Amendment 88 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas substantial progress has been achieved in ~~addressing the flaws of~~improving and strengthening the governance of the EMU through legislation such as the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack regulations, as well as through the introduction of the European Semester and the creation of new instruments such as the ESM, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) including the Fiscal Compact and the Euro-Plus Pact, thereby making the EMU more resilient against possible shocks in the future, however, these instruments cannot fulfil their function if they are not enforced;

Amendment 88 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

Amendment 89 #

Maria João RODRIGUES, Jutta STEINRUCK, Brando BENIFEI, Elena GENTILE, Sergio GUTIÉRREZ PRIETO, Joachim SCHUSTER

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas not enough progress has been achieved in addressing the flaws of EMU through legislation such as the Six- Pack and the Two-Pack regulations, to tackle the structural imbalances that were allowed to accumulate in the Monetary Union from inception until such imbalances were brutally exposed by the sovereign debt crisis in 2010; .as well as through the introduction of the European Semester and the creation of new instruments such as the ESM;

Amendment 89 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Considers that in order to foster voluntary mobility throughout the European labour market, it should be ensured that no worker is left uncovered by social and labour rights protection, including mobile workers, the principle of equal treatment should be guaranteed and wages and social standards safeguarded; the European Unemployment Insurance scheme should build on and complement existing European instruments and be open to Member States with a commitment to adopt the euro in the future.

Amendment 9 #

Maria João RODRIGUES, Jutta STEINRUCK, Brando BENIFEI, Elena GENTILE, Sergio GUTIÉRREZ PRIETO, Joachim SCHUSTER

Motion for a resolution
Citation 3

~~– having regard to the Werner report (1970),~~deleted

Amendment 9 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Points out that the success of the eurozone and achievement of Treaty objectives is dependent on increasing the welfare of all its citizens, based on a sustained process of upward convergence in productivity and employment levels, and on well- functioning labour markets and welfare systems, based on decent work with rights, a strong role for the social partners, social dialogue, collective bargaining and collective agreements, and preventing individual Member States from trying to gain an unfair competitive advantage by infringing workers’ rights or promoting social dumping; highlights that societies which are characterized by a high level of equality and investment in people do better in terms of growth and employment resilience; recalls the importance of adopting a European pillar of social rights as a way to guarantee social and labour rights and to foster upward economic and social convergence in order to tackle the economic and social divergences between Member States and within societies;

Amendment 9 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Believes that the crisis enhanced the need for ~~improvement~~a change in EU economic governance ~~and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be progressively comple~~so to boost growth and employment within the EU Member Stateds;

Amendment 90 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas progress has been achieved in addressing the flaws of EMU through ~~legislation such as the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack regulations, as well as through the introduction of the European Semester and the creation of new instruments such as the ESM~~the creation of new instruments such as the ESM, the establishment of a Banking Union and the enlargement of the surveillance scope as regards the economic governance framework; whereas this legislation has however failed to deliver a speedy and sustainable economic and social recovery in the Eurozone;

Amendment 90 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 b (new)

6b. Believes that it is a mistake to increase the interdependence of the EU and the Eurozone; warns that there is increasing risk that a failure of the Euro- system will damage EU institutions or the entire EU; warns that problems economically caused by the Euro-system will be increasingly attributed by citizens on the EU; maintains that increased transfers from northern Europe to the South within the Eurozone system would help parties that want to abolish the EU altogether;

Amendment 91 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas progress has been achieved in addressing the flaws of EMU through legislation such as ~~the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack regulations, as well as through the introduction of the European Semester and the creation of new instruments such as~~creation of banking union and the ESM;

Amendment 91 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 c (new)

6c. Believes that a budgetary capacity would make the EU still more opaque to the voter and reduce democratic control;

Amendment 92 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas progress has been achieved in addressing the flaws of EMU through legislation such as the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack regulations~~, as well as through the introduction of the European Semester and the creation of new instruments such as the ESM~~;

Amendment 92 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 d (new)

6d. Warns of the difficulty to correctly identify asymmetric economic shocks and their duration; warns that the fiscal capacity would be used to compensate not for temporary shocks but for permanent loss in competitiveness; reminds that countries such as Italy1a or France1b regularly devalued to the German Mark before the Euro-System but rarely and only temporarily revalued; indicating that loss of competitiveness usually must be absorbed by permanent and not temporary measures; notes that fiscal capacities such as the "Länderfinanzausgleich" in Germany rarely reverse and usually are permanent transfer systems; 1a http://fxtop.com/de/zoom-historischen- wechselkursen- graph.php?C1=DEM&C2=CHF&A=1&DD1=01& MM1=01&YYYY1=1953&DD2=06&MM2=05&Y YYY2=2016&LARGE=1〈=de&CJ=0&MM1Y=0. 1b http://fxtop.com/de/zoom-historischen- wechselkursen- graph.php?C1=DEM&C2=CHF&A=1&DD1=01& MM1=01&YYYY1=1953&DD2=06&MM2=05&Y YYY2=2016&LARGE=1〈=de&CJ=0&MM1Y=0.

Amendment 93 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. ~~whereas progress has been achieved in addressing the flaws of EMU through~~having regard to the adoption of legislation such as the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack regulations, ~~as well as through~~ the introduction of the European Semester and the creation of new instruments such as the ESM;

Amendment 93 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 e (new)

6e. Believes that quantitative easing policies are damaging capital allocation and are damaging long-term growth and job creation; maintains that current debt levels in some member states are unsustainable;

Amendment 94 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas it is to be deplored that no progress has been achieved in addressing the flaws of EMU through legislation ~~such as the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack regulations, as well as through the introduction of the European Semester~~ and the creation of new instruments such as the ESM;

Amendment 94 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 f (new)

6f. Acknowledges that ECB policies are reducing pressure to reform in Member States; fears that a EU budgetary capacity will have the same effect; reminds that the OECD has concluded that France and Italy have made little progress since 2013; reminds that Mario Draghi has repeatedly asked the member states to use the time gained by ultra-loose monetary policy to carry out structural reform; maintains that a fiscal capacity will massively build moral hazard and disincentive to reform;

Amendment 95 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas ~~progress has been achieved in addressing the flaws of EMU through~~austerity measures prescribed in legislation such as the Six- Pack and the Two-Pack regulations, as well as th~~rough the introduction of the European Semester and the creation of new instruments such as the ESM~~e European Semester and enforced as conditions for financial assistance from the ESM have deepened the economic crisis and led to a depression in some Member States;

Amendment 95 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 g (new)

6g. Acknowledges that the introduction of the common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing economic shocks such as exchange rate fluctuation; maintains that a currency union need not have transfer mechanisms as long as labour markets are sufficiently flexible; points out that this was known at the start of the currency union1a and reforms should have been implemented when joining the currency union; 1a http://www.zvab.com/W%C3%A4hrungsunion- Arbeitsmarkt-Auftakt-unabdingbaren-Reformen- Dohse/14988303120/bd.

Amendment 96 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas ~~progress has been achieved in addressing the flaws of EMU through legislation~~the flaws of EMU have been aggravated because of measures such as the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack regulations, ~~as well as through~~ the introduction of the European Semester and the creation of new instruments such as the ESM;

Amendment 96 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 h (new)

6h. Deplores that there is no figure of the size of the envisioned budgetary capacity mentioned except for the Community Budget of 5-7% of GDP as mentioned in the 1977 McDougall Report;

Amendment 97 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas progress has been achieved in ~~addressi~~streng the ~~flaws of~~ning EMU through legislation such as the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack regulations, the Banking Union as well as through the introduction of the European Semester and the creation of new instruments such as the ESM;

Amendment 97 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 i (new)

6i. Acknowledges that the rules of the Euro and the institutions dealing with it (ECB, ESM) were broken numerous times and there is no indication that the rule of law would be observed in a budgetary capacity; reminds that when Jean Claude Juncker was questioned about the continual failure of France to fulfil its debt criteria he responded "we should not blindly apply the stability pact”;

Amendment 98 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas ~~progres~~it seems tha~~s been achieved in addre~~t the only escape route from the morass in~~g the flaws of EMU~~to which the euro has turned is a headlong race forward through legislation such as the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack regulations, as well as through the introduction of the European Semester ~~and the creation of new instruments such as the ESM~~, which are nothing less than a gun held to the head of the sovereignty of states and peoples;

Amendment 98 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 j (new)

6j. Warns that the fiscal capacity might issue equities; warns that debt- based Keynesian deficit spending will only have short temporary effect on the labour markets; warns that while they will be backed by the strongest countries the control over debt issuance will currently be in the hands of the deficit countries; warns that debt issuance of the facility will further undermine the deficit criteria of the Maastricht treaty; demands that national parliaments will have a veto over debt issuance as they will be held accountable for backing this debt;

Amendment 99 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)

Ga. whereas the attempt to strengthen the stability and growth pact with regards to its credibility and macro-economic coherence by means of the Six Pack, the Two Pack and the Fiscal Compact have added more complexity and less credibility than needed, proving to be a poor substitute for a more fundamental overhaul of euro area governance that will be required in order to achieve a sustainable balance between responsibility and solidarity within our common currency;

Amendment 99 #