2015/2344(INI) | [ParlTrack]

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Observes that the European Economic and Monetary Union lacks the fundamental requirements of an optimal currency area and the adjustment mechanisms required in order to absorb asymmetric shocks, ~~as the crisis has demonstrated that self-corrective market forces alone cannot be relied on to prevent Member States from becoming over-indebted~~thereby leading to the build-up of unsustainably large macroeconomic imbalances; points out that,as the crisis has demonstrated, in the absence of the self-corrective mechanism of a flexible exchange rate, the weaker euro area economies have to bear disproportionately high costs of adjustment through internal devaluation and fiscal austerity in order to maintain a currency that is overvalued, while stronger economies can benefit from the competitive advantage of an undervalued currency to expand their exports and accumulate large current account surpluses;

Amendment 10 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. ~~Recalls Parliament’s position that~~Believes that the proposal on the establishment of a fiscal capacity should go hand in hand with a proper discussion at the institutional level about the need to provide for democratic withdrawal and opt-out mechanisms for any country that wishes to leave or remain outside the EMU; stresses that any further deepening of European institutional and economic integration ~~is necessary to ensure the st~~should be done on a voluntary basis and following a democratic consultation through a referendum to be held in each Member State, in order to ensure the political and social sustainability of the eEuro~~zone and of the~~pean Union as a whole;

Amendment 11 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Is concerned that the instruments developed in recent years to tackle the crisis ~~are intergovernmental in nature, are not integrated into the Community acquis, and~~ lack democratic oversight and accountability to Parliament;

Amendment 12 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Emphasises that the establishment of a budgetary and fiscal capacity within the eurozone is necessary to complete the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); believes that the stabilisation function of a fiscal capacity is the most feasible of the fiscal policy functions, while a redistribution function could be envisaged in a more integrated polineeds massive permanent fiscal transfers from countries running excessive current account surpluses to economically depressed areas; believes nevertheless that such fiscal capacity based on a more integrated political and economic union is not politically acceptable nor economically efficient; stresses therefore that alternative options, such as an orderly and coordinated break- up of the monetary union, shall be urgently explored in order to protect the EU cooperation from effects of a chaotical and euncon~~omic union~~trolled break-up of the Euro Area;

Amendment 13 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. ~~Emphasises that the establishment of a budgetary and fiscal~~Rejects macroeconomic conditionality for the budgetary capacity ~~with~~in the eurozone is necessary to complete the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); believes that the stabilisation function of a fiscal capacity is the most feasible of the fiscal policy functions, while a redistribution function could be envisaged in a more integrated political and economic unionform of labour market reforms, social security cuts, liberalisation/deregulation and privatisations. Such "structural reforms" deepen the economic crisis and prevent recovery, recognised now even by the IMF;

Amendment 14 #

Ingeborg GRÄSSLE

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. ~~Emphasise~~Considers that the establishment of a budgetary and fiscal capacity within the eurozone ~~is necessary to~~would be a further step towards completeing the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); believes that the stabilisation function of a fiscal capacity is the most feasible of the fiscal policy functions, while a redistribution function cwould ~~be envisaged in a more~~presuppose a fully integrated political and economic union;

Amendment 15 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Stresses that such a capacity should be established as part of the Union budget, outside the multiannual financial framework (MFF), and implemented by the Commission; recalls its position that any fiscal or budgetary capacity developed specifically for the eurozone must be developed within the Union frameworkany proposed budgetary capacity for the eurozone should be delayed until such time as the above examination is complete;

Amendment 16 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. ~~Stress~~Believes that such a capacity should be established as part of the Union budget, outside the multiannual financial framework (MFF), and implemented by the Commission; recalls its position that any fiscal or budgetary capacity developed specifically for the eurozone must be developed within the Union frameworkMember States could accept an European fiscal capacity only after public consultation in every Member State with a referendum;

Amendment 17 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6 a. Emphasises that whatever recommendations emerge from the above examination must be considered, even if this means a new Treaty and a new direction for the entire EU;

Amendment 18 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 b (new)

6 b. Points out that the Eurozone has an internal problem with competitiveness, i.e. the gap between Germany and the rest. This cannot be addressed by a fiscal capacity alone but must be addressed primarily by Germany (through strong nominal wage growth/public investment spending) or if not, then given that this is contributing to the eurozone macroeconomic imbalance, the Commission and the Council need to consider practical measures to assist Germany in correcting this imbalance; this would have the added bonus of reducing the need for permanent transfers and allow Member States to finance temporary deficits via domestic saving;

Amendment 19 #

Patricija ŠULIN, Tomáš ZDECHOVSKÝ

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 c (new)

6 c. Points out that any budgetary capacity needs a strong focus on public investment, aiming at social and economic goals, e.g. full employment, social and regional convergence;

Amendment 2 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Observes that the European Economic and Monetary Union lacks the fiscal or budgetary adjustment mechanism required in order to absorb asymmetric shocks, as the crisis has demonstrated that self-corrective market forces alone cannot be relied on to prevent Member States from becoming over- indebted;

Amendment 20 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 d (new)

6 d. Points out that regarding financing, the budgetary capacity needs to be included in the EU budget. Possible sources of financing could be measures against tax avoidance and evasion or national wealth levies.

Amendment 3 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1 a. Observes that since the launch of the euro currency, five eurozone countries (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Cyprus) have had to enter rescue programmes, with at least one other major economy, Italy, on the brink;

Amendment 4 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1 b. Observes additionally that since the launch of the euro currency, the debt/GDP ratio of all eurozone countries has escalated, in most cases well beyond what had been formerly been seen as the redline 80% level;

Amendment 5 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 c (new)

1 c. Observes also that even of those countries that followed all the rules, some – Finland especially – are now nevertheless also facing major economic challenges, challenges in which they too, because of the lack of the requisite country-specific tools in a common currency, find themselves stymied in the corrective measures they can take;

Amendment 6 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 d (new)

1 d. Observes that in the case of Ireland and Greece especially, the ECB stretched (at least) its official remit, in Ireland's case by forcing the government to fully bail out even non-systemic banks, including full payment (with full coupon) on even unsecured unguaranteed bonds, an act which now sees the Central Bank of Ireland now destroying borrowed billions every year;

Amendment 7 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. ~~Considers that, as illustrated by the crisis, a common currency cannot~~ Stresses that further fiscal, economic and political integration necessarily entails further loss of fiscal, economic and political sovereignty, therelby ~~solely on a central bank to control the money supply, without further fiscal, economic and political integration~~depriving Member States of the democratic control over fundamental macroeconomic policy instruments strongly believes that respecting the national sovereignty on monetary and fiscal policy is the only way to ensure that Member States have the economic and political power to react in times of crisis;

Amendment 8 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Considers that, as illustrated by the crisis, the euro has failed as a common currency can~~not rely sole~~d thus the entire exercise needs to be fully, o~~n a central bank to control the money supply, without further fiscal, economic and political integration~~bjectively and independently examined with a view to either a) scrapping the whole idea or b) reducing the number of countries in the eurozone to those whose economies are suited to a common currency;

Amendment 9 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

~~3. Recalls Parliament’s position that deepening European economic integration is necessary to ensure the stability of the eurozone and of the Union as a whole;~~deleted

source: 584.158

2016/06/09 BUDG, ECON 1021 amendments...

Amendment 1 #

Joëlle MÉLIN, Mara BIZZOTTO, Dominique MARTIN

Motion for a resolution
Heading 1

on a budgetary capacity for the Eeuro~~zone~~ area

Amendment 1 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Points out that ~~the success of the eurozon~~meeting the expectations of the people of Europe is dependent on increasing the welfare of all ~~its~~ citizens, and on well- functioning labour markets and welfare systems, based on decent work with rights, a strong role for the social partners, social dialogue, collective bargaining and collective agreements, and preventing individual Member States from trying to gain an unfair competitive advantage by infringing workers’ rights or promoting social dumping;

Amendment 1 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph -1 (new)

-1. Recalls that, although still a young currency and despite having experienced a serious crisis over recent years, the euro is solidly established as a global reserve currency;

Amendment 10 #

Neoklis SYLIKIOTIS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Fabio DE MASI

Motion for a resolution
Citation 4

~~– having regard to the McDougall report (1977),~~deleted

Amendment 10 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Points out that the success of the eurozone is dependent on increasing the welfare of all its citizens, and on well- functioning labour markets and welfare systems, based on decent work with rights, a strong role for the social partners, social dialogue, collective bargaining and collective agreements, and preventing individual Member States from trying to gain an unfair competitive advantage by infringing workers’ rights or,by promoting social dumping, by dismantling collective agreements, or by lowering the workers' social protection;

Amendment 10 #

Dariusz ROSATI, Siegfried MUREŞAN, Jan OLBRYCHT

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Believes that the euro crisis ~~enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be progressive~~has shown that the EMU is not functioning, and calls, to that end, for the current Monetary Union not to be continued or supposedly completed;

Amendment 100 #

Emmanuel MAUREL

Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)

Ga. whereas the euro area lacks a fiscal instrument capable of upholding the strategic priorities which the euro area shares with the European Union, i.e. the priorities of the Europe 2020 Strategy, together with a reduction in inequalities of income and wealth, the recovery of internal consumption, and the energy transition;

Amendment 101 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)

Ga. whereas some Member States dramatically lack the willingness to implement the Country Specific Recommendations, given on the yearly basis by the Commission, and, hence, undermine the economic growth that the EU currently strives for;

Amendment 102 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Elmar BROK

Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)

Ga. whereas the question of upholding the existing convergence criteria, and of their flexibility, is a question worth asking;

Amendment 103 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas the Community method was ~~abandon~~suspended in favour of intergovernmental agreements in order to allow for ~~rapid~~urgent and timely responses during the crisis; whereas ~~this has made the European Council the leading actor in the crisis, while the European Parliament and its national counterparts have been sidelined~~instruments such as the ESM were not possible to be established inside the Treaties due to its limits given Article 125 TFEU; whereas decisions had to be taken outside the existing institutions as later confirmed by the Pringle case; whereas in the long-term all of the instruments established during the crisis and the actions being taken now to prevent future crises should be inserted within the Community framework;

Amendment 104 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Sylvie GOULARD, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas the Community method was abandoned in favour of intergovernmental agreements in order to allow for rapid responses in the crisis; whereas this has made the European Council the leading actor in the crisis, while the European Parliament and its national counterparts have been side-lined and the European Commission relegated to a role of secretariat of the European Council;

Amendment 105 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas the Community method was abandoned in favour of intergovernmental agreements in order to allow for rapid responses in the crisis; whereas this has made the European Council the leading actor in the crisis, while the European Parliament has been sidelined, and its national counterparts have ~~been sidelin~~always been excluded;

Amendment 106 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas ~~the Community method was abandoned in favour of intergovernmental agreements~~intergovernmental agreements instead of the Community method have been used in order to allow for rapid responses in the crisis; whereas this has made the European Council the leading actor in the crisis, while the European Commission, the European Parliament and its national counterparts have been sidelined;

Amendment 107 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas the Community method was ~~abando~~undermined in favour of intergovernmental agreements in order to allow for rapid responses in the crisis; whereas this has made the Euro~~pean Council~~group the leading actor in the crisis, while the European Parliament and its national counterparts have been sidelined;

Amendment 108 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas the Community method was largely abandoned in favour of intergovernmental agreements in ~~order to allow for rapid responses in~~the context of the crisis; whereas this has made the European Council the leading actor in the crisis, while the European Parliament and its national counterparts have been sidelined;

Amendment 109 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)

Ha. whereas the Council internally has organised itself to reflect the reality of the existence of a Eurozone, while the European Parliament will eventually also need to reflect the reality that not all EU Member States will adopt the euro in the foreseeable future and are prepared to accept responsibilities that come with such membership;

Amendment 11 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 4 a (new)

– having regard to the Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community (Delors report, 1989),

Amendment 11 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Stresses that the integration of economies and markets at European level enhances the efficiency, competitiveness and economic solidity of the Member States, thereby contributing to economic growth and job creation;

Amendment 11 #

Fabio DE MASI, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Recalls that 26 Member States are committed to joining the euro area and that in the Treaties the euro is recognised as the currency of the economic and monetary union (article 3(4) TEU); underlines that this single currency is the reason for the current single institutional framework which means that all MEPs, Commissioners and European judges participate fully in decisions concerning the euro area;

Amendment 110 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)

Ha. whereas Member States under duress have been forced to adopt harsh adjustment programs at enormous social and economic costs; whereas several national governments resigned after financial assistance was withheld; whereas this has severely damaged the reputation of the EU, its institutions and some Member States;

Amendment 111 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Gunnar HÖKMARK, Luděk NIEDERMAYER, Dariusz ROSATI

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas, a ~~great deal of trust has been lost in the process, both between Member States and on the part of citizens and the markets in the EU institutions and the Union as a who~~s the disaster spread and deepened, some Member States have revealed the hypocrisy of a European project which claims to favour solidarity but in which some countries fiercely defend their own interests while others naively serve a fantasy 'European interest'; whereas people have become aware that the European project is not viable;

Amendment 112 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas Member States that failed to adhere to the SGP and enforce fiscal rules at national level have lost credibility of financial markets and herewith the possibility to finance themselves and a great deal of trust has been lost in the process, both between Member States and on the part of citizens ~~and the markets in the EU institutions and the Union as a whole~~;

Amendment 113 #

Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS, Pablo ZALBA BIDEGAIN

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas, especially since the crisis broke at the end of 2007, the shortcomings and weaknesses highlighted within the EU have meant that a great deal of trust has been lost ~~in the process~~, both between Member States and on the part of citizens and the markets in the EU institutions and the Union as a whole;

Amendment 114 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas ~~a great deal of trust has been lost in the process, both between Member States and on the part of citizens and the markets in the EU institutions and the Union as a whol~~the EU institutions and the Union as a whole have not in any way taken into account the devastating effects of their political and economic choices for citizens and small businesses in Europe;

Amendment 115 #

Fabio DE MASI, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Recital Θ

I whereas it is to be deplored that a great deal of trust has been lost ~~in the process~~, both between Member States and on the part of citizens ~~and the markets~~ in the EU institutions and the Union as a whole;

Amendment 116 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas a great deal of trust has been lost in the process, both between Member States and on the part of citizens ~~and the markets~~ in the EU institutions and the Union as a whole;

Amendment 117 #

Danuta Maria HÜBNER

Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)

Ia. whereas the principles of unity and completeness of the EU budget laid down in article 310(1) TFEU require all items of revenue and expenditure of the Union to be shown in the EU budget and therefore prohibit any type of separate budget;

Amendment 118 #

Danuta Maria HÜBNER

Motion for a resolution
Recital I b (new)

Ib. whereas articles 121(6) and 136 TFEU would provide an appropriate legal basis for a mechanism the scope of which would cover the euro area and which would aim to provide financial incentives to structural reforms and to national policies fostering EU-wide economic convergence if the objectives of such a mechanism do not go beyond what is needed to achieve the proper implementation of the multilateral surveillance procedure set out in article 121 TFEU; whereas, should the objectives of the fiscal capacity be broader and more ambitious, it would be necessary to make use of the so-called ‘flexibility provision’ of article 352 TFEU;

Amendment 119 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas the ECJ ruled in the Pringle case that the ESM is consistent with the TFEU and opened the door to a possible integration of that mechanism into the acquis communautaire within the current limits of the Treaties;deleted

Amendment 12 #

Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Marian HARKIN

Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 a (new)

– having regard to the European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 on amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro,

Amendment 12 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Regrets the low proportion of the budget in relation to the EU GDP which prevents too much a more efficient policy towards employment and labour markets;

Amendment 12 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Notes that already existing supranational components of the EMU, such as the Stability and Growth Pact, have not encouraged greater convergence between the eurozone Member States;

Amendment 120 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

Amendment 121 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

Amendment 122 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Elmar BROK

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas the ECJ ruled in the Pringle case that ~~the ESM is consistent with the TFEU and opened the do~~due to the limits of the Treaties no new decision powers can be conferred to the institutions of the European Union; whereas under the current framework t~~o a possible integration of that mechanism into the acquis communautaire~~he EU institutions and the ESM are limited to decisions taken by the finance ministers of the euro area; whereas the European Commission is able to participate in the administrative work in relation with in ~~the current limits of the Treaties~~struments such as the ESM; whereas the incorporation of the ESM into Community law would require Treaty change;

Amendment 123 #

Bernd KÖLMEL, Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas the ECJ ruled in the Pringle case that the ESM is consistent with the TFEU ~~and opened the door to a possible integration of that mechanism into the acquis communautaire within the current limits of the Treaties~~;

Amendment 124 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas the ECJ ruled in the Pringle case that the ESM ~~is consistent with the TFEU and opened the door to a possible integration of that mechanism into the acquis communautaire within the current limits of th~~cannot be incorporated into the Community framework without a complete Ttreat~~ies~~y change;

Amendment 125 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas the E~~CJ ruled in the Pringle case that the ESM is consistent with~~U Budget could be reinforced with the ECB’s surpluses, or the surplus of the TFEU ~~and opened the door to a possible integration of that mechanism into the acquis communautaire within the current limits of the Treaties;~~Budget, discounted to the Member States every year in their national contributions.

Amendment 126 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)

Ja. whereas article 310 of the TFEU does not prohibit the issuance of bonds by the Commission, as confirmed in particular by article 2 of Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism;

Amendment 127 #

Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)

Ja. whereas there is little public support for permanent fiscal transfers and federal decision making structures within the Economic and Monetary Union;

Amendment 128 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)

Ja. whereas Art. 21 of the Financial Regulation allows for assigned revenues to be used to finance specific items of expenditure;

Amendment 129 #

Bernd LUCKE

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)

Ja. whereas this ruling is highly controversial and subject to harsh criticism by legal experts;

Amendment 13 #

Maria João RODRIGUES, Jutta STEINRUCK, Brando BENIFEI, Elena GENTILE, Sergio GUTIÉRREZ PRIETO, Joachim SCHUSTER

Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 a (new)

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism;

Amendment 13 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Notes that the protracted Eurozone crisis has shown that the lack of a common budgetary capacity worsens economic adjustment processes within the currency union, leading to unnecessary social hardship and undermining fundamental social standards; points out that contractionary economic policies undertaken in many Eurozone countries in the absence of greater risk-sharing have translated into substantial shortages of public and private investment, leading to a dangerous divergence in Member States' longer-term growth potential, manifested also by high rates of long-term unemployment and emigration from crisis-hit countries; highlights the importance of the automatic stabilisation function of welfare systems, both in the economic sense and to absorb social shock-waves caused by recessions; stresses that high quality welfare systems and social investments are extremely important if Europe wants to maintain its main competitive advantage - highly skilled workers and productive companies;

Amendment 13 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. ~~Consider~~Notes that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone is ~~necessary to complete the EMU~~regarded as necessary so as to protect the existing EMU crisis regime against economic shocks in the longer term, by making it mandatory for all eurozone members, regardless of whether or not a country is in economic crisis, and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework;

Amendment 130 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)

Ja. whereas the ESM is not formally under parliamentary control;

Amendment 131 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J b (new)

Jb. whereas the crisis revealed considerable democratic deficits in economic and financial policies, areas of European policy of particular significance for the citizens; whereas some Member States now see themselves subject to austerity policies which their parliaments would never have decided on their own, while other Member States see themselves forced to grant sizeable loans or guarantees in order to avoid a breakup of the euro; whereas, because of the spill over effects of national economic and fiscal policy decisions on the economies of other Euro area Member States, their national parliaments are thus effectively deprived of their budgetary autonomy;

Amendment 132 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J b (new)

Jb. whereas according to art. 311 TFEU the EU budget shall be financed wholly from own resources without prejudice to other revenue;

Amendment 133 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J c (new)

Jc. whereas the abovementioned provisions allow euro area Member States to assign a financial contribution or a specific revenue to a specific item of expenditure within the EU budget; whereas euro area Member States can do that both by establishing a new own resource that is to be financed by them, and by classifying their financial contributions as ‘other revenue’;

Amendment 134 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J c (new)

Jc. whereas any reform of the EMU economic governance structure should respect the will of the EU Member States that have an opt-out from having to introduce the euro currency to retain their respective currencies;

Amendment 135 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J d (new)

Jd. whereas art. 175.3 TFEU allows the Union to adopt, under the ordinary legislative procedure, specific actions outside the existing Structural Funds which are considered necessary to coordinate the Member States’ economic policies, and whereas the ECJ in the case C-166/07 has clarified that nothing prevents those actions to address a specific part of the Union, as the euro area is;

Amendment 136 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J d (new)

Jd. whereas due consideration should be given to the mutual spill-over effects of the EMU and non-euro area members;

Amendment 137 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J e (new)

Je. whereas Union and national policy makers and parliamentarians should continuously explain to their citizens the benefits and possible downsides of a single currency, including the costs and risks linked to a break-up of the euro area;

Amendment 138 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J e (new)

Je. whereas article 136 TFEU offers a proper legal basis for the adoption of convergence guidelines and, in combination with art. 175.3 of an European Unemployment Benefit Scheme or a Rainy Day fund;

Amendment 139 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital J f (new)

Jf. whereas there is no wide public support for establishing a formal system of fiscal transfers within the Economic and Monetary Union;

Amendment 14 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 b (new)

– having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism of 2 February 2012;

Amendment 14 #

Sergio GUTIÉRREZ PRIETO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Considers that the existing mechanisms have not been able to tackle the increasing employment and social imbalances in the euro zone (the unemployment rate ranges from around 5% in Germany and Austria to very high, 23% in Spain and 26% in Greece 1a ), since, as stated by the European Commission 1b , employment and social divergences within and between Member States persist and social developments still point to further divergence hindering growth, employment and cohesion; recalls that based on art. 3.3 TEU the EU "shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress" 1aEU Employment and Social Situation, quarterly review March 2015 1b Joint Employment Report 2016, page 2

Amendment 14 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the euro~~zone~~ area is a necessary milestone to complete the EMU, coherently with the McDougall and the Delors reports and that it is highly recommendable and feasible to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework;, notably through articles 136, 175, and 352 TFEU

Amendment 140 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 1

Historical background ~~and shortcomings of~~of the EMU

Amendment 141 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Recalls that the Werner Report in 1970 highlighted the fact that a ~~monetary union~~n EMU would require ~~all~~ ‘the essential features of ~~national public budgets to~~the whole of the public budgets, and in particular variations in their volume, the size of balances and the methods of financing or utilizing them, will be decided at Community level’;

Amendment 142 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Recalls that the Werner Report in 1970 highlighted the fact that a monetary union would require all the essential features of national public budgets to be decided at Community level, which is not politically desirable;

Amendment 143 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Recalls with regret that the Werner Report in 1970 highlighted the fact that a monetary union would require all the essential features of national public budgets to be ~~decid~~centrally planned at Community level;

Amendment 144 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Recalls that ~~the Werner Report in 1970 highlighted the fact that a monetary union would require all the essential features of national public budgets to be decided at Community level~~several Member States failed to comply with the Maastricht Criteria, both regarding their annual budgets and their total indebtedness;

Amendment 145 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Recalls that the McDougall Report in1977 stressed that the establishment of a monetary union would require a significant Community budget amounting to 5-7 % of GDP in order to absorb economic shocks and provide a minimum degree of income convergence;deleted

Amendment 146 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Recalls that the MacDougall Report in 1977 ~~stressed that the establishment of a monetary union would require a significant Community budget amounting to 5-7 % of GDP in order to absorb economic shocks and provide a minimum degree of incom~~explores the idea of a Community budget amounting to 2-2.5% of GDP in a pre-federal integration stage, with Community action taken in the areas of structural and cyclical policies, and 5-7 % of GDP at a later stage, to ensure that the benefits of closer integration favour all and that there is growing convergence in the econ~~vergence~~omic performance of Member States;

Amendment 147 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

Amendment 148 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Recalls that the Delors Report (1989) already stressed that a monetary union without a sufficient degree of convergence of economic policies is unlikely to be durable and could be damaging to the Community, and recommended to set up a financial assistance mechanism to provide support to countries experiencing temporary difficulties;

Amendment 149 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Notes that if Member States are able to obtain budget surpluses in economic upturn, a shock absorbing mechanism of over 3% of GDP would be available to Member States to implement countercyclical fiscal policies in times of economic downturn without breaking the rules set out in the Stability and Growth Pact;

Amendment 15 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 8

~~– having regard to the judgment of the European Court of Justice in Case C- 370/12 Pringle v Ireland [2012],~~deleted

Amendment 15 #

Claude ROLIN

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Emphasises the need to consolidate the eurozone by giving it a specific own-resources budget;

Amendment 15 #

Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone is necessary to complete the EMU ~~and that it i~~, within the framework of the Treaties and with the aim of promoting the eurozone’s reco~~mmendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework~~nomic and social convergence and sustainable structural reforms, enhancing the eurozone’s competitiveness and resilience and absorbing asymmetric shocks;

Amendment 150 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Luděk NIEDERMAYER, Brian HAYES, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)

2b. Recalls that the EU budget was not reconsidered following the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union and the adoption of the euro to take account of the major impact of the associated changes on the functioning of the EU and its internal market;

Amendment 151 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Considers, against this background, that s~~hortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception und~~tronger enforcement of existing fiscal rules such as the SGP, the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack is necessary, and not the transfer of more financial means; whereas the SGP is a set of rules designed to ensure that EU Member States pursue sound public finances and coordinate their fiscal policies, however, the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policiesmain shortcoming is the non-implementation of existing rules as well as the underestimation of macroeconomic imbalances, which were not addressed in a sufficient and timely manner; whereas governments of euro countries are required by European economic governance rules to submit their draft budgetary plans for the following year to the European Commission by October 15 each year to ensure the coordination of fiscal and economic policies among euro countries and that EU economic governance rules are respected, but the implementation rate of the guidelines put forward by the European Commission subsequently has to be improved;

Amendment 152 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Considers, against this background, that shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policies, supplemented by a no-bailout clause that is not fully operational in practice for as long as no permanent and democratically legitimate procedure to enforce a good debt equilibrium for Member States confronted with a liquidity problem and no credible procedure for the orderly bankruptcy of an insolvent member are in place that would allow for a fresh start;

Amendment 153 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Sylvie GOULARD, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Considers, against this background, that shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policies, which already represent infringements of national sovereignty which are hard for peoples to tolerate, thus demonstrating that any step forward is politically inconceivable;

Amendment 154 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Considers, against this background, that shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policies; recalls that the Stability and Growth Pact is a necessary set of rules allowing Member States to share a single currency but is not, per se, a European economic policy;

Amendment 155 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Considers, against this background, that shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty, with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level~~, while~~ and budgetary policyies remainsing within the competencies of the Member States ~~and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policie~~, including weak enforcement of the provisions of Stability and Growth, lack of effective banking regulation at European level, lack of euro area-wide stability mechanism and absence of strong incentives to implement necessary structural reforms;

Amendment 156 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

Amendment 157 #

Tibor SZANYI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

Amendment 158 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Considers~~, against this background, that~~ that structural shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policdue to the fact that it is not an optimal currency area and has, over the years, generated unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances especially for many peripheral countries;

Amendment 159 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

Amendment 16 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)

– having regard to the Commission Communication ‘A Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU – Launching a European Debate’ of 28 November 2012,

Amendment 16 #

Tamás MESZERICS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Points out that an adequate fiscal capacity to deal with asymmetrical shocks, based on automatic mechanisms and consolidated indicators could strengthen the confidence in the future of the EMU;

Amendment 16 #

Fabio Massimo CASTALDO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone ~~is necessary to complete the EMU and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework;~~ would be detrimental to the harmonious development of the EU, given that it would confirm a significant gap between countries that have adopted the single currency and those that have kept their own currencies, leading to the emergence of a 'two-speed' Europe;

Amendment 160 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. CRightly considers, against this background, that shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policies;

Amendment 161 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Considers, ~~against this background,~~ that shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policies;

Amendment 162 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Notes that during the creation of the euro, the choice was made not to have an economic government for the euro but a clear set of rules; notes that the rules have been systematically infringed; notes that, in the current institutional and political set-up, deprived of the necessary legitimacy, sanctions have never been and cannot be applied; deplores that, as a result, we neither have respect for the rules, nor the economic government to enforce them;

Amendment 163 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

Amendment 164 #

Dariusz ROSATI, Siegfried MUREŞAN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

Amendment 165 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuation; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix; emphasises however that the three percent deficit rule under the enhanced Stability and Growth Pact provides sufficient fiscal space to cope with asymmetric shocks, under condition that EU Member States strictly observe the structural budgetary balance rule in the medium term;

Amendment 166 #

Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS, Pablo ZALBA BIDEGAIN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

Amendment 167 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Brian HAYES, Elmar BROK, Burkhard BALZ, Luděk NIEDERMAYER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated ~~tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctua~~fluctuation risks, exchange costs as well as risks and lack of transparency in cross- border transactions; ~~reiterat~~stresses that the ~~relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mech~~benefits of the euro are interconnected, as economic stability creates trust and credibility, reduces uncertainty for businesses and encourages companismes to ~~cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix~~invest, creates more employment and better-quality jobs for citizens and allows for long-term planning of governments; stresses that the need for convergence and competitiveness are conditions for the functionality of a common currency area, since a country cannot restore its competitiveness in a sustainable manner by simply devaluating its currency;

Amendment 168 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuation; also notes that, although the agreed rules are mandatory, many Member States have increased debt levels without, however, generating effects that would allow the economy to overcome negative cycles; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms t~~o cope~~hat are able to deal with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix;

Amendment 169 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuation; reminds, however, that in addition to these policy options, sovereign bond issuances on international capital markets were also possible before the introduction of the euro; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix;

Amendment 17 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 b (new)

– having regard to the Four Presidents’ Report ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’ of 5 December 2012,

Amendment 17 #

Tamás MESZERICS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Calls for launching a roadmap towards the creation of an Unemployment Insurance Scheme, and points out that this scheme would limit moral hazard by providing funds only to countries experiencing large increases in cyclical unemployment and should be balanced over the cycle;

Amendment 17 #

Jo LEINEN

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone is necessary to complete the EMU and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework as a stopgap measure until such time as an enhanced legal basis is established through reform of the Treaties;

Amendment 170 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuation replacing them with measures of internal devaluation that cause social disruptions and injustices, leading to a loss of social cohesion and encouraging political extremism; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix;

Amendment 171 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate devaluation; acknowledges that the Euro in itself is a shield against exchange rate fluctuations; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix;

Amendment 172 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuation; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix to achieve real and social convergence priorities under full democratic control;

Amendment 173 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuation; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix, and that the costs of this latter alternative would be astronomical;

Amendment 174 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

Amendment 175 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency ~~has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuation~~required the carrying out of structural reforms to compensate for the loss of monetary policy as a stabilisation tool; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix;

Amendment 176 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Urmas PAET, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Notes that the creation of the Euro led to the establishment of a European Central Bank of federal essence; deplores that Member States did not draw the political and institutional consequences of the creation of a single currency by creating a democratic economic, budgetary and fiscal government for the Eurozone; is convinced that without a genuine Economic government the euro area will always be deprived of the necessary tools to implement a proper policy mix;

Amendment 177 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Points out that the introduction of permanent and democratically legitimate procedure to enforce a good debt equilibrium for Member States confronted with a liquidity problem and a credible bankruptcy procedure for the euro area will need to be preceded by a transition regime in order to avoid a destabilisation of Member States under pressure from the financial markets;

Amendment 178 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Stresses that private risk-sharing, e.g. through capital and financial markets, alleviates the burden on governments to provide insurance and furthermore has a smoothing potential; regrets, therefore, that private risk- sharing in the EMU is still relatively limited due also to the outstanding completion of the Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union;

Amendment 179 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Burkhard BALZ, Dariusz ROSATI, Brian HAYES, Luděk NIEDERMAYER, Markus FERBER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that ~~EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalanc~~the causes of the sovereign debt crisis were mainly unsustainable levels of public and private debt, lack of competitiveness and proper regulation in the banking and financial sectors; underlines, t~~riggered by capital flows f~~hat high levels of debt limited the space of manoeuvre for eurom co~~re euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States, aggravated and led to a sovere~~untries and led to an increase in financing costs, which impeded the repayment of debt at maturity; stresses that high costs of servicing debt due to high interest rates were too big of a burden given the overall debt level of some euro countries; whereas too hignh debt ~~crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the mere~~levels entail high interest rates which have to be served instead of being able to invest in growth enhancing measures, social spending, healthcare and education; whereas the causes of the crises differed in existen~~ce of the~~t among euro area Member States;

Amendment 18 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 9

– having regard to Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area, Regulation (EU) no 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, Regulation 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, Regulation (EU) no 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, Regulation (EU) no 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure;

Amendment 18 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Urges the Commission to focus EFSI investments on strategic sectors, in particular R&D&i and infrastructure, taking into account the specific features of the regions in which they are carried out;

Amendment 18 #

Pascal DURAND

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone ~~is necessary to complete the EMU and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under~~, under the current Treaty framework, is a sine qua non for remedying the serious shortcomings that have had mutually reinforcing effects and exacerbated the overall fragility of the ceur~~rent Treaty framework~~ozone and, in particular, for dealing with asymmetric shocks;

Amendment 180 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalances, triggered by capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States, aggravated by the entanglement of banks, financial markets and governments and led to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, ~~in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop~~without a proper crisis mechanism such as a European Monetary Fund to deal with illiquidity and without an orderly insolvency procedure for a Member State with unsustainable debt levels, the mere existence of the euro area;

Amendment 181 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalances~~, triggered by capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States,~~ aggravated and led to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the ~~mere existence of the euro area~~economies of those countries;

Amendment 182 #

Nils TORVALDS, Michael THEURER, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

Amendment 183 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when ~~unsustainable imbalances, triggered by capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member State~~in the light of excessive public and private debt levels, unsustainable imbalances, triggered by a lack of structural reforms to foster competitiveness, aggravated and led to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, ~~the mere~~and the lack of consolidation of public finances, partly due to non-adherence to agreed budgetary rules, the very existence of the euro area;

Amendment 184 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalances, ~~triggered by capital flows from~~caused by beggar-thy-neighbour policies in core euro ~~area~~ nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States, aggravated and led to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member Stateand by capital flows to the periphery leading to elevated debt levels (private or public), which caused a dramatic increase in government borrowing costs in some Member States, following the rise in public spending due to bank bailouts and initial counter- cyclical policy responses to the crisis, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the mere existence of the euro area;

Amendment 185 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability, in the context of the global financial and economic crisis, wh~~en unsustainable imbalances, triggered by capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising~~ich arose from an excessive public spending ratio in some Member States~~, aggravated~~ and led to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the mere existence of the euro area;

Amendment 186 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that the EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalances, triggered by capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising p~~ublic spending~~rivate and public debt ratio in some Member States, aggravated and led to a financial sector crisis across the EU as a whole and subsequently to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the mere existence of the euro area;

Amendment 187 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalances, triggered by capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery that were actually facilitated and encouraged by the very existence of the euro, and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States, aggravated and led to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the mere existence of the euro area;

Amendment 188 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

Amendment 189 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

Considers that EMU exposed its 5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalances, triggered by unsustainable capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery ~~and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States,~~due to the existence of the single currency, were aggravated and led to a ~~sovereign debt~~balance of payments crisis, in which ~~government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the mere existence of the euro area~~required Member States to intervene and led to a perilous increase in public debt in a context where states can no longer have recourse to borrowing from their central banks;

Amendment 19 #

Maria João RODRIGUES, Jutta STEINRUCK, Brando BENIFEI, Elena GENTILE, Sergio GUTIÉRREZ PRIETO, Joachim SCHUSTER

Motion for a resolution
Citation 11

– having regard to its resolution of 102 June 2013 on strengthening European democracy in the future4 , __________________ 4 OJ C 65, 19.2.2016, p. 96. OJ C 65, 19.2.2016, p. 96.

Amendment 19 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Takes note of the relevance of existing instruments such as the European Structural and Investment Funds, the European Stability Mechanism, the European Fund for Strategic Investments and the Structural Reforms Support Programme; highlights, however, that the modalities of their intervention are not sufficiently adapted to enable timely recovery in investment levels and renewed economic catching-up process in countries most hit by the Eurozone crisis; considers that the Youth Employment Initiative comes conceptually closest to what is needed for re- convergence, by providing targeted grant support for the implementation of the Youth Guarantee, which is a comprehensive set of structurally relevant measures that also give some short-term relief; calls for accelerated and improved implementation of the YEI and its further funding with € 20 billion in the period 2017-20;

Amendment 19 #

Morten MESSERSCHMIDT

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone is ~~necessary to complete~~unacceptable for the EMU and ~~that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework~~will provoke controversies and divisions between Member States; believes that EU has sufficient tools like ESM for financial emergency intervention to perform stabilization function;

Amendment 190 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalances, ~~triggered by capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States,~~caused by the introduction of the single currency, and massive public interventions to rescue the financial sector aggravated and led to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of ~~a proper fiscal backstop, the mere existence of the euro area~~democratic mechanisms to exit the eurozone, the very survival of the EU;

Amendment 191 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Points out that the narrow focus on public deficit and debt level does not address the main causes of the euro crisis; stresses that unsustainable current account imbalances had developed before the crisis, due to beggar-thy-neighbour policies in some Member States, which led to increasing debt levels (public and private) in deficit countries;

Amendment 192 #

Bernd KÖLMEL, Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER, Bernd LUCKE, Bas BELDER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Amendment 193 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Amendment 194 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Werner LANGEN, Brian HAYES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that the crisis has proved that, in the context of a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks, compliance with and enforcement of the common fiscal rules and the rules of economic governance are crucial;

Amendment 195 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy ~~without a common fiscal policy cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area~~alone cannot lead to balanced growth or counter the lack of competitiveness of some euro countries, but supports cyclical recovery which facilitates the introduction of structural policies, as has repeatedly been called for by the President of the ECB; reiterates that ~~mere~~ coordination of national fiscal policies wi, notably throut credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economgh adhering to the fiscal rules such as the SGP and transposing relevant reforms as outlined in the country specific recommendations (CSRs), is necessary to boost competitiveness and structural convergence, making Member States more resilient against asymmetric shocks;

Amendment 196 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy can~~not address a~~ lead to economic divergences in the Eurozone and cannot address asymmetric and symmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without ~~credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap,~~proper and democratic legitimated cooperation at Eurozone level including the absence of credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks, Points out that the European Semester has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms ~~and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks~~;;

Amendment 197 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a ~~common monetary policy without a common fiscal~~'one-size-fits-all' common monetary policy cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shock and that the inability to devalue the currency shifts the burden of adjustment to the weaker eurozone economies which are forced to perform the most painful internal devaluation to restore competitiveness;

Amendment 198 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy that organises risk sharing and clearly attributes the responsibility between Member States and the euro area as whole so as to address problems of moral hazard cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks;

Amendment 199 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that beyond the inherent instabilities generated by the gaping structural divergences embedded in the euro area (such as the ‘north’-‘south’ divide), the crisis has also proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks;

Amendment 2 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 1

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), especially Article 3 thereof, ~~which establishes the creation of the single market, whose currency is the euro,~~

Amendment 2 #

Arne GERICKE

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Points out that the success of the eurozone is dependent on efforts by the Member States to implement sustainable economic policies and reduce their debt, on increasing the welfare of all its citizens, and on well- functioning labour markets and welfare systems, based on decent work with rights, a strong, independent role for the social partners, social dialogue, collective bargaining and collective agreements, and preventing individual Member States from trying to gain an unfair competitive advantage by infringing workers’ rights or promoting social dumping;

Amendment 2 #

Morten MESSERSCHMIDT

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Believes that the crisis enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance ~~and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be progressively completed;~~ – with the proviso that this must not in any way undermine the EU’s democracies – and that before the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is progressively completed, the first stage must be to revise the geography of the eurozone, which should not be allowed to extend beyond those countries that, taken together, would correspond to an optimal currency area (ZMO), this being a sine qua non for any currency to work, failing which the euro will continue to reduce flexibility, an intolerable situation in an economy open to what is in some cases unfair competition and one that would apply whatever the reforms and however many billions in financial transfers were channelled towards the southern countries, to quote the view that has long been held by many economists, including the five Nobel Prize winners, Maurice Allais, Milton Friedman, Amartya Sen, Paul Krugman, and Joseph Stiglitz;

Amendment 20 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 12

~~– having regard to the Five Presidents’ Report ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’ of 22 June 2015,~~deleted

Amendment 20 #

Sergio GUTIÉRREZ PRIETO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Recalls that together with the four pillars of the Economic and Monetary Union set out in the Five Presidents´ Report there should be a strong social pillar aimed at preserving Europe´s social market economy including a European Framework on minimum wages, as a mechanism that while respecting national practices allows converging at the level of wages at European level to the 28 Member States;

Amendment 20 #

Morten MESSERSCHMIDT

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Considers that the establishment of a budgetary capacity within the new eurozone, comprising the optimal currency area (ZMO) only, is necessary to complete the EMU and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework;

Amendment 200 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. ~~Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; r~~Reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks;

Amendment 201 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy ~~without a common fiscal policy~~ cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that ~~mere~~ coordination of national fiscal policies ~~without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap,~~ has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks;

Amendment 202 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Amendment 203 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Amendment 204 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that ~~the crisis has proved that~~ a common monetary policy with~~out a common~~in the monetary union is generally able to deal with symmetric shocks; insists that it is up to national fiscal policy can~~not address~~d flexible national labour markets to accommodate asymmetric shocks to the euro area Member States; reiterates that ~~mere~~weak coordination of national ~~fiscal~~ policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has ~~not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb~~led to large fiscal deficits and growing public debt, thus depriving Member States of the necessary fiscal space and structural flexibility required to absorb asymmetric economic shocks;

Amendment 205 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a ~~common~~ monetary ~~policy~~union without a c~~ommon~~redible fiscal surveillance framework, common economic and fiscal policy can~~not address~~d in the absence of full capital and labour mobility cannot absorb asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national economic and fiscal policies without credible enforcement ~~mechanisms~~ has not prevented ~~an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks~~;

Amendment 206 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a com~~mon fiscal~~plementary fiscal, industrial, social and cohesion policyies cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that ~~mere coordination of national fiscal policies wi~~the fiscal policy response, especially throu~~t credible enforcement mechanis~~gh the fiscal adjustment programs, has ~~not prevent~~caused an investment gap~~, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced~~ depressing growth, and severely hampering the national capacity to absorb economic shocks;

Amendment 207 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Amendment 208 #

Luděk NIEDERMAYER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustCommon monetary policy can only play a limited role in reaction to various shocks that the EU and the eurozone may face. It is therefore important to increase resilience of Member States’ economies via implementing structural reforms on one hand, and to conduct such a fiscal policy on national level that allows governments to react to such shocks on the other. The instruments avainlable a~~nd socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks;~~t the European level including the ESM should only play a complementary role.

Amendment 209 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Amendment 21 #

Maria João RODRIGUES, Brando BENIFEI, Elena GENTILE, Sergio GUTIÉRREZ PRIETO, Joachim SCHUSTER, Jutta STEINRUCK

Motion for a resolution
Citation 12

~~– having regard to the Five Presidents’ Report ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’ of 22 June 2015,~~deleted

Amendment 21 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 c (new)

1c. Considers that a 'convergence instrument' should be put in place to foster a gradual process of renewed structural convergence within the Eurozone by providing incentives and support for sustainable and growth- friendly structural reforms and investments based on a 5-year 'convergence code', enabling better implementation of the Integrated Guidelines and relevant country-specific recommendations; notes that this instrument could be of temporary nature and should be targeted at countries whose growth potential has been most eroded by the long financial crisis; considers that, after a long period of macroeconomic adjustment, focus should be put on delivering structural reforms and investments with the aim of strengthening growth potential based on quality jobs and productivity, of promoting fair, robust, efficient and fiscally sustainable welfare systems based on solidarity, social justice and a fair wealth distribution, and of fostering a sustainable transition of Member States' economies towards greater resource efficiency;

Amendment 21 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Considers that the e~~stablishment~~xistence of a budgetary capacity within the eurozone ~~is necessary to complete the EMU and that it is recommendable to create a budgetary capacity,~~ albeit limited is needed, under the current Treaty framework;

Amendment 210 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy cannot address ~~asymmetric~~major shocks to the euro area; reiterates that the mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks;

Amendment 211 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Considers that, where a Member State whose currency is the euro is unwilling to further surrender its budgetary sovereignty, it should be given the option of leaving the euro area without leaving the EU; invites the Commission and the Eurogroup – acting in liaison with the ECB – to assist in such a scenario the Member State concerned with practical steps to make a withdrawal from the euro area feasible and as smooth as possible;

Amendment 212 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Believes that the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure has not been used to its full potential to prevent imbalances and to foster greater convergence;

Amendment 213 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Burkhard BALZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Amendment 214 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. ~~Observes that the stabilisation of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively on~~Recalls first and foremost that the primary objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability, laid down in Article 127 (1) TFEU, and thereby contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 TEU; recalls that the ECB, a~~nd that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional monetary policy measures~~ims at inflation rates of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term; recalls that when inflation rates dropped below 0% in December 2014, the ECB acted by introducing its asset purchase programme in 2015, in addition to fighting possible deflation and slowing growth by reducing the three key interest rates, which had the collateral effect of slightly increasing growth; stresses that the ECB pursued its mandate of price stability with the instruments defined in the Treaties to tackle weak growth and low inflation in the euro area, making use of all instruments at its disposal to steer inflation closer to 2%; recalls that the President of the ECB has called for integrated institutions, for a stronger and proactive fiscal policy on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reforms to improve the resilience and competitiveness of their economies, pursuing growth enhancing policies while at the same time pursuing fiscal consolidation and budget discipline;

Amendment 215 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Observes that the stabilisation of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively on the ECB, and that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional monetary policy measures; ~~recalls that the President of the ECB has~~notes that, despite these measures, investment levels remain low; points to the criticism by the ECB Governing Council regarding the consistency of the EMU’s fiscal policies; welcomes its call for growth enhancing fiscal policies while maintaining the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact; believes that restoring trust in the EMU’s future evolution and a proper balance between monetary and fiscal tools requires the set- up of more investment-stimulating tools; recalls that the Presidents of the ECB and the Eurogroup have both called for integrated institutions, for a stronger and proactive fiscal policy on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reform;

Amendment 216 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Observes that the stabilisation of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively on the ECB, and that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional monetary policy measures; recalls that the President of the ECB has called for integrated institutions, for a stronger and proactive fiscal policy on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reformRegrets the fact that since the beginning of the crisis the ECB has initiated unconventional monetary policy measures that have not had any effect in stabilising the economic cycle and have triggered a cycle of deflation which is dangerous for the real economy;

Amendment 217 #

Nils TORVALDS, Siegfried MUREŞAN, Michael THEURER, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Observes that the stabilisation efforts of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively on the ECB, while this responsibility should rather lie with democratically elected institutions, and that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional monetary policy measures; recalls that the President of the ECB has called for integrated institutions, for a stronger and proactive fiscal policy on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reform; alerts that monetary policy by its own is unable to reignite the economy and risks to end with speculative bubbles;

Amendment 218 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Observes that in the absence of the willingness of euro area Member States’ governments to take action to rapidly consolidate their public finances and modernise their economies the stabilisation of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively on the ECB, and that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional monetary policy measures; recalls that the President of the ECB has called for integrated institutions, for a stronger ~~and proactive fiscal policy~~fiscal surveillance framework on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reform;

Amendment 219 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Observes that the stabilisation of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively on the ECB, as well as on some factors in the world economic situation, and that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional monetary policy measures; recalls that the President of the ECB has called for ~~integrated institutions, for a stronger and proactive fiscal policy on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reform~~an increase in public investments in the euro area;

Amendment 22 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 12 a (new)

– having regard to its resolution of 16 December 1998 on the adjustment mechanism in cases of asymmetric shocks,

Amendment 22 #

Sergio GUTIÉRREZ PRIETO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 c (new)

1c. Considers that the governance mechanisms introduced with the implementation of the 2-pack and 6-pack have not been able to ensure a balance between the social pillar of EMU (art. 148 TFEU) and the economic pillar (art. 121 TFEU) therefore it is essential to ensure a social dimension of economic governance at multiple levels of the Union, as provided for in Article 9 TFEU;

Amendment 22 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. ~~Consider~~Notes that the ~~establishment of a~~idea of a single budgetary capacity ~~within the eurozone is necessary to complete the EMU and~~is contrary to the Treaties and points out that, i~~t i~~n 2012, the previous Pre~~commendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty framework~~sident of the European Commission, Mr Barroso, stated that a fiscal capacity for the EMU could not can be achieved without detailed treaty adjustments;

Amendment 220 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Amendment 221 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Amendment 222 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Amendment 223 #

Jonás FERNÁNDEZ, Paul TANG, Jakob von WEIZSÄCKER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Amendment 224 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Emphasises that the division of labour between monetary and fiscal policy for the euro area as currently enshrined in the treaties simply did not anticipate that monetary policy would ever reach the zero lower bound, and shortcoming that urgently needs to be corrected;

Amendment 225 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Amendment 226 #

Bernd LUCKE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Amendment 227 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Acknowledges the poor results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening coordination of national fiscal policies, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two- Pack Regulations; welcomes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary control, and hence ownership;

Amendment 228 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Amendment 229 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Amendment 23 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 15

~~– having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2015 on completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union2, __________________ 2 Texts adopted, P8_TA(2015)0469.~~deleted

Amendment 23 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 c (new)

1c. Recalls that the economic and financial crisis revealed great economic imbalances between Member States;

Amendment 23 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Elmar BROK

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Recalls that the asymmetry of the EMU, with the Monetary Union not coupled with an Economic Union is one of the main structural reasons for the euro area's slow recovery after the 2008 crisis;

Amendment 230 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Acknowledges the results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to ~~address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by~~ strengthen~~ing~~ coordination of national fiscal policies, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack Regulations; welcomes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); ~~underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary~~notes that due to the constraints of the Treaties the ESM had to be established at intergovernmental level with parliamentary control primarily taking place at national level, national governments being responsible vis-à-vis their national parliaments, within the limits set by the Constitutional Court of each countr~~ol, and hence ownership;~~ y; stresses that in the long- term all of the established instruments shall be inserted within the Community framework in order to also ensure parliamentary control through the European Parliament;

Amendment 231 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Acknowledges the ~~result~~institutional reforms achieved since the crisis ~~broke~~ in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening coordination of national fiscal ~~policies, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two- Pack Regulations;~~and economic policies, regrets however that strengthened fiscal coordination has failed to deliver on a speedy economic recovery; deplores the asymmetry in the correction of imbalances between surplus and deficit countries welcomes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary control, and ~~hence~~ ownership; recalls its resolution on the role and operations of the Troika] and stresses the need to follow up on the recommendations made;

Amendment 232 #

Nils TORVALDS, Michael THEURER, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Acknowledges the results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points ~~in particular~~ to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis ~~by strengthening coordination of national fiscal policies, in particular via the adop~~, and in particular the creation of banking union and the ESM; recalls that the well-intentioned creation of the Six-Pack ~~and~~, the Two- Pack Regulations; welcomes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor,and the Fiscal Compact have created more complexity, less credibility and less macro-economic cohesion than needed, stresses that further steps are required to create a credible and sustainable architecture of the Eeuro~~pean Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary control, and hence ownership~~, including a euro area budgetary capacity, a euro treasury and a democratic decision making body specific to the euro area;

Amendment 233 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Acknowledges the results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening ~~coordination of national fiscal policie~~fiscal surveillance frameworks, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack Regulations, but is concerned by the lack of compliance and enforcement of the revised rule set; welcomes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms ~~dramatically lack~~lack full democratic oversight and parliamentary control, and hence ownership;

Amendment 234 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Acknowledges the results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; ~~points in particular to the many~~notes the measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening coordination of national fiscal policies~~, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two- Pack Regulations~~; welcomes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary control, and hence ownership;

Amendment 235 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Amendment 236 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Acknowledges~~Expresses its dissatisfaction at the results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the ~~many~~inadequate measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening coordination of national fiscal policies, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack Regulations; ~~welcomes further the fact~~notes that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary control, and hence ownership;

Amendment 237 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Acknowledg~~Values the results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening coordination of national fiscal policies, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack Regulations; welcomes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary control, and hence ownership;

Amendment 238 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Amendment 239 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Acknowledges~~Takes into account the results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening coordination of national fiscal policies, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack Regulations; ~~welcom~~notes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary control~~, and hence ownership~~;

Amendment 24 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 15 a (new)

– having regard to the declaration ‘Greater European Integration : the way forward’ signed by the Presidents of the Italian Camera dei deputati, the German Bundestag, the French National Assembly and Luxembourg’s Chamber of Deputies;

Amendment 24 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 d (new)

1d. Takes the view that the smooth operation of the EMU, and the eurozone in particular, requires that the common monetary policy be accompanied by greater political, fiscal and economic integration, and that the Member States make use of the flexibility allowed under the Stability and Growth Pact to guarantee the sustainability of public finances and the financial stability of the EU as a whole;

Amendment 24 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 b (new)

2b. Expresses its worry that postponing crucial necessary decisions to better times is creating the condition for extremism rise, thus making those decisions even more difficult in the future;

Amendment 240 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Recalls that in 2012 the Commission introduced in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ the idea of a Convergence and Competitiveness instrument for euro area Member States, whereby euro area Member States could get financial support for ‘reform packages that are agreed and important both for the Member States and for the good functioning of the euro area’, and that this financial support ‘could be set up in principle as part of the EU budget’ and be established by secondary law on the basis of Article 352 TFEU and financed by either a commitment on the part of the euro area Member States or a legal obligation to that effect enshrined in the EU’s own resources legislation as ‘assigned revenues’; considers the review by the Commission of the European Semester, including the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), as a follow-up to this approach;deleted

Amendment 241 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Amendment 242 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Burkhard BALZ, Nils TORVALDS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Recalls that in 2012 the Commission introduced in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ the idea of a Convergence and Competitiveness ~~instrument for euro area Member States,~~Instrument (CCI) for euro area Member States, whereby ‘the implementation of structural reforms in the euro area Member States would be facilitated by the set-up of contractual arrangements to be agreed between them and the Commission’, building on the existing EU surveillance framework and the CSRs; states further that ‘by promoting structural reforms that enhance the adjustment capacity of a Member State the CCI would improve the economy’s capacity to absorb asymmetric shocks through enhancing market functioning’; whereby euro area Member States could get financial support for ‘reform packages that are agreed and important both for the Member States and for the good functioning of the ~~euro area~~EMU’, and that this financial support ‘could be set up in principle as part of the EU budget’ and be established by secondary law on the basis of Article 136 or alternatively Article 352 TFEU and financed by either a commitment on the part of the euro area Member States or a legal obligation to that effect enshrined in the EU’s own resources legislation as ‘assigned revenues’; considers the review by the Commission of the European Semester, including the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), as a follow-up to this approach; demands from the European Commission to reflect upon further measures to improve the implementation rate of CSRs, as currently only 4% of CSRs are fully implemented while nearly half of the recommendations have not been implemented at all or only in a limited manner due to the non-binding character of CSRs, and should be followed up within the European Semester;

Amendment 243 #

Dariusz ROSATI, Siegfried MUREŞAN, Janusz LEWANDOWSKI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. ~~Recall~~Notes that in 2012 the Commission introduced in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ the idea of a Convergence and Competitiveness instrument for euro area Member States, whereby euro area Member States could get financial support for ‘reform packages that are agreed and important both for the Member States and for the good functioning of the euro area’, and that this financial support ‘could be set up in principle as part of the EU budget’ and be established by secondary law on the basis of Article 352 TFEU and financed by either a commitment on the part of the euro area Member States or a legal obligation to that effect enshrined in the EU’s own resources legislation as ‘assigned revenues’; considers the review by the Commission of the European Semester, including the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), as a follow-up to this approach; however, points out in this context to the serious risk of moral hazard and to potentially distorted incentives, in fact encouraging Member States to wait with necessary reforms until financial support from the EU is secured; therefore, if this idea is to be implemented, strong safeguards against potential moral hazard need to be included;

Amendment 244 #

Inese VAIDERE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Recalls that in 2012 the Commission introduced in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ the idea of a Convergence and Competitiveness instrument for euro area Member States, whereby euro area Member States could get financial support for ‘reform packages that are agreed and important both for the Member States and for the good functioning of the euro area’, and that thise financial support ‘could be set up in principle as part of the EU budget’ and be established by secondary law on the basis of Article 352 TFEU and financed by either a commitment on the part of the euro area Member States or a legal obligation to that effect enshrined in the EU’s own resources legislation as ‘assigned revenues’scal capacity of the Eurozone should be established outside the EU budget and should be fiscally neutral; considers the review by the Commission of the European Semester, including the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), as a follow- up to this approach;

Amendment 245 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Amendment 246 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Recalls that in 2012 the Commission introduced in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ the idea of a Convergence and Competitiveness instrument for euro area Member States, whereby euro area Member States could get financial incentives support for ‘reform packages that are agreed and important both for the Member States and for the good functioning of the euro area’, and that this financial support ‘could be set up in principle as part of the EU budget’ and be established by secondary law on the basis of Article 352 TFEU and financed by either a commitment on the part of the euro area Member States or a legal obligation to that effect enshrined in the EU’s own resources legislation as ‘assigned revenues’; considers the review by the Commission of the European Semester, including the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), as a follow-up to this approach; the fiscal capacity should play a role in providing these financial incentives.

Amendment 247 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Recalls that in 2012 the Commission introduced in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ the idea of a Convergence and Competitiveness instrument for euro area Member States, whereby euro area Member States could get financial support for ‘reform packages that are agreed and important both for the Member States and for the good functioning of the euro area’, and that this financial support ‘could be set up in principle as part of the EU budget’ and be established by secondary law on the basis of Articles 136 or 352 TFEU, if necessary by enhanced cooperation, and financed by either a commitment on the part of the euro area Member States or a legal obligation to that effect enshrined in the EU’s own resources legislation, with inclusion in the EU budget as ‘assigned revenues’; considers the review by the Commission of the European Semester, including the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), as a follow-up to this approach;

Amendment 248 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Nils TORVALDS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Recalls that in 2012 the Commission introduced in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ the idea of a Convergence and Competitiveness instrument for euro area Member States, whereby euro area Member States could get financial support for ‘reform packages that are agreed and important both for the Member States and for the good functioning of the euro area’, and that this financial support ‘could be set up in principle as part of the EU budget’ and be established by secondary law on the basis of Article 352 TFEU and financed by either a commitment on the part of the euro area Member States or a legal obligation to that effect enshrined in the EU’s own resources legislation; believes that any such contributions should be entered into the EU budget as ‘assigned revenues’; considers the review by the Commission of the European Semester, including the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), as a follow-up to this approach;

Amendment 249 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Recalls the four pillars of an Economic Union of convergence, growth and jobs, set out in the Five Presidents’ Report: cthe creation of a euro area system of Completi~~ng the economic, financial and fiscal Union and~~tiveness Authorities, a strengthened implementation of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, a greater focus on employment and social performance, and on stronger coordination of economic policies within a revamped European Semester; recalls the content of the Five Presidents’ Report on completing the economic, financial and fiscal Union, strengthening democratic accountability, legitimacy and the institutional setting as well as the social dimension of the EMU; emphasises that this report reiterates the view set out in the Blueprint of the Commission and the Four Presidents’ Report, coordinated by then President of the European Council Mr Herman van Rompuy, that a ~~shock absorption capacity at euro area level is needed to complement automatic stabilisers at national level, whose functioning is limited, as was shown during the crisis;~~ ny fiscal capacity ‘should not lead to permanent transfers between countries or to transfers in one direction only, which is why converging towards Economic Union is a precondition for participation. It should also not be conceived as a way to equalise incomes between Member States’, it should further prevent moral hazard by being tightly linked to compliance with the EU governance framework, ‘be open and transparent vis-à-vis all EU Member States’, and not fulfil the function of the ESM as a crisis management instrument, but ‘improve the overall economic resilience of the EMU’;

Amendment 25 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 15 a (new)

– having regard to its resolution of 13 March 2014 on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to the euro area programme countries;

Amendment 25 #

Dieter-Lebrecht KOCH

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Amendment 25 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Takes note of different proposals for this purpose, with different designs and assigning different functions; points out that some options are possible under the current Treaties, whereas others would require Treaty change; stresses the importance of examining this issue from a holistic perspective - a budgetary capacity of the euro area is a tool which can complement others, notably a greater focus on convergence, or the completion of the Single Market, in order to reinforce both the euro area and the European Union - as an isolated measure it cannot be a panacea;

Amendment 250 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Recalls the four pillars set out in the Five Presidents’ Report: completing the economic, financial and fiscal Union and strengthening democratic accountability, legitimacy and the institutional setting; emphasises that this report reiterates the view set out in the Blueprint of the Commission and the Four Presidents’ Report, coordinated by then President of the European Council Mr Herman van Rompuy,Stresses that a shock absorption capacity at euro area level is needed to complement automatic stabilisers at national level, whose functioning ~~is limited, as was shown~~has been limited by the imposition of deficit constraints on Member States budgets and austerity policies during the crisis;

Amendment 251 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Recalls the four pillars set out in the Five Presidents’ Report: completing the economic, financial and fiscal Union and strengthening democratic accountability, legitimacy and the institutional setting; emphasises that this report reiterates the view set out in the Blueprint of the Commission and the Four Presidents’ Report, coordinated by then President of the European Council Mr Herman van Rompuy~~, that a shock absorption capacity at euro area level is needed to complement automatic stabilisers at national level, whose functioning is limited, as was shown during the crisis~~;

Amendment 252 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Recalls the four pillars set out in the Five Presidents’ Report: completing the economic, financial and fiscal Union and strengthening democratic accountability, legitimacy and the institutional setting; emphasises that this report reiterates the view set out in the Blueprint of the Commission and the Four Presidents’ Report, coordinated by then President of the European Council Mr Herman van Rompuy, that a shock absorption capacity at euro area level is needed to complement automatic stabilisers at national level, whose functioning is limited, as was shown during the crisis (i.e. they are insufficient and need to be complemented by the monetary tool);

Amendment 253 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Recalls the four pillars set out in the Five Presidents’ Report: completing the economic, financial and fiscal Union and strengthening democratic accountability, legitimacy and the institutional setting; emphasises that this report reiterates the view set out in the Blueprint of the Commission and the Four Presidents’ Report, coordinated by then President of the European Council Mr Herman van Rompuy, that a shock absorption capacity at euro area level is needed to complement automatic stabilisers at national level, whose functioning is limited, a~~s was shown~~nd was further restricted as a result of the fiscal consolidation measures during the crisis;

Amendment 254 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. ~~Recall~~Notes the four pillars set out in the Five Presidents’ Report: completing the economic, financial and fiscal Union and strengthening democratic accountability, legitimacy and the institutional setting; ~~emphasis~~notes that this report reiterates the view set out in the Blueprint of the Commission and the Four Presidents’ Report, coordinated by then President of the European Council Mr Herman van Rompuy, that a shock absorption capacity at euro area level is needed to complement automatic stabilisers at national level, whose functioning is limited, as was shown during the crisisand calls for a shock absorption capacity at euro area level; stresses that any such mechanism, by its mere institutional set-up, risks to lack accountability and democratic legitimacy if it becomes just a new layer of governance which risks to cause moral hazard;

Amendment 255 #

Nils TORVALDS, Michael THEURER, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Makes it clear that rapid action is needed to ensure the sustainability of the euro; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens and markets;deleted

Amendment 256 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Makes it clear that rapid action is needed to ensure the sustainability of the euro by pursuing structural reforms and sound fiscal policies; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to implement and enforce structural reforms, ensure compliance with fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance frameworks, to complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens and markets;

Amendment 257 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Makes it clear that ~~rapid~~further action is needed to ensure the sustainability of the euro; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens and markets; stresses that the responsibility of transposing reforms to complete the EMU lies primarily with the Member States;

Amendment 258 #

Jonás FERNÁNDEZ, Paul TANG, Jakob von WEIZSÄCKER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Makes it clear that rapid action is needed to ensure the sustainability of the euro; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to complete the EMU, act meaningfully to reduce structural divergences between and within economies of the euro area, and to restore the trust of citizens and markets;

Amendment 259 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Makes it clear that rapid a~~ction~~nd far reaching action, including changes to the Treaties, is needed to ensure the sustainability of the euro; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens and markets;

Amendment 26 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 17 a (new)

– having regard to the rapporteurs’ study visits to Berlin, Paris and Rome and to the meetings held with national parliaments, Finance Ministers and sherpas,

Amendment 26 #

Sven SCHULZE

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Amendment 26 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Takes note of the different proposals ~~for this purpose~~, with different designs and assigning different functions, all of which involve, however, a central component for coordinating and monitoring 'fiscal discipline' and 'fiscal risk-sharing' in the eurozone;

Amendment 260 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Makes it clear that rapid action is needed to ensure the sustainability of the ~~euro~~Member States afflicted by Merkelian austerity policies; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens ~~and markets~~;

Amendment 261 #

Sylvie GOULARD, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Lieve WIERINCK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Makes it clear that rapid action is needed to ~~ensure the sustainability of the euro~~abolish the euro and save the peoples who are its victims; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to ~~complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens and markets~~work together;

Amendment 262 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Makes it clear that ~~rapid action is needed to ensure the sustainabil~~a well-defined roadmap is needed to realise the full benefitys of the ~~euro~~common currency; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens and markets;

Amendment 263 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Makes it clear that rapid action is needed to ensure the sustainability of the euro providing proper living conditions for all citizens; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to ~~complete the EMU and to~~ restore the trust of citizens ~~and markets~~;

Amendment 264 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Makes it clear that ~~rapid~~ action is needed to ensure th~~e sustainability of the euro; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of~~at Member States wishing to leave the euro may do so; stresses furthermore that the EU and ~~its~~ Member States ~~to complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens and markets~~should start to provide for measures and plans for a coordinated dismantling of EMU;

Amendment 265 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

11a. Is of the opinion that the current threat to the Schengen agreement on free movement of persons raises a particular challenge to the euro area given the importance of labour mobility within a currency zone;

Amendment 266 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Elmar BROK, Werner LANGEN, Burkhard BALZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Amendment 267 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. ~~Believ~~Stresses that ~~in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this ent~~the introduction of the euro led to closer economic and monetary cooperation that allowed the internal market to develop further, for the whole European economy to perform better, bringing more jobs and greater prosperity for European citizens benefiting individuals, businesses and whole economies in the euro area, including greater choice and stable prices for consumers and citizens, greater security and more opportunities for businesses and markets, promoting trade and investment, improving economic stability and growth, more integrated financial markets and stronger priese~~, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked t~~nce for the EU in the global economy; underlines that the single currency brings new strengths and opportunities arising from integration and scale of the euro are~~sponsibilit~~a economy, m~~ean~~aking th~~at financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria;~~ e single market more efficient and doing business in the euro area more cost-effective and less risky; stresses that the euro remains an attractive reserve currency for third countries and a trustworthy currency for new Member States, which was proven by the fact that, despite the economic crisis, several countries recently decided to join the euro area: Cyprus and Malta in 2008, Slovakia in 2009, Estonia in 2011, Latvia in 2014 and Lithuania in 2015;

Amendment 268 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a ~~vital~~possible element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if ~~solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria~~moral hazard is prevented and responsibility and solidarity are closely linked, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of adherence to the fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance framework, the CSRs and to commitments that are being made under specific programmes;

Amendment 269 #

Sylvie GOULARD, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Lieve WIERINCK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria; considers that it should go hand in hand with completion of the internal market, with an EU budget funding European and future oriented investments;

Amendment 27 #

Joëlle MÉLIN, Mara BIZZOTTO, Dominique MARTIN

Motion for a resolution
Citation 18 a (new)

– having regard to articles 33.1.a) and 40.1 of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank Statute, and article 129.3 of the TFEU;

Amendment 27 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Points out that in order to stabilise the social situation in Member States, ~~economic stabilisers such as a European Unemployment Insurance (EUI) scheme~~their sovereignty as nations and their national currencies should be restore~~ngthen the welfare state and fight social deprivation caused by one- sided fiscal discipline measures taken under the European economic governance framework~~d without delay in order to free up national economies and allow a return to full employment;

Amendment 27 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. ~~Takes note of different proposals for this purpose, with different designs and assigning different func~~Strongly opposes the idea of a single fiscal capacity for the EMU, since this would further erode the powers of the Member States and amount to debt mutualisations;

Amendment 270 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards ~~a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning tha~~compliance with its own set of rules as a vital element fin~~ancial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria~~ this enterprise;

Amendment 271 #

Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS, Pablo ZALBA BIDEGAIN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that ~~in order to regain trust, the euro must~~the euro has failed to deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a ~~vital element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria~~further failed attempt to save an economic and monetary approach which has failed;

Amendment 272 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility~~, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria~~; stresses further that, in the medium and long term, achieving the above objective is conditional on progress towards a genuine economic and monetary union, which will be possible only through the creation of a single treasury;

Amendment 273 #

Bernd KÖLMEL, Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER, Bernd LUCKE, Bas BELDER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of cleariterates that the Member States whose currency is the euro must comply with the Maastricht criteria;

Amendment 274 #

Fabio DE MASI, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as aone vital element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria and if linked directly to meaningful action to reduce structural divergences;

Amendment 275 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro and the European economic project must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, social justice, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this enterprise~~, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria~~;

Amendment 276 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that in order to regain trust from citizens and workers, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria;

Amendment 277 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards ~~a fiscal capacity a~~enhanced fiscal sustainability and structural reforms as vital elements in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility~~, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria~~;

Amendment 278 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. ~~Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element~~ Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national and European level are needed, as well as fighting tax avoidance, halting th~~is enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial supp~~e fiscal devaluation race among Member States, and taking into account that a morte i~~s provided on the basis of clear criteria~~ntegrated European economy needs some kind of new common fiscal figures;

Amendment 279 #

Clare MOODY, Anneliese DODDS, Neena GILL, Cătălin Sorin IVAN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Considers that the achievement of EMU needs to be supported by a strong political narrative rather than debates on specific instruments; warns against piecemeal technical reforms without a clear contribution to this objective; believes that the settlement of a fiscal capacity for the euro area is only one piece of the puzzle that needs to go hand in hand with a clear re-foundation spirit among its members and the ones to join;

Amendment 28 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 18 a (new)

– having regard to the Council conclusions, 18th and 19th February 2016;

Amendment 28 #

Arne GERICKE

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Points out that ~~in order~~the European Semester is a new but strong instrument to stabilise the social situation in Member States~~, economic stabilisers~~ and that further measures, such as a European Unemployment Insurance (EUI) scheme ~~should strengthen the welfare state and fight social deprivation caused by one- sided fiscal discipline measures taken under the Europe~~, are neither politically justified nor effective in structural terms. On the contrary: they serve to hide structural problems, provide negative incentives and e~~conomic governance framework~~ntrench social inequality more deeply;

Amendment 28 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. ~~Takes note of different proposals for this purpose, with different designs and assigning different functions~~Warns that the idea of a single fiscal capacity is an infringement of no bail-out clause (Art. 125 TEU);

Amendment 280 #

Sylvie GOULARD, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Lieve WIERINCK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Argues that Member States have to improve their own tax collection capacities and their cooperation, notably in terms of exchanges of information, transparency, and the gradual harmonisation of rates and tax bases; calls upon the Commission to come with proposals and, when appropriate, country-specific recommendations;

Amendment 281 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Argues that convergence, good governance and conditionality enforced through institutions being held democratically accountable at the euro-area and national level are key, notably to preventing permanent transfers and moral hazard; states that responsibilities must be assigned at the level where decisions are taken or implemented, with national parliaments scrutinising national governments and the European Parliament scrutinising the European executives; believes that this is the only way to ensure the required increased accountability of decision-making;

Amendment 282 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Brian HAYES, Gunnar HÖKMARK, Nils TORVALDS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Argues that convergence, good governance and conditionality enforced through institutions being held democratically accountable at the euro-area and national level are key, notably to preventing permanent ~~transfers~~and moral hazard; stresses the need to safeguard these institutions by restoring the no-bail-out clause and a democra~~l hazard~~tically founded right to withdraw from the Eurozone; points out that exclusion from the Eurozone for serious infringements could be appropriate;

Amendment 283 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Argues that ~~convergence, good governance and conditionality enforced through institutions being held democratically accountable at the euro- area and national level are key, notably to preventing~~the enforcement of fiscal rules, the implementation of CSRs and good governance at euro area and national level are key to pursue sound fiscal responsibility, address macroeconomic imbalances, implement structural reforms and boost investment, in addition there is a need for monitoring and evaluating transposed reforms, notably to prevent and avoid any form of permanent transfers and moral hazard;

Amendment 284 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Argues that convergence, good governance and conditionality enforced through institutions being held democratically accountable at the euro-area and national level ~~are key, notably to preventing permanent transfers and moral hazard~~is not the only way forward and poses a high risk of moral hazard; emphasizes that enforcing a credible no bail-out clause would also lead to these ends without requiring a burdening coordination and enforcement effort;

Amendment 285 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

Amendment 286 #

Emmanuel MAUREL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Argues that convergence, and good governance ~~and conditionality~~ enforced through institutions being held democratically accountable at the euro-area and national level are key, notably to preventing ~~permanent transfers and~~ moral hazard;

Amendment 287 #

Fabio DE MASI, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Argues that convergence, good governance and conditionality enforced through institutions being held democratically accountable at the euro-area and/or national level are key, notably to preventing permanent transfers and moral hazard;

Amendment 288 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Argues that ~~convergence, good governance and conditionality enforced through~~social and regional convergence pursued by institutions being held democratically accountable at ~~the euro- area~~EU, national and ~~nat~~regional level are ~~key, notably~~needed, also to prevent~~ing~~ permanent transfers and moral hazard;

Amendment 289 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

13a. Takes the view that financial instruments such as the ESM model pose several problems to the EU economy functioning and stability; as public investment is conditioned by the interests of private investment; as decision making is determined by the most powerful Member States providing the biggest contributions; and it is less redistributive than a model based in progressive taxes; finally, that the public guarantee system means that any losses in the projects will be taken in charge by public institutions while main profits go to the private sector.

Amendment 29 #

Clare MOODY, Neena GILL, Anneliese DODDS, Cătălin Sorin IVAN

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes the creation of ~~the single market~~an economic and monetary union, whose currency is the euro; whereas ~~the European Monetary Union currently consists of 19 members, two of whom have opt-out clauses,~~of the 28 Member States of the EU, 19 have already adopted the single currency, seven are under a derogation which applies until the Council decides that the conditions are met for its abrogation, and two Member States have, pursuant to Protocols No 15 and No 16 annexed to the Tre~~maining seven EU Member States having yet to join~~aties, respectively no obligation to adopt the euro or an exemption from doing so (‘opt-outs’); whereas no financial liability will be incurred by th~~e two~~ose countries with opt-outs from EMU in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area;

Amendment 29 #

Thomas MANN

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Amendment 29 #

Fabio DE MASI, Marisa MATIAS, Ernest MARAGALL

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. ~~Takes note of different proposals for this purpose, with different designs and assigning different functions~~Opposes firmly any further extension of supranational budgetary policy;

Amendment 290 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

13a. Stresses the need for a truly symmetric Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure that effectively targets chronic current account surpluses; points out that balanced current accounts of Member States are necessary to mitigate the need for permanent transfers; underlines that Member States may finance government deficits primarily by domestic household savings without need for arbitrary fiscal rules such as the Stability and Growth Pact if external balance is effectively pursued.

Amendment 291 #

Paul TANG, Jakob von WEIZSÄCKER, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance at or close to the zero lower bound, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; emphasises that a mechanism to achieve an aggregate fiscal stance in the future especially at or close to the zero lower bound as well as incentives for symmetric as opposed to asymmetric adjustment for accelerated macro-economic convergence in response to crises are essential for a proper functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocks;

Amendment 292 #

Luděk NIEDERMAYER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that while manoeuvring space of domestic fiscal policy must play prominent role, a fiscal capacity should~~, moreover,~~ address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocks;. Member States with close to balanced budgets at the moment of adverse economic shock have significant space available for use of automatic stabilizers as well as for eventual discretional fiscal support of their economy within existing European rules.

Amendment 293 #

Hugues BAYET, Maria João RODRIGUES, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ, Andrea COZZOLINO, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Cătălin Sorin IVAN, Alfred SANT, Roberto GUALTIERI, Udo BULLMANN, Costas MAVRIDES, Olle LUDVIGSSON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance and ensuring, that all Eurozone countries contribute to macroeconomic adjustment towards real convergence, including those who have greater fiscal space to be used to the benefit of the monetary union as a whole, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that beyond a proper use of the MIP between deficit and surplus countries, a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocks;

Amendment 294 #

Nils TORVALDS, Michael THEURER, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that ~~incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for address~~compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact and pursuing structural ~~weaknesses~~reform at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocksare core elements for the functioning of the euro area;

Amendment 295 #

Bernd KÖLMEL, Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER, Bernd LUCKE, Bas BELDER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocksare core elements for the functioning of the euro area;

Amendment 296 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level~~, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance,~~ are core elements for the well-functioning of the euro area; ~~considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocks;~~

Amendment 297 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Gérard DEPREZ, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. ~~Takes the view~~Notes that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are c~~ore~~urrent elements for the functioning of the euro area, but that the convergence criteria and the implementation of the measures for ensuring compliance with them must now be revised; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocks;

Amendment 298 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns forthat the role of a fiscal capacity should be to absorb shocks, support sound fiscal and macroeconomic policies at national level and provide the eEuro ~~area in the case of absorbing shocks~~zone with a fiscal backstop;

Amendment 299 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; ~~considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocks;~~

Amendment 3 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 1

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), especially Article ~~3 thereof, which establishes the creation of the single market, whose currency is the euro~~s 3 and 50 thereof,

Amendment 3 #

Sven SCHULZE

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Points out that the success of the eurozone is dependent on increasing the welfare of all its citizens~~, and on well- functioning labour markets and~~; is convinced that growth and prosperity go hand in hand with labour markets which react to supply and demand and with properly functioning welfare systems, based on decent work with rights, a strong role for the social partners, social dialogue, collective bargaining and collective agreements~~, and~~; emphasises that European minimum standards are an effective way of preventing individual Member States from trying to gain an unfair competitive advantage by infringing workers’ rights or promoting social dumping;

Amendment 3 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Dariusz ROSATI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Believes, however, that the crisis enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be progressively completed; considers that public confidence will only be rebuilt through the development of a progressive and comprehensive roadmap; calls for this roadmap to be urgently established;

Amendment 30 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes the creation of the single market, whose currency is the euro; whereas the E~~urope~~conomic and Monetary Union of the European Union currently consists of ~~19 m~~28 Member~~s, two of whom~~ States, out of these only 19 Member States shavre ~~opt-out clauses, the remaining seven EU Member States having yet to join; whereas~~the common currency and form part of the euro area; whereas of the nine Member States whose currency is not the euro, one Member has an opt-out and one Member has an opt-in from joining the common currency and no financial liability will be incurred by the ~~two~~se countries ~~with opt-outs from EMU~~ in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area; whereas the remaining seven EU Member States are bound by their Treaties of Accession to the European Union to join the common currency once they fulfil the necessary criteria;

Amendment 30 #

Romana TOMC

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Points out that in order to stabilise the social situation in Member States, economic stabilisers such as a European Unemployment Insurance (EUI) scheme should strengthen the welfare state and fight social deprivation caused by one- sided fiscal discipline measures taken under the European economic governance frameworkvarious measures are needed, including ensuring the effective functioning of financial funds intended for socially excluded people, in order to stabilise the social situation in Member States and fight social deprivation;

Amendment 30 #

Dariusz ROSATI, Janusz LEWANDOWSKI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Takes note of different proposals ~~for this purpose,~~ with different designs and assigning different functions;

Amendment 300 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should~~, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in~~ be an instrument of last resort, and be activated only in case of large asymmetric shocks theat ca~~se of absorbing shocks~~nnot be fully absorbed by responsible national fiscal policy;

Amendment 301 #

Sylvie GOULARD, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Lieve WIERINCK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that a revived non bail-out clause might provide sufficient incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; ~~considers that a fiscal capacity for absorbing shocks should, relate to address specific Eurozone concerns;~~

Amendment 302 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro ~~area in the case of absorbing shocks~~to prevent shocks and in order to enable daily political management;

Amendment 303 #

Fabio DE MASI, Matt CARTHY, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that ~~incentives for sound~~sound and progressive fiscal policymaking and ~~for~~ addressing structural weaknesses at national and cross-border level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocks;

Amendment 304 #

Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, ~~taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance,~~ are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, ~~address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shock~~strengthen the resilience of the Member States' economies by increasing competitiveness;

Amendment 305 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shockand European level, fighting tax avoidance, halting the fiscal devaluation race among Member States, and taking into account that a more integrated European economy needs some kind of new common fiscal figures;

Amendment 306 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are ~~core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocks~~elements that are detrimental to the sovereignty of the Member States; considers that a fiscal capacity is not politically viable given that the concept is so firmly rejected by the peoples of Europe;

Amendment 307 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specia fiscal capacity for the euro area would be absolutely incapable of solving the very serious structural problems of EMU and the resultant internal macroeconomic imbalances; considers that such a system would run the risk of transforming deficit co~~ncerns for the eur~~untries on the periphery into are~~a in the case of absorbing shock~~gions structurally dependent on transfers from the central creditor countries;

Amendment 308 #

Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Marisa MATIAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)

14a. Stresses that the euro area needs to diminish the risk for the public budgets and to financial stability by creating an environment conducive to private risk- sharing and, in that regard, by achieving a genuine Banking Union and Capital Markets Union, which together with the shock absorbing function of the fiscal capacity will enable trade-offs in shock absorption;

Amendment 309 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)

14a. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national and European level, are core elements for fighting tax avoidance, halting the fiscal devaluation race among Member States, and taking into account that a more integrated European economy needs some kind of new common fiscal figures;

Amendment 31 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes the creation of the single market, and a European Monetary Union whose currency is the euro; whereas the ~~European Monetary Union currently consists of 19 members, two of whom~~Single Market consists of the 28 members of the EU and the European Monetary Union currently consists of 19 members; whereas all but two Member States are bound to join the euro; whereas the two Member States not bound to join the euro have ‘opt-outs’ clauses, th~~e remaining seven EU Member States having yet to join;~~at are different in nature and scope as only the United Kingdom is not committed to join the euro whereas no financial liability will be incurred by the two countries with opt-outs from EMU in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area;

Amendment 31 #

Maria João RODRIGUES, Jutta STEINRUCK, Brando BENIFEI, Elena GENTILE, Sergio GUTIÉRREZ PRIETO, Joachim SCHUSTER

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Points out that in order to stabilise the social situation in Member States during future cyclical downturns, economic stabilisers such as a European Unemployment Insurance (EUI) scheme should ~~strengthen the welfare state~~be considered as an instrument helping to uphold growth levels and fight social deprivation otherwise caused by one- sided fiscal discipline measures taken under the European economic governance framework; stresses that an EUI scheme must include safeguards to prevent a lowering of national unemployment insurance standards, it should be financed by taxes (e.g. corporate taxation), should be complementary to national schemes and address cyclical unemployment only; looks forward to the publication of the final report of the study on Feasibility and Added Value of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme, conducted for the Commission under a Pilot Project initiated by the European Parliament and expects the Commission swiftly to follow up on this study with legislative proposals, also in the context of the roadmap envisaged by the Five Presidents' Report;

Amendment 31 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Reiterates that the approaches taken to date to bring eurozone countries' economic cycles more into line with each other and reduce macroeconomic imbalances, inter alia through welfare cuts, more flexible labour markets, public- infrastructure cuts and other so-called structural reforms, have failed to a large degree to meet their targets, have been counter-productive to some extent and, as a result, have plunged the economies concerned into a deep recession;

Amendment 310 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)

14a. Recalls the objective of full employment stipulated in Article 3.3 of the Treaty on the European Union; considers that a Eurozone budgetary capacity is an important instrument for achieving this goal, as well as for fostering convergence among EMU members, and for the stabilization and the sustainable development of the Eurozone economy.

Amendment 311 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)

14a. Stresses that a sufficient degree of wage and price flexibility, and labour mobility need to be guaranteed to ensure that a fiscal capacity is sustainable and does not lead to permanent transfers between Member States;

Amendment 312 #

Nils TORVALDS, Michael THEURER, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Amendment 313 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Amendment 314 #

Bernd KÖLMEL, Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER, Bernd LUCKE, Bas BELDER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Amendment 315 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Stresses that if a fiscal capacity ~~must~~is to be created, it should be in addition and on top of the existing EU ~~funding ins~~budget and without any detruiments, to it, and within its legal framework, in order to ensure consistent development between euro and non-euro Member States; Emphasizes that the planned EU funding instruments should be addressed to all EU Member States so that they are consistent with the fundamental values of the European integration such as the Single Market and should not undermine the competitiveness of the EU Member States as well as the EU as a whole;

Amendment 316 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Stresses that a fiscal capacity must be created on top of and next to existing EU funding instruments, within ~~its~~the EU legal framework, in order to ensure consistent ~~development~~synergies and complementarity between euro and non-euro Member States; stresses that, in the long run, genuine own resources in the form of taxation will have to abound a budget of the Eurozone; Such specific budget could go hand-in-hand with a transfer of competences exercised today at national level that could be best dealt with at Eurozone level;

Amendment 317 #

Sylvie GOULARD, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Lieve WIERINCK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Stresses that, while seeking complementarities and avoiding overlaps, a fiscal capacity must be created on top of existing EU funding instruments, within its legal framework, in order to ensure consistent development between euro and non-euro Member States; considers however that the option of an ad-hoc Euro area Treaty should not be disregarded, as this has been the tool chosen for the UK settlement;

Amendment 318 #

Paul TANG

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Stresses that a fiscal capacity must be created on top of existing EU funding instruments, within its legal framework, in order to ensure consistent development between euro and non-euro Member States; emphasizes that for any new instrument, payments have to be carried out on the basis of an automatic mechanism to avoid escalating payment backlogs;

Amendment 319 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Stresses that a fiscal capacity ~~mus~~cannot be created on top of existing EU funding instruments, within its legal framework~~, in order to ensure consistent development between euro and non-euro Member States~~;

Amendment 32 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Treaty on European Union ~~establishes the creation of the single market~~contains the objective, inter alia, to establish an internal market and an economic and monetary union, whose currency is the euro; whereas the European Monetary Union currently consists of 19 members, two of whom have opt-out clauses, the remaining seven EU Member States having yet to join; whereas no financial liability will be incurred by the two countries with opt-outs from EMU in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area;

Amendment 32 #

Enrique CALVET CHAMBON

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Points out that ~~in order to stabilise the social situation in Member States, economic stabilisers such as a~~economic, cultural and social situation differs greatly across and within Member States; while stressing the importance of continuing with "ad hoc" structural reforms, economic stabilisers could help some Member States in a situation of an adverse shock. One of the targets of the budget should be financing important tools (for example an European Unemployment Insurance (EUI) scheme ~~should strengthen the welfare~~ to enhance cohesion); takes note of the numerous administrative and ~~fight social deprivation caused by one- sided fiscal discipline measures taken under the European economic governance framework~~political burdens that the establishment of these tools would face and calls therefore on the Commission to evaluate the feasibility of such an instrument like EUI;

Amendment 32 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Recalls it permanent call for the insertion of the European Stability Mechanism within the EU legal framework and requests it to be done as soon as possible; recommends its transformation into a European Monetary Fund, acting as a specific shock- absorption instrument within the Eurozone budgetary capacity, which could thus reach about the dimension indicated by the MacDougall and Delors Reports as necessary to sustain the Economic and Monetary Union;

Amendment 320 #

Clare MOODY, Anneliese DODDS, Neena GILL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Stresses that a fiscal capacity ~~mus~~cannot be created ~~on top of existing EU funding instruments, within its legal framework,~~ without the backing o~~rder to ensure consistent development between euro and non-euro Member States~~f the peoples of Europe concerned;

Amendment 321 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Stresses that a Eurozone fiscal capacity must be created on top of existing EU funding instruments, and within its legal framework~~, in order to ensure consistent development between euro and non-euro Member States~~; however it must be ring fenced from contributions from countries with euro currency 'opt-outs';

Amendment 322 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Stresses that a fiscal capacity must be created on top of existing EU funding instruments, within ithe Union's legal framework, ~~in order to~~and ensure consistent development between eEurozone and non-e Eurozone Member States;

Amendment 323 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Stresses that creating a fiscal capacity ~~must be created on top of existing EU funding instruments, within its legal framework, in order to ensure consistent development between euro and non-euro~~for the euro area would set the seal on a definitive split between those countries that adopt the single currency and those that have kept their own currencies, undermining the principles of social and territorial cohesion and solidarity between Member States;

Amendment 324 #

Isabelle THOMAS, Constanze KREHL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)

15a. Upholds that this instrument should be used to invest in public goods, with an Eurozone added value and taking into account national contexts; underlines that the access to a fiscal capacity involves an agreement that incentivizes the investment in these domains; asks the Commission to explore the potential fields where a fiscal capacity can have such an Eurozone added value and how synergy with the Eurozone budget can be brought about; underlines that the access to a fiscal capacity involves an agreement that incentivizes the investment in these domains;

Amendment 325 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)

15a. Considers that the budgetary capacity and the incentive measures for convergence within the euro area are additional tools dedicated to the euro area;

Amendment 326 #

Paul TANG

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 b (new)

15b. Points to out that some crisis management mechanisms, such as European Stability Mechanism (ESM), are not covered by the EU budget, whereas other lending and guarantee instruments are indeed protected by the EU budget either directly or by the Guarantee Fund; insist that any lending operation of which the risk is covered by the EU budget, should not lead to cuts in EU budget lines that are not linked to national envelopes, particularly in heading 1a;

Amendment 327 #

Nils TORVALDS, Michael THEURER, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

~~16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resources;~~deleted

Amendment 328 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

~~16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resources;~~deleted

Amendment 329 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Burkhard BALZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires ~~sufficient resources;~~ more resources than a fiscal capacity could provide, thus it is too small to address shocks of this dimension and will not be able to rescue large euro area Member States, just as little as the ESM would be on its own merits; stresses that Member States are responsible for servicing their own debt and that the fiscal capacity should not have the task of rescuing euro countries in difficulties, which is explicitly forbidden by Article 125 TFEU; adds that the scope of any potential fiscal capacity should be to increase the competitiveness and resilience of an economy, therefore limit the extent of shocks that hit the economy and prevent future crises;

Amendment 33 #

Fabio DE MASI, Miguel VIEGAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes the creation of the single market, whose currency is the euro; whereas the European Monetary Union currently consists of 19 members~~, two of whom have opt-out clauses, the remaining seven EU Member States having yet to join~~; whereas no financial liability will be incurred by the two countries with opt-outs from EMU in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area;

Amendment 33 #

Sylvie GOULARD, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Jean ARTHUIS, Michael THEURER, Lieve WIERINCK

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Points out that in order to stabilise the social situation in Member States, economic stabilisers such as a European Unemployment Insurance (EUI) scheme should strengthen the welfare state and fight social deprivation caused by one- sided fiscal discipline measures taken under the European economic governance frameworkit is necessary to guarantee balanced public accounts that safeguard the survival and sustainability of the welfare state and to adopt economic reforms that will enable growth and job creation; takes the view that the budgetary capacity of the eurozone should foster and support convergence and the adoption of sustainable structural reforms, and be capable of responding to asymmetric shocks;

Amendment 33 #

Jo LEINEN

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Points out in this connection that a European unemployment insurance scheme, which would complement rather than replace national unemployment insurance systems, could help cushion asymmetric economic shocks, increase labour market convergence, strengthen EMU's social pillars, and establish a direct link between the EU level and European citizens;

Amendment 330 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires ~~sufficient resources~~adequate own resources, drawing lessons from one of the main failures of the EU budget coming from the expectation of a "fair return", calculated only in numerical terms; recalls the creation of the interinstitutional group on own resources (the Monti group), whose creation in itself reveals an awareness of this problem;

Amendment 331 #

Danuta Maria HÜBNER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resources and that the reflection on new own resources for the EU should be deepened and pursued; awaits with great interest the findings and recommendations of the final report of the High Level Group on Own Resources due for December 2016;

Amendment 332 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Gérard DEPREZ, Enrique CALVET CHAMBON, Urmas PAET, Nedzhmi ALI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Points out that ~~effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resource~~in order to access the fiscal capacity, Eurozone members will have to qualify for it and converge the way they did in the run-up to the euro; Notes that the creation of the fiscal capacity must go hand-in-hand with the democratisation and strengthening of the governance structure of the Eurozone as well as the harmonisation of national public accounts;

Amendment 333 #

Luděk NIEDERMAYER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. ~~Points out~~Acknowledges that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries may requires sufficient resources;. These resources can be made available via mix of domestic fiscal policy, existing instruments (including the ESM) and potentially newly considered tools such as a budgetary capacity for the eurozone.

Amendment 334 #

Emmanuel MAUREL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resources; considers that in this respect and in accordance with historical texts on the subject, the future budget of the euro area must be equivalent to a minimum of 3% of the GDP of this area;

Amendment 335 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resources; stresses that the stabilization function of the fiscal capacity should not be undermined by fiscal rules;

Amendment 336 #

Bernd KÖLMEL, Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER, Bernd LUCKE, Bas BELDER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resources, and that the huge scale of the task makes it politically impracticable to carry it out;

Amendment 337 #

Bernd LUCKE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires ~~sufficient resourc~~an enormous amount of resources at the expense of taxpayers in other countries;

Amendment 338 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires ~~sufficient resources~~a direct link between decision making and accountability;

Amendment 339 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires ~~sufficient resources~~a credible no bail-out clause;

Amendment 34 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes the creation of the single market, whose currency is the euro; whereas the European Monetary Union referred to in TEU article 3.4 currently consists of 19 members~~, two of whom~~ having the Euro, two members haveing opt-out clauses, and the remaining seven EU Member States ~~having yet~~bound to join; whereas no financial liability will be incurred by the two countries with opt-outs from EMU in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area;

Amendment 34 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Points out that in order to stabilise the social situation in Member States and drastically to reduce unemployment, economic stabilisers such as a European Unemployment Insurance (EUI) scheme should strengthen the welfare state and fight social deprivation caused by one- sided fiscal discipline measures taken under the European economic governance framework;

Amendment 34 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Matt CARTHY, Marisa MATIAS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Points out that a budgetary capacity aiming to provide conditional incentives for structural reforms can be established on the basis of the current Treaties, if need be through enhanced cooperation;

Amendment 340 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Takes the view that the European Investment bank (EIB) supported by guarantees from the European Central Bank (ECB) can complement a fiscal capacity and play a key role in promoting public investment programs in the EU;

Amendment 341 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Notes the complexity and lack of credibility of the EU economic governance; urges the Commission to work towards EU fiscal framework with a better economic and social rationale;

Amendment 342 #

Nils TORVALDS, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3

~~Three pillars of the fiscal capacity~~deleted

Amendment 343 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3

~~Three pillars of the fiscal capacity~~deleted

Amendment 344 #

Sylvie GOULARD, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Nils TORVALDS, Lieve WIERINCK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Considers that, in opposition to the ESM, EFSF, EFSM which were conceived as emergency tools, the budgetary capacity of the euro area should be seen as a permanent governance tool and fund the stability of the Euro area, labour mobility, investment to bring prosperity, in order to make it an optimal currency area;

Amendment 345 #

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Brian HAYES, Dariusz ROSATI, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 346 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Considers that three different functions have to be fulfilled; argues, first, that in order to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’' structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that ~~differences in th~~more efforts have to be made to stabilise business cycle movements of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a wholeover time, since business cycle fluctuations across euro countries are highly correlated, but differ in variance, which explains why shocks in the euro area are of a more symmetric nature with differences in the boom-bust dynamics of growth rates in individual Member States, especially experienced by euro countries of the periphery; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed at national level, while respecting the SGP and maintaining budgetary discipline, by making economies more competitive so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole; adds that in the reform of the SGP in 2005, the European Council asked EU Member States to strengthen their domestic fiscal governance through fiscal rules and institutions at national level and further reinforced national fiscal frameworks following the adoption of the Budgetary Frameworks Directive, the Fiscal Compact and the Two-Pack;

Amendment 347 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 348 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Considers that th~~ree different~~e theoretical founcdations have to be fulfilled; argues, first, that in order to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’ structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a wholefor macroeconomic "imbalances" and "shocks" are insufficiently specified, prone to confusing cause and effect, and too vague to shape the new economic governance structure of the EMU;

Amendment 349 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Considers ~~that three different functions have to be fulfilled; argues, first,~~ that in order to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’ structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole;

Amendment 35 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes the creation of the single market, whose currency is the euro; whereas the European Monetary Union currently consists of 19 members, t~~wo of whom~~hat have adopt~~-out clauses, the remaining seven EU Member States~~ed the euro as their currency, seven that hav~~ing~~e yet to join and two that have opt-out clauses; whereas no financial liability will be incurred by the two countries with opt-outs from EMU in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area;

Amendment 35 #

Ivan JAKOVČIĆ

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Amendment 35 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 b (new)

3b. Underlines the fact that real convergence between eurozone members, which is necessary, is possible, in particular through strengthened social cohesion brought about by bringing differing standards of living more into line with each other in the medium term and expanding social welfare systems; reaffirms that that requires public investment and stronger domestic demand across the board; in this connection, regards the proposed budgetary capacity as one of a variety of possible tools for funding such investment;

Amendment 350 #

Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Xabier BENITO ZILUAGA, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Considers that ~~three different functions have to be fulfilled; argues, first, that in order~~a sound management of the Euro area must include notably the following elements: to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’ structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so asto address asymmetric shocks, to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole;

Amendment 351 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Considers that ~~three~~ different functions have to be fulfilled~~; argues, first, that in order~~ to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic ~~competitiveness and~~ resilience of the euro area, Member States’ structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for; argues that structural differences of euro area Member States create the need for coherent, cohesion and industrial, policies as well as an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers~~, thirdly,~~ that symmetric shocks should be addressed so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole;

Amendment 352 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 353 #

Nils TORVALDS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Considers that three different functions have to be fulfilled by the Eurozone fiscal capacity, which requires the setting up of a Euro area treasury ; argues, first, that in order to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’ structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole;

Amendment 354 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Considers that ~~three~~ different ~~func~~conditions have to be fulfilled; argues, first, that in order to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’ structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole before a fiscal capacity can be established, particularly compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact, compliance with the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and effective implementation of the country specific recommendations; argues, that to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’ need to step up efforts to effectively implement structural reforms;

Amendment 355 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 356 #

Tibor SZANYI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 357 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Considers that the following three different functions have to be fulfilled even without fiscal capacity; argues, first, that in order to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’ structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole;

Amendment 358 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 359 #

Nils TORVALDS, Anneli JÄÄTTEENMÄKI, Ulrike MÜLLER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Amendment 36 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes the creation of the single market, whose currency is the euro; whereas the European Monetary Union currently consists of 19 members, two ~~of whom~~Member States have opt-out clauses, the remaining seven EU Member States having yet to join the euro; whereas no financial liability will be incurred by the two countries with opt-outs from EMU in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area;

Amendment 36 #

Sven SCHULZE

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Takes the view that the Member States should be provided with incentives and expertise to help them implement agreed structural reforms designed to enhance their competitiveness and their ability to withstand crises; points out that, if such incentives take the form of financial assistance, they should be linked to requirements such as compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact, in order not to undermine the principle of national responsibility and responsibility vis-à-vis the other Member States and to rule out deadweight effects;

Amendment 36 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 b (new)

3b. Points out that if a budgetary capacity would aim to provide support for adjustment to asymmetric or symmetric shocks, mechanisms to strengthen economic integration and convergence will need to develop from decentralized national fiscal policies towards further sovereignty sharing within common institutions, with increased democratic control at EU level, implying also a general use of the ordinary legislative procedure where this is not yet the case;

Amendment 360 #