2020/2133(INI) Strengthening transparency and integrity in the EU institutions by setting up an independent EU ethics body
Next event: Indicative plenary sitting date, 1st reading/single reading 2021/07/05 more...
Lead committee dossier:
Next event: Indicative plenary sitting date, 1st reading/single reading 2021/07/05 more...
- Committee opinion 2021/02/25
- Amendments tabled in committee 2021/02/16
- Committee draft report 2021/01/27
Progress: Awaiting committee decision
Role | Committee | Rapporteur | Shadows |
---|---|---|---|
Lead | AFCO | FREUND Daniel ( Verts/ALE) | WIELAND Rainer ( EPP), CIMOSZEWICZ Włodzimierz ( S&D), BOYER Gilles ( Renew), CHAIBI Leila ( Confederal Group of the European United Left) |
Committee Opinion | PETI | KANEV Radan ( EPP) | Margrete AUKEN ( Verts/ALE), Ryszard CZARNECKI ( ECR), Ramona STRUGARIU ( RE), Ibán GARCÍA DEL BLANCO ( S&D), Stefania ZAMBELLI ( ID) |
Committee Opinion | CONT | PEKSA Mikuláš ( Verts/ALE) | Luke Ming FLANAGAN ( GUE/NGL), Tomáš ZDECHOVSKÝ ( PPE), Isabel GARCÍA MUÑOZ ( S&D), Gilles BOYER ( RE) |
Committee Opinion | ECON | EPPINK Derk Jan ( ECR) | Jörg MEUTHEN ( ID), Paul TANG ( S&D), Manon AUBRY ( GUE/NGL), Damien CARÊME ( Verts/ALE), Ivars IJABS ( RE), Sven SIMON ( PPE) |
Committee Opinion | JURI | SÉJOURNÉ Stéphane ( Renew) | Geoffroy DIDIER ( PPE), Lara WOLTERS ( S&D), Manon AUBRY ( GUE/NGL), Gunnar BECK ( ID), Raffaele STANCANELLI ( ECR), Marie TOUSSAINT ( Verts/ALE) |
Lead committee dossier:
Legal Basis:
RoP 54, RoP 57
Legal Basis:
RoP 54, RoP 57Subjects
Events
2021/07/05
Indicative plenary sitting date, 1st reading/single reading
2021/02/25
EP - Committee opinion
Documents
2021/02/16
EP - Amendments tabled in committee
Documents
2021/01/27
EP - Committee draft report
Documents
2020/11/20
EP - Committee opinion
Documents
2020/10/07
EP - PEKSA Mikuláš (Verts/ALE) appointed as rapporteur in CONT
2020/09/17
EP - Committee referral announced in Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
2020/09/17
EP - Referral to associated committees announced in Parliament
2020/07/16
EP - KANEV Radan (EPP) appointed as rapporteur in PETI
2020/07/13
EP - SÉJOURNÉ Stéphane (Renew) appointed as rapporteur in JURI
2020/06/25
EP - EPPINK Derk Jan (ECR) appointed as rapporteur in ECON
2020/02/19
EP - FREUND Daniel (Verts/ALE) appointed as rapporteur in AFCO
Documents
Amendments | Dossier |
143 |
2020/2133(INI)
2020/10/07
ECON
56 amendments...
Amendment 1 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Recalls its resolution of 16 January 2020 on institutions and bodies of the Economic and Monetary Union: preventing post-public employment conflicts of interest1
Amendment 10 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Points out that the
Amendment 11 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Points out that the inherent complexities in financial regulatory policies and the information asymmetries between financial market players and public officials ma
Amendment 12 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 a (new) 3 a. Deplores for instance the appointment of the EBA Executive Director as AFME Chief Executive in February 2020; notes that this post-public employment with no cooling off period constitutes not only a risk to the reputation and independence of the EBA but to all Union institutions; considers that the independent EU ethics body should be competent to assess and make binding recommendations on such cases;
Amendment 13 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Calls for a strengthening of the existing regulatory and enforcement framework for both pre-public and post- public employment conflicts of interest, in
Amendment 14 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Calls for a strengthening of the existing regulatory and enforcement framework for both pre-public and post- public employment conflicts of interest, in order to establish appropriate, clear and binding boundaries between the public sector and the private and non-profit sectors; calls on the Commission to consider measures such as mandatory divestment of interests in undertakings that are subject to the authority of the institution to which a newly appointed official belongs or which have dealings with that institution, and to consider also new types of prevention measures, such as mandatory recusal when dealing with matters that affect a former private sector employer; welcomes in this regard the work done by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the European Court of Auditors and the European Ombudsman; recalls that the EU ethics body should have competences over these matters;
Amendment 15 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Calls for a strengthening of the existing regulatory and enforcement framework for both pre-public and post- public employment conflicts of interest, in order to establish appropriate as well as proportionate boundaries between the public sector and the private and non-profit sectors; welcomes in this regard the work done by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the European Court of Auditors and the European Ombudsman;
Amendment 16 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Calls for a strengthening of the existing regulatory and enforcement framework for both pre-public and post- public employment conflicts of interest, in order to establish appropriate boundaries between the public sector and the private and non-profit sectors; welcomes in this regard the work done by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the European Court of Auditors and the European Ombudsman; points out the lack of alignment of the EU ethics rules with the OECD Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service; notes the OECD Guidelines recommended the creation of a central function responsible for the development and maintenance of the conflict-of-interest policy and procedure, that could take the form of an independent agency; underlines the European Ombudsman has been handling conflicts-of-interest complains in the absence of a mechanism dedicated to this task on top of its other missions, and without having the proper means and power to enforce its decisions;
Amendment 17 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 a (new) Amendment 18 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 a (new) 4 a. Welcomes additional transparency measures announced by the President of the European Central Bank (ECB) Christine Lagarde regarding the publication of the ECB Ethics Committee’s opinions for cases of conflict of interest and post-mandate gainful employment by the members of the ECB’s Executive Board, Governing Council and Supervisory Board; calls on the ESAs to adopt a similar approach and publish relevant documents produced by their internal bodies in charge of conflict of interest and post mandate gainful employment;
Amendment 19 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 a (new) 4 a. Calls for an outright ban on individual stock ownership by Commissioners, senior EU institution officials and other senior agency officials while in office, where stock value might be influenced by their actions;
Amendment 2 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Recalls its resolution of 16 January 2020 on institutions and bodies of the Economic and Monetary Union: preventing post-public employment conflicts of interest1
Amendment 20 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 a (new) 4 a. Takes the view that the current legal framework and institutional enforcement for Ethics and Integrity in EU institutions and agencies is not fit for purpose and merits a thorough review;
Amendment 21 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 b (new) 4 b. Considers that the EU ethics body should also be competent to supervise the proper functioning and independence of the Commission’s decision-making process, including the creation and operations of Commission expert groups and similar entities; underlines that specific interests and/or organisations should not be granted undue influence over others; in this regard, is concerned about the recent decision by the Commission to grant the secretariat of the Clean Hydrogen Alliance to the industry association Hydrogen Europe, which represents the interests of the hydrogen and fuel cells industry, without any transparent procedure nor any public tender; calls on the Commission to review its decision on that particular matter;
Amendment 22 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 b (new) 4 b. Calls therefore for the setting up an independent EU ethics body;
Amendment 23 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 c (new) 4 c. Notes that the current ethics system in the European institutions is highly fragmented, with different standards and bodies in the different institutions, lacks independence and investigative powers; further notes that the application of existing rules for EU Commissioners, Members of the European Parliament and EU officials has shown too many weaknesses;
Amendment 24 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 c (new) 4 c. Takes the view that the new EU ethics body should have a broad mandate to assess all matters relating to ethics and integrity within EU institutions and agencies, including lobbying rules, transparency, “revolving doors” and conflicts of interest;
Amendment 25 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 d (new) 4 d. Stresses that the new EU ethics body should have the competence to oversee cases relating to all staff of the EU institutions and agencies, Members of the European Parliament, and European Commissioners, and that this ethics body should be able to revise authorizations of a job move where such a move could lead to conflicts of interests;
Amendment 26 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 e (new) 4 e. Points out that the new EU ethics body should be independent in terms of structure, governance and budget; underlines that the exact composition and mandate of the ethics body should be discussed taking due account of the opinion of civil society organisations;
Amendment 27 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 f (new) 4 f. Takes the view that the new EU ethics body should have a mandate comprising of both preventive and monitoring duties, namely on the technical and impartial review of declarations of financial interests and on verifying that imposed lobbying bans and control conditions are maintained, but also are active role, taking on complaints by designated entities, including whistleblowers;
Amendment 28 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 g (new) 4 g. Highlights that the new EU ethics body should have the power to issue administrative sanctions subject to possibilities of appeal and judicial review without interfering with the Treaties, namely with the prerogatives of the European Parliament;
Amendment 29 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 h (new) 4 h. Seeks the EU ethics body to be set up in a timely manner, so as to avoid cases of revolving doors and conflicts of interest already in the near future;
Amendment 3 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 a (new) 1 a. Stresses that, following an inquiry, the European Ombudsman found that the EBA should not have allowed its former Executive Director to become CEO of a financial lobby association and did not immediately put in place sufficient internal safeguards to protect its confidential information when the planned move became clear; welcomes, in this regard, the measures introduced by the European Banking Authority to deal with future “revolving door” situations, following recommendations by the Ombudsman;
Amendment 30 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 Amendment 31 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5.
Amendment 32 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5.
Amendment 33 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Recommends
Amendment 34 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Recommends
Amendment 35 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Recommends empowering the European Anti-Fraud Office or the European Ombudsman, or exploring the creation of an independent and non- political EU body with the responsibility to carry out oversight of conflicts of interest, revolving doors and lobby transparency for EU institutions and agencies;
Amendment 36 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Recommends empowering the European Anti-Fraud Office or the European Ombudsman with the responsibility to carry out oversight of conflicts of interest, revolving doors and lobby transparency for EU institutions and agencies; stresses, especially in the cases of elected members, the necessity to adequately inform the broad public of relevant past and prospected (over a reasonable time frame) personal and financial commitments in order to meet transparency and accountability criteria to the benefit of European citizens;
Amendment 37 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 a (new) 5 a. Recommends that the independent EU ethics body’s decisions, including sanctions, should be binding and that such body should be given appropriate human and financial resources; considers that the capacity of an EU ethics body to adequately enforce ethics standards in the EU institutions largely depends on its independence and that its composition should therefore reflect this necessity; considers it necessary for the body to have the right of initiative to monitor pro- actively and sanction breaches of ethics rules within the EU institutions as well as enhanced investigatory powers; recommends that such EU ethics body should be able to give advice on request and to issue annual reports about its work including recommendations on its own initiative on how to further develop the EU ethics regime;
Amendment 38 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 a (new) 5 a. Underlines this body should work in close cooperation with internal ethics committees to the EU institutions, the Transparency Register secretariat, the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Ombudsman; stresses however that the EU independent ethics body must be the one ultimately responsible for decisions related to conflicts-of-interest situations and must be competent for all EU institutions, including the ECB and the European Parliament, to avoid overlaps with other institutions that could lead to inactivity; calls for the lead committee to address this issue in its report;
Amendment 39 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 b (new) 5 b. Stresses the independent ethics body must have the necessary means, resources, and power to carry out definition, oversight, and enforcement of the EU ethics rules; underlines this body must have investigative powers to detect conflicts-of-interest pre, during, and post- public employment and the power to enforce both attenuation measures and sanctions, including the mandate to oversight cooling-off periods and revise the authorization of a job move if it finds that the specific job move in question constitutes a conflict of interest;
Amendment 4 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Highlights that post-public employment and ‘revolving door’ conflict of interest situations are recurring concerns
Amendment 40 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 c (new) 5 c. Stresses the EU independent ethics body will not be self-sufficient to address conflicts-of-interest situations within the EU institutions; therefore calls for a revision of relevant EU rules, especially the EU staff rules, the Commission Decision C(2018) 4048 of 29.6.2018 and the Codes of Conduct of the different EU institutions to ensure legislative consistency;
Amendment 41 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 d (new) 5 d. Notes that EU ethics rules are not respected in practice due to weaknesses in the functioning and the mandate of the ethics committees internal the EU institutions; is concerned about the lack of independence of these ethics committees from the EU institutions; calls for a revision of the regulations setting these ethics committee to ensure they are independent of the EU institutions they are controlling; takes the view the EU independent ethics body should oversight these ethics committees, is competent for all EU institutions and have the ultimate responsibility on questions of revolving doors and conflicts of interest;
Amendment 42 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 e (new) 5 e. Stresses the composition and mandate of the EU independent ethics body should be discussed inclusively, including the views of civil society; stresses the composition of the EU independent ethics body must be chosen carefully to ensure it is truly independent of political considerations and any other interests;
Amendment 43 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6.
Amendment 44 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Recognises the need to
Amendment 45 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Recognises the need to
Amendment 46 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Recognises the need to strike a
Amendment 47 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Is of the view that
Amendment 48 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Is of the view that
Amendment 49 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Is of the view that
Amendment 5 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Highlights that post-public employment and ‘revolving door’ conflict of interest situations are recurring concerns that
Amendment 50 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Is of the view that any prohibition of a professional move should be justified on
Amendment 51 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 a (new) 7 a. Calls for the establishment of an online ethics record at the European level to provide access to key transparency documents, including all appointments that may create pre-public and post-public employment conflicts of interest and all conflicts of interest assessments as carried out by ad hoc and/or internal ethics committees;
Amendment 52 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 a (new) 7 a. Reiterates that unless clear procedures are in place, inclusive of effective sanctions for those who fail to observe them or who infringe them for personal advantage, EU decision-making will continue to suffer from a credibility problem with the wider public;
Amendment 53 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 a (new) 7 a. Is hesitant of using the imposition of conditions or lobbying restrictions in place of banning job moves in cases where such restrictions cannot be strictly controlled;
Amendment 54 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 b (new) 7 b. Reiterates the need for a unified legal framework to efficiently address these issues and its call on the Commission to propose a review of the legal framework for the prevention of post-public employment conflict-of- interest when the new EU ethics body is set up;
Amendment 55 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 c (new) 7 c. Insists on its call on the Commission to include rules on the expansion of the possibility to block professional moves, and to consider a possible extension of cooling-off periods of senior officials on a proportionate case-by-case basis, to ensure equal treatment in line with Article 15 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union;
Amendment 56 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 d (new) 7 d. Reiterates its call on the Commission to extend this review to pre- public employment conflicts of interest and to consider strengthening existing measures, such as mandatory divestment of interests in undertakings that are subject to the authority of the institution to which a newly appointed official belongs or which have dealings with that institution, and also to consider new types of preventive measures, such as mandatory recusal when dealing with matters that affect a former private-sector employer;
Amendment 6 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 a (new) 2 a. Underlines that transparency and integrity issues at EU and at national level are strongly interlinked; supports therefore the work of the Council of Europe's Group of States against Corruption, and calls on Member States to implement their recommendations, specifically those regarding the creation of a strict code of conduct for national politicians and the introduction of rules for post-public employment;
Amendment 7 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 a (new) 2 a. Recalls that, according toa report by Transparency International EU1a,in early 2017 more than 50% of former Commissioners and 30% of former Members of the European Parliament who had left politics were working for organisationsregistered within the EU Transparency Register; _________________ 1ahttp://transparency.eu/wp- content/uploads/2017/01/Access-all- areas.pdf
Amendment 8 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 b (new) 2 b. Highlights the integrity risks created by the financing of political parties at national and European level; regrets in this context the direct involvement of US ambassador to the Netherlands Pete Hoekstra in fundraising activities of Forum voor Democratie, including by hosting a high-level fundraising event at the US embassy;
Amendment 9 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 c (new) 2 c. Underlines the importance of strong party ethics codes, including strict rules on post-public employment and full transparency on any secondary positions held by politicians;
source: 658.867
2020/11/25
JURI
87 amendments...
Amendment 1 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Notes that within the EU institutions different legislative measures aimed at preventing conflicts of interest contain varying definitions of the term ‘conflict of interest’; believes therefore that the term should be understood to mean a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has private- capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities; notes, however, that a definition of this kind has an evolving nature and that full transparency does not necessarily guarantee the absence of any conflict of interest, nor does it guarantee public trust; highlights that post- public employment and ‘revolving door’ conflict of interest situations are recurring concerns of a systematic nature and a problem common to institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies across the EU; considers that conflict of interest situations could jeopardise the enforcement of high ethical standards in the EU institutions and agencies, thus compromising their integrity and damaging citizens’ trust in them;
Amendment 10 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 a (new) 1 a. Notes that the European Parliament has established the Advisory Committee on the Conduct of Members as the body responsible for giving Members guidance on the interpretation and implementation of the Code of Conduct; it also assesses alleged breaches of the Code of Conduct and advises the President on possible action to be taken;
Amendment 11 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 a (new) 1 a. Reminds that the Committee on Legal Affairs is the committee responsible for the Statute for Members and the Staff Regulations of the European Union, the privileges and immunities and the verification of Members' credentials as stipulated by in Annex VI of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament;
Amendment 12 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 a (new) 1 a. Notes that trust in the European institutions and their democratic legitimacy have been profoundly altered by the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 despite the rejection by referendum in France and in the Netherlands of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2005;
Amendment 13 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 b (new) 1 b. Further notes the low level of trust in the EU institutions, with only half of the EU citizens expressing trust for the EU institutions according to the Eurobarometer survey carried out by the European Commission in 2019;
Amendment 14 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 c (new) 1 c. Underlines that utmost importance of independence, transparency and accountability of public institutions and public officers to foster the trust of citizens that is necessary for the legitimate functioning of democratic institutions;
Amendment 15 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 d (new) Amendment 16 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 e (new) 1 e. Notes that during the examination of the potential conflict of interests of Commissioner-designates in 2019, Members of the Committee for Legal Affairs have underlined profound flaws of the current procedure; Further notes that these flaws include the access only to a limited range of information, the lack of time for examination, the absence of investigative powers, the absence of support from experts, and the lack of impartiality of Members of the Legal Affairs Committee considering that Commissioner-designates are often chosen from their own political movements, and often by their own national governments;
Amendment 17 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Is of the opinion that the examination of Commissioner-designates’ declarations with a view to inferring a conflict of interest is of fundamental institutional and democratic importance and should be undertaken with the utmost attention, commitment and sense of responsibility, by means of a fully objective and independent interpretation focused on documenting the technical implications;
Amendment 18 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Is of the opinion that the examination of Commissioner-designates’ declarations with a view to inferring a conflict of interest is of fundamental institutional and democratic importance and should be undertaken with the utmost attention, commitment and sense of responsibility; insists that the declaration of the President-elect of the European Commission should also be examined;
Amendment 19 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Is also of the opinion that for this
Amendment 2 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Notes that there is no widely accepted European Union definition of conflict of interest and that no guidelines for its applicability have been clearly established; points out that within the EU institutions different legislative measures aimed at preventing conflicts of interest accordingly contain varying definitions of the term ‘conflict of interest’; believes therefore that the term should be understood to mean a conflict between the public duty - implying professional and official accountability - and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has private-
Amendment 20 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Is also of the opinion that for this examination to be complete and accurate, and for the possibility of a conflict of interest to be excluded, information and documents beyond the declaration of financial interests of Commissioner- designates are often essential; stresses in this regard that the future independent EU Ethics Body should be given a right to access a wider range of documents, including from national Parliaments and other elected and executive bodies, as well as tax authorities; considers that the future independent EU ethics body should have the power to request Commissioner- designates and all others falling under its scope to provide sufficiently detailed information in order to allow it to carry out well-reasoned and well-documented assessments;
Amendment 21 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Is also of the opinion that for this examination to be complete and accurate, and for the possibility of a conflict of interest to be excluded, information and documents beyond the declaration of financial interests of Commissioner- designates
Amendment 22 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Is also of the opinion that for this examination to be complete and accurate, and for the possibility of a conflict of interest to be excluded,
Amendment 23 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Believes therefore that the Committee on Legal Affairs should be given sufficient time to evaluate possible conflicts of interest; further believes that it should be provided with sufficient resources, tools and skills to cross-check and locate necessary information as well as ask for complementary information where necessary;
Amendment 24 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Believes therefore that the Committee on Legal Affairs in cooperation with the independent ethics body should be given sufficient time to evaluate possible conflicts of interest; further believes that it should be provided with sufficient resources, tools and skills to cross-check and locate necessary information;
Amendment 25 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Believes therefore that the Committee on Legal Affairs should be given sufficient time to evaluate possible conflicts of interest; further believes that it should be provided with sufficient
Amendment 26 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 (new) Reminds that the absence of any conflict of interest is a precondition for holding the hearing of a Commissioner-designate by the committee responsible and that the Committee on Legal Affairs possesses clear powers to reject Commissioners- designates in case of a conflict of interest;
Amendment 27 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 a (new) Amendment 28 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Considers that, given the sophisticated and complex nature of this responsibility, the establishment of a possible conflict of interest should be de- politicised and performed in an independent and systematic way with the assistance of a body with the relevant expertise and experience and with the highest degree of independence in relation to its composition, its budget and its investigatory powers; notes that several similar bodies e.g. in France and Canada dispose of a staff of around 50 persons and several million euro of budget; calls on the Commission and all participating institutions to allocate the future EU ethics body sufficient staff and resources for a professional case-by-case assessment by experts of potential conflicts of interest in particular of Commissioners, Members of Parliament and high-ranking EU officials; considers that most national and EU institutions are not in the position to carry out professional and speedy assessments in each case so far;
Amendment 29 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Considers that, given the sophisticated and complex nature of this responsibility, the e
Amendment 3 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Notes that within the EU institutions different legislative measures aimed at preventing conflicts of interest contain varying definitions of the term ‘conflict of interest’; believes therefore that the term should be understood to mean a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has private- capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities, or in which the performance of official duties is prompted by private-capacity interests; notes, however, that a definition of this kind has a
Amendment 30 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Considers that, given the sophisticated and complex nature of this responsibility, the establishment of a possible conflict of interest should be
Amendment 31 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Considers that, given the sophisticated and complex nature of this responsibility, the examination of and the establishment of a possible conflict of interest
Amendment 32 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Considers that, given the sophisticated and complex nature of this responsibility, the establishment of a possible conflict of interest should be de- politicised and performed
Amendment 33 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Considers that, given the sophisticated and complex nature of this responsibility, the establishment of a possible conflict of interest should be de-
Amendment 34 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 a (new) 5 a. Considers in particular that the independence of the future ethics body necessarily implies the power to start investigations on its own initiative; believes in this regard that the ethics body should be equipped with mechanisms designed to facilitate reporting from whistle-blowers, in line with Directive 2019/1937, and to facilitate media reports and access to other legally available information;
Amendment 35 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 a (new) 5 a. Underlines the need to review and align relevant EU legislation and codes of conduct, including with a view to laying down strict rules and requiring full transparency on the employment or the projects taken up by high-ranking EU officials after leaving public office and on any side activities held by Members of the European Parliament;
Amendment 36 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 b (new) 5 b. Stresses the need to learn from best practices in Member States; underlines in this light that in some Member States elected representatives are required to refrain from voting on issues in which they have a personal interest, and that these instances can occur in the European Parliament as well, for instance with Members who have farmland voting on direct income support under the CAP; asks MEPs in these cases to refrain from voting;
Amendment 37 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 Amendment 38 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 Amendment 39 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6.
Amendment 4 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Notes that within the EU institutions different legislative
Amendment 40 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Considers that for proper expertise to be acquired, the
Amendment 41 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Considers that for proper expertise to be acquired, the future ethics body should have a permanent, independent and collegiate
Amendment 42 #
6. Considers that for proper expertise to be acquired, the future ethics body should have a permanent, independent and collegiate structure, and that its composition could be based either on specific institutional positions, such as that of the President of the Court of Justice, or on the nomination of experts by each EU institution; considers that the members of the college must offer guarantees in terms of independence, impartiality, integrity, probity and experience;
Amendment 43 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Considers that for proper expertise to be acquired, the future ethics body should have a permanent, independent and collegiate structure, and that
Amendment 44 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Considers that for proper expertise to be acquired, the future ethics body should be given broad investigative powers and have a permanent, independent and collegiate structure, and that its composition could be based either on specific institutional positions, such as that of the President of the Court of Justice, or on the nomination of experts by each EU institution;
Amendment 45 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Considers that for proper expertise to be acquired, the future ethics body should have a permanent, independent and collegiate structure, and that its composition could be based either on specific institutional positions, such as that of the President of the Court of Justice, or on the nomination or election of experts by each EU institution;
Amendment 46 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 a (new) 6 a. Considers that the nomination by the Parliament of members of the independent ethics body should be done by a vote of the two third the plenary assembly;
Amendment 47 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 b (new) 6 b. Stresses that the composition of the independent ethics body should respect gender parity;
Amendment 48 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 Amendment 49 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Underlines however that the assessment of the independence of Commissioner-designates remains a political and institutional competence of the European Parliament; Recommends therefore that, while fully keeping its competence on the matter, the Committee on Legal Affairs decide on the existence of a conflict of interest after having received
Amendment 5 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Notes that within the EU
Amendment 50 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Recommends therefore that, while fully keeping its competence on the matter, the Committee on Legal Affairs decide on the existence of a conflict of interest of Commissioner-designates after having received a non-binding recommendation by such an independent expert advisory body; insists that the body should also have the investigative powers to detect relevant conflicts of interests prior to, during and after public office or employment of all Union institutions, bodies,offices, and agencies; suggests the EU ethics body to be competent on declarations of interest, declarations of assets, conflicts of interest, gifts and lobby transparency rules;
Amendment 51 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Recommends, therefore, that
Amendment 52 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Recommends therefore that, while fully keeping its competence on the matter, the Committee on Legal Affairs decide on the existence of a conflict of interest after having received a non-binding recommendation by such an independent expert
Amendment 53 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Recommends therefore that, while fully keeping its competence on the matter, the Committee on Legal Affairs decide on the existence of a conflict of interest after having received a non-binding recommendation by such an independent expert advisory body, which would have the effect of strengthening its action;
Amendment 54 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Recommends therefore that, while fully keeping its competence on the matter, the Committee on Legal Affairs decide on the existence of a conflict of interest after having received a non-binding recommendation
Amendment 55 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 a (new) 7 a. Upholds that the ethics body should be able to take on concerns by stakeholders, including by whistle- blowers;
Amendment 56 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 b (new) 7 b. Questions the recent approval by the European Commission of former Commissioner Oettinger’s employment by the international consulting firm Kekst CNC, a consultancy firm whose biggest EU-lobbying client is Philip Morris International, the tenth post- Commissioner position of Mr. Oettinger which has been approved for in less than a year;
Amendment 57 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 Amendment 58 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 Amendment 59 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 8. Believes
Amendment 6 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Notes that within the EU institutions different legislative measures aimed at preventing conflicts of interest contain varying definitions of the term ‘conflict of interest’; believes therefore that the term should be understood to mean a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official or a public decision-maker, in which the public official or public decision-maker has private-
Amendment 60 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 8. Believes furthermore that this future advisory body could also be entrusted with
Amendment 61 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 8. Believes furthermore that the mission of this future advisory body
Amendment 62 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 8. Believes furthermore that this future advisory body could also be
Amendment 63 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 8. Believes
Amendment 64 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 8. Believes furthermore that this future advisory body could also be entrusted with the broader task of examining conflicts of interest within the
Amendment 65 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 a (new) 8 a. Notes that the most acute challenges in the implementation of present rules for Members and staff of EU institutions, bodies and agencies exist as regards the management of disclosure requirements, as regards revolving-door cases and the management of conflicts of interest due to side-activities and memberships; Calls on the Commission to design the future EU ethics body as the competent instance for the substantial harmonisation and the centralised enforcement of the rules on transparency, ethics and conflicts of interest applicable to the staff of EU institutions, bodies and agencies, in order to more efficiently tackle the issue the ‘revolving doors’ and generally increase the level of transparency and integrity among Members and staff of EU institutions;
Amendment 66 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 a (new) 8 a. Notes that the fragmented administrative structure of the European Union has led to the development of different and uneven ethical standards and enforcement mechanisms across European institutions; Stresses that all European institutions and bodies should strive for the highest possible standards of transparency, accountability and integrity; Recommends that the future independent ethics body serves as an overarching supervisory body and works towards the harmonization of ethical standards while taking into account the specific nature and challenges of each institution;
Amendment 67 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 a (new) 8a. Regrets the lack of professionalism on the part of some MEPs who, when the potential conflicts of interest of the current High Representative were being verified, took it upon themselves to provide their journalist friends with a live commentary on matters being discussed and decided upon during the debate in the Committee on Legal Affairs; takes a very dim view of the unscrupulous behaviour of the MEPs concerned, who were motivated solely by partisan interests and showed a glaring lack of decorum and professionalism;
Amendment 68 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 a (new) 8 a. Recalls that the Parliament may withdraw confidence from an individual Member of the Commission, after which the President of the Commission shall either require the resignation of that Member or explain his/her refusal to do so before Parliament in the following part-session, in line with point 5 of the Inter-Institutional Agreement of November 20th 2010.
Amendment 69 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 a (new) 8a. Considers that the examination of conflicts of interest should be carried out on taking up a post, during the performance of the duties involved and on leaving a post; is of the opinion that such an examination should include the checking of statements made and compliance with the rules on transparency and lobbying the European institutions;
Amendment 7 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Notes that within the EU institutions different legislative measures aimed at preventing conflicts of interest contain varying definitions of the term ‘conflict of interest’; believes therefore that the term should be understood to mean a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official or post, in which the public official has private- capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities; notes, however, that a definition of this kind has an evolving nature and that full transparency does not necessarily guarantee the absence of any conflict of interest, nor does it guarantee public trust;
Amendment 70 #
8a. Stresses, in particular, that this body should examine possible conflicts of interest of Commissioners throughout, and at the end of, their term of office;
Amendment 71 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 b (new) 8 b. Considers that the European Parliament should lead by example with regards to rules on ethics and their enforcement; Suggests that the future independent ethics body should we able to investigate breaches of ethics rules by Member of the European Parliament and impose appropriate sanctions, such as fines or the retention of allowances; Considers that the independent ethics body should be able to investigate on serious conflicts of interests arising in relation to a Member’s rapporteurship or shadow rapporteurship for specific files and take appropriate and effective decisions to redress litigious situations;
Amendment 72 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 b (new) 8b. Considers that an institutional culture based on prevention, support and transparency requires close cooperation with the various bodies and institutions subject to oversight; considers that, in due course, internal administrative services responsible for ethical issues could be replaced by contact points responsible for relations with the European ethics body;
Amendment 73 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 b (new) 8 b. Considers that the future ethics body could make use of its future powers to start an independent investigation on the links between the European Commission and among others the ‘Big Four’ audit, consultancy and accountancy companies, in order to avoid potential conflict of interests;
Amendment 74 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 c (new) 8 c. Believes that the ethics body should also be entrusted with the duty of examining conflicts of interests within the European institutions and with expert groups, advisory, facilitator and research bodies, playing a preventive role to avoid any conflicts of interests; considers that the ethics body should act as a guarantor of the general interest, especially regarding the implementation of the Green Deal, and should thus put in place particularly strong requirements when examining conflicts of interest involving fossil fuels companies;
Amendment 75 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 c (new) 8 c. Believes that the independent ethics body should control the independence and ethical conduct of EU civil servants both before, during and after they hold a position or an office within the EU institutions; stresses the importance of combating the phenomenon of revolving doors between public and private organisations; recommends the adoption of harmonized and adequate cooling-off periods across all EU institutions and reinforce the currently failing system of enforcement of those rules;
Amendment 76 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 c (new) 8c. Considers that such a body should have investigative powers, as well as the power to request and have access to administrative documents;
Amendment 77 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 d (new) Amendment 78 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 d (new) 8 d. Considers that competent civil society organisations should be closely associated to the work of the independent ethics body; Recommends that the European Parliament appoints civil society organisations as permanent members of the independent ethics body; Considers that they should also support the work of the independent ethics body in an advisory capacity and be responsible for the publication of an annual report on the functioning of the independent ethics body that should be transmitted to the European Parliament and the European Commission;
Amendment 79 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 d (new) 8d. Considers that the consultation, prevention and support tasks of the future ethics body could be accompanied by the possibility of sanctions in order to ensure that its recommendations are followed up; considers that the publication or forwarding of recommendations and opinions could constitute a form of sanction in itself; stresses that such a body should not replace the CJEU;
Amendment 8 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Notes the multitude of existing legal approaches to the meaning and applicability of the concept of conflict of interest; draws attention to the pressing concern of the EU institutions to optimise the effectiveness of standards and rules governing ethics and transparency, giving less attention to the implications and importance of conflicts of interest; expresses its concern in this connection regarding the uncertainty surrounding the appropriate regulatory mechanism, the unpredictable effectiveness of deterrents and sanctions, the dubious efficacy of existing regulations and the need to introduce other political, behavioural and economic instruments;
Amendment 80 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 e (new) 8 e. Considers that companies convicted for environmental crimes should not be allowed to benefit from any of the measures foreseen for registrants into the transparency register; suggests, to this end, to revise the scope and the code of conduct of the transparency register in order to include provisions on the removal from it of companies convicted for environmental crimes;
Amendment 81 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 e (new) 8 e. Stresses that it is of utmost importance that the independent ethics body is given the possibility to start investigations on its own initiative;
Amendment 82 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 f (new) 8 f. Calls on all EU institutions to make meetings of their staff working on policy drafting or policy implementation with interest representatives conditional upon their inscription in the EU Transparency Register;
Amendment 83 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 f (new) 8 f. Recommends the creation of an internal and confidential complaint mechanism for European public officers to raise concerns about potential breaches of existing rules without fearing retaliation;
Amendment 84 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 g (new) 8 g. Stresses that the independent ethics body should be accessible to legitimate external stakeholders; Recommends the creation of a mechanism to allow for the submission of concerns by external stakeholders including individuals and civil society organizations;
Amendment 85 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 h (new) 8 h. Recommends the adoption of a specific complaint mechanism for designated civil society organizations, as well as the obligation for the independent ethics body to examine these submissions without delay and motivate any decision taken in their regard;
Amendment 86 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 i (new) 8 i. Stresses that the combat against fraud, corruption, maladministration or misuse of public funds are distinct, although sometimes related, to the control of ethical issues in the EU institutions; Consequently underlines that the creation of an independent ethics body must not lead to the undue suppression or restriction of other existing bodies that supervise the good administration of the European Union;
Amendment 87 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 8 j (new) 8 j. Considers that, for the purpose creating an ethics body “common to all EU institutions”, in line with the mission letter of the Vice-President of the European Commission for Values and Transparency, it is necessary to amend the treaties of the European Union;
Amendment 9 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Notes that the European institutions have a fragmented approach to the prevention of conflicts of interest and that each institution applies its own rules; considers that the establishment of a new ethics body could contribute to a harmonised interpretation of existing rules and to strengthening their implementation;
source: 661.820
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