11 Amendments of Ildikó GÁLL-PELCZ related to 2010/0276(CNS)
Amendment 55 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 1
Recital 1
(1) The coordination of the economic policies of the Member States within the Union, as provided by the Treaty, should entail compliance with the guiding principles of stable prices, soundbalanced functioning of public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments.
Amendment 71 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 3
Recital 3
(3) The Stability and Growth Pact is based on the objective of sound government financesbalanced functioning of government finances (balanced budgets, market flexibility, structural reforms) as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth underpinned by financial stability and conducive to employment creation.
Amendment 79 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 4
Recital 4
(4) The common framework for economic governance requires to be enhanced, including with regard to budgetary surveillance, in line with the high degree of integration achieved by Member States economies within the European Union, and particularly in the euro area, but it should be noted that it is not possible to prescribe a one-size-fits-all good practice for the Member States within the common framework for economic governance.
Amendment 86 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 4 a (new)
Recital 4 a (new)
(4a) Enhancement of European economic governance requires the cooperation of every Member State, as this creates the possibility of growth for the Union.
Amendment 112 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 5
Recital 5
(5) The rules on budgetary discipline and on complying with and enforcing it should be strengthened in particular by giving a more prominent role to the level and evolution of debt and overall sustainability.
Amendment 114 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 5 a (new)
Recital 5 a (new)
(5a) Greater balance must be ensured between economic grounds and political room for manoeuvre but the rules must remain simple, transparent and practicable.
Amendment 163 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 1
Article 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1– paragraph 1
Article 1– paragraph 1
1. This Regulation sets out the provisions to speed up and clarify the excessive deficit procedure, having as its objective to deter any worsening of excessive government deficits and, if they occur, to further prompt their correction, where compliance with the budgetary discipline is examined on the basis of the government deficit and government debt criteria.
Amendment 172 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point a
Article 1 – point 2 – point a
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2– paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 2– paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
(1) The excess of a government deficit over the reference value shall be considered exceptional, in accordance with the second indent of Article 126 (2) (a) of the Treaty, when resulting from an unusual event outside the control of the Member State concerned and which has a major impact on the financial position of general government, or when resulting from a general severe economic downturn, and when any of these events causes a deviation from the path of prudent fiscal policy.'
Amendment 200 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point c
Article 1 – point 2 – point c
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3
Article 2 – paragraph 3
(3) The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) of the Treaty shall take into account all relevant factors as indicated in that Article. The report shall appropriately reflect developments in the medium-term economic position (in particular potential growth, prevailing cyclical conditions, inflation, excessive macroeconomic imbalances) and developments in the medium-term budgetary position (in particular, fiscal consolidation efforts in ‘good times’, public investment, the implementation of policies in the context of the common growth strategy for the Union and the overall quality of public finances, in particular, compliance with Council Directive […] on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States). The report shall also analyse developments in the medium-term debt position by type (State, personal, corporate) as relevant (in particular, it appropriately reflects risk factors including the maturity structure and currency denomination of the debt, stock-flow operations, accumulated reserves and other government assets; guarantees, notably linked to the financial sector; liabilities both explicit and implicit related to ageing and private debt to the extent that it may represent a contingent implicit liability for the government). Furthermore, the Commission shall give due consideration to any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess in qualitative terms the excess over the reference value and which the Member State has put forward to the Commission and to the Council. In that context, special consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and to achieving Union policy goals, including financial stability.
Amendment 222 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point e
Article 1 – point 2 – point e
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 7
Article 2 – paragraph 7
e) paragraph 7 is replaced by the following: „(7) In the case of Member States where the excess of the deficit or the breach of the requirements of the debt criterion according to Article 126 (2) (b) of the Treaty reflects the implementation of a pension reform introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar in which risk is shared (in addition to the pay-as-you-go system), the Commission and the Council shall also consider the cost of the reform to the publicly managed pillar when assessing developments in EDP deficit and debt figures. In cases where the debt ratio exceeds the reference value, the cost of the reform shall be considered only if the deficit remains close to the reference value. For that purpose, for a period of five years starting from the date of entry into force of such a reform, consideration shall be given to its net cost as reflected in deficit and debt developments on the basis of a linear degressive scale. Additionally, irrespective of the date of entry into force of the reform, its net cost as reflected in debt developments shall be given consideration for a transitional period of five years from [date of entry into force of this Regulation, to be inserted] on the basis of the same linear degressive scale. The net cost as thus calculated shall be taken into account also for the decision of the Council under Article 126(12) of the Treaty on the abrogation of some or all of its decisions under paragraphs 6 to 9 and 11 of Article 126 of the Treaty, if the deficit has declined substantially and continuously and has reached a level that comes close to the reference value and, in case of non- fulfilment of the requirements of the debt criterion, the debt has been put on a declining path. Moreover, equal consideration shall be given to the reduction in this net cost resulting from the partial or total reversal of an above mentioned pension reform.'However, in calculating the net cost, the impact of the cost of and revenue from successive reforms which have an impact on one another should always be taken into account.’
Amendment 223 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 2 – point 2 – point e
Article 2 – point 2 – point e
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 7
Article 2 – paragraph 7
(7) In the case of Member States where the excess of the deficit or the breach of the requirements of the debt criterion according to Article 126 (2) (b) of the Treaty reflects the implementation of a pension reform introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar, the Commission and the Council shall also consider the cost of the reform to the publicly managed pillar when assessing developments in EDP deficit and debt figures. In cases where the debt ratio exceeds the reference value, the cost of the reform shall be considered only if the deficit remains close to the reference value. For that purpose, for a period of five years starting from the date of entry into force of such a reform, consideration shall be given to its net cost as reflected in deficit and debt developments on the basis of a linear degressive scale. Additionally, irrespective of the date of entry into force of the reform, its net cost as reflected in debt developments shall be given consideration for a transitional period of five years from [date of entry into force of this Regulation, to be inserted] on the basis of the same linear degressive scale. The net cost as thus calculated shall be taken into account also for the decision of the Council under Article 126(12) of the Treaty on the abrogation of some or all of its decisions under paragraphs 6 to 9 and 11 of Article 126 of the Treaty, if the deficit has declined substantially and continuously and has reached a level that comes close to the reference value and, in case of non- fulfilment of the requirements of the debt criterion, the debt has been put on a declining path. Moreover, equal consideration shall be given to the reduction in this net cost resulting from the partial or total reversal of an above mentioned pension reform.'However, in calculating the net cost, the impact of the cost of and revenue from successive reforms which have an impact on one another should always be taken into account.’