Activities of Daniel FREUND related to 2018/0902R(NLE)
Plenary speeches (1)
Existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded (debate)
Shadow opinions (1)
OPINION on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded
Amendments (14)
Amendment 5 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Expresses deep concern about the deliberate and systematic efforts of the Hungarian Government to undermine the founding values of the Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU, in particular through the removal of the constitutional checks and balances, by the limitation of the independence of the judiciary, by intentional alterations of the national electoral system and by hampering freedom of expression and other fundamental rights; highlights that these trends have substantially worsened since the triggering of Article 7(1) TEU and have been severely amplified by the COVID-19 crisis;
Amendment 6 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Insists on the need to avoid the creation of a hierarchy of EU values; stresses that it is important to ensure that not only the rule of law, but also other Union values, including a wider spectrum of fundamental rights and democracy are properly assessed;
Amendment 10 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Deplores the fact that the constitutional balance in Hungary has continued to be significantly altered by a deliberately broad and instrumental use of cardinal laws and constitutional amendments aiming to entrench the issues which are to be regulated by ordinary legislation, with no or limited public consultation, in a very expedient manner, without any effective involvement of the opposition or civil society; highlights that such a trend is contrarya threat to the rule of law, to constitutional traditions and to principles common to Member States and has been a source of open and consistent criticism by the EU and by, the Council of Europe institutions, the United Nations and the OSCE/ODIHR; denounces the excessive use of extraordinary powers with the declaration of the state of danger at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic;
Amendment 14 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Underlines that several recently adopted provisions in fundamental law or in cardinal acts aimed to curb the operational functioning of civil law institutions such as universities or to increase obstacles for political parties to be able to run a national list of candidates in the parliamentary elections, the main effect of which is to favour the incumbents1a; recalls that the OSCE/ODIHR decided to send a full-scale election observation mission to the 2022 Hungarian parliamentary elections because campaign finance legislation has remained largely unchanged and the latest amendments thereto have not addressed the recommendations of the ODIHR and GRECO; of concerns regarding general deterioration of conditions for democratic elections, and over the independence of judiciary and freedom of the media; recalls that the recommendations issued by OSCE/ODIHR following the 2018 parliamentary elections, as well as by GRECO, remain largely unaddressed. and new concerns have been indicated by the election observation mission on 4 April; _________________ 1a https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/docu ments/?pdf=CDL-AD(2021)039-e, paragraph 32
Amendment 15 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Stresses that in its Statement of Preliminary Findings and Preliminary Conclusions, the OSCE election observation mission to the 2022 Hungarian parliamentary elections 1b found that while the elections offered voters distinct alternatives and were well run, the process was marred by the pervasive overlapping of government and ruling coalition’s messaging that blurred the line between state and party, as well as by media bias and opaque campaign funding; _________________ 1b https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/6 /515111.pdf
Amendment 20 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Expresses concern about the steps the Hungarian Government has taken to further limit the independence of the judiciary, in particular by weakening the powers of the National Judicial Council, which damages mutual trust in the EU, as national judges are judges of first instance of EU law and guarantee equality between EU citizens; highlights, furthermore, that the Hungarian Government increasingly relies on the Hungarian Constitutional Court to avoid compliance with the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), thereby undermining the primacy of EU law;
Amendment 21 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Amendment 22 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 b (new)
Paragraph 4 b (new)
4 b. Regrets the lack of proper follow up to its reasoned proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the TEU, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded; stresses the high thresholds needed for the activation and use of this provision in the Council and the political considerations influencing the procedure;
Amendment 26 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Insists that the Council’s constitutional obligation to organise hearings, enshrined in Article 7(1) TEU, should be implemented in an open, regular and structured manner; regrets that so far this has not been the case; insists that in all proceedings related to Article 7(1) TEU, Parliament and the Commission should be treated equally; calls on the Council to systematically provide the Member State concerned with recommendations, and to oversee the implementation thereof on a regular basis, following the hearings under Article 7(1) TEU; urges the Council to immediately address recommendations to Hungary;
Amendment 28 #
5 a. Expresses its deep concern that the standard modalities for hearings referred to in Article 7(1) of the TEU do not ensure the same treatment for Parliament as for the Commission and one third of the Member States for the purposes of presenting the reasoned proposal; recalls that Article 7(1) of the TEU provides for equal rights and procedural status for one third of the Member States, Parliament and the Commission with regard to triggering the procedure; insists that Parliament’s invitation to a formal Council meeting is still owing on the basis of the right of initiative and the principle of sincere cooperation between institutions enshrined in Article 4(3) of the TEU; reiterates its call on the Council to keep Parliament promptly and fully informed at every stage of the procedure;
Amendment 31 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 b (new)
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5 b. Points out that the failure by the Council to make effective use of Article 7 of the TEU continues to undermine the integrity of common European values, mutual trust, and the credibility of the Union as a whole; reiterates its position on its own proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the TEU, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded; calls on the Commission to make full use of the tools available to address a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded, in particular expedited infringement procedures and applications for interim measures before the Court of Justice;
Amendment 33 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Welcomes the judgment of the CJEU in cases C-156/21 and C-157/21 of 16 February 2022, which confirms the validity of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, as it is based on an appropriate legal basis and is compatible with the procedure laid down in Article 7 TEU; calls on the Commission to trigger as soon as possible the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation on all the grounds addressed in the letter sent to Hungary by the Commission on 19 November 2021;
Amendment 35 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6 a. Reiterates that approval of the national plans under the Recovery and Resilience Facility should be made conditional on the fulfilment of all 11 criteria set out in Article 19 of and Annex V to the regulation on the Recovery and Resilience Facility; expects the Commission to exclude all risks of programmes under cohesion policy contributing to the misuse of EU funds or to breaches of the rule of law before approving the partnership agreements and cohesion policy programmes; calls on the Commission to apply the Common Provisions Regulation and the Financial Regulation more stringently in order to tackle the discriminatory use of EU funds, in particular any use of a politically motivated nature;
Amendment 38 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Insists that legitimacyTakes the view that the latest developments in the ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) of the TEU’s action on the rule of law needs to be und once again underline the imminent need for an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights (DRF), as proposed by Parliament, in the form of an interpinned bystitutional agreement including a coherent, effective and visible EU annual rule of lawDRF monitoring cycle, which should also integratetake into account procedures under Article 7 TEU and under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; reiterates that the mechanism must complement and reinforce, rather than substitute, the ongoing and future proceedings under Article 7 of the TEU; calls on the Council and the Commission to respondassess without delay to Parliament’s requestsheir reluctance to negotiate an interinstitutional agreement under Article 295 TFEU framing such a mechanism;