25 Amendments of Philippe DE BACKER related to 2014/0020(COD)
Amendment 102 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 a (new)
Recital 3 a (new)
(3 a) Since the proposal of the High-level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the Union’s banking sector, the Union has adopted a large amount of legislation (EMIR, MIFID2, CRR, CRD4, DGS, BRRD among others) reducing systemic risk, increasing capital requirements, safeguarding depositors and improving the tools for dealing with bank crises across the Union. As a result of these new rules and of new structures for supervision, the legal framework has been reinforced and the single rulebook in banking has created a new basis for financial markets in the Union, facilitating a single financial market and a working Capital Markets Union.
Amendment 111 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
Recital 10
Amendment 120 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12 a (new)
Recital 12 a (new)
(12 a) Through a risk-based approach, this Regulation should aim at providing financial stability, reducing systemic risk and maintaining a competitive European banking sector able to finance the economy.
Amendment 138 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
Recital 17
(17) To ensure that the entities subject to the prohibition of proprietary trading can continue to contribute toward the financing of the economy, they should be allowed to invest in a closed list of funds. This exhaustive list should comprise closed- ended and unleveraged alternative investment funds (AIFs), European Vwhich are not substantially leveraged in accordance with the Directive 2011/61/EU26 and Regulation 231/2013, venture Ccapital Ffunds that fall under the definition foreseen in Article 3(b) of Regulation (EU) No 346/2013, European Social Entrepreneurship Funds and European Long Term Investment Funds. To Given the contribution of vensture that these funds do not endanger the viability and financial soundness of the credit institutions that invest in them, it is essential that closed-ended and unleveraged AIFs in which credit institutions can still invest are managed by AIF managers that are authorised and supercapital funds toward the financing of the economy, in particular SMEs and the fact that EuVECA is an optional regime, credit institutions should be allowed to continue to invest in all type of venture capital funds. Therefore all venture capital funds that meet the definition of qualifying venture capital fund should be exempted from the proprietary trading ban. All the funds mentioned above are properly regulated and competent authorities are provisded in accordance with the relevant provisions of Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council26 , and that those AIFs are established in the Union or, if they are not established in the Union, they are marketed in the Union according to the rules of that Directivewith different supervisory tools for monitoring and addressing risks associated with either funds' or managers' activities. Investments in those types of funds do not endanger financial soundness of the credit institutions and therefore credit institutions should be allowed to invest in such funds. __________________ 26Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010
Amendment 140 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17 a (new)
Recital 17 a (new)
(17a) Having in mind that private equity and venture capital funds contribute to the financing of the real economy and that this positive role partly depends on the relationship of the private equity and venture capital industry with the banks (whether as investors, asset manager or lenders), banks lending to private equity and venture capital funds as well as providing guarantees to such funds should not be considered as trading activities that should be subject to the structural separation.
Amendment 162 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24
Recital 24
(24) There are particular concerns in relation to market making. The resolvability of a bank may be impeded by the presence of trading and inventory within a large banking group, as individual trading positions are treated the same way in a resolution process, whether they result from client activity driven market making or from speculation. Additionally, market makers are interconnected with other large banking groups. Furthermore, market makers can be exposed to substantial counterparty risk and the concrete functioning of market making can vary in relation to different financial instruments and market models. Market making activities, however, are also indispensable to the well-functioning of the market for corporate bonds and other debt instruments, since liquidity is necessary to make the instruments appropriate for a wide variety of investors. Therefore, particular attention to those activities should be made during the assessment of the competent authority.
Amendment 203 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 47 a (new)
Recital 47 a (new)
(47 a) As stated in the Liikanen report, "attention should be paid to the governance and control mechanisms of all banks". More attention should indeed be given by the competent authorities to the ability of management and boards to run and monitor large and complex banks as well as smaller ones as the crisis has shown that small banks represent a risk too. Complementary supervisory tools should be developed such as fit-and- proper tests applied when evaluating the suitability of management and board candidates.
Amendment 344 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 3
Article 6 – paragraph 3
3. The restrictions laid down in point (b) of paragraph 1 shall not apply with regard to closed-ended and unAIFs, which are not substantially leveraged AIFs, as defined in Directive 2011/61/EU where those AIFs are established in the Union or, if they are not established in the Union, they are marketed in the Union according to Articles 35 or 40 of Directive 2011/61/EU and Article 111 of the Regulation 231/2013, to qualifying venture capital funds as defined in Article 3(b) of Regulation (EU) No 345/2013, to qualifying social entrepreneurship funds as defined in Article 3(b) of Regulation (EU) No 346/2013, and to AIFs authorized as ELTIFs in accordance with Regulation (EU) No [XXX/XXXX].
Amendment 375 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
(b a) providing guarantees
Amendment 391 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
(i a) the selling of interest rate derivatives, foreign exchange derivatives, credit derivatives, emission allowances derivatives and commodity derivatives eligible for central counterparty clearing, and emission allowances, to non-financial clients and to financial entities referred to in the second and third indents of point (19) of Article 5, to insurance undertakings, or to institutions providing occupational retirement benefits, where the sole purpose of the sale is to hedge interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, credit risk, commodity risk or emissions allowance risk.
Amendment 428 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 b (new)
Article 9 – paragraph 1 b (new)
Amendment 460 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point h
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point h
Amendment 553 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 5 – point a – point a
Article 10 – paragraph 5 – point a – point a
(a) (i) the relevant limit of each of the metrics provided in points (a) to (hg) of Article 9(1), above which the risk level of the trading activity concerned is deemed individually significant;
Amendment 698 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21
Article 21
Amendment 703 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – title
Article 21 – title
Amendment 707 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. At the request of a Member State, the Commission may grant a derogation from the requirements of this Chapter to aThis Regulation shall not prevent Member States from implementing national bank structural reforms that apply at individual level to credit institutions authorized in their territory with the view of isolating core credit institutions or taking deposits from individuals and SMEs that are subject to national primary legislation adopted before 29 January 2014macro-prudential measures, with the prior consent of the competent authorities and resolution authorities. Competent authorities and resolution authorities shall not authorise those national measures whenre the national legislation complies with the following requirements:credit institution is subject to a resolution regime equipped with resolution financing arrangements that prevent the use of tax payer money by establishing ex ante funding in a resolution fund separate from Member States' general budget.
Amendment 709 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – point a
Amendment 712 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – point b
Amendment 716 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – point c
Amendment 721 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Amendment 723 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Amendment 727 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
Amendment 732 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 4
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 4
Amendment 736 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5
Amendment 740 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6