[ParlTrack]

Dominique VLASTO, Herbert REUL, Paul RÜBIG, Nicole FONTAINE, Ján HUDACKÝ, Catherine TRAUTMANN

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 4

(4) The Communication of the Commission of 10 January 2007 entitled “An Energy Policy for Europe” highlighted the importance of completing the internal market in electricity and of creating a level playing field for all electricity companies established in the Community. The Internal Energy Market Communication ~~and the final Report on the Competition Sectoral Enquiry~~ showed that the present rules and measures do not provide the necessary framework for achieving the objective of a well functioning internal market. Furthermore, the final Report on the Competition Sectoral Enquiry and the impact assessment conducted to support the third legislative package on the internal energy market provided no convincing evidence to make it possible to determine the best or only way to improve the way the internal market works.

2008/03/17
Committee: ITRE

Dominique VLASTO, Herbert REUL, Paul RÜBIG, Nicole FONTAINE, Ján HUDACKÝ, Catherine TRAUTMANN

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 5

(5) Without effective separation of networks from activities of generation and supply, there is an inherent risk of discrimination not only in the operation of the network but also in the incentives for ~~vertically integrated~~ companies to invest adequately in their networks. The main motivation for investing is the remuneration received by the operator. If the national regulatory authority sets a low level of remuneration, this will lead to a decrease in investment. On the other hand, if it sets a fair and proportionate level of remuneration, ensuring that revenue covers costs and pays off such investment, it will automatically generate an increase in investment, regardless of whether the network operator belongs to an integrated group. Therefore, the primary major determining factor for investment resides in pricing regulation and in the role and powers of the national regulatory authorities, which should be reinforced in order to complete the internal market to the benefit of the consumer.

2008/03/17
Committee: ITRE

Dominique VLASTO, Herbert REUL, Paul RÜBIG, Nicole FONTAINE, Ján HUDACKÝ, Catherine TRAUTMANN

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 7

(7) ~~Only t~~The removal of the inherent incentive for vertically integrated companies to discriminate against competitors as regards network access and investment can ensure effective unbundling. Ownership unbundling, which implies the network owner being appointed as the network operator and being independent from any supply and production interests, is ~~clearly the most effective and stabl~~one of the way tos of solveing the inherent conflict of interest ~~and to ensure security of supply. For this reason, t~~. The European Parliament in its Rresolution on Pprospects for the internal gas and electricity market adopted on 10 July 2007 referred to ownership unbundling at transmission level as the most effective tool to promote investments in infrastructures in a non-discriminatory way, fair access to the grid for new entrants and transparency in the market. Member States should therefore be required to ensure that the same person or persons are not entitled to exercise control, including through minority blocking rights on decisions of strategic importance such as investments, over a production or supply undertaking and, at the same time, hold any interest in or exercise any right over a transmission system operator or transmission system. Conversely, control over a transmission system operator should preclude the possibility of holding any interest in or exercising any right over a supply undertaking.

2008/03/17
Committee: ITRE

Dominique VLASTO, Herbert REUL, Paul RÜBIG, Nicole FONTAINE, Ján HUDACKÝ, Catherine TRAUTMANN

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 8 a (new)

(8a) Member States that so wish may apply the provisions of this Directive relating to the effective and efficient separation of transmission systems and transmission system operators. This separation is effective because it helps ensure the independence of transmission system operators. It is efficient because it provide a more appropriate regulatory framework to guarantee fair competition, sufficient investment, access for new entrants and the integration of electricity markets. It is based on a pillar of organisational measures and measures relating to the governance of transmission system operators and on a pillar of measures relating to investment, connecting new production capacities to the network and market integration through regional cooperation. It is in line with the requirements laid down by the European Council at its meeting in Brussels on 8 and 9 March 2007.

2008/03/17
Committee: ITRE

Norbert GLANTE, Robert GOEBBELS, Edit HERCZOG, Atanas PAPARIZOV, Anni PODIMATA, Bernhard RAPKAY, Hannes SWOBODA, Catherine TRAUTMANN

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 10 a (new)

(10a) Complying with the regulations on an effective and efficient legal unbundling and provided that the network undertaking performs all the functions of the network operator and a detailed regulation and extensive regulatory control mechanism are put in place, vertical integrated undertakings may remain the owner of their network assets and ensure an effective separation of interests at the same time.

2008/03/17
Committee: ITRE

Dominique VLASTO, Herbert REUL, Paul RÜBIG, Nicole FONTAINE, Ján HUDACKÝ, Catherine TRAUTMANN

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 11

(11) Where the undertaking owning a transmission system is part of a vertically integrated undertaking, Member States should therefore be given a choice between ownership unbundling ~~and, as a derogation,~~, effective and efficient unbundling of transmission systems and of transmission system operators, and setting up system operators which are independent from supply and generation interests. The full effectiveness of the independent system operator solution needs to be assured by way of specific additional rules. To preserve fully the interests of the shareholders of vertically integrated companies, Member States should have the choice of implementing ownership unbundling either by direct divestiture or by splitting the shares of the integrated company into shares of the network company and shares of the remaining supply and generation business, provided that the requirements resulting from ownership unbundling are complied with.

2008/03/17
Committee: ITRE

Norbert GLANTE, Robert GOEBBELS, Edit HERCZOG, Atanas PAPARIZOV, Anni PODIMATA, Bernhard RAPKAY, Hannes SWOBODA, Catherine TRAUTMANN

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 11

(11) Where the undertaking owning a transmission system is part of a vertically integrated undertaking, Member States should therefore be given a choice between ownership unbundling ~~and, as a derogation~~, setting up system operators which are independent from supply and generation interests and effective and efficient legal unbundling of transmission system operators. The full effectiveness of the independent system operator solution needs to be assured by way of specific additional rules. To preserve fully the interests of the shareholders of vertically integrated companies, Member States should have the choice of implementing ownership unbundling either by direct divestiture or by splitting the shares of the integrated company into shares of the network company and shares of the remaining supply and generation business, provided that the requirements resulting from ownership unbundling are complied with.

2008/03/17
Committee: ITRE

Dominique VLASTO, Herbert REUL, Paul RÜBIG, Nicole FONTAINE, Ján HUDACKÝ, Catherine TRAUTMANN

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 22

(22) In view of the creation of an internal market for electricity, Member States should foster the integration of their national markets and the cooperation of network operators at European and ~~regional level~~national level. Regional integration initiatives are an essential intermediate step in achieving European integration of energy markets, which remains the final objective. The regional level contributes towards accelerating the integration process by making it possible for the actors concerned, particularly the Member States, the national regulatory authorities and the transmission system operators, to cooperate on specific issues.

2008/03/17
Committee: ITRE

Dominique VLASTO, Herbert REUL, Paul RÜBIG, Nicole FONTAINE, Ján HUDACKÝ, Catherine TRAUTMANN

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 22 a (new)

(22a) Regional coordinators could be appointed to facilitate dialogue between all relevant actors, national authorities, transmission system operators, users, electricity exchanges and other market actors. Their involvement could be particularly beneficial for the planning of cross-border investment. They will report annually to the Commission and the Member States on the progress made and difficulties encountered.

2008/03/17
Committee: ITRE

Norbert GLANTE, Robert GOEBBELS, Edit HERCZOG, Atanas PAPARIZOV, Anni PODIMATA, Bernhard RAPKAY, Hannes SWOBODA, Catherine TRAUTMANN

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 4

Directive 2003/54/EC
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. In order to ensure the independence of transmission system operators, Member States shall ensure that as from [date of transposition plus one year] vertically integrated undertakings have to comply either with the following points (a) to (d) or with Article 10 or with the provisions of Article 10b:

2008/04/11
Committee: ITRE

Norbert GLANTE, Robert GOEBBELS, Edit HERCZOG, Atanas PAPARIZOV, Anni PODIMATA, Bernhard RAPKAY, Hannes SWOBODA, Catherine TRAUTMANN

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 8 a (new)

Directive 2003/54/EC
Article 10 b (new)

(8a) The following Article shall be inserted: "Article 10b Effective and efficient legal unbundling of transmission systems I. Assets, equipment, staff and identity 1. Transmission system operators shall be equipped with all human, physical and financial resources of the vertically integrated undertaking necessary for the regular business of electricity transmission, in particular: (i) transmission system operator shall own assets that are necessary for the regular business of electricity transmission; (ii) transmission system operator shall employ personnel necessary for the regular business of electricity transmission; (iii) appropriate financial resources for future investment projects shall be available in the annual financial plan. The activities deemed necessary for the regular business of electricity transmission mentioned in previous subparagraph shall at least include: - representation of the transmission system operator and contacts with third parties and national regulatory authorities, - granting and managing third party access to the grid, especially the access for new market operators and producers of renewable energies, - collection of the access charges, congestion rents and payments under the inter transmission system operator compensation mechanism in compliance with Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, - operation, maintenance and development of the transmission system, - investment planning ensuring the long- term ability of the system to meet reasonable demand and guaranteeing security of supply, - legal services, - accountancy and IT services. 2. Leasing of personnel and rendering of services, from and to any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of generation or supply, shall be prohibited. 3. The transmission system operator shall not engage in any business or activity outside transmission which could be in conflict with its tasks, including the holding of shares or interests in any undertaking or part of the vertically integrated company or in any other electricity and gas company. Exceptions require the prior consent of the national regulatory authority and shall be restricted to shares and interests in other network businesses. 4. The transmission system operator shall have its own legal identity, significantly different from the vertically integrated undertaking with separate branding, communication and premises. 5. The transmission system operator shall not share any commercially advantageous and sensitive information with any undertaking of the vertically integrated undertaking unless it does so with all market participants in a non- discriminatory way. The transmission system operator shall in cooperation with the national regulatory authority define this information. 6. Transmission system operators´ accounts shall be audited by another auditor than the one auditing the vertically integrated undertaking and all its affiliated companies. II. Independence of the transmission system operator management, chief executive officer / executive board 7. Decisions on the appointment and on any early termination of the employment of the chief executive officer / members of the executive board of the transmission system operator and the conclusion or early termination of the respective employment agreements with these persons shall be notified to the national regulatory authority. These decisions and agreements may become binding only if, within a period of 3 weeks after notification, the national regulatory authority has not used its right of veto. A veto may be issued in cases of appointment and conclusion of respective agreements if serious doubts arise as to the professional independence of the nominated chief executive officer / member of the executive board; in the case of early termination of employment and of respective agreements of the chief executive officer / member of the executive board, the veto may be used if serious doubts exist regarding the basis and justification of such termination. 8. Right of appeal to the national regulatory authority or to a court shall be guaranteed to the chief executive officer / member of the executive board of the transmission system operator in the case of early terminations of their employment. 9. The national regulatory authority shall decide on the appeal within six months. Exceptions shall be justified. 10. After termination of employment in the transmission system operator, former chief executive officers / members of the executive board shall not participate in any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of generation or supply for a period of not less than 3 years. 11. The chief executive officer / members of the executive board shall not hold any interest in or receive any compensation from any undertaking of the vertically integrated company other than the transmission system operator. His/their remuneration shall in no part depend on activities of the vertically integrated undertaking other than those of the transmission system operator. 12. The chief executive officer or the members of the executive board of the transmission system operator may not bear responsibility, directly or indirectly, for the day-to-day operation of any other branch of the vertically integrated undertaking. 13. Without prejudice to the provisions above, the transmission system operator shall have all effective decision-making rights, independent from the integrated electricity undertaking, with respect to assets necessary to operate, maintain or develop the network. This should not prevent the existence of appropriate coordination mechanisms to ensure that the parent company is able to set global limits on the levels of indebtedness of its subsidiary. It shall not permit the parent company to give instructions regarding day-to-day operations, nor with respect to individual decisions concerning the construction or upgrading of transmission lines, that do not exceed the terms of the approved financial plan, or any equivalent instrument. III. Supervisory board / Board of directors 14. The chairman of the supervisory board/board of directors of the transmission system operator and all of its members shall not participate in any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking. They shall also not be members of the supervisory board/board of directors of any undertaking of the vertically integrated company. 15. The supervisory boards / boards of directors of transmission system operators shall include also independent members, appointed for a term of at least 5 years. Their appointment shall be notified to the regulatory authority and become binding under the conditions described in paragraph 6. 16. For the purpose of paragraph 15, a member of the supervisory board / board of directors of a transmission system operator shall be deemed independent if he is free of any business, or other relationship with the vertically integrated undertaking, its controlling shareholders or the management of either, that creates a conflict of interest, in particular: (a) has not been an employee of any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of generation and supply in five years prior to their appointment as supervisory board / board of directors member; (b) does not hold any interest in and does not receive any compensation from the vertically integrated undertaking or any of its affiliates except the transmission system operator; (c) does not hold any relevant business relationship with any branch of the vertically integrated company performing functions of energy supply during his/her appointment as supervisory board / board of directors member; (d) is not a member of the executive board of a company in which the vertically integrated undertaking appoints members of the supervisory board /board of directors. IV. Compliance officer 17. Member States shall ensure that transmission system operators establish and implement a compliance programme which sets out measures to be taken to ensure that discriminatory conduct is excluded. The programme shall also set out the specific obligations of employees of the transmission system operator to meet this objective. It shall be subject to approval of the national regulatory authority. Compliance of the program shall be independently monitored by the compliance officer. The national regulatory authority shall have the power to impose sanctions in case of inappropriate implementation of the compliance program by the transmission system operator. 18. The chief executive officer/ executive board of the transmission system operator shall appoint a person or a body in a function of a compliance officer who shall be responsible for: (i) monitoring the implementation of the compliance programme; (ii) elaborating an detailed annual report, setting out the measures taken in order to implement the compliance programme and submitting it to the national regulatory authority; definition of measures for the implementation of the compliance program and presentation of the report to the regulatory authority; (iii) issuing recommendations on the compliance programme and its implementation. 19. The independence of the compliance officer shall be guaranteed in particular by the terms of his/her employment contract. 20. The compliance officer shall have the opportunity to regularly address the supervisory board/board of directors of the transmission system operator and of the vertically integrated undertaking and the national regulatory authorities. 21. The compliance officer shall participate at all meetings of the supervisory board / board of directors of the transmission system operator that address the following issues: (i) conditions for access and connection to the grid, including the collection of access charges, congestion rents, and payments under the inter transmission system operator compensation mechanism in compliance with Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003; (ii) projects undertaken in order to operate, maintain and develop the transmission grid system, including interconnection and connection investments; (iii) balancing rules, including reserve power rules; (iv) energy purchases in order to cover energy losses. 22. During these meetings, the compliance officer shall prevent information about generation or supply activities which may be commercially advantageous from being disclosed in a discriminatory manner to the supervisory board/board of directors. 23. The compliance officer shall have access to all relevant books, records and offices of the transmission system operator and to all the necessary information for the fulfilment of his/her tasks. 24. The compliance officer shall be nominated and removed by the chief executive officer / executive board only after prior approval by the national regulatory authority. 25. Following revocation of his/her mandate, the compliance officer should be barred from having business relations with the vertical integrated undertaking for a period of not less than five years. V. Grid development and powers to make investment decisions 26. Transmission system operators shall elaborate a 10-year network development plan at least every two years. They shall provide efficient measures in order to guarantee system adequacy and security of supply. 27. The 10-year network development plan shall in particular: (a) indicate to market participants the main transmission infrastructures that ought to be built over the next ten years, (b) contain all the investments already decided and identify new investments for which an implementation decision has to be taken in the next three years. 28. In order to draw up this 10-year network development plan, each transmission system operator shall make reasonable hypothesis about the evolution of generation, consumption and exchanges with other countries, and take into account regional and European-wide existing network investment plans. Transmission system operator shall submit in due time the draft of this plan to the national regulatory authority. 29. The national regulatory authority shall consult all relevant network users on the basis of a draft for the 10-year network development plan in an open and transparent manner and may publish the result of the consultation process, in particular possible needs for investments. 30. The regulatory authority shall examine whether the draft 10-year network development plan covers all investment needs identified in the consultation. This authority may oblige the transmission system operator to amend its draft. 31. If the transmission system operator rejects to implement a specific investment listed in the 10-year network development plan to be executed in the next three years, Members States shall ensure that the national regulatory authority has the competence to take one of the following measures: (a) request by all legal means the transmission system operator to execute its investment obligations using its financial capacities, or (b) invite independent investors to participate in a tender for a necessary investment in a transmission system and at the same time may oblige the transmission system operator: - to agree to financing by any third party, - to agree to building by any third party or to build the respective new assets, - to operate the respective new asset and - to oblige transmission system operator to accept a capital increase to finance the necessary investments and allow independent investors to participate in the capital. The relevant financial arrangements shall be subject to the approval of the national regulatory authority. In both cases, tariff regulation shall allow for revenues that cover the costs of such investments. 32. The national regulatory authority shall monitor and evaluate the implementation of the investment plan. VI. Decision-making powers regarding the connection of new power plants to the transmission grid 33. Transmission system operators shall be obliged to establish and publish transparent and efficient procedures for non-discriminatory connection of new power plants to the grid. Those procedures shall be subject to the approval of national regulatory authorities. 34. Transmission system operators shall not be entitled to refuse the connection of a new power plant on the grounds of possible future limitations to available network capacities, e.g. congestion in distant parts of the transmission grid. The transmission system operators shall be obliged to supply necessary information. 35. Transmission system operators shall not be entitled to refuse a new connection point on the sole ground that it will lead to additional costs linked with necessary capacity increase of grid elements in the close-up range to the connection point. VII. Regional cooperation 36. Member States choosing this path must place precise obligations on transmission system operators within a clearly defined time frame and progressively leading to the creation of a common regional dispatching centre responsible for security issues within six years after the entry into force of this Directive. 37. In case of a cooperation between several Member States at a regional level and following the joint request of these Member States, the Commission may designate a regional coordinator. 38. The regional coordinator shall promote, at a regional level, the cooperation of regulatory authorities and any other competent public authorities, network operators, power exchanges, grid users and market parties. In particular, the regional coordinator shall: (a) promote new efficient investments in interconnections. To this end, the regional coordinator shall assist transmission system operators by elaborating their regional interconnection plan and shall contribute to the coordination of their investments decisions and, where appropriate, of their open season procedure; (b) promote the efficient and safe use of the networks. To this end, the regional coordinator shall contribute to the coordination between transmission system operators, national regulatory authorities and other competent national public authorities with the elaboration of common allocation and common safeguard mechanisms; (c) annually submit a report to the Commission and Member States concerned on the progress achieved in the region and on any difficulty or obstacle that may hinder the progress. VIII. Sanctions 39. In order to carry out the duties assigned to it by this Article, the national regulatory authority: (i) shall have the right to request any information from the transmission system operator and to directly contact all staff of the transmission system operators; if doubts remain, the same rights shall apply for the vertically integrated undertaking and its subsidiaries; (ii) may conduct all necessary inspections of the transmission system operators and, if doubts remain, of the vertically integrated undertaking and its subsidiaries; the rules of Article 20 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty shall apply. 40. In order to carry out its duties assigned to it by this Article, the national regulatory authority shall have the power to impose effective, appropriate and dissuasive sanctions to the transmission system operator and/or the vertically integrated undertaking not complying with its obligations under this Article or any decisions of the national regulatory authority. This power shall include the right to: (i) impose effective, appropriate and dissuasive fines related to the turnover of the network company; (ii) issue orders to remedy a discriminatory behaviour; (iii) withdraw, at least partly, the licence of the transmission system operator in case of repeated breach of the unbundling provisions set out in this Article."

2008/04/11
Committee: ITRE

Catherine TRAUTMANN

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 12

Directive 2003/54/EC
Article 22c – paragraph 1 – point (h a) (new)

(ha) encouraging the development of European interruptible supply contracts by fixing a reference value for financial compensation for unused electrical energy, for each relevant class of consumers, according to a transparent indexing system calculated on the basis of energy prices in the market, the price of CO2, the saving in investment required for electrical production capacity and the recommendations of a group of specialist advisors made up of representatives of the electricity companies and final consumers;

2008/03/19
Committee: ITRE

Norbert GLANTE, Robert GOEBBELS, Edit HERCZOG, Atanas PAPARIZOV, Anni PODIMATA, Bernhard RAPKAY, Hannes SWOBODA, Catherine TRAUTMANN

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 2 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. The Commission shall report to the European Parliament and the Council annually on the formal and practical implementation of this Directive in each Member State."

2008/03/19
Committee: ITRE

Norbert GLANTE, Robert GOEBBELS, Edit HERCZOG, Atanas PAPARIZOV, Anni PODIMATA, Bernhard RAPKAY, Hannes SWOBODA, Catherine TRAUTMANN

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 2 – paragraph 2 b (new)

2b. On the basis of public consultations and of discussions with the competent authorities and after having received an opinion by the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, and six years following the entry into force of this Directive, the Commission shall report to the European Parliament and the Council on the desirability of maintaining or amending this Directive. The several versions of restructuring electricity companies laid down in Articles 8a to 8d, 10 and 10b of Directive 2003/54/EC shall be verified in particular in terms of the effectiveness of their impact on network access and the necessary investments.

2008/03/19
Committee: ITRE

14 Amendments of Catherine TRAUTMANN related to 2007/0195(COD)

ParlTrack - 2011-2024