21 Amendments of Astrid LULLING related to 2013/2166(INI)
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) whas anvery important next step towards coherent supervision of bankimplications for the institutional setting up of micro and macro-prudential supervision in the EU given the powers attributed to the ECB in those fields;
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Recital G a (new)
Ga. whereas according to the ESRB Recommendation 2011/3 central banks should have a leading role in macro- prudential supervision and, accordingly, representatives of central banks should necessarily be members of the ESRB decision-making bodies;
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas supervision by the European Central Bank (ECB) of financial conglomerates active in banking and insurance business is limited by the legal basis for the SSM which could have been avoided by establishing the SSM on the basis of Article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU);
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital S
Recital S
S. whereas the voting rights in the Boards of Supervisors of the ESAs are not proportionate to the size of the relevant Member States;, which is a comparable situation existing in the ECB or in European agencies
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital T
Recital T
T. whereas some national supervisors from Member States had difficulties to meet their compulsory contributions to the ESAs’ budgets;
Amendment 156 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 1 – indent 5
Annex – paragraph 1 – indent 5
– EstablishMake sure the ESRB outside the ECB to avoid the arising conflicts of interest between micro-prudential supervision and macro-economic oversightmay further develop as a strong network ensuring a permanent monitoring and analysis of systemic risks among decision makers, developing a culture of dialogue between micro-prudential supervision and macro- prudential oversight; provide for mechanisms enhancing the independence of the ESRB, while preserving the current institutional arrangements ensuring interaction with the ECB, including the ex-officio designation of the ECB President as ESRB Chair; ensure the necessary operational changes to the ESRB as a consequence of the establishment of the SSM, including the possibility for the ESRB to address warnings and recommendations to the ECB and the SSM.
Amendment 168 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 1
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 1
Amendment 193 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 3
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 3
– amending Article 45 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010, and of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 and transforming the Management Boards of the three ESAs into independent bodies, staffed by three professionals with a European mandate, appointed by the European Parliament, the chairperson of the ESAs and the executive directors and granting the members of the Management Board the right to vote on the Board of Supervisors to ensure more independence from national interests;
Amendment 204 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 5
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 5
Amendment 230 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 1 – indent 8
Annex – paragraph 1 – indent 8
– withdrawing the right to voteclarifying that on questions concerning consumer protection for members of the Board of Supervisors which do notshould also have a mandate for consumer protection in their Member State;
Amendment 237 #
– enabling the ESRB to explore and to propose additional measures for macroeconomic stability such as leverage and loan-to-value ratios, counter cyclical buffers and accounting standarddevelop guidance to Member States on additional macro- prudential instruments promoting financial stability;
Amendment 254 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 11
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 11
– revising the structure of the ESRB to allow swifter decision-making and stronger accountability by establishing a systemic stability council with a limited number of members, while ensuring appropriate representation of authorities;
Amendment 273 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 14
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 14
Amendment 279 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 17
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 17
– providing for the mandatory involvement of the ESAs and of the ESRB in preparation of legislative processes concerning their fields of expertise;
Amendment 284 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 18
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 18
– enhancing transparency of stakeholder involvement and potential conflicts of interest and developing a stricter regime on cooling-off periods, in particular through a greater outreach to retail groups, efficient consultations and more transparent processes;
Amendment 286 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 18 a (new)
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 18 a (new)
– recognising that the stakeholder groups of the ESAs have made a valuable contribution and recommending that the ESA’s provide greater administrative support to these groups to enable them to become more helpful;
Amendment 288 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 20
Annex – paragraph 2 – indent 20
Amendment 308 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 3 – indent 1 a (new)
Annex – paragraph 3 – indent 1 a (new)
– which consequences the establishment of SSM will imply on the financial supervision in the European Union as a whole;
Amendment 309 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 3 – indent 1 b (new)
Annex – paragraph 3 – indent 1 b (new)
– whether, concerning banking supervision, the SSM will totally modify the functioning of the EBA;
Amendment 317 #
Motion for a resolution
Annex – paragraph 3 – indent 5 a (new)
Annex – paragraph 3 – indent 5 a (new)
– to consider the possibility for the ESA’s to suspend temporarily the application of a particular rule if this could led to unintended consequences due to extraordinary market consequences;