15 Amendments of Rina Ronja KARI related to 2015/0226(COD)
Amendment 109 #
Proposal for a regulation
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Amendment 125 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
Recital 6
(6) It is appropriate to provide, in line with the existing definitions in Union sectoral legislation, definitions of all the key concepts of securitisation. In particular, a clear and encompassing definition of securitisation is needed to capture any transaction or scheme whereby the credit risk associated with anpayments in the transaction or scheme are dependent on the performance of the exposures or pool of exposures is tranched. The economic transfer of the exposures being securitised should be achieved by the transfer of ownership of the securitised exposures from the originator institution to an SSPE or through sub-participation by an SSPE. An exposure that creates a direct payment obligation for a transaction or scheme used to finance or operate physical assets should not be considered an exposure to a securitisation, even if the transaction or scheme has payment obligations of different seniority.
Amendment 149 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
Recital 14
(14) Originators, sponsors and SSPE's should make all materially relevant data on the credit quality and performance of underlying exposures available in the investor report, including data allowing investors to clearly identify delinquency and default of underlying debtors, debt restructuring, debt forgiveness, forbearance, repurchases, payment holidays, losses, charge offs, recoveries and other asset performance remedies in the pool of underlying exposures. Data on the cash flows generated by underlying exposures and by the liabilities of the securitisation issuance, including separate disclosure of the securitisation position’s income and disbursements, that is scheduled principal, scheduled interest, prepaid principal, past due interest and fees and charges and any data relating to the breach of any triggers implying changes in the priority of payments or replacement of any counterparties as well as data on the amount and form of credit enhancement available to each tranche should also be made available in the investor report. Although securitisations that are simple, transparent and standardised have in the past performed well, the satisfaction of any STS requirements does not mean that the securitisation position is free of risks, nor does it indicate anything about the credit quality underlying the securitisation. Instead, it should be understood to indicate that a prudent and diligent investor will be able to analyse the risks involved in the securitisation. There should be two types of STS requirements: one for long-term securitisations and one for short-term securitisations (ABCP), which should be subject to a large extent to similar requirements with specific adjustments to reflect the structural features of these two market segments. The functioning of these markets are different with ABCP programmes relying on a number of ABCP transactions consisting of short term exposures which need to be replaced once matured. In addition, STS criteria need also to reflect the specific role of the sponsor providing liquidity support to the ABCP conduits.
Amendment 151 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
Recital 16
(16) In securitisations which are not 'true sale', the underlying exposures are not transferred to such an issuer entity, but rather the credit risk related to the underlying exposures is transferred by means of a derivative contract or guarantees. This introduces an additional counterparty credit risk and potential complexity related in particular to the content of the derivative contract. To date, no analysis on an international level or Union level has been sufficient to identify STS criteria for those types of securitisation instruments. An assessment in the future of whether some synthetic securitisations that have performed well during the financial crisis and are simple, transparent and standardised are therefore eligible to qualify as STS would be essential. On this basis, the Commission will assess whether securitisations which are not 'true sale' shouldUnder no circumstances should synthetic securitisations be covnsidered by the STS designation in a future proposalas STS.
Amendment 178 #
Draft legislative resolution
Recital 38 a (new)
Recital 38 a (new)
(38a) Account should be taken of the viewpoints expressed by the Member States’ academic communities on the risks associated with reviving securitisation;
Amendment 197 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Amendment 201 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10
(10) 'synthetic securitisation' means a securitisation where the transfer of risk is achieved by the use of credit derivatives or guarantees, and the exposures being securitised remain exposures of the originator; it shall under no circumstances be recognised as an STS;
Amendment 235 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
The originator, sponsor or the original lender of a securitisation shall retain on an ongoing basis a material net economic interest in the securitisation of not less than 25 %. Where the originator, sponsor or the original lender have not agreed between them who will retain the material net economic interest, the originator shall retain the material net economic interest. There shall be no multiple applications of the retention requirements for any given securitisation. The material net economic interest shall be measured at the origination and shall be determined by the notional value for off-balance sheet items. The material net economic interest shall not be split amongst different types of retainers and not be subject to any credit risk mitigation or hedging.
Amendment 244 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. Only the following shall qualify as a retention of a material net economic interest of not less than 525 % within the meaning of paragraph 1:
Amendment 248 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point a
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the retention of no less than 525 % of the nominal value of each of the tranches sold or transferred to investors;
Amendment 256 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point c
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) the retention of randomly selected exposures, equivalent to no less than 525 % of the nominal value of the securitised exposures, where such non-securitised exposures would otherwise have been securitised in the securitisation, provided that the number of potentially securitised exposures is no less than 100 at origination;
Amendment 261 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point d
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point d
(d) the retention of the first loss tranche and, where such retention does not amount to 525 % of the nominal value of the securitised exposures, if necessary, other tranches having the same or a more severe risk profile than those transferred or sold to investors and not maturing any earlier than those transferred or sold to investors, so that the retention equals in total no less than 25% of the nominal value of the securitised exposures;
Amendment 265 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point e
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point e
(e) the retention of a first loss exposure of not less than 525 % of every securitised exposure in the securitisation.
Amendment 269 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 4 – point c
Article 4 – paragraph 4 – point c
Amendment 271 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 5
Article 4 – paragraph 5