BETA

Activities of Gilles LEBRETON related to 2018/0902R(NLE)

Legal basis opinions (0)

Amendments (6)

Amendment 2 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
1. Expresses deep concern about the deliberate and systematic efforts of the Hungarian Government to undermine the founding values of the Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU, in particular through the removal of the constitutional checks and balances, by the limitation of the independence of the judiciary, by intentional alteratirection to which the whole European Union is heading due to unfounded and politically motivated attacks against the Member States, which oppose the mainstream visions of the national electoral system and by hampering freedom of expression; highlights that these trends have substantially worseneEU as an ever closer federal supra-national state, and defend the sovereignty and since the triggering of Article 7(1) TEU and have been severely amplified by the COVID-19 crisidependence of the Member States;
2022/04/12
Committee: AFCO
Amendment 9 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
2. Deplores the fact that theRegards that constitutional balance inchanges that Hungary has continued to be significantly altered by a deliberately broad and instrumental use of cardinal laws and constitutional amendments aiming to entrench the issues which are to beapproved during the last decade are a regsulated by ordinary legislation, with no or lt of a legitimiated public consultation, in use of a govery expedient manner, without any effective involvement of the opposition or civil society; highlights that such a trend is contrary to the rule of law, to constitutional traditions and to principles common to Member States and has been a source of open and consistent criticism by the EU and by the Council of Europe institutions; denounces the excessive use of extraordinary powers with the declaration of the state of danger at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemicning majority received in democratic elections, if and to the extent to which the Hungarian Constitutional Court has upheld them or, at any rate, not questioned them constitutionally;
2022/04/12
Committee: AFCO
Amendment 19 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
4. Expresses concern about the steps the Hungarian Government has taken to further limit the independenceRecalls that the fact that the Hungarian Government relies ofn the judiciary, in particular by weakening the powers of the National Judicial Council, which damages mutual trust in the EU, as national judges are judges of first instance of EU law and guarantee equality between EU citizens; highlights, furthermore, that the Hungarian Government increasingly relies on the Hungarian Constitutional Court to avoid compliance with the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), thereby undermining the primacy of EU lawHungarian Constitutional Court without seeking compliance with the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is legitimate use of state sovereignty, which is in compliance with the EU treaties; further recalls that the principle of primacy of EU law has no basis in the EU treaties except for the normative ambiguous Declaration 17 to the Treaty on European Union;
2022/04/12
Committee: AFCO
Amendment 24 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
5. Insists that the Council’s constitutional obligation to organise hearings, enshrined in Article 7(1) TEU, should be implemented in an open, regular and structured manner; insists that in all proceedings related to Article 7 TEU, Parliament and the Commission shoulEU institutions terminate proceedings under Article 7(1) TEU due to the fact that it results in interference in internal affairs of a sovereign and independent state, which is contrary to public international law; recalls that according to the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co- operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted bey treated equally; calls on the Council to systematically provide the Member State concerned with recommendations, and to oversee the implementation thereof on a regular basis, following the hearings under Article 7 TEU; he UN General Assembly on 24 October 1970 (resolution 26/25 (XXV))1a, "[n]o state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state", and that "interference or attempted threats against the personality of the state or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law"; _________________ 1a https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/3dda1f 104.pdf
2022/04/12
Committee: AFCO
Amendment 39 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
7. InsistsPoints out that legitimacy of the EU’s action on the rule of law needs to be underpinned by a coherent, effective and visible EU annual rule of law monitoring cycle, which should also integrate procedures under Article 7 TEU and under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; calls on the Council and the Commission to respond without delay to Parliament’s requests to negotiate an interinstitutional agreement under Article 295 TFEU framing such a mechanism suffers from actions that create tensions and erode unity between the Member States e.g. from procedures under Article 7 TEU and under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; calls on the Council and the Commission to terminate aforementioned proceedings;
2022/04/12
Committee: AFCO
Amendment 45 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8
8. Takes note of the recent parliamentary elections in Hungary and insists that any Hungarian government elected remains responsible for eliminating the risk of serious breaches of EU values.totally respects their legitimate and democratic outcome;
2022/04/12
Committee: AFCO