25 Amendments of Bernard MONOT related to 2017/2072(INI)
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6
Citation 6
— having regard to the ECB’s guidance to banks on non-performing loans of 20 March 2017, and to the public consultation on its draft addendum to this guidance of 4 October 2017,
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 a (new)
Citation 6 a (new)
- having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament's Legal Service of 9 November 2017 on the addendum to the ECB guidance to banks on non- performing loans (SJ-0693/17),
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 b (new)
Citation 6 b (new)
- having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 4 September 2007 on institutional and legal implications of the use of “soft law” instruments (P6_TA(2007)0366),
Amendment 94 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Notes that the current supervisory system focuses on credit risk, completely ignoring exposure to risky trading activities and legal risks possibly affecting the sustainability of financial institutions;
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Notes the obvious disparity between real and effective significance regarding ECB supervision of the German banking sector;direct supervision of the German system is relatively light when measured against its assets and compared to the significance that that the banking system of the largest economy of the monetary area should have;while German banking assets amount to 27.6% of the euro area total, supervised German assets amount to 20.6% of total directly supervised assets;while consolidated loans from the German banking system represent 26.4% of total euro area lending, higher than all other countries, the figure falls to 18.2% of the subtotal for loans subject to direct supervision;while German deposits amount to 27.9% of the total, again the highest value, the figure falls to 17.6% of the total for supervised banks;
Amendment 140 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Reiterates its concerns aboutNotes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that ‘Member States and bpoints out that the problem can only be tackled definitively by meanks themselvof a systemic solution; stresses thave a primary responsibility in tackling non-performing loans’4; welcomes, nonetheless, the work done by different EU institutions and bodies ont this is the result of the macroeconomic imbalances caused by the EMU and poor crisis management with mistaken economic policies; considers thise issue; calls on these actors and the Member States to duly implement the Council conclusions of 11 July 2017 on to be crucial and calls on the Member States to adopt anti-cyclical policies to stimulate growthe action plan to tackle non- performing loans in Europe; _________________ 4Commission communication on completing the Banking Union, 11 October 2017, p. 15 (COM(2017)0592).nd support domestic demand in order to limit NPLs, given the need to resolve macroeconomic problems associated with chronic demand shortages and the collapsing purchasing power of households;
Amendment 160 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt which are artificially maintained by the constraints imposed on central banks by the Treaties; notes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly investedcould invest much more in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessivwhich would constitute an additional safety net and enable ‘thome bias’; se Member States to escape the arbitrary dictaktes note, in this respect, of the Commission’s ongoing work on the idea of so-called sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS)of the market; opposes, in this respect, any attempt to limit the scope for banks to purchase sovereign bonds issued by their own government;
Amendment 181 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. WelcomNotes the work done by the ECB to assess the adequacy of internal models, including its new guide to the TRIM, with a view to addressing the variability in risk- weights applied to risk- weighted assets of the same class across credit institutions; calls for a rapid conclusion of negotiations on output floors within the BCBS;
Amendment 184 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Stresses that any further measures proposed by the ECB, a purely technocratic institution, should respect the principle of accountability and democratic transparency;
Amendment 193 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. WelcomNotes the banking reform package proposed by the Commission in November 2016; underlines the importance of the fast-track procedure for the phasing-in of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 in order to avoid cliff effects on the regulatory capital of credit institutions; supports the efforts made to reduce the reporting burden for smaller banks; is concerned, however,is concerned about the proposed amendments to the waivers in Articles 7 and 8 of the CRR, and more generally, about the proposed shift in the home-host balance;
Amendment 201 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. WelcomesStresses that the banking reform package proposed by the Commission inas of November 2016; underlines the importance is having a considerable impact ofn the fast-track procedure for the phasing-in of International Financial Repstability of the banking system; notes that a more restrictive approach to non-perfortming Standard (IFRS) 9 in order to avoid cliff effects on the regulatory capital of credit institutions; supports the efforts made to reduce the reporting burden for smaller banks; is concerned, however, about the proposed amendments to the waivers in Articles 7 and 8 of the CRR, and more generally, about the proposed shift in the home-host balanceloans (NPLs) and a tighter sovereign debt policy might in fact step up pressure on a number of banking systems and jeopardise the smooth functioning of the debt market; supports, however, efforts to reduce the reporting burden for smaller banks;
Amendment 212 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Calls for the repeal of the BRRD, which has already shown itself to be ineffective and dangerous for investors, bondholders and savers and for the stability of the financial system as a whole;
Amendment 218 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Recalls its resolution of 17 May 2017 on FinTech; welcomnotes, in this respect, the work of the Commission, the proposed inclusion of technological innovation in the mandates of the ESAs and the ongoing public consultation on the ECB’s draft guidance to assessments of FinTech bank licence applications;
Amendment 225 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. WelcomNotes the work done by the EBA and ESMA on promoting supervisory convergence in the context of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU with a view to limiting the development of regulatory and supervisory arbitrage risks; believes that, in order to preserve financial stability, a new supervisory cooperation model should be developed between the EU and the UK;
Amendment 233 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Looks forward toAwaits the Commission’s proposal on large investment firms;
Amendment 266 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Is concerned about the high number of legal applications lodged before the General Court of the EU in relation to the Banco Popular Español S.A. case; asks the Commission to assess whetherhow this could endanger the effectiveness ofconfirm the risks associated with the new resolution regime; calls on the SRB and the Commission to provide more transparency in future resolution decisions;
Amendment 273 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Notes that, while the concern about the mismatch between state aid rules and Union legislation as expressed in the previous report5 related to the ability of deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) to participate in resolution as provided for in the BRRD and DGSD, the 2017 banking cases brought to light other areas of mismatch, in particular thehighlighted the still extant possibility for the Member States to intervene in support of their banking sectors and their citizens by using the opportunity to avoid being subject to the discipline of the BRRD - literally - by paying ‘liquidation aid’; _________________ 5 European Parliament, Resolution of 15 February 2017 on ‘Banking Union – Annual Report 2016’, paragraph 38.
Amendment 293 #
14. WelcomNotes the SRB’s stated prioritisation of enhancing resolvability of credit institutions, as well as the progress made but also the slow progress made, as well as the inadequacy of the results achieved, in developing minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) targets in the framework of institution- specific resolution strategies;
Amendment 306 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for progress to be made on the legislative proposals implemeOpposes the inclusion of a pre- resolution moratorium tool in the BRRD; strongly criticises the ECB proposal of 8 November 2017 containg total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) in Union law; supports the inclusion of a pre-resolution moratorium tool in the BRRDed in the 'Opinion of the ECB of 8 November 2017 on revisions to the Union crisis management framework(CON/2017/47), paragraph 5 point 1' ; Believes that freezing accounts below EUR 100 000 would have a devastating impact on confidence in the banking system and the protection of savers and their right, as enshrined in numerous national constitutions;
Amendment 311 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for progress to be made on the legislative proposals implementing total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) in Union law; supports the inclusion of a pre- resolution moratorium tool in the BRRD;
Amendment 363 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern for all EU citizens; is currently debating the proposal on an EDIS at committee level; notes, in this respect, the Commission’s more proportionate ‘new approach’ to an EDIS as put forward in its communication of 11 October 2017;
Amendment 373 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Notes the potential benefits andserious risk situation facing European depositors: governments are not permitted to support their banks and, as we wait for eligible liquidity to be put in place (which will take a number of years), it is the depositors who will see their likely risks related toquidity absorbed and lost with bank resolutions, in a situation in which the financial robustness of national debt guarantee provisions is weakened by constraints on monetary sovereignty and the introduction of anthe EDIS; considers, therefore, risk reduction measures to be essential building blocks laying the foundations for an EDIS remains blocked until further notice; considers, therefore, that a backward step has to be taken and the Banking Union dismantled in preference to remaining in this maximum-risk, minimum-protection situation;
Amendment 386 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22a. Underlines that, as in all advanced systems, a public backstop is needed to ensure effective deposit protection; points out that the ECB is the institution able to guarantee unlimited protection for all euro-denominated current accounts in the banking union;