Activities of Mady DELVAUX related to 2017/0358(COD)
Plenary speeches (1)
Prudential supervision of investment firms (Directive) - Prudential requirements of investment firms (Regulation) (debate) FR
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prudential supervision of investment firms and amending Directives 2013/36/EU and 2014/65/EU PDF (1 MB) DOC (160 KB)
Shadow opinions (1)
OPINION on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prudential supervision of investment firms and amending Directives 2013/36/EU and 2014/65/EU
Amendments (69)
Amendment 14 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 4
Recital 4
(4) Many of the requirements that stem from Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU framework are designed to address common risks faced by credit institutions. Accordingly, the existing requirements are largely calibrated to preserve the lending capacity of credit institutions through economic cycles and to protect depositors and taxpayers from possible failure, and are not designed to address the different risk-profiles of investment firms. Investment firms do not have large portfolios of retail and corporate loans and do not take deposits. The likelihood that their failure can have detrimental impacts for overall financial stability is lower than in the case of credit institutions, but they still pose a risk which has to be addressed through a robust framework. The risks faced and posed by investment firms are thus substantially different to the risks faced and posed by credit institutions and such difference should be clearly reflected in the prudential framework of the Union.
Amendment 22 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 20
Recital 20
(20) To align remuneration with the risk profile of investment firms and to guarantee a level-playing field, investment firms should be subject to clear principles on corporate governance arrangements and rules on remuneration that are gender neutral and that take into account the differences between credit institutions and investment firms. Small and non- interconnected investment firms should however be exempted from those rules because the provisions on remuneration and corporate governance under Directive 2014/65/EU are sufficiently comprehensive for those types of firms.
Amendment 33 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1
Article 4 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall designate one or more competent authorities that carry out the functions and duties provided for in this Directive. The Member States shall inform the Commission, EBA and EBSMA of that designation, and where there is more than one competent authority, of the functions and duties of each competent authority.
Amendment 40 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 4
Recital 4
(4) Many of the requirements that stem from Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU framework are designed to address common risks faced by credit institutions. Accordingly, the existing requirements are largely calibrated to preserve the lending capacity of credit institutions through economic cycles and to protect depositors and taxpayers from possible failure, and are not designed to address the different risk-profiles of investment firms. Investment firms do not have large portfolios of retail and corporate loans and do not take deposits. The likelihood that their failure can have detrimental impacts for overall financial stability is lower than in the case of credit institutions, but they still pose a risk which has to be addressed through a robust framework. The risks faced and posed by investment firms are thus substantially different to the risks faced and posed by credit institutions and such difference should be clearly reflected in the prudential framework of the Union.
Amendment 42 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 16 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
Article 16 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
The administrative penalties and other administrative measures shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and Member States shall apply a harmonised set of penalties for similar offences to avoid treaty shopping.
Amendment 44 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d
(d) in case of a legal person, administrative pecuniary penalties of up to 105% of the total annual net turnover, including the gross income consisting of interest receivable and similar income, income from shares and other variable or fixed-yield securities, and commissions or fees of the undertaking in the preceding business year;
Amendment 45 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e
(e) in the case of a legal person, administrative pecuniary penalties of up to twicehree times the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided due to the breach where those profits or losses can be determined;
Amendment 46 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – point b – point iv
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – point b – point iv
(iv) to interview any other person who consents to be interviewedrelevant person for the purposes of collecting information on the subject matter of an investigation;
Amendment 48 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 18 – paragraph 1
Article 18 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that competent authorities publish on their official website any administrative penalties and measures imposed in accordance with Article 16 and which has not been appealed or can no longer be appealed, without undue delay. That publication shall include information on the type and nature of the breach and the identity of the natural or legal person on whom the penalty is imposed or against whom the measure is taken. The information shall only be published after that person has been informed of those penalties or measures and to the extent the publication is necessary and proportionate. Competent authorities shall ensure that the same information is published on the official website of the investment firm concerned.
Amendment 49 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 18 – paragraph 2
Article 18 – paragraph 2
2. Where Member States permit the publication of administrative penalties or measures imposed in accordance with Article 16 against which there has been an appeal, competent authorities shall also publish on their official website information on the appeal status and on the outcome of the appeal. Competent authorities shall ensure that the same information is published on the official website of the investment firm concerned.
Amendment 51 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 19 – paragraph 1
Article 19 – paragraph 1
Competent authorities shall inform EBA of administrative penalties and measures imposed pursuant to Article 16, of any appeal against those penalties and measures and of the outcome thereof. EBA shall maintain a central database of administrative penalties and measures communicated to it solely for the purpose of exchanging information between competent authorities. That database shall be accessible to competent authorities onlyand ESMA, and it shall be updated regularly, at least on a quarterly basis.
Amendment 54 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 20
Recital 20
(20) To align remuneration with the risk profile of investment firms and to guarantee a level-playing field, investment firms should be subject to clear principles on corporate governance arrangements and rules on remuneration that are gender neutral and that take into account the differences between credit institutions and investment firms. Small and non- interconnected investment firms should however be exempted from those rules because the provisions on remuneration and corporate governance under Directive 2014/65/EU are sufficiently comprehensive for those types of firms.
Amendment 57 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1
Article 4 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall designate one or more competent authorities that carry out the functions and duties provided for in this Directive. The Member States shall inform the Commission, EBA and EBSMA of that designation, and where there is more than one competent authority, of the functions and duties of each competent authority.
Amendment 70 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 16 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
Article 16 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
The administrative penalties and other administrative measures shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and Member States shall apply a harmonised set of penalties for similar offences to avoid treaty shopping.
Amendment 71 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d
(d) in case of a legal person, administrative pecuniary penalties of up to 105% of the total annual net turnover, including the gross income consisting of interest receivable and similar income, income from shares and other variable or fixed-yield securities, and commissions or fees of the undertaking in the preceding business year;
Amendment 73 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e
(e) in the case of a legal person, administrative pecuniary penalties of up to twicehree times the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided due to the breach where those profits or losses can be determined;
Amendment 75 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – point b – point iv
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – point b – point iv
(iv) to interview any other person who consents to be interviewedrelevant person for the purposes of collecting information on the subject matter of an investigation;
Amendment 76 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 18 – paragraph 1
Article 18 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that competent authorities publish on their official website any administrative penalties and measures imposed in accordance with Article 16 and which has not been appealed or can no longer be appealed, without undue delay. That publication shall include information on the type and nature of the breach and the identity of the natural or legal person on whom the penalty is imposed or against whom the measure is taken. The information shall only be published after that person has been informed of those penalties or measures and to the extent the publication is necessary and proportionate. Competent authorities shall ensure that the same information is published on the official website of the investment firm concerned.
Amendment 77 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 18 – paragraph 2
Article 18 – paragraph 2
2. Where Member States permit the publication of administrative penalties or measures imposed in accordance with Article 16 against which there has been an appeal, competent authorities shall also publish on their official website information on the appeal status and on the outcome of the appeal. Competent authorities shall ensure that the same information is published on the official website of the investment firm concerned.
Amendment 78 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 19 – paragraph 1
Article 19 – paragraph 1
Competent authorities shall inform EBA of administrative penalties and measures imposed pursuant to Article 16, of any appeal against those penalties and measures and of the outcome thereof. EBA shall maintain a central database of administrative penalties and measures communicated to it solely for the purpose of exchanging information between competent authorities. That database shall be accessible to competent authorities onlyand ESMA, and it shall be updated regularly, at least on a quarterly basis.
Amendment 81 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 26 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
Article 26 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
Member States shall determine which investment firms are considered significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities. Member States shall require those firmsrequire all firms which do not fall under the criteria defined in Article 30(4)(a) to establish a risk committee composed of members of the management body who do not perform any executive function in the investment firm concerned.
Amendment 82 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 26 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
Article 26 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
Members of the risk committee referred to in the first subparagraph shall have appropriate knowledge, skills and expertise to fully understand, manage and monitor the risk strategy and the risk appetite of the investment firm. They shall ensure that the risk committee advises the management body on the investment firm’s overall current and future risk appetite and strategy and assists the management body in overseeing the implementation of that strategy by senior management. The management body shall retain overall responsibility for the firm’s risk strategies and policies. Investment firms shall aim at a gender balance in their risk committees.
Amendment 86 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the remuneration policy is clear and documented, documented and is gender neutral: same or similar type of jobs will be equally remunerated regardless of gender;
Amendment 86 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 26 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
Article 26 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
Member States shall determine which investment firms are considered significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities. Member States shall require those firmsrequire all firms which do not fall under the criteria defined in Article 30(4)(a) to establish a risk committee composed of members of the management body who do not perform any executive function in the investment firm concerned.
Amendment 87 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 26 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
Article 26 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
Members of the risk committee referred to in the first subparagraph shall have appropriate knowledge, skills and expertise to fully understand, manage and monitor the risk strategy and the risk appetite of the investment firm. They shall ensure that the risk committee advises the management body on the investment firm's overall current and future risk appetite and strategy and assists the management body in overseeing the implementation of that strategy by senior management. The management body shall retain overall responsibility for the firm´s risk strategies and policies. Investment firms shall aim at a gender balance in their risk committees.
Amendment 88 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
(ba) the remuneration policy should not only reflect short term profitability, but also take into account long term effects of the investment decisions taken, looking at the ESG criteria;
Amendment 88 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the remuneration policy is clear and documented; , documented and is gender neutral: same or similar type of jobs will be equally remunerated regardless of gender;
Amendment 89 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
(ia) the ratio of remuneration between an investment firm's employees and board members shall be proportionate;
Amendment 90 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new)
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new)
(da) the ratio of remuneration between an investment firm’s employees and board members shall be proportionate;
Amendment 91 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 28 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 28 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. For the purpose of point (ia), for those investment firms which do not comply with the criteria set in article 30(4)(a), Member States shall ensure that they set a maximum remuneration ratio and that investment firms shall apply it. The investment firm shall calculate its remuneration ratio as quotients of: i) the remuneration received by each individual member of its board; ii) and the median of the annual remuneration of all its employees with the exception of board members.
Amendment 93 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Member States shall ensure that where an investment firm benefits from extraordinary public financial support as defined to in Article 2(1)(28) of Directive 2014/59/EU, the following requirements apply:it does not pay any variable remuneration.
Amendment 94 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point a
Amendment 96 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point b
Amendment 97 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 28 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 28 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. For the purposes of point (da), for those investment firms which do not comply with the criteria set in Article 30(4)(a), Member States shall ensure that they set a maximum remuneration ratio and that investment firms shall apply it. The investment firm shall calculate its remuneration ratio as quotients of: (i) the remuneration received by each individual member of its board; (ii) and the median of the annual remuneration of all its employees with the exception of board members.
Amendment 97 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point c
Amendment 98 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 2
Article 29 – paragraph 2
Amendment 101 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 30 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 30 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) where variable remuneration is performance related, the total amount of variable remuneration shall be based on a combination of the assessment of the performance of the individual, -regardless the gender-, of the business unit concerned and of the overall results of the investment firm;
Amendment 102 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Member States shall ensure that where an investment firm benefits from extraordinary public financial support as defined to in Article 2(1)(28) of Directive 2014/59/EU, the following requirements apply:it does not pay any variable remuneration.
Amendment 102 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 30 – paragraph 1 – point j a (new)
Article 30 – paragraph 1 – point j a (new)
(ja) as a derogation from point (j) in case an investment firm does not issue any of those instruments, national competent authorities can approve the use of alternative arrangements fulfilling the same objectives;
Amendment 104 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point a
Amendment 104 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 30 – paragraph 1 – point k
Article 30 – paragraph 1 – point k
(k) at least 450% of the variable remuneration shall be deferred over a three to five year period as appropriate, depending on the business cycle of the investment firm, the nature of its business, its risks and the activities of the individual in question, except in the case of a variable remuneration of a particularly high amount where the proportion of the variable remuneration deferred is at least 670%;
Amendment 106 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point b
Amendment 107 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 31 – paragraph 1
Article 31 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that competent authorities have the necessary powers to guarantee that investment firms which are determined as significant in accordance withdo not comply with the criteria in Article 26(430(4)(a) establish a remuneration committee. That remuneration committee shall exercise competent and independent judgment on remuneration policies and practices and the incentives created for managing risk, capital and liquidity. Within a group, the remuneration committee can also be a group-wide remuneration committee.
Amendment 108 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point c
Amendment 108 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 31 – paragraph 2
Article 31 – paragraph 2
2. Member States shall ensure that competent authorities have the necessary powers to guarantee that the remuneration committee is responsible for the preparation of decisions regarding remuneration, including decisions which have implications for the risk and risk management of the investment firm concerned and which are to be taken by the management body. The Chair and the members of the remuneration committee shall be members of the management body who do not perform any executive function in the investment firm concerned. Where employee representation in the management body is provided for by national law, the remuneration committee shall include one or more employee representatives. Investment firms shall aim at a gender balance in their remuneration committee.
Amendment 109 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 31 – paragraph 3
Article 31 – paragraph 3
3. When preparing the decisions referred to in paragraph 2, the remuneration committee shall take into account the public interest and the long- term interests of shareholders, investors and other stakeholders in the investment firm and ensure that the remuneration policy decisions are gender neutral.
Amendment 110 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 32 – paragraph 1
Article 32 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that competent authorities collect the information disclosed in accordance with points (a), (b), (ba), (c), (d) and (f) of Article 51 of [Regulation (EU) ---/----[IFR] and use that information to benchmark remuneration trends and practices. Competent authorities shall provide that information to EBAthe EBA and the ESMA; the EBA shall publish an annual report on these trends and practices.
Amendment 111 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 2
Article 29 – paragraph 2
Amendment 111 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 32 – paragraph 3
Article 32 – paragraph 3
3. EBA, in consultation with ESMA, shall issue guidelines on the application of sound and gender neutral remuneration policies. Those guidelines shall take into account at least the requirements referred to in Articles 28 to 31 and principles on sound remuneration policies set out in Commission Recommendation 2009/384/EC43 . _________________ 43 Commission Recommendation 2009/384/EC of 30 April 2009 on remuneration policies in the financial services sector (OJ L 120, 15.5.2009, p. 22).
Amendment 114 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
(fa) the inclusive consideration of risks related to environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors in the risk- mitigating arrangements of the investment firms.
Amendment 116 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 30 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 30 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) where variable remuneration is performance related, the total amount of variable remuneration shall be based on a combination of the assessment of the performance of the individual, regardless of the gender, of the business unit concerned and of the overall results of the investment firm;
Amendment 116 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 36 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point l a (new)
Article 36 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point l a (new)
(la) to require investment firms to reduce risks posed to the security of their network and information systems to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of the processes and data.
Amendment 117 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 37 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 37 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the investment firm is exposed to risks or elements of risks that are not covered or not sufficiently covered by the capital requirement set out in Part Three of [Regulation (EU) ---/----[IFR], especially taking into account risks in relation to environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors;
Amendment 119 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 58 a (new)
Article 58 a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2(1), point (3)
Article 2(1), point (3)
Article 58 a Amendment to Directive 2014/59/EU Directive 2014/59/EU is amended as follows: in Article 2(1), point (3) is replaced by the following: "(3) 'investment firm' means an investment firm as defined in point (2) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 that is subject to the initial capital requirement laid down in Article 8(1) of [Directive (EU) ---/---- [IFD]];".
Amendment 120 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 60 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Article 60 – paragraph 1 a (new)
By [5 years from the date of application of this Directive] and subsequently every 3 years, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and the Council a report on the application of this Directive and its impacts.
Amendment 121 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 30 – paragraph 1 – point j a (new)
Article 30 – paragraph 1 – point j a (new)
(ja) as a derogation from point (j) in case an investment firm does not issue any of those instruments, national competent authorities can approve the use of alternative arrangements fulfilling the same objectives;
Amendment 123 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 30 – paragraph 1 – point k
Article 30 – paragraph 1 – point k
(k) at least 450% of the variable remuneration shall be deferred over a three to five year period as appropriate, depending on the business cycle of the investment firm, the nature of its business, its risks and the activities of the individual in question, except in the case of a variable remuneration of a particularly high amount where the proportion of the variable remuneration deferred is at least 670%;
Amendment 133 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 31 – paragraph 1
Article 31 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that competent authorities have the necessary powers to guarantee that investment firms which are determined as significant in accordance withdo not comply with the criteria in Article 26(430(4)(a) establish a remuneration committee. That remuneration committee shall exercise competent and independent judgment on remuneration policies and practices and the incentives created for managing risk, capital and liquidity. Within a group, the remuneration committee can also be a group-wide remuneration committee.
Amendment 134 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 31 – paragraph 2
Article 31 – paragraph 2
2. Member States shall ensure that competent authorities have the necessary powers to guarantee that the remuneration committee is responsible for the preparation of decisions regarding remuneration, including decisions which have implications for the risk and risk management of the investment firm concerned and which are to be taken by the management body. The Chair and the members of the remuneration committee shall be members of the management body who do not perform any executive function in the investment firm concerned. Where employee representation in the management body is provided for by national law, the remuneration committee shall include one or more employee representatives. Investment firms shall aim at a gender balance in their remuneration committee.
Amendment 135 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 31 – paragraph 3
Article 31 – paragraph 3
3. When preparing the decisions referred to in paragraph 2, the remuneration committee shall take into account the public interest and the long- term interests of shareholders, investors and other stakeholders in the investment firm and ensure that the remuneration policy decisions are gender neutral.
Amendment 137 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 32 – paragraph 1
Article 32 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that competent authorities collect the information disclosed in accordance with points (a), (b), (ba), (c), (d) and (f) of Article 51 of [Regulation (EU) ---/----[IFR] and use that information to benchmark remuneration trends and practices. Competent authorities shall provide that information to EBAthe EBA and the ESMA; the EBA shall publish an annual report on these trends and practices.
Amendment 138 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 32 – paragraph 3
Article 32 – paragraph 3
3. EBA, in consultation with ESMA, shall issue guidelines on the application of sound and gender neutral remuneration policies. Those guidelines shall take into account at least the requirements referred to in Articles 28 to 31 and principles on sound remuneration policies set out in Commission Recommendation 2009/384/EC43. _________________ 43 Commission Recommendation 2009/384/EC of 30 April 2009 on remuneration policies in the financial services sector (OJ L 120, 15.5.2009, p. 22).
Amendment 144 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point f
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point f
(f) governance arrangements and gender policy of investment firms and the ability of members of the management body to perform their duties.
Amendment 145 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
(fa) the risks posed to the security of network and information systems which investment firms use in their operations to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of its processes and data.
Amendment 147 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
(fa) the inclusive consideration of risks related to environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors in the risk- mitigating arrangements of the investment firms.
Amendment 160 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 36 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point l a (new)
Article 36 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point l a (new)
(la) to require investment firms to reduce risks posed to the security of their network and information systems to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of the processes and data.
Amendment 164 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 37 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 37 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the investment firm is exposed to risks or elements of risks that are not covered or not sufficiently covered by the capital requirement set out in Part Three of [Regulation (EU) ---/----[IFR], especially taking into account risks in relation to environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors;
Amendment 200 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 58 a (new)
Article 58 a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Article 58a (new) Amendment to Directive 2014/59/EU in Article 2(1), point (3) is replaced by the following: “(3) ‘investment firm’ means an investment firm as defined in point (2) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 that is subject to the initial capital requirement laid down in Article 28(21) of [Directive 2013/36/EU; (EU) ---/---- [IFD]];” Or. en (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?qid=1528106699033&uri=CELEX:02014L0059-20171228)
Amendment 205 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 60 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Article 60 – paragraph 1 a (new)
By [5 years from the date of application of this Directive] and subsequently every 3 years, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and the Council a report on the application of this Directive and its impacts.