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Activities of Marco VALLI related to 2015/0226(COD)

Plenary speeches (1)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2015/0226(COD)

Shadow reports (1)

2016/11/22
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2015/0226(COD)
Documents: PDF(966 KB) DOC(156 KB)

Amendments (58)

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2

(2) In the Investment Plan for Europe presented on 26 November 2014, the Commission announced its intention to restart high-quality securitisation markets, without repeating the mistakes made before the 2008 financial crisis. The development of a simple, transparent and standardised securitisation market constitutes a building block of the Capital Markets Union (CMU) and contributes to the Commission's priority objective to support job creation and a return to sustainable growth.deleted

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3

(3) The European Union ~~does not intent to weak~~must strengthen the legislative framework implemented after the financial crisis to address the risks inherent in ~~highly complex, opaque and risky~~ securitisation. It is essential to ensure that rules are adopted to ~~better differentiate simple, transparent and standardised products from complex, opaque and risky instruments and apply a more risk- sensitive prudential framework~~apply a more risk-sensitive prudential framework; it is equally important to ban re-securitisation and to exclude synthetic securitisation from this Regulation.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4

(4) Securitisation is an important element of well-functioning financial markets. Soundly structured securitisation is an important channel for diversifying funding sources and allocating risk more efficiently within the Union financial system. It allows for a broader distribution of financial sector risk and can help to free up originator’s balance sheets to allow for further lending to the economy. Overall, it can improveefficiencies in the financial system and provide additional investment opportunities. Securitisation can create a bridge between credit institutions and capital markets with an indirect benefit for businesses and cIt should be recalled that in the years prior to the financial crisis of 2008, an excessive and reckless use of securitised assets changed the business model of banks, thus encouraging the use of leverage that enabled banks to make high profits in a short period of time but with risks of significant losses: these were the preconditizeons ~~(through, for example, less expensive loans, business financing, credits for immovable property and credit cards)~~for the outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis, which began in the US economy and then spread to others.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6

(6) It is appropriate to provide, in line with the existing definitions in Union sectoral legislation, definitions of all the key concepts of securitisation. In particular, a clear and encompassing definition of securitisation is needed to capture any transaction or scheme ~~whereby the credit risk associated with an exposure or pool of exposures is tranched~~. An exposure that creates a direct payment obligation for a transaction or scheme used to finance or operate physical assets should not be considered an exposure to a securitisation, even if the transaction or scheme has payment obligations of different seniority.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12

(12) It is important that the interests of originators, sponsors and original lenders that transform exposures into tradable securities and investors are aligned. To achieve this, the originator, sponsor or original lender should retain a significant interest in the underlying exposures of the securitisation. It is therefore important for the originators or the sponsors to retain a material net economic exposure to the underlying risks in question. More generally, securitisation transactions should not be structured in such a way so as to avoid the application of the retention requirement. That requirement should be applicable in all situations where the economic substance of a securitisation is applicable, whatever legal structures or instruments are used. There is no need for multiple applications of the retention requirement. For any given securitisation, it suffices that only the originator, the sponsor or the original lender is subject to the requirement. Similarly, where securitisation transactions contain other securitisations positions as underlying exposures, the retention requirement should be applied only to the securitisation which is subject to the investment. The STS notification indicate to investors that originators are retaining a material net economic exposure to the underlying risks. Certain exceptions should be made for cases when securitised exposures are fully, unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by in particular public authorities. In case support from public resources provided in the form of guarantees or by other means, any provisions in this Regulation are without prejudice to State aid rules.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13

(13) The ability of investors to exercise due diligence and thus make an informed assessment of the creditworthiness of a given securitisation instrument depends on their access to information on those instruments. Based on the existing acquis, it is important to create a comprehensive ~~system~~, transparent system that is based on the actual risk inherent in these instruments, under which investors will have access to all the relevant information over the entire life of the transactions and to reduce originators, sponsors and SSPEs reporting tasks and to facilitate investors' continuous;, easy and free access to reliable information on securitisations, and on the assets underlying them. The market should be transparent and encourage the exchange of information through the creation of a dedicated public register containing such data.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14

(14) Originators, sponsors and SSPE’s should make all materially relevant data on the credit quality and performance of underlying exposures available in the investor report, including data allowing investors to clearly identify delinquency and default of underlying debtors, debt restructuring, debt forgiveness, forbearance, repurchases, payment holidays, losses, charge offs, recoveries and other asset performance remedies in the pool of underlying exposures. Data on the cash flows generated by underlying exposures and by the liabilities of the securitisation issuance, including separate disclosure of the securitisation position’s income and disbursements, that is scheduled principal, scheduled interest, prepaid principal, past due interest and fees and charges and any data relating to the breach of any triggers implying changes in the priority of payments or replacement of any counterparties as well as data on the amount and form of credit enhancement ~~available to each tranche~~ should also be made available in the investor report. Although securitisations that are simple, transparent and standardised have in the past performed well, the satisfaction of any STS requirements does not mean that the securitisation position is free of risks, nor does it indicate anything about the credit quality underlying the securitisation. Instead, it should be understood to indicate that a prudent and diligent investor will be able to analyse the risks involved in the securitisation. There should be two types of STS requirements: one for long-term securitisations and one for short-term securitisations (ABCP), which should be subject to a large extent to similar requirements with specific adjustments to reflect the structural features of these two market segments. The functioning of these markets are different, with ABCP programmes relying on a number of ABCP transactions consisting of short- term exposures which need to be replaced once matured. In addition, STS criteria need also to reflect the specific role of the sponsor providing liquidity support to the ABCP conduits.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16

(16) In securitisations which are not 'true sale', the underlying exposures are not transferred to such an issuer entity, but rather the credit risk related to the underlying exposures is transferred by means of a derivative contract or guarantees. This introduces an additional counterparty credit risk and potential complexity related in particular to the content of the derivative contract. To date, no analysis on an international level or Union level has been sufficient to identify STS criteria for those types of securitisation instruments. An assessment in the future of whether some synthetic securitisations that have performed well during the financial crisis and are simple, transparent and standardised are therefore eligible to qualify as STS would be essential.. On this basis, the Commission will assess whether securitisations which are not 'true sale' should be covered by the STS designation in a future proposalIt makes sense, therefore, to exclude synthetic securitisations from this Regulation.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19

(19) It is essential to prevent the recurrence of purely ‘originate to distribute’ models, as used in the period before the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis. In those situations lenders grant credits applying poor and weak underwriting policies as they know in advance that related risks are eventually sold to third parties. Notes with concern that some banks are starting to offer mortgages that finance 100% of the cost of purchasing a property. Thus, the exposures to be securitised should be originated in the ordinary course of the originator’s or original lender's business pursuant to underwriting standards that should not be less stringent than those the originator or original lender applies to origination of similar exposures which are not securitised. Material changes in underwriting standards should be fully disclosed to potential investors. The originator’s or original lender should have sufficient experience in originating exposures of a similar nature to those which have been securitised. In the case of securitisations where the underlying exposures are residential loans, the pool of loans should not include any loan that was marketed and underwritten on the premise that the loan applicant or, where applicable intermediaries, were made aware that the information provided might not be verified by the lender. The assessment of the borrower's creditworthiness should also meet where applicable, the requirements set out in Directives 2014/17/EU or 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council or equivalent requirements in third countries.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20

(20) Where originators, sponsors and SSPE’s would like their securitisations to use the STS designation, they should notify investors, competent authorities and ESMA that the securitisation meets the STS requirements. ESMA should then publish it on a list of transactions made available on its website for information purposes. The inclusion of a securitisation issuance in ESMA’s list of notified STS securitisations ~~does not~~ implyies that ESMA or other competent authorities have certified that the securitisation meets the STS requirements. The compliance with the STS requirements remains solely the responsibility of the originators, sponsors and SSPEs. This will ensure that originators, sponsors and SSPE’s take responsibility for their claim that the securitisation is STS and that there is transparency on the market.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 28

(28) As regards the amendments to Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, over-the- counter (OTC) derivative contracts entered into by securitisation special purpose entities should not be subject to the clearing obligation, provided that certain conditions are met. This is because counterparties to OTC derivative contracts entered into with securitisation special purpose vehicles are secured creditors under the securitisation arrangements and adequate protection against counterparty credit risk is usually provided for. With respect to non- centrally cleared derivatives, the levels of collateral required should also take into account the specific structure of securitisation arrangements and the protections already provided for therein.deleted

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29

(29) There is a degree of substitutability between covered bonds and securitisations . Therefore, in order to prevent the possibility of distortion or arbitrage between the use of securitisations and covered bonds because of the different treatment of OTC derivative contracts entered into by covered bond entities or by SSPEs, Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 should also be amended to exempt covered bond entities from the clearing obligation and to ensure that covered bond entities are subject to the same bilateral margins.deleted

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – introductory part

(1) 'securitisation' means a transaction or scheme, whereby ~~the credit risk associated with an~~payments made within the transaction or scheme are dependent upon the performance of the exposures or pool of exposures ~~is tranched, having both of the following characteristics:~~;

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point a

~~(a) payments in the transaction or scheme are dependent upon the performance of the exposures or pool of exposures;~~deleted

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b

~~(b) the subordination of tranches determines the distribution of losses during the ongoing life of the transaction or scheme;~~deleted

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2

(2) 'Securitisation Special Purpose Entity' or 'SSPE' means a corporation, trust or other legal entity, other than an originator or sponsor, established for the purpose of carrying out one or more securitisations, the activities of which are limited to those appropriate to accomplishing that objective, the structure of which is intended to isolate the obligations of the SSPE from those of the originator, and in which the holders of the beneficial interests have the right to pledge or exchange those interests without restriction; such entities cannot be established in a third country.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6

(6) 'tranche' means a contractually established segment of the credit risk associated with an exposure or a pool of exposures, where a position in the segment entails a risk of credit loss greater than or less than a position of the same amount in another segment, without taking account of credit protection provided by third parties directly to the holders of positions in the segment or in other segments;deleted

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7

(7) ‘asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) programme’ or ‘ABCP programme’ means a programme of securitisations the securities issued by which predominantly take the form of asset-backed commercial paper with an original maturity of one year or less;deleted

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 8

(8) ~~'asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) transaction' or 'ABCP transaction’ means a securitisation within an ABCP programme;~~deleted

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9

(9) 'traditional securitisation' means a securitisation involving the economic transfer of the exposures being securitised. This shall be accomplished by the transfer of ownership of the securitised exposures from the originator institution to an SSPE or through sub- participation by an SSPE. The securities issued do not represent payment obligations of the originator institution;deleted

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10

(10) 'synthetic securitisation' means a securitisation where the transfer of risk is achieved by the use of credit derivatives or guarantees, and the exposures being securitised remain exposures of the originator;deleted

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) where the originator or original lender is not a credit institution or investment firm as defined in Article 4(1), points (1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the originator or original lender grants all its credits on the basis of sound and well-defined criteria and clearly established processes for approving, amending, renewing and financing those credits and has effective systems in place to apply these criteria and processes;deleted

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) the originator, sponsor or original lender always retains a material net economic interest in accordance with Article 4 of this Regulation and discloses it to the institutional investor in accordance with Article 5;

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

The originator, sponsor or the original lender of a securitisation shall retain on an ongoing basis a material net economic interest in the securitisation of not less than 520 %. Where the originator, sponsor or the original lender have not agreed between them who will retain the material net economic interest, the originator shall retain the material net economic interest. There shall be no multiple applications of the retention requirements for any given securitisation. The material net economic interest shall be measured at the origination and shall be determined by the notional value for off-balance sheet items. [...] The material net economic interest shall not be split amongst different types of retainers and not be subject to any credit risk mitigation or hedging.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – introductory part

2. Only the following shall qualify as a retention of a material net economic interest of not less than 520% within the meaning of paragraph 1:

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point a

(a) the retention of no less than 520% of the nominal value of each of the tranches sold or transferred to investors;

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point b

(b) in the case of revolving securitisations or securitisations of revolving exposures, the retention of the originator's interest of no less than 520% of the nominal value of each of the securitised exposures;

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point c

(c) the retention of randomly selected exposures, equivalent to no less than 520% of the nominal value of the securitised exposures, where such non-securitised exposures would otherwise have been securitised in the securitisation, provided that the number of potentially securitised exposures is no less than 100 at origination;

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point d

(d) the retention of the first loss tranche and, where such retention does not amount to 5% of the nominal value of the securitised exposures, if necessary, other tranches having the same or a more severe risk profile than those transferred or sold to investors and not maturing any earlier than those transferred or sold to investors, so that the retention equals in total no less than 5% of the nominal value of the securitised exposures;deleted

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point e

(e) the retention of a first loss exposure of not less than 520% of every securitised exposure in the securitisation.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 4 – point c

~~(c) institutions to which a 50% risk weight or less is assigned under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;~~deleted

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 5

5. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions based on a clear, transparent and accessible index, where the underlying reference entities are identical to those that make up an index of entities that is widely traded, or are other tradable securities other than securitisation positions.deleted

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 6 – introductory part

6. The European Central Bank (ECB) shall ensure and check that the European Banking Authority (EBA), in close cooperation with the European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) ~~shall~~ develops draft regulatory technical standards to specify in greater detail the risk retention requirement, in particular with regards to:

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 6 – point e – paragraph 3

~~Power is~~ delegated ~~to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.~~

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) information on the exposures underlying the securitisation on a quarterly ~~basis, or, in the case of ABCP, information on the underlying receivables or credit claims on a monthly~~ basis;

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point e – introductory part

(e) quarterly investor reports~~, or, in the case of ABCP, monthly investor reports,~~ containing the following:

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point e – point ii

ii) data on the cash flows generated by the underlying exposures and by the liabilities of the securitisation, ~~except for ABCP,~~ and information on the breach of any triggers implying changes in the priority of payments or replacement of any counterparties;

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point g – point v – paragraph 3

The information described in subparagraphs (a) and (e) shall be made available at the same moment each quarter at the latest one month after the due date for the payment of interest. With regard to ABCP securitisations, the information described in subparagraphs (a) and (e) shall be made available at the same moment each month, at the latest one month after the due date for the payment of interest.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 3 – introductory part

3. ~~EMS~~The European Central Bank (ECB) shall ensure and check that ESMA, in close cooperation with EBA and EIOPA, ~~shall~~ develops draft regulatory technical standards to specify:

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1

Securitisations~~, except ABCP securitisations,~~ that meet the requirements in Articles 8, 9 and 10 of this Regulation shall be considered 'STS'.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2

2. Interest rate and currency risks arising from the securitisation shall be mitigated and the measures taken to that effect shall be disclosed. The underlying exposures shall not include derivatives~~, unless for the purpose of hedging currency risk and interest rate risk. Those derivatives shall be underwritten and documented according to common standards in international finance~~.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 3

3. Any referenced interest payments under the securitisation assets and liabilities shall be based on generally used market interest rates and shall not reference ~~complex~~ formulae or derivatives.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 6 – point c

~~(c) provisions that ensure the replacement of derivative counterparties, liquidity providers and the account bank upon their default, insolvency, and other specified events, where applicable.~~deleted

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11

Simple, transparent and standardised ABCP Securitisations securitisation ABCP securitisations shall be considered 'STS' where the ABCP programme complies with the requirements in Article 13 of this Regulation and all transactions within that ABCP programme fulfil the requirements in Article 12.Article 11 deleted

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12

~~Article 12~~deleted Transaction level requirements 1. A transaction within an ABCP programme shall meet the requirements of Section 1 of this Chapter, except for Articles 7, Article 8 (4) and (6), Article 9 (3), (4), (5), (6) and (8) and Article 10 (3). For the purposes of this Section, the terms "originator" and "original lender" under Article 8(7) shall be considered the seller. 2. programme shall be backed by a pool of underlying exposures that are homogeneous in terms of asset type and shall have a remaining weighted average life of no more than two years and none shall have a residual maturity of longer than three years. The underlying exposures shall not include loans secured by residential or commercial mortgages or fully guaranteed residential loans, as referred to in paragraph 1(e) of Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. The underlying exposures shall contain contractually binding and enforceable obligations with full recourse to debtors with defined payment streams relating to rental, principal, interest, or related to any other right to receive income from assets warranting such payments. The underlying exposures shall not include transferable securities, as defined in Directive 2014/65/EU. 3. under the securitisation transaction's assets and liabilities shall be based on generally used market interest rates, but shall not reference complex formulae or derivatives. 4. an acceleration event, no substantial amount of cash shall be trapped in the SSPE and principal receipts from the underlying exposures shall be passed to investors holding a securitisation position via sequential payment of the securitisation positions, as determined by the seniority of the securitisation position. There shall be no provisions requiring automatic liquidation of the underlying exposures at market value. 5. originated in the ordinary course of the seller's business pursuant to underwriting standards that are no less stringent than those that the seller applies to origination of similar exposures that are not securitised. Material changes in underwriting standards shall be fully disclosed to potential investors. In the case of securitisations where the underlying exposures are residential loans, the pool of loans shall not include any loan that was marketed and underwritten on the premise that the loan applicant or, where applicable intermediaries, were made aware that the information provided might not be verified by the lender. The seller shall have expertise in originating exposures of a similar nature to those securitised. 6. shall include triggers for termination of the revolving period, including at least the following: (a) of the underlying exposures to or below a pre-determined threshold; (b) related event with regard to the seller or the servicer. (c) a failure to generate sufficient new underlying exposures that meet the pre- determined credit quality; 7. shall clearly specify: (a) and responsibilities of the sponsor, the servicer and its management team who shall have expertise in servicing the underlying exposures, and, where applicable, the trustee and other ancillary service providers; (b) the processes and responsibilities necessary to ensure that a default or insolvency of the servicer does not result in a termination of servicing; (c) replacement of derivative counterparties and the account bank upon their default, insolvency or other specified events, where applicable; (d) due diligence and verify that the seller meets sound underwriting standards, servicing capabilities and collection processes that meet the requirements specified in points (i) to (m) of Article 259 (3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or equivalent requirements in third countries. Policies, procedures and risk management controls shall be well documented and effective systems shall be in place.s within an ABCP Any referenced interest payments Following the seller’s default or The underlying exposures shall be The transaction documentation a deterioration in the credit quality the occurrence of an insolvency- The transaction documentation the contractual obligations, duties provisions that ensure the The sponsor shall perform its own

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13

Article 13 Programme level requirements 1. programme shall fulfil the requirements of Article 12 of this Regulation. 2. original lender shall satisfy the risk retention requirement in accordance with Article 4 of this Regulation. 3. be a re-securitisation and the credit enhancement shall not establish a second layer of tranching at the programme level. 4. programme shall be a credit institution supervised under Directive 2013/36/EU. The sponsor shall be a liquidity facility provider and shall support all securitisation positions at transaction level within the ABCP programme and cover all liquidity and credit risks and any material dilution risks of the securitised exposures as well as any other transaction costs and programme-wide costs. 5. The securities issued by an ABCP programme shall not include call options, extension clauses or other clauses that have an effect on their final maturity. 6. arising atdeleted All transactions within an ABCP The originator, sponsor or the The ABCP programme ~~level~~ shall be mitigated and the measures taken to that effect shall be disclosed. Derivatives shall only be used at programme level for the purpose of hedging currency risk and interest rate risk. Such derivatives shall be documented according to common standards in international finance. 7. The documentation relating to the programme shall clearly specify: (a) the responsibilities of the trustee and other entities with fiduciary duties to investors; (b) resolution of conflicts between the sponsor and the holders of securitisation positions; (c) contractual obligations, duties and responsibilities of the sponsor, and its management team, who shall have expertise in credit underwriting, trustee and other ancillary service providers; (d) necessary to ensure that a default or insolvency of the servicer does not result in a termination of servicing; (e) derivative counterparties, and the account bank at ABCP programme level upon their default, insolvency and other specified events, where applicable. (f) that upon specified events, default or insolvency of the sponsor remedial steps shall be provided for to achieve, as appropriate, collateralisation of the funding commitment or replacement of the liquidity facility provider. In case the liquidity facility provider does not renew the funding commitment within 30 days of its expiry, the liquidity facility shall be drawn down, the maturing securities shall be repaid and the transactions shall cease to purchase exposures while amortising the existing underlying exposures. Policies, procedures and risk management controls shall be well documented and effective systems shall be in place. 8. shall be jointly responsible for compliance at ABCP programme level with Article 5 of this Regulation and shall make all information required by Article 5(1) (a) available to potential investors before pricing. The originator, sponsor and SSPE shall make the information required by Article 5 (1) (b) to (e) available before pricing at least in draft or initial form, where permissible under Article 3 of Directive 2003/71/EC. The originator, sponsor and SSPE shall make the final documentation available to investors at the latest 15 days after closing of the transactionnot The sponsor of the ABCP Interest rate and currency risks provisions that facilitate the timely processes and responsibilities provisions for replacement of The originator, sponsor and SSPE

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 1

1. Originators, sponsors and SSPE's shall jointly notify ESMA by means of the template referred to in paragraph 5 of this Article that the securitisation meets the requirements of Articles 7 to 10 ~~or Articles 11 to 13~~ of this Regulation ('STS notification'). ESMA shall publish the STS notification on its official website pursuant to paragraph 4. They shall also inform their competent authority. The originator, sponsor and SSPE of a securitisation shall designate amongst themselves one entity to be the first contact point for investors and competent authorities.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 3

3. The originator, sponsor and SSPE shall immediately notify ESMA and their competent authority when a securitisation no longer meets the requirements of ~~either~~ Articles 7 to 10 ~~or Articles 11 to 13~~ of this Regulation.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 4

4. ESMA shall ~~maintain~~publish immediately on an appropriate section of its official website a list of all securitisations for which the originators, sponsors and SSPEs have notified that they meet the requirements of Articles 7 to 10 o~~r Articles 11 to 13 of this Regulation on its official website~~f this Regulation. ESMA shall update the list where the securitisations are no longer considered to be STS following a decision of competent authorities or a notification by the originator, sponsor or SSPE. Where the competent authority has imposed administrative sanctions or remedial measures in accordance with Article 17, it shall immediately notify ESMA thereof. ESMA shall immediately indicate on the list that a competent authority has imposed administrative sanctions or remedial measures in relation to the securitisation concerned.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

The European Central Bank (ECB) shall ascertain and check that ESMA, in close cooperation with EBA and EIOPA, ~~shall~~ develops draft regulatory technical standards that specify the information that the originator, sponsor and SSPE provide to comply with their obligations under paragraph 1, and shall provide the format by means of standardised templates.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 2 – point e

(e) maximum administrative fines of at least EUR 510 000 000, or in the Member States whose currency is not the euro, the corresponding value in the national currency on [date of entry into force of this Regulation]

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 2 – point f

(f) or in the case of a legal person, the maximum administrative fines referred to in point (e) or of up to 120 % of the total annual turnover of the legal person according to the last available accounts approved by the management body; where the legal person is a parent undertaking or a subsidiary of the parent undertaking which has to prepare consolidated financial accounts in accordance with Directive 2013/34/EU, the relevant total annual turnover shall be the total annual turnover or the corresponding type of income in accordance with the relevant accounting legislative acts according to the last available consolidated accounts approved by the management body of the ultimate parent undertaking;

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009

~~(1) In recitals 22 and 41, in Articles 8c and in Annex II, point 1, "structured finance instrument" is replaced by "securitisation instrument".~~deleted

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009

(2) In recitals 34 and 40, in Articles 8(4), 8c, 10(3), 39(4) as well as in Annex I, section A, point 2, paragraph 5, Annex I, section B, point 5, Annex II (title and point 2), Annex III, Part I, points 8, 24 and 45, Annex III, Part III, point 8, "structured finance instruments" is replaced by "securitisation instruments".deleted

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 1

1. By [~~two year~~18 months after entry into force of this Regulation] and every t~~hree~~wo years thereafter, EBA, in close cooperation with ESMA and EIOPA, shall publish a report on the implementation of the STS requirements as laid down by Articles 6 to 14 of this Regulation.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 3

3. By [t~~hree~~wo years after entry into force of this Regulation] ESMA, in close cooperation with EBA and EIOPA, shall publish a report on the functioning of the transparency requirements in Article 5 of this Regulation and the level of transparency of the securitisation market in the Union.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. The report shall include a detailed analysis of the impact of STS securitisation on the real economy and in particular on access to credit for SMEs, taking account also of possible risks engendered in financial market stability and monitoring not just aggregated but also disaggregated data.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 30 – paragraph 1

By [~~four~~three years after entry into force of this Regulation] the Commission shall present a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the functioning of this Regulation, accompanied, where appropriate, by a legislative proposal.

2016/07/27
Committee: ECON