BETA

Activities of Marco VALLI related to 2018/2100(INI)

Plenary speeches (1)

Banking Union - Annual report 2018 (debate) IT
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2018/2100(INI)

Shadow reports (1)

REPORT on Banking Union – annual report 2018 PDF (435 KB) DOC (53 KB)
2016/11/22
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2018/2100(INI)
Documents: PDF(435 KB) DOC(53 KB)

Amendments (17)

Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5
– having regard to the Commission proposal of 24 May 2018 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on sovereign bond-backed securities3 , _________________ 3 COM(2018)0339.deleted
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 7 a (new)
– having regard to the ESMA Annual Statistical Report on the EU derivatives markets of 18 October 2018,
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas entrusting the ECB with the supervision of financial institutions has proven to be successful;deleted
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas significant financial risks stemming from the holding of complex and illiquid financial instruments in certain jurisdictions remain insufficiently addressed and largely underestimated;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)
Ab. whereas, according to the first Annual Statistical Report published by ESMA in October 2018, based on data submitted by trade repositories, the EU’s derivatives markets amounted to EUR 660 trillion of gross notional outstanding transactions by the end of 2017;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A c (new)
Ac. whereas the number of credit institutions in the EU has consistently fallen for about 10 years in a row, the main reduction being among small banks;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas the latest CumEx Files scandal revealed that more than EUR 55 billion in taxes on share dividends were lifted out of the public coffers of several EU Member States over 15 years thanks to the active involvement of European largest banks; whereas this shows once again the crucial role played by the EU banking sector in facilitating and supporting mass-scale organised tax fraud, in the absence of adequate financial supervision and effective mechanisms of exchange of information between authorities;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas it is important to clarify the treatment of State aid in actions by deposit guarantee schemes9 ; _________________ 9 OJ C 145 25.4.2016, p. 34.deleted
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Takes note of the achievementRecalls the aims of the Banking Union inof fostering a truly single market, a level playing field and predictability for market actors; considers that a fully completed Banking Union will further strengthen, however, that the current supervisory framework and practices have resulted in asymmetric effects on the EU traditional banking systems, whereby credit risk exposures have been subject to extensive attention, whereas market risk exposures related to illiquid securities, including derivatives, have been disregarded; believes that a full revision of the design of Banking Union and a more adequate identification of supervisory priorities will be necessary in order to strengthen the level playing field, financial stability and growth prospects in the EU;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Reiterates its concerns over the high level in certain jurisdictions of complex and illiquid financial instruments classified as level 2 and level 3 and the difficulty of their valuation; welcomes, in this regard, the inclusion of level 2 and level 3 instruments in the scope of 2018 stress tests; reiterates its call on the SSM to make the reduction of these complex and illiquid financial instruments, including derivatives, its main supervisory priority;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Highlights that sovereign debt is not risk-free; takes note of the on-going work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on sovereign risk; is concerned by the fact that some financial institutions are heavily invested in their own sovereign debt; calls on the Commission to assess whether to introduce risk weighting on sovereign bonds or exposure limits in the EU;deleted
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 103 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Urges all negotiators to work towards the adoption of tha balanced and sustainable legislative package to reduce risk in the banking system before the European elections in 2019, taking into account any disproportionate and pro- cyclical effects within the EU banking sector and the need to preserve the ability of European banks to support the real economy;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the NPL package; welcomes the ECB addendum on NPLs and the work of the EBA on guidelines on management of non-performing and forborne exposures; welcomes thearns that its economic and social implications have been insufficiently addressed and little understood; reiterates its concerns over the adoption by the ECB of the addendum on NPLs without any quantitative impact assessment of its effects on financial stability and the real economy, including the real estate market; highlights the important reduction in volume of NPLs achieved over the past years; stresses that the risk to f, however, that de facto mandatory disposals of NPLs in ancial stability posed by NPLs is still significant illiquid and opaque market pose significant risks to the stability of specific institutions, while raising concerns in terms of their impact on pricing and competition in the market for NPLs; agrees with the Commission that the primary responsibility for reducing NPLs lies with the Member States, notably through efficient insolvency laws, and banks themselves, through effective and transparent internal systems;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 142 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Stresses that the problem of too- big-to-fail banks is still very relevant and poses significant risks to bank resolvability; recalls the need for a structural reform of the banking sector based on clear and mandatory separation of the core credit activities from the trading ones; points out that this reform represents a fundamental complement to the crisis resolution framework, as highlighted by the lessons learned from the 2008 financial crisis;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 148 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. WelcomNotes the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will provide the common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and be turned into a true European Monetary Fund (EMF) based on strict conditions ensuring responsibility and the principle of avoiding moral hazard; stresses the need for proper democratic scrutiny; recalls Parliament’s position that the EMF should be fully incorporated into the Union's institutional framework; stresses the need for proper democratic scrutiny;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 157 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Reaffirms its position that the rules for precautionary recapitalisation need to be clarified; notes that precautionary recapitalisation can be an instrument for crisis management but believes that its use needs to be strictly limited to exceptional cases where the bank is solvent and where compliance with EUNotes that precautionary recapitalisation can be a crucial and legitimate instrument for the prevention management of bank crises; believes that this instrument should be made fully available where the bank is solvent but is facing a temporary liquidity crisis and there is a need to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State aind rules is ensuredpreserve financial stability; recalls that the objective of the EU resolution regime is to make should ensure that taxpayers are protected, the cost of bank management failures is borne by its shareholders and creditors, excluding retail and depositors, and that the stability of the financial system as a whole is preserved; stresses in this regard that, in order to avoid adverse social and economic consequences and restore public confidence in the banking system, bank losses should be borne exclusively by professional investors that have sufficient loss-bearing capacity, while retail investors and depositors should always be protected;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 177 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
23. Takes note of the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS); underlines the necessity of EDIS as the third pillar of the Banking Union; believes it should be fully implemented once significant risk reduction has taken place since its inception; stresses that it should be fully implemented in order to increase depositor confidence as well as the shock-absorbing capacity of the EU banking system; recalls that risk sharing and risk reduction should move forward in parallel;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON