19 Amendments of Marco ZANNI related to 2017/2072(INI)
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6
Citation 6
— having regard to the ECB’s guidance to banks on non-performing loans of 20 March 2017, and to the public consultation on its draft addendum to this guidance of 4 October 2017,
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 a (new)
Citation 6 a (new)
- having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament's Legal Service of 9 November 2017 on the addendum to the ECB guidance to banks on non- performing loans (SJ-0693/17),
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 b (new)
Citation 6 b (new)
- having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 4 September 2007 on institutional and legal implications of the use of “soft law” instruments (P6_TA(2007)0366),
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
D a. whereas the Banking Union is acting on the consequences of the crisis and not on the causes;
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D b (new)
Recital D b (new)
D b. whereas a proper structural reform of banks based on a clear separation between trading and credit activities is the only way to prevent the risk of bail-out at the expense of taxpayers and ensure financial stability;
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Notes that the current supervisory system focuses on credit risk, completely ignoring exposure to risky trading activities and legal risks possibly affecting the sustainability of financial institutions;
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Notes the obvious disparity between real and effective significance regarding ECB supervision of the German banking sector;direct supervision of the German system is relatively light when measured against its assets and compared to the significance that that the banking system of the largest economy of the monetary area should have;while German banking assets amount to 27.6% of the euro area total, supervised German assets amount to 20.6% of total directly supervised assets;while consolidated loans from the German banking system represent 26.4% of total euro area lending, higher than all other countries, the figure falls to 18.2% of the subtotal for loans subject to direct supervision;while German deposits amount to 27.9% of the total, again the highest value, the figure falls to 17.6% of the total for supervised banks;
Amendment 140 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Reiterates its concerns aboutNotes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that ‘Member States and bpoints out that the problem can only be tackled definitively by meanks themselvof a systemic solution; stresses thave a primary responsibility in tackling non-performing loans’4; welcomes, nonetheless, the work done by different EU institutions and bodies ont this is the result of the macroeconomic imbalances caused by the EMU and poor crisis management with mistaken economic policies; considers thise issue; calls on these actors and the Member States to duly implement the Council conclusions of 11 July 2017 on to be crucial and calls on the Member States to adopt anti-cyclical policies to stimulate growthe action plan to tackle non- performing loans in Europe; _________________ 4Commission communication on completing the Banking Union, 11 October 2017, p. 15 (COM(2017)0592).nd support domestic demand in order to limit NPLs, given the need to resolve macroeconomic problems associated with chronic demand shortages and the collapsing purchasing power of households;
Amendment 157 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; nNotes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly invested in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessive ‘home bias’; takes note, in this respect, of the Commission’s ongoing work on the idea of so-called sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS); recalls the importance of government securities for banks as risk-free assets and and high quality collateral for the purpose of repo transactions; stresses that, as indicated by Benoît Cœuré (Member of the ECB's Executive Board) in his keynote address of 3 November 2016 on 'Sovereign debt in the euro area: too safe or too risky?' at Harvard University's Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies in Cambridge, MA, and by other economists and researchers, the structure of the EMU artificially increases the risk levels of government bonds in the euro area;
Amendment 177 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. WelcomNotes the work done by the ECB to assess the adequacy of internal models, including its new guide to the TRIM, with a view to addressing the variability in risk-weights applied to risk- weighted assets of the same cl: maintains, however, that the use of such models increases across credit institutions; calls for a rapid conclusion of negoregulatory asymmetries in the banking union and results in an unjustified competiations on output floors wve disadvantage for smaller credith in the BCBSstitutions;
Amendment 184 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Stresses that any further measures proposed by the ECB, a purely technocratic institution, should respect the principle of accountability and democratic transparency;
Amendment 201 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. WelcomesStresses that the banking reform package proposed by the Commission inas of November 2016; underlines the importance is having a considerable impact ofn the fast-track procedure for the phasing-in of International Financial Repstability of the banking system; notes that a more restrictive approach to non-perfortming Standard (IFRS) 9 in order to avoid cliff effects on the regulatory capital of credit institutions; supports the efforts made to reduce the reporting burden for smaller banks; is concerned, however, about the proposed amendments to the waivers in Articles 7 and 8 of the CRR, and more generally, about the proposed shift in the home-host balanceloans (NPLs) and a tighter sovereign debt policy might in fact step up pressure on a number of banking systems and jeopardise the smooth functioning of the debt market; supports, however, efforts to reduce the reporting burden for smaller banks;
Amendment 212 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Calls for the repeal of the BRRD, which has already shown itself to be ineffective and dangerous for investors, bondholders and savers and for the stability of the financial system as a whole;
Amendment 265 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Is concerned about the high number of legal applications lodged before the General Court of the EU in relation to the Banco Popular Español S.A. case; asks the Commission to assess whether this could endanger the effectiveness of the new resolution regime;management of the Banco Popular Español S.A. resolution, which has led to a high number of legal applications being lodged before the General Court. calls on the SRB and the Commission to provide more transparency in futureto this resolution decisions - by publishing in full all the documents, in particular the Deloitte valuation report;
Amendment 306 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for progress to be made on the legislative proposals implemeOpposes the inclusion of a pre- resolution moratorium tool in the BRRD; strongly criticises the ECB proposal of 8 November 2017 containg total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) in Union law; supports the inclusion of a pre-resolution moratorium tool in the BRRDed in the 'Opinion of the ECB of 8 November 2017 on revisions to the Union crisis management framework(CON/2017/47), paragraph 5 point 1' ; Believes that freezing accounts below EUR 100 000 would have a devastating impact on confidence in the banking system and the protection of savers and their right, as enshrined in numerous national constitutions;
Amendment 355 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern for all EU citizens; is currently debatnotes that slow progress regarding the EDIS proposal on an EDIS at committee level; notes, is aggravating this respect, the Commission’s more proportionate ‘new approach’ to an EDIS as put forward in its communication of 11 October 2017e instability of the European financial system;
Amendment 378 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Notes the potential benefits and the likely risks related to the introduction of an EDIS; considers,alls therefore, risk reduction measures to be essential building blocks laying the foundations for a for a halt to activities on EDIS;
Amendment 380 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Notes the potential benefits and the likely risks related to the introduction of an EDIS; considers, therefore, risk reduction measures to be essential building blocks laying the foundations for an EDIS, which must have unlimited coverage guaranteed by a public ECB backstop;
Amendment 386 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22a. Underlines that, as in all advanced systems, a public backstop is needed to ensure effective deposit protection; points out that the ECB is the institution able to guarantee unlimited protection for all euro-denominated current accounts in the banking union;