BETA

25 Amendments of Laura AGEA related to 2017/2072(INI)

Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas at the end of 20167 the total number of credit institutions in the euro area stood at 5 073 on an unconsolidated basis, down from 5 475 in 2015, 5 614 in 2014 and 6 767 in 20083, the main reduction being among small banks; _________________ 3 For the data on 2015, 2014 and 2008, see: ECB, Report on Financial Structures, October 2016, p. 22. The data for 2016 have been sent to us by the ECB and are based on the SDW (http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/). They can be updated once the Report on Financial Structures for 2017 is available.
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 33 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas the Commission has announced in its Work Programme for 2018 that it intends to withdraw its proposal on banking separation;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas, according to a recent study by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the derivatives market in the European Union has a total notional value of 453 000 billion;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 48 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas the 2017 banking cases have shown that the move from bail-out to bail-in has yet to be finalisednot resolved the problem of moral hazard and unfair involvement of tax payers in rescuing banks, but rather has exacerbate it dramatically, also directly inflicting losses on savers;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas the Banking Union remains incomplete and incapable of preventing and managing crises without generating panic among savers and forfeiting the confidence of tax payers;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Stresses that the disappearance of a significant proportion of small banks since 2008 reflects an alarming trend towards concentration of the banking sector;regrets that this has exacerbated the unresolved problem of banks too big to fail that lies at the heart of the post- crisis global financial reform agenda;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 117 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Notes that the exclusion of a large part of the German credit system from the cross section of European banks subject to direct ECB scrutiny is a source of major asymmetries in the banking union;stresses that the German system is made up of small or medium-sized banks characterized by strong interconnections that can give rise to systemic risks for the whole euro area;recalls in this connection that 68 German banks not subject to ECB supervision failed to pass the stress tests conducted by Bundesbank and Bafin linked to interest rate and property market disruption ;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Points out that in-depth analysis of bank balance sheets is still producing distorted results owing to differences in the treatment of countries that have in the past provided massive state aid for struggling banks and those that did not grant such aid prior to the Communication of 2013 and now have much less room for manoeuvre;urges the SSM, in fulfilment of its supervisory role, to address this disparity;calls on the Commission also to investigate distortions of competition resulting from the sudden change of tack regarding state aid for banks and propose suitable measures to reinstate a level equal playing field in the banking union and eliminate the competitive advantage enjoyed by banking systems that have received substantial public aid in the wake of the crisis;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 129 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Reiterates its concerns abouPoints out that the high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that ‘Member States and banks themselves have a primary responsibility in tackling non-performing loans’4; welcomes, nonetheless, the work done by different EU is largely linked to the impact of the economic recession and the austerity policies pursued in the outlying parts of the euro area over the last few years; points out that a broad-based strategy based on expansionary fiscal policies geared to economic recovery and reducing unemployment is necessary to resolve the problem; agrees with the Commission that ‘Member States and banks themselves have a primary responsibility in tackling non-performing loans4 and calls for measures to promote alternative solutions to the disposal thereof; deplores the constant pressure being exerted by the European supervisory authorities for the rapid disposal of non-performing loans (NPLs) on the market, culminsatitutions and bodies on this issue; calls on these actors and the Member States to duly implement the Council conclusions of 11 July 2017 on the action plan to tackle non- perng in the publication of the Addendum to the ECB Guidelines on automatic provisioning levels for NPLs, which is to be condemned from a procedural point of view also; stresses that the mandatory disposal of NPLs in an illiquid and opaque market dominated by a small number of speculative funds capable of pushing prices down to rock bottom can result in unjustified balance-sheet losses for banks and, finally, the avoidable risk of a haircut form ing loans in Europevestors, savers and current account holders in case of resolution; _________________ 4 Commission communication on completing the Banking Union, 11 October 2017, p. 15 (COM(2017)0592).
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 145 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Notes with concern the systemic risks to the stability of the entire euro area because of the high exposures of certain banking systems engaged in level 2 and level 3 activities;regrets that such illiquid and complex instruments have not been among the single ECB supervision priorities since its inception;welcomes in this regard the inclusion by the EBA in the 2018 stress test procedures of specific risk management measures relating to level 2 and level 3 instruments;strongly reaffirms the appeal to the SSM to make the issue a single supervision priority for 2018 in order to ensure a more robust and realistic assessment of the real systemic risks inherent in the European banking system and bring about their necessary reduction;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 150 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)
3b. Notes that scrupulously close attention to credit risk in the course of individual bank supervision, contrasted with the tendency to underestimate market and operational risks, is a major factor in distorting the level playing field for national banking systems, as well as revealing an alarming weakness in the single supervision process;points out that this asymmetry has placed banking systems based more on traditional credit activities at a major disadvantage, penalizing above all the outlying euro area member countries that have been most affected by the economic crisis, to the advantage of the more exposed banking systems at the centre of the euro area that are engaged in speculative financial activities;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 151 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly invested in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessive ‘home bias’; takes note, in this respect, of the Commission’s ongoing work on the idea of so-called sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS);deleted
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 175 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. WelcomPoints out that the internal models used by banks are exposed to manipulation risks and high opacity, in particular for the evaluation of complex derivatives; notes the work done by the ECB to assess the adequacy of internal models, including its new guide to the TRIM, with a view to addressing the variability in risk-weights applied to risk- weighted assets of the same class across credit institutions; calls for a rapid conclusion of negotiations on output floors within the BCBS; stresses in this context the importance of introducing an appropriate leverage ratio to assess the hidden risks of banks' financial portfolios;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 197 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. WelcomesNotes with concern that the banking reform package proposed by the Commission in November 2016; underlines the importance of the fast-track procedure for the phasing-in of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 in order to avoid cliff effects on the regulatory capital of credit institutions; supports the efforts made to reduce the reporting burden for smaller banks; is concerned, however, about the proposed amendments to the waivers in Articles 7 and 8 of the CRR, and more generally, about the proposed shift in the home-host balance fails to address the serious difficulties encountered in implementing the banking union and does not provide for sufficient measures to reduce the accumulation of systemic risks in the banking sector or offer any credible solutions to the problem of banks too big to fail;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 219 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Notes that capital market union initiatives, in particular the relaunch of securitisation, are having the alarming effect of increased financialisation of the economy, the spread of shadow banking and greater financial interconnectivity; highlights the urgent need to introduce adequate and stringent provisions for regulation of the shadow banking system and of systemic risks, in line with the lessons learned from the crisis;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 267 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Draws attention to the fundamental importance of achieving an ambitious structural reform of the banking sector based on a clear and compulsory separation between investment and traditional credit transactions; opposes the Commission's wish to withdraw its proposal on this matter; points out that this reform was promoted by the Commission itself as an important complement to the BRRD for bank crisis resolution; stresses that separation is indispensable in order to facilitate crisis resolution while ensuring full protection of savers and depositors and effectively address the problem of banks too large to fail; calls on the Commission to re-launch the proposal and to promote the conclusion of an agreement between the co-legislators;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 275 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Notes that, while the concern about the mismatch between state aid rules and Union legislation as expressed in the previous report5 related to the ability of deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) to participate in resolution as provided for in the BRRD and DGSD, the 2017 banking cases brought to light other areas of mismatch, in particular the possibility for Member States to avoid being subject to the discipline of the BRRD by paying ‘liquidation aid’with respect to the need to safeguard the fundamental right to the protection of savings, which is constitutionally guaranteed in a number of European countries; _________________ 5 European Parliament, Resolution of 15 February 2017 on ‘Banking Union – Annual Report 2016’, paragraph 38.
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 277 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Expresses strong concern about the adverse repercussions of bail-in on the confidence of European investors and citizens; points out that the bail-in mechanism may have the perverse effect of accelerating crises and increasing financial instability, triggering panic and contagion on the markets; condemns the underlying injustice of the bail-in principle, under which responsibility for bank failures is partially borne by small investors, savers and current account holders, despite the fact that they have no control over the soundness of banks or influence over their management;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 279 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Calls on the Commission to undertake as soon as possible the review referred to in the last subparagraph of Article 32(4) of the BRRD, taking into account the interplay between the new resolution regime and the 2013 Banking Communication, in order to draw lessons from the 2017 banking cases;deleted
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 292 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. WelcomDeplores the SRB’s prioritisation of enhancing resolvability of credit institutions, as well as the progress made infact that measures taken to developing minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) targets in the framework of institution- specific resolution strategies are inadequate for the purpose of ensuring the resolvability of these institutions;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 299 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. WelcomNotes the progress made in furtheradditional harmonisingation of the priority ranking of unsecured debt instruments through the Commission’s proposal of November 2016; regrets the lack of safeguards for retail customers and investment limits for pension funds; calls for rapid implementation by Member States so that banks can issue debt in the new insolvency class and thereby build up the required buffers;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 305 #
16. Calls for progress to be made on the legislative proposals implementing total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) in Union law; supportsexpresses strong concern about the counter-productive effects on citizens' confidence in the banking sector linked to the inclusion of a pre- resolution moratorium tool in the BRRD; condemns in this regard the imposition of an extended moratorium on current accounts, especially guaranteed accounts, as proposed in the ECB's opinion on the revision of that directive;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 317 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Notes the ongoing technical work by the Council on a common fiscal backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF)at the ability of the banking union to cope with systemic crises or the collapse of large banks is further compromised by the lack of credible and effective backstop mechanisms; highlights in this respect the inadequate resources of the single resolution fund, together with the lack of any credible prospect of reaching an agreement on a common fiscal backstop and the absence of a central bank able to act as a lender of last resort to guarantee the system; points out that this situation cannot in fact prevent inevitable recourse to a publicly-funded bailout in the event of new systemic crises;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 353 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern ofor all EU citizens and considers that all deposits should benefit from unlimited and effective protection, irrespective of the amount; is currently debating the proposal on an EDIS at committee level; notecondemns, in this respect, the Commission’s more proportionate ‘new approach’ to anrecent step back taken by the Commission with its change of course regarding the EDIS as put forward in its communication of 11 October 2017;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 370 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Notes the potential benefits and the likely risks related to the introduction of an EDIS; considers, therefore, risk reduction measures to be essential building blocks laying the foundations for an EDIS;deleted
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON