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34 Amendments of Laura AGEA related to 2017/2124(INI)

Amendment 24 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas, according to the Eurosystem macroeconomic projection of June 2017, annual HICP inflation in the euro area is expected to stand at 1.5 % in 2017, 1.3 % in 2018 and 1.6 % in 2019;deleted
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Underlines the federal nature of the ECB, which rules out national vetoes, enabling it to act decisively in addressing the crisis;deleted
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Denounces the fact that the extraordinary monetary policy measures launched by the ECB after the crisis (such as LTRO, TLTRO, ABSPP and QE) have not had the promised effects because the huge liquidity injected into the markets is not readily transmitted to the real economy;deplores the fact that precisely these policies are responsible for the increase in systemic risk, rising inequalities and the increased risk of speculative bubbles;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 92 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Observes that the single currency policy cannot meet the various requirements in terms of interest rates an inflation rates of the 19 Eurozone Member States;stresses that the current political controversy concerning QE and the desirability of extending it clearly demonstrates the asymmetries attached to the single currency and the impossibility of meeting the various monetary policy requirements in economies which are very heterogeneous;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Deplores the fact that the extraordinary monetary policy measures have not had the promised impact on the investment gaps that exist in the Eurozone, because of slack domestic demand arising from austerity policies and banking supervision that concentrates excessively on credit risks;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Acknowledges that without the ECB’s policy package, inflation would be almost 0.5 % lower on average than the rate currently projected for the years 2016-2019Observes that the ECB’s policy package has limited impact on the real economy;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 126 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Agrees with the ECB that in order to reach the inflation target, supportive fiscal policies and socially balanced productivity-enhancing reforms are required;deleted
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 142 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Considers that the President of the ECB should refrain from making judgements about the need for Member States to introduce structural reforms, particularly if their aim is to devalue wages in order to offset the imbalances caused by the euro;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 143 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6b. Deplores the fact that the main objective of the ECB's monetary policy is price stability and not full employment;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 158 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Considers that the ECB should take prompt action to prevent the formation of financial bubbles on the market because of its monetary policy;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 162 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)
7b. Calls on the ECB to investigate the differences in the transmission of monetary policy to the economies of the various Member States;calls furthermore on the ECB to publish the results of that investigation;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 203 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Underlines the positive effect of the ECB monetary policy on growth, employment and the financing costs of Member States, non-financial companies and households;deleted
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 215 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Condemns the fact that, in the absence of progress in reforming EMU, reforms based on the devaluation of wages remain the only way of maintaining the stability of the Eurozone;stresses that such a solution is unacceptable from both the political and the social point of view and imperils the survival of the European project and its fundamental values;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 242 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Considers that monetary policy alone is not sufficient to achieve a sustainable and more even and inclusive economic recovery, and that public and private investments should therefore be encouraged in the context of a moderately positive fiscal stance in the Eurozone as proposed by the Commission;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 261 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Points ouCondemns the fact that, while unemployment has decreased, aggregate demand in the euro area remains subdued, largely as a result of the rise in poor quality, temporary, low-paid jobs; calls on the ECB to evaluate how this phenomenon is slowing the recovery and explore ways to stimulate demand in spite of wage stagnation;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 286 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Considers it deplorable that the excessive current account surpluses are due to the adoption of the single currency, which has imposed a regime of fixed exchange rates for the 19 Member States, which differ too much in a suboptimal currency area;deplores the fact that the euro has generated, and continues to generate, balance-of-payments imbalances, causing excessive surpluses for countries which remain unpunished by the Commission;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 289 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 b (new)
16b. Considers that EMU has proven vulnerable in the context of the global financial and economic crisis, while the imbalances caused by the introduction of the euro are serious, and that the massive public interventions to rescue the financial sector have resulted in a sovereign debt crisis, whose costs have risen dramatically in some Member States;observes that over the years, because of structural flaws - such as the absence of compensatory budget transfers - EMU has caused unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances, particularly for many peripheral countries;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 290 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 c (new)
16c. Considers it deplorable that the introduction of the single currency has aggravated the increase in structural divergences between countries and has hampered capacities to respond to crises;stresses that the introduction of the euro as a single currency has made it impossible to intervene in response to asymmetric shocks, transferring the burden of adjustment to the weakest economies in the Eurozone;considers that there is an urgent need to introduce an opt-out procedure for Member States that democratically express a desire to leave the Eurozone;considers furthermore that there is an urgent need to organise a technical plan for the controlled dismantling of the whole single currency area in order not to be caught unprepared by an uncontrolled sudden collapse of the Eurozone;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 291 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 d (new)
16d. Condemns the Target2 compensatory mechanism as a further source of internal imbalance in the Eurozone, as the Target2 deficits with the ECB of peripheral countries such as Italy and Spain continue to increase while the surpluses of core countries such as Germany are growing spectacularly;stresses that the main cause of these imbalances is the fixed exchange rate regime;considers it obvious that, in time, the existing imbalances will accumulate further and ultimately become unsustainable;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 300 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Acknowledges that monetary policy has effectively reduced the cost of credit and helped to, without however significantly improveing access to finance for companies and households; considers, however, that the the limited effect of this policy is limited owing to the lack of sufficient creditto be due to the unresolved problem of the collapse in domestic demand in the euro area;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 314 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Condemns the divergence between the financing rates granted to SMEs and those granted to large businesses, between the conditions applicable to credit for SMEs based in different Eurozone countries and between the interest rates applied to loans to modest and larger entities;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 316 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Agrees with the ECB that a bank’s profitability depends on its business model, low interest rates notwithstanding;deleted
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 327 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Acknowledges that the current policy of low interest rates has a positive effect on the level of nonperforming loans (NPLs); calls for a European strategy involving a secondary market for NPLs in order to alleviate the burden of NPLs in some Member States;deleted
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 400 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
27. Agrees that a well-functioning, diversified and integrated capital market would support the transmission of the single monetary policy; calls for the full completion and implementation of the capital markets union and the banking union;deleted
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 407 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)
27a. Strongly condemns the project of a Capital Markets Union, because a further financialisation of the economy will make the economic system more fragile, interconnected and exposed to systemic risks and fresh crises, to the detriment of the real economy;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 420 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
29. Underlines the urgent need to proceed towards establishing a truly European safe asset for the Eurozone’s banking union;deleted
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 433 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29 a (new)
29a. Rejects the project of the Banking Union;considers that the steps so far taken in that direction bear witness to yet another failure by the European institutions;observes that supervision has proved to be arbitrary, lacking in impartiality and punitive for the banking systems of some Member States, as the assessment exercises (AQR and stress tests) have not taken due account of the derivatives held by some systemic banking groups, choosing rather to focus mainly on the credit risk;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 434 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29 b (new)
29b. Deplores the role played by the ECB in connection with the SSM as the supervisor of European systemic banks, as this function, centralised and without effective democratic control, could give rise to possible conflicts of interest;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 435 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29 c (new)
29c. Considers it necessary to implement Bank Structural Reform as soon as possible, with a clear and compulsory separation between retail banking and investment activities in order to protect savings and reduce interdependencies and risks in the banking sector and to increase its resilience;deplores the lack of interest displayed by the European institutions in pursuing such a reform;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 517 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36 a (new)
36a. Urges the ECB to continue its efforts to ensure transparency, in view of its growing number of tasks and responsibilities;points out that the monetary dialogue is an important forum for ensuring the transparency, democratic scrutiny and accountability of monetary policy vis-à-vis Parliament and the general public, and therefore invites the representatives of the ECB to give precise and detailed replies to the questions asked by the Members of the European Parliament;calls also on ECB officials to provide answers in writing when the replies given during this exchange of views prove to be unsatisfactory and/or incomplete;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 523 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36 b (new)
36b. Is concerned in particular about the management of conflicts of interest at the ECB, as evidenced by the outdated whistle-blowing policy, the lack of independence of the ECB Audit Committee, where all members are currently or have previously been members of the ECB Governing Council, and the lack of independence of the Ethics Committee, which is chaired by a former President of the ECB;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 527 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36 c (new)
36c. Urges the ECB to make available declarations of financial interests for all members of the ECB Governing Council and senior managers;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 533 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 a (new)
37a. Deplores the fact that the ECB has overstepped its mandate as regards its role in the Troika;urges the ECB to take a step back and heighten its independence from the decision-making process;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 537 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 b (new)
37b. Is concerned by the lack of sufficient clarity and transparency surrounding the provision of ELA, and calls on the ECB to make ELA a responsibility of the Governing Council for significant banks supervised by the SSM;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON