BETA

Activities of Bernd LUCKE related to 2017/0358(COD)

Shadow reports (1)

REPORT on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prudential supervision of investment firms and amending Directives 2013/36/EU and 2014/65/EU PDF (1 MB) DOC (160 KB)
2016/11/22
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2017/0358(COD)
Documents: PDF(1 MB) DOC(160 KB)

Amendments (10)

Amendment 17 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 10 – point 1
As far as references to the amount of initial capital are concerned, the following correlation shall apply. Levels of initial capital set by Article 8 of this Directive should, as of the date of application of this Directive, be construed to replace references to levels of initial capital set by Directive 2013/36/EU as follows: the initial capital of investment firms referred to in Article 28 of Directive 2013/36/EU should be construed to refer to Article 8(1); the initial capital of investment firms referred to in Articles 29 or 31 of Directive 2013/36/EU should be construed to refer to Article 8(2) or (3), depending on the type of investment services and activities of an investment firm; the initial capital referred to in Article 30 of Directive 2013/36/EU should be construed to refer to Article 8(1).deleted
2018/06/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 25 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 23
(23) The revenues of investment firms in the form of fees, commissions and other revenues in relation to the provision of different investment services are highly volatile. Limiting the variable component of remuneration to a portion of the fixed component of remuneration would affect the firm’s ability to reduce remuneration at times of reduced revenues and could lead to an increase of the firm’s fixed cost base, leading in turn to risks for the firm’s ability to withstand times of economic downturn or reduced revenues. To avoid those risks, a single maximum ratio between the variable and the fixed elements of remuneration should not be imposed on non-systemic investment firms. Instead, those investment firms should set appropriate ratios themselves.
2018/06/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 27 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 24
(24) In response to the growing public demand for tax transparency and to promote investment firms’ corporate responsibility, it is appropriate to require that investment firms, unless they qualify as small and non-interconnected, disclose certain information, including information on profits made, taxes paid and any public subsidies received.
2018/06/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 37 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 8 a (new)
Article 8a References to initial capital in Directive 2013/36/EU The levels of initial capital set by Article 8 of this Directive shall, as of the date of application of this Directive, be construed to replace references to the levels of initial capital set by Directive 2013/36/EU in respect of the following: (a) the initial capital of investment firms referred to in Article 28 of Directive 2013/36/EU shall be construed to refer to Article 8(1) of this Directive; (b) the initial capital of investment firms referred to in Articles 29 or 31 of Directive 2013/36/EU shall be construed to refer to Article 8(2) or (3) of this Directive, depending on the type of investment services and activities of the investment firm; (c) the initial capital referred to in Article 30 of Directive 2013/36/EU shall be construed to refer to Article 8(1) of this Directive.
2018/06/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 66 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Member States shall require investment firms except those which qualify as small and non-interconnected to disclose by Member State and by third country in which the investment firm has a branch or a subsidiary that is a financial institution as defined in Article 4(1)(26) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the following information on an annual basis:
2018/06/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 80 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 26 – paragraph 4
4. Member States shall determine which investment firms are considered significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities. Member States shall require those firms to establish a risk committee composed of members of the management body who do not perform any executive function in the investment firm concerned. Members of the risk committee referred to in the first subparagraph shall have appropriate knowledge, skills and expertise to fully understand, manage and monitor the risk strategy and the risk appetite of the investment firm. They shall ensure that the risk committee advises the management body on the investment firm’s overall current and future risk appetite and strategy and assists the management body in overseeing the implementation of that strategy by senior management. The management body shall retain overall responsibility for the firm’s risk strategies and policies. Competent authorities may allow an investment firm which is not considered to be significant as referred to in the first subparagraph to allow the audit committee as referred to in Article 39 of Directive 2006/43/EC, where one has been established, to perform the function of the risk committee referred to in the first subparagraph. Members of that committee shall have the knowledge, skills and expertise referred to in the second subparagraph.deleted
2018/06/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 94 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 28 – paragraph 2
2. For the purposes of point (i) of paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that investment firms set the appropriate ratios between the variable and the fixed component of the total remuneration in their remuneration policies, taking into account the business activities of the investment firm and associated risks, as well as the impact that different categories of individuals referred to in paragraph 1 have on the risk profile of the investment firm.deleted
2018/06/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 112 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 30
[...]deleted
2018/06/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 132 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 31
Remuneration committee 1. competent authorities have the necessary powers to guarantee that investment firms which are determined as significant in accordance with Article 26(4) establish a remuneration committee. That remuneration committee shall exercise competent and independent judgment on remuneration policies and practices and the incentives created for managing risk, capital and liquidity. 2. competent authorities have the necessary powers to guarantee that the remuneration committee is responsible for the preparation of decisions regarding remuneration, including decisions which have implications for the risk and risk management of the investment firm concerned and which are to be taken by the management body. The Chair and the members of the remuneration committee shall be members of the management body who do not perform any executive function in the investment firm concerned. Where employee representation in the management body is provided for by national law, the remuneration committee shall include one or more employee representatives. 3. When preparing the decisions referred to in paragraph 2, the remuneration committee shall take into account the public interest and the long- term interests of shareholders, investors and other stakeholders in the investment firm.Article 31 deleted Member States shall ensure that Member States shall ensure that
2018/06/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 136 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 32
Oversight of remuneration policies 1. competent authorities collect the information disclosed in accordance with points (c), (d) and (f) of Article 51 of [Regulation (EU) ---/----[IFR] and use that information to benchmark remuneration trends and practices. Competent authorities shall provide that information to EBA. 2. received from the competent authorities in accordance with paragraph 1 to benchmark remuneration trends and practices at Union level. 3. shall issue guidelines on the application of sound remuneration policies. Those guidelines shall take into account at least the requirements referred to in Articles 28 to 31 and principles on sound remuneration policies set out in Commission Recommendation 2009/384/EC43. 4. investment firms provide competent authorities, where requested, with information on the number of natural persons per investment firm that are remunerated EUR 1 million or more per financial year, in pay brackets of EUR 1 million, including information on their job responsibilities, the business area involved and the main elements of salary, bonus, long-term award and pension contribution. Competent authorities shall forward that information to EBA, which shall publish it on an aggregate home Member State basis in a common reporting format. EBA, in consultation with ESMA, may elaborate guidelines to facilitate the implementation of this paragraph and to ensure the consistency of the information collected. _________________ 43Commission Recommendation 2009/384/EC of 30 April 2009 on remuneration policies in the financial services sector (OJ L 120, 15.5.2009, p. 22).Article 32 deleted Member States shall ensure that EBA shall use the information EBA, in consultation with ESMA, Member States shall ensure that
2018/06/04
Committee: ECON