13 Amendments of Fulvio MARTUSCIELLO related to 2017/2072(INI)
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)
Citation 8 a (new)
- having regard to the Commission's public consultation on insufficient provisioning for newly originated loans that turn non performing,
Amendment 12 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 15
Citation 15
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the stock of non- performing loans of significant institutions (SIs) stood at EUR 865470 billion net at the end of March 2017;
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
B a. whereas, according to the EBA's quarterly Risk Dashboard, Europe's main banks reported a weighted average NPL Ratio (non performing loans, gross of impairments, divided by total loans) of 4,47% as of June 30, 2017, which has been steadily decreasing for the last 30 months, with a sharper drop since September 2016, with Germany and Italy, among the EU's large national banking systems, having achieved also significant increases in coverage;
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
Amendment 105 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
Amendment 152 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly invested in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessive ‘home bias’; takes note, in this respectrecalls however how controversial is this topic both at European and International level, since the introduction of specific risk weight for sovereign exposures and/or concentration limits could strongly: i) affect European economic growth; ii) cause financial distress and great instability in some countries to detriment to the whole financial sector; iii) determine capital outflow outside the European Union; iv) enhance the unleveled playing field among different jurisdictions; recalls that a correct evaluation of the causal link between NPL and economic growth is functional to define the right policy interventions: indeed there is not empirical evidence that the supply of credit, and therefore the economic growth, is causally determined by the level of NPLs, meanwhile some analysis suggest that the negative correlation between NPLs and credit growth is mainly due to changes in economic and financial conditions of firms, to contraction in their credit demand connected to heavy fiscal disciplines; takes note, of the Commission’'s ongoing work on the idea of so-called sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS); recalls the risk of poor liquidity in many small EU government bonds' markets; recalls how difficult could be to diversify on other EU government bonds market, especially on small EU poor liquid markets;
Amendment 198 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Welcomes the banking reform package proposed by the Commission in November 2016; underlines the importance of the fast-track procedure for the phasing- in of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 in order to avoid cliff effects on the regulatory capital of credit institutions; supports the efforts made to reduce the reporting burden for smaller banks; is concerned, however, about the proposed amendments to the waivers in Articles 7 and 8 of the CRR, and more generally, about the proposed shift in the home-host balance; Recalls the absence or the poor action of market making in many small EU government bonds market, resulting in high volatility and a wide bid ask spread;
Amendment 315 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for progress to be made on the legislative proposals implementing total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) in Union law; supports the inclusrecalls to carefully assess any potential introduction of a pre- resolution moratorium tool in the BRRD;
Amendment 339 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Welcomes the EBA’s decision to publish on an annual basis data received by it in accordance with Article 10(10) of the DGSD; regrets that the data do not allow for a direct comparison of the adequacy of funding between deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs); notes, nonetheless, the need for several DGSs to accelerate the build-up of available financial means in order to achieve thea target level of 0.8 % of covered deposits by 3 July 2024 more balanced and realistic than the 0,8%;
Amendment 388 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23a. Stresses that any new primary, secondary rules or even guidelines must be accompanied by an in-depth impact analysis which makes clear the overall impact on the real economy - in particular on SMEs and the financing of households - on employment and on the demand for investment;
Amendment 391 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 b (new)
Paragraph 23 b (new)
23b. Recalls the powers of the European Parliament in the issuance of Pillar 1 rules.