BETA

4 Amendments of Fabio DE MASI related to 2015/0270(COD)

Amendment 106 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4 a (new)
(4a) Regrettably, no agreement has yet been reached on a Bank Structural Reform, which is necessary to end the too- big-to-fail problem and to improve the resilience of the European banking sector and which constitutes a vital step to break the sovereign/bank link by removing the implicit guarantee enjoyed by systemically important institutions.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 169 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
(17) EDIS should progressively evolve from a reinsurance scheme into a fully mutualised co-insurance scheme over a number of years. In the context of efforts to deepen the EMU, together with the work on the establishment of bridge-financing arrangements for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and on developing a common fiscal backstop, this step is necessary to reduce the bank/sovereign links in individual Member States by means of steps towards risk sharing among all the Member States in the Banking Union, and thereby to reinforce the Banking Union in achieving its key objective. However, such risk sharing implied by stepsBank Structural Reform to end the too-big-to- fail problem is a necessary measure to reinforce the Banking Union. These steps must proceed in parallel with other risk reducing measures designed to break the bank-sovereign link more directly.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 236 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26
(26) Contributions would be directly levied on banks to finance the Deposit Insurance Fund. The Board would collect the contributions and administer the Deposit Insurance Fund, while national DGSs would continue to collect national contributions and administer national funds. In order to ensure fair and harmonised contributions for participating banks and provide incentives to operate under a model which presents less risk, both contributions to EDIS and to national DGS should be calculated on the basis of covered deposits and a risk-adjustment factor per bank. During the re-insurance period the risk-adjustment factor should consider the degree of risk incurred by a bank relative to all other banks affiliated to the same participating DGS. Once the stage of co-insurance is reached, the risk- adjustment factor should consider the degree of risk incurred by a bank relative to all other banks established in the participating Member States. This would ensure that, overall, EDIS is cost-neutral for banks and national DGSs and avoid any redistribution of contributions during the build-up phase of the Deposit Insurance Fund. When calculating contributions, the risk-reducing effects of "alternative measures" to avoid a bank failure, particularly participation in Institutional Protection Schemes, should be properly accounted for.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 707 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 - point f a (new)
(fa) risk-reducing effects of "alternative measures" to avoid a bank failure, particularly participation in Institutional Protection Schemes;
2016/12/21
Committee: ECON