BETA

10 Amendments of Fabio DE MASI related to 2016/0363(COD)

Amendment 36 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital -1 (new)
(-1) Regulatory shortcomings in financial market legislation have been one of the key reasons for the 2007/2008 financial crisis. These shortcomings have, however, been only marginally addressed by policy makers in the Union and elsewhere and especially the too-big-to fail problem persisted. As highlighted by recent bail-out cases, despite the Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council1a the socialisation of losses continues. ______________ 1aDirective 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190)
2017/09/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 38 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 3
(3) Member States should ensure that credit institutions and investment firms should have sufficient loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity to ensure smooth and fast absorption of losses and recapitalisation in resolution with a minimum impact on financial stability and taxpayers. This should be achieved through constant compliance by credit institutions and investment firms with a TLAC minimum requirement as provided in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and a requirement for own funds and permissible liabilities as provided in Directive 2014/59/EU. Nothing should prevent competent authorities to set higher MREL levels than the minimum TLAC requirement.
2017/09/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 44 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 6
(6) The national rules adopted so far diverge significantly. The absence of harmonised Union rules creates uncertainty for issuing credit institutions, investment firms and investors alike and makes the application of the bail-in tool for cross- border institutions more difficult. This also results in competitive distortions on the internal market given that the costs for credit institutions and investment firms to comply with the subordination requirement established in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2014/59/EU and the costs borne by investors when buying debt instruments issued by credit institutions and investment firms may differ considerably across the Unand may therefore further reduce the effectiveness of a credible and effective bail-in regime as countries may use loopholes in existing legislation.
2017/09/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 45 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 8
(8) It is, therefore, necessary to remove the significant obstacles into the proper functioning of the bail-in regime in the internal market and avoid distortions of competition resulting from the absence of harmonised Union rules on bank creditors' hierarchy and to prevent such obstacles and distortions from arising in the future. Consequently, the appropriate legal basis for this Directive should be Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as interpreted in accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
2017/09/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 46 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 9
(9) In order to reduce to a minimum credit institutions and investment firms' costs of compliance with the subordination requirement and any negative impact on their funding costensure that the bail-in regime works effectively and to avoid the socialisation of losses, this Directive should not allow Member States to keep the existing class of unsecured senior debt, which has the highest insolvency ranking among debt instruments and is less costly for credit institutions and investment firms to issue than any other subordinated liabilities. It should, nevertheless,. It should require Member States to create a new asset class of 'non- preferred' senior debt which fulfils the subordination requirement and that should only be bailed-in during resolution after other capital instruments, but before other senior liabilities. Credit institutions and investment firms should remain free to issue debt in both classes while only the 'non-preferred' senior class should be eligible to meet the subordination requirement of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and of Directive 2014/59/EU. This should allow credit institutions and investment firms to use for their funding or any other operational reasons the less costly senior debt while issuing the new 'non-preferred' senior class for compliance with the subordination requireOnly professional clients should be allowed to purchase such instruments.
2017/09/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 61 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 12
(12) Since the objectives of this Directive, namely to lay down uniform rules for bank creditor hierarchy for the purposes of the Union recovery and resolution framework especially with regard to ensuring a credible bail-in regime, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale of the action, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.
2017/09/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 77 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 2
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 2 – point c a (new)
(ca) they can be sold only to professional clients as defined in point (10) of Article 4 (1) of Directive 2014/65/EU.
2017/09/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 78 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 2
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. In Member States where ordinary unsecured claims resulting from debt instruments with the highest priority ranking among debt instruments under national law governing normal insolvency proceedings, as it stood prior to the adoption of the legal instruments necessary to comply with [this Directive], are statutorily subordinated to other ordinary senior liabilities, Member States shall ensure that debt instruments that meet the conditions referred to in this paragraph rank pari passu with such statutorily subordinated senior unsecured debt instruments under national insolvency law.
2017/09/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 82 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 2
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 4
4. Member States shall ensure that their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings as they were adopted at [31 December 2016]in force on the day prior to the date of implementation of this directive in national law apply to ordinary unsecured claims resulting from debt instruments issued by entities referred to in points (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) prior to [the date of applicimplementation of this Directive – July 2017]."in national law.
2017/09/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 84 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 2
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Member States shall ensure that all debt instruments as defined in point (48) of Article 2(1) issued by entities referred to in points (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) after the date of implementation of this Directive shall comply with the criteria set out in points (a), (b), (c) and (c a) of paragraph 2.
2017/09/08
Committee: ECON