26 Amendments of Molly SCOTT CATO related to 2016/0365(COD)
Amendment 263 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 60
Recital 60
Amendment 279 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Each Member State shall designate one or more resolution authoritiesy that areis empowered to use the resolution tools and exercise the resolution powers as set out in this Regulation.
Amendment 282 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 3
Article 3 – paragraph 3
3. Where a resolution authority designated pursuant to paragraph 1 is entrusted with other functions, the Member State shall ensure the full operational independence of that resolution authority and shall put in place all necessary arrangements to avoid conflicts of interest between the functions entrusted to the resolution authority pursuant to this Regulation and all other functions entrusted to that authority.
Amendment 288 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 9 – introductory part
Article 3 – paragraph 9 – introductory part
9. Where a Member State designates more than one resolution authority pursuant to paragraph 1, tThe notification referred to in paragraph 8 shall include the following:
Amendment 289 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 9 – point a
Article 3 – paragraph 9 – point a
(a) thewhere the designated reasons justifylution authority combines other functions with those referred to ing that mis Regulatiple desigon, the reasons justifying that combination;
Amendment 290 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 9 – point b
Article 3 – paragraph 9 – point b
(b) the precise allocation of functions and responsibilities betweewithin those authorities;
Amendment 291 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 9 – point b a (new)
Article 3 – paragraph 9 – point b a (new)
(ba) the measures taken to ensure full operational independence in conformity with this Article;
Amendment 292 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 9 – point c
Article 3 – paragraph 9 – point c
(c) the way in which coordinationnflict of interest between them is ensuravoided;
Amendment 293 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 9 – point d
Article 3 – paragraph 9 – point d
Amendment 305 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 5 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. ESMA shall assess CCP recovery and resolution arrangements across the Union in terms of their aggregate effect on Union financial stability through regular stress-testing and crisis simulation exercises with respect to potential system-wide stress events. In exercising this role, ESMA shall ensure consistency with the assessments of the resilience of individual CCPs carried out pursuant to Article 21(6) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 with regard to the frequency and design of the tests and shall cooperate closely with the ESRB and competent authorities designated under Article 4 of Directive 2013/36/EU, including the ECB in carrying out its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism under Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, and any national competent authorities tasked with the supervision of CCPs. In areas where these arrangements are found to be wanting as a result of these comprehensive stress tests, the responsible institution or institutions will have to address the shortcomings and resubmit their arrangements for another round of stress tests within 6 months of the previous stress tests.
Amendment 306 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 5 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. ESMA shall assess CCP recovery and resolution arrangements across the Union in terms of their aggregate effect on Union financial stability through regular stress-testing and crisis simulation exercises with respect to potential system-wide stress events. In exercising this role, ESMA shall ensure consistency with the assessments of the resilience of individual CCPs carried out pursuant to Article 21(6) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 with regard to the frequency and design of the tests and shall cooperate closely with the ESRB and competent authorities designated under Article 4 of Directive 2013/36/EU, including the ECB in carrying out its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism under Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, and any national competent authorities tasked with the supervision of CCPs. In areas where these arrangements are found to be wanting as a result of these comprehensive stress tests, the responsible institution or institutions will have to address the shortcomings and resubmit their arrangements for another round of stress tests within 6 months of the previous stress tests.
Amendment 358 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 3
Article 10 – paragraph 3
3. When assessing the recovery plan, the competent authority shall take into consideration the CCP's capital structure, its default waterfall and whether it respects the general principle that losses should be distributed between CCPs, clearing members and clients as a function of their ability to monitor and manage risks, the level of complexity of the organisational structure and the risk profile of the CCP, and the impact that the implementation of the recovery plan would have on clearing members, their clients, financial markets served by the CCP and on the financial system as a whole.
Amendment 396 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 7 a (new)
Article 13 – paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. The resolution authority shall ensure that the resolution plan is compatible with resolution plans drawn up by the resolution authorities of the CCP's clearing members.
Amendment 459 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point c a (new)
Article 22 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point c a (new)
(ca) the CCP failed to implement one or more of the arrangements or measures required of it under point (a) of Article 9(1) within a specific timeframe;
Amendment 493 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 8
Article 27 – paragraph 8
8. National insolvency law rules relating to the voidability or unenforceability of legal acts detrimental to creditors shall not apply to transfers of assets, rights, obligations or liabilities from a CCP in relation to which resolution tools or government financial stabilisation tools are used.
Amendment 497 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 9 – introductory part
Article 27 – paragraph 9 – introductory part
9. The resolution authority may recover any reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the use of the resolution tools or powers or government financial stabilisation tools in any of the following ways:
Amendment 524 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 32 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
The resolution authority shall use the write-down and conversion tool in accordance with Article 33 in respect of instruments of ownership and debt instruments issued by the CCP in resolution or other unsecured liabilities other than initial margin in order to absorb losses, recapitalise that CCP or a bridge CCP, or to support the use of the sale of business tool.
Amendment 540 #
Proposal for a regulation
Title 5 – chapter 3 – section 7
Title 5 – chapter 3 – section 7
Amendment 542 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 45
Article 45
Amendment 552 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 46
Article 46
Amendment 553 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 47
Article 47
Amendment 560 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 60 – paragraph 1
Article 60 – paragraph 1
Where the resolution authority uses one or more resolution tools, it shallould aim to ensure that shareholders, creditors and, clearing participants do not incur: (a) clearing member,members and their clients do not incur greater losses than they would have incurred had the resolution authority not taken resolution action in relation to the CCP at the time the resolution authority considered that the conditions for resolution pursuant to Article 22(1) were met and had they instead been subject to all possible outstanding obligations pursuant to the CCP's recovery plan orand all other contractual arrangements in its operating rules; (b) of a clearing member, greater losses than they would have incurred had the CCP been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings including by taking account of its contractu for either a default or a non-default event and had the CCP been a gone concern with no residual franchise value and wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, properly taking into account any plausible adverse effects of systemic instability and market turmoil, including fire sales, replacement costs and the breakdown of entire segments of the financial marrangements in its operating rules.ket on the positions of the stakeholders in question. in the event of the default of a in an event other than the default
Amendment 570 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 61 – paragraph -1 (new)
Article 61 – paragraph -1 (new)
-1. For the purpose of informing stakeholders exposed to the CCP, the CCP shall produce a daily estimate of how losses would affect each category of creditor under extreme but plausible scenarios for a default and non-default event leading to the insolvency of the CCP. This estimate shall fully reflect the contractual arrangements governing the CCP's loss waterfall and be consistent with the margining and stress testing methodology used to fulfil the CCP's obligations under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.
Amendment 573 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 61 – paragraph 2 – point a
Article 61 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the treatment that shareholders, creditors and clearing participants would have received had the resolution authority not taken resolution action in relation to the CCP the resolution authority considered that the conditions for resolution pursuant to Article 22(1) were met, and they had instead been subject to possible outstanding obligations pursuant to the CCP's recovery plan or other arrangements in its operating rules or the CCP had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings as a gone concern with no residual franchise value, properly taking into account any plausible adverse effects of systemic instability and market turmoil, including fire sales, replacement costs and the breakdown of entire segments of the financial market on the positions of the stakeholders in question ;
Amendment 600 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 80 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 80 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 6a – paragraph 1 – point b – introductory part
Article 6a – paragraph 1 – point b – introductory part
(b) the suspension of the clearing obligation laid down in Article 4 for those specific classes of OTC derivatives is necessary to avoid a serious threat to financial stability in the Union in connection with the resolution of the CCP, in particular where both of the following criteria are met:
Amendment 605 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 80 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 80 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 6a – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
Article 6a – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
(ba) no alternative CCPs are available to offer the clearing service to the clearing participants of the CCP in resolution, or clearing members and clients are not operationally and technically able to meet within a reasonable timeframe all legal or operational requirements of those alternative CCPs