BETA

65 Amendments of Ernest URTASUN related to 2016/0361(COD)

Amendment 15 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
(2) The implementation of the TLAC standard in the Union needs to take account of the existing institution-specific minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities ('MREL') applicable to all Union credit institutions and investment firms as laid down in Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Union and of the Council12 . As TLAC and MREL pursue the same objective of ensuring that Union institutions have sufficient loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity, the two requirements should be complementary elements of a common framework. Operationally, the harmonised minimum level of the TLAC standard for G-SIIs ('TLAC minimum requirement') should be introduced in Union legislation through amendments to Regulation (EU) No 575/201313 , while the institution- specific add-on for G-SIIs and the institution-specific requirement for non- G-SIIs, referred to as minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities, should be addressed through targeted amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU and Regulation (EU) No 806/201414 . The relevant provisions of this Regulation as regards loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity of institutions should be applied together with those in the aforementioned pieces of legislation and in Directive 2013/36/EU15 in a consistent way. _________________ 12 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190 13 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p.1 14 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1 15 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 17 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3
(3) The absence of harmonised rules in the Member States participating in the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) in respect of the implementation of the TLAC standard would create additional costs and legal uncertainty for institutions and make the application of the bail-in tool for cross- border institutions more difficult. The absence of harmonised Union rules also results in competitive distortions on the internal market given that the costs for institutions to comply with the existing requirements and the TLAC standard may differ considerably across the participating Member States. It is therefore necessary to remove those obstacles to the functioning of the internal market and to avoid distortions of competition resulting from the absence of harmonised rules in respect of the implementation of the TLAC standard. Consequently, the appropriate legal basis for this Regulation is Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as interpreted in accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 21 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
(9) The MREL should allow institutions to absorb losses expected in resolution and recapitalise the institution post-resolution. The Board should, on the basis of the resolution strategy chosen by them, duly justify the imposed level of the MREL, in particular as regards the need and the level of the requirement referred to in Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU in the recapitalisation amount. As such, that level should be composed of the sum of the amount of losses expected in resolution that correspond to the institution's own funds requirements and the recapitalisation amount that allows the institution post- resolution to meet its own funds requirements necessary for being authorised to pursue its activities under the chosen resolution strategy. The MREL should be expressed as a percentage of the total risk exposure and leverage ratio measures, and institutions should meet the levels resulting from the two measurements simultaneously. The Board should be able to adjust the recapitalisation amounts in cases duly justified to adequately reflect also increased risks that affect resolvabiliupwards the recapitalisation amounts in order to add a safety marisging from the resolution group’s business model, funding profile and overall risk profile and therefore in such limited circumstances require that oreseen for covering costs that may arise from implementing either recapitalisation amounts referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 12d(3) and (4) are exceededsolution actions or a business reorganisation plan.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 22 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
(10) To enhance their resolvability, the Board should be able to impose an institution-specific MREL on G-SIIs, on G-SIIs and institutions not considered as less significant in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/20131 in addition to the TLAC minimum requirement provided in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. That institution-specific MREL may only be imposed where the TLAC minimum requirement ideemed by competent authorities as not sufficient to absorb losses and recapitalise a G-SII under the chosen resolution strategy. ________________ 1a Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 24 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
(11) When setting the level of MREL, the Board should consider the degree of systemic relevance of an institution and the potential adverse impact of its failure on the financial stability. The Board should take into account the need for a level playing field between G-SIIs and other comparable institutions with systemic relevance within the participating Member States such as O-SIIs and institutions not considered as less significant in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/20131 . Thus MREL of institutions that are not identified as G-SIIs but the systemic relevance within participating Member States of which is comparable to the systemic relevance of G- SIIs should not diverge disproportionately from the level and composition of MREL generally set for G- SIIs. ________________ 1a Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 27 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) Similarly to powers conferred to competent authorities by Directive 2013/36/EU, the Board should be allowed to impose higher levels of MREL while addressing in a more flexible manner any breaches of those levels, in particular by alleviating the automatic effects of those breaches in the form of limitations to the Maximum Distributable Amounts ('MDAs'). The Board should be able to give guidance to institutions to meet additional amounts to cover losses in resolution that are above the level of the own funds requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU, and/or to ensure sufficient market confidence in the institution post-resolution. To ensure consistency Directive 2013/36/EU, guidance to cover additional losses may only be given where the 'capital guidance' has been requested by the competent supervisory authorities in accordance with Directive 2013/36/EU and should not exceed the level requested in that guidance. For the recapitalisation amount, the level requested in the guidance to ensure market confidence should enable the institution to continue to meet the conditions for authorisation for an appropriate period of time including by allowing the institution to cover the costs related to the restructuring of its activities following resolution. The market confidence buffer should not exceed the combined capital buffer requirement under Directive 2013/36/EU unless a higher level is necessary to ensure that, following the event of resolution, the entity continues to meet the conditions for its authorisation for an appropriate period. Where an entity consistently failsFor the recapitalisation amount, the level requested in the guidance to ensure market confidence should enable the institution to continue to meet the conditions for authorisation for an appropriate period of time. Where an entity consistently fails to have additional own funds and eligible liabilities as expected under the guidance, it should be subject to partial limitations of the MDAs. Whenever the failure of an entity to have additional own funds and eligible liabilities as expected under the guidance, the Board should be able to require that the a lasts longer than six mount ofhs, the MREL be increased to cover the amount of the guidance. For the purposes of considering whether there is a consistent failure, the Board should take into account the entity's reporting on the MREL as required by Directive 2014/59/EUrelevant authorities should exercise their powers to address breaches of the MREL.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 29 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
(16) Any breaches of the TLAC minimum requirement and of the MREL should be appropriately addressed and remedied by competent authorities, resolution authorities and the Board. Given that a breach of those requirements cshould constitute an impediment to institution or group resolvability, the existing procedures to remove impediments to resolvability should be shortened to address any breaches of those requirements expediently. The Board should also be able to require institutions to modify the maturity profiles of eligible instruments and items and to prepare and implement plans to restore the level of those requirements within a pre-specified timeframe.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 32 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 7 – paragraph 4
2a. in Article 7, paragraph 4 is replaced by the following: "4. Where necessary to ensure the consistent application of high resolution standards under this Regulation, the Board mayshall: (a) further to the notification by a national resolution authority of a measure under paragraph 3 of this Article pursuant to Article 31(1), within the appropriate timeframeone week having regard to the urgency of the circumstances, issue a warning to the relevant national resolution authority where the Board considers that the draft decision with regard to any entity or group referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article does not comply with this Regulation or with its general instructions referred to in Article 31(1)(a); (b) at any time decide, in particular if its warning referred to in point (a) is not being appropriately addressed, on its own initiative, after consulting the national resolution authority concerned, or upon request from the national resolution authority concerned, to exercise directly all of the relevant powers under this Regulation also with regard to any entity or group referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article. " Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0806)
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 33 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 3 – point b a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 8 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 3
(ba) in paragraph 6, subparagraph 3 is replaced by the following: "When drawing up and updating the resolution plan, the Board shall identify any material impediments to resolvability and, where necessary and proportionappropriate, outline relevant actions for how those impediments could be addressed, in accordance with Article 10. Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0806)
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 34 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 3 – point b b (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 8 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 5 – point a
(a) any extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the Fund established in accordance with Article 67; bb) in paragraph 6, subparagraph 5, point a is replaced by the following: (a) any extraordinary public financial support to the entity under resolution or entities acquiring parts of its business besides the use of the Fund established in accordance with Article 67; Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0806)
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 35 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 3 – point b c (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 8 – paragraph 7
(bc) in Article 8, paragraph 7 is replaced by the following: "7. The resolution plan shall include an analysis of how and when an institution may apply, in the conditions addressed by the plan, for the use of central bank facilities and shall identify those assets which would be expected to qualify as collateral. while providing a prudent estimation of its average yearly value in aggregate for central bank liquidity purposes taking due account of relevant haircuts ." Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0806)
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 36 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 3 – point b d (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 8 – paragraph 9 – point i – point i
(i) any extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the Fund established in accordance with Article 67 bc) in paragraph 9, point i, point i is replaced by the following : "(i) any extraordinary public financial support to the entity under resolution or entities acquiring parts of its business besides the use of the Fund established in accordance with Article 67" Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0806)
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 37 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 3 – point c a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 8 – paragraph 9 – point p a (new)
(ca) In paragraph 9, the following point pa is inserted : (pa) a detailed and comprehensive list of capital and debt instruments per each ranking category as established according to national insolvency proceedings and of where available a detailed list of the holders of these instruments. The list shall be updated within 24 hours of any change to the liability structure and be made available to competent or resolution authorities within 24 hours of a request by such an authority.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 38 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 3 – point c b (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 8 – paragraph 9 a (new)
(cb) The following paragraph is inserted: 9a. The Board shall have the power to require an institution and an entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU to maintain detailed records of financial contracts to which it is a party. The Board shall specify a time-limit within which the institution or entity referred to those points is to be capable of producing those records. The same time-limit shall apply to all institutions and all entities referred to in those points under the Board’s jurisdiction. The Board may decide to set different time-limits for different types of financial contracts as referred to in Article 2(100) of the Directive 2014/59/EU. This paragraph shall not affect the information gathering powers of the competent authority.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 39 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 4 – point -a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 10 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
(-a) in paragraph 3, subparagraph 1 is replaced by the following: "3. When drafting a resolution plan, the Board shall assess the extent to which such an entity is resolvable in accordance with this Regulation. An entity shall be deemed to be resolvable if it is feasible and credible for the Board to either liquidate it under normal insolvency proceedings or to resolve it by applying to it resolution tools and exercising resolution powers while avoiding, to the maximum extent possible, any significant adverse consequences for financial systems, including circumstances of broader financial instability or system wide events, of the Member State in which the entity is situated, or other Member States, or the Union and with a view to ensuring the continuity of critical functions carried out by the entity. The assessment of resolvability shall in particular identify explicitly whether the institutions shall be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or whether it shall be subject to the resolution tools established by this Directive. The assessment of resolvability shall also indicate whether given specific the characteristics of the institution a resolution action is expected to be necessary in the public interest pursuant to Article 32 whenever the institution is failing or likely to fail. An institution or a group shall be deemed to be non-resolvable if any of the information required pursuant to Article 8, (9) and (9a) cannot be provided to the standard deemed necessary by the Board." Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0806)
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 40 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 4 – point c
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 10 – paragraph 9 – subparagraph 1 a
Where an impediment to resolvability is due to a a situationithin three months from the date of receipt of the report, the entity or the parent undertaking shall propose to the Board possible measures to address or remove the substantive impediments identified in the report. The Board shall communicate any measure proposed by the entity or parent undertaking to the competent authorities, to EBA and, where significant branches of institutions that are not part of a group are located in non- participating Member States, to the resolution authorities of those Member States. Where an impediment to resolvability is due a failure to comply with the requirement of Articles 12c to 12f and with the requirement as referred to in Article 141a(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU, the Union parent undertaking shall propose to the Board possible measures to address or remove within one year the impediment identified in accordance with the first subparagraph within two weeks of the date of receipt of a notification made in accordance with paragraph 7 to ensure that the institution complies with Articles 12c to 12f and the requirement referred to in Article 128(6) of Directive2013/36/EU.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 42 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 4 – point c a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 10 – paragraph 10 – subparagraph 2
In identifying alternative measures, the Board shall(ca) in paragraph 10, subparagraph 2 is replaced by the following: The entity or parent undertaking shall have the right to demonstrate how the measures proposed by the institutionreferred to in paragraph 9 would not be able to remove the impediments to resolvability and how the alternative measures proposed are proportionateby the Board are more burdensome than necessary in removing them. The Board shall take into account the threat to financial stability of those impediments to resolvability and the effect of the measures on the business of the institution, its stability and its ability to contribute to the economy, on the internal market for financial services and on the financial stability in other Member States and the Union as a whole. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0806&from=EN)" Or. en
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 43 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 4 – point c b (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 10 – paragraph 11 – point i
(i) to require an entity to issue eligible liabilities to meet the requirements of Article 12; (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0806&from=EN)cb) in paragraph 11, point i is replaced by the following: "(i) to require within a specified timeframe an entity to issue eligible liabilities to meet the requirements of Article 12g and Article 12h; Or. en
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 44 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 4 – point c c (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 10 – paragraph 11 – point j
(cc) in paragraph 11, point j is replaced by the following: (j) to require an entity to take other steps to meet the requirements referred to in Article 12g and Article 12h, including in particular to attempt to renegotiate any eligible liability, Additional Tier 1 instrument or Tier 2 instrument it has issued, with a view to ensuring that any decision of the Board to write down or convert that liability or instrument would be effected under the law of the jurisdiction governing that liability or instrument. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0806&from=EN)" Or. en
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 45 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 4 – point e
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 10 – paragraph 11 – point k
(k) require an entity to submit within three weeks, a plan to restore within one year compliance with Articles 12g and 12h, and the requirement referred to in Article 128(6) of Directive 2013/36/EU;
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 46 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 4 – point e
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 10 – paragraph 11 – point l
(l) require within three weeks an entity to change the maturity profile of items referred to in Article 12c and points (a) and (b) of Article 12h(3) to ensure continuous compliance with Article 12g and Article 12h.;
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 52 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 c – paragraph 2 – point c a (new)
(ca) the entity has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the resolution authority that the instrument is sufficiently loss absorbing and can be bailed-in without undue complexity.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 56 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 – introductory part
The Board's decision under this paragraph shall contain the reasons for that decision on the basis of the following elements. Such reasons shall be limited to:
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 57 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 – point c
(c) the amount of subordinated liabilities shall not exceed the amount necessary to ensure that creditors referred to in point (b) shall not incur losses above the level of losses that they would otherwise have incurred in a winding up under normal insolvency proceedings.deleted
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 67 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 d – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) the entity or its subsidiaries that are institutions, but not resolution entities are recapitalised to a level necessary to enable them to continue to comply with the conditions for authorisation and carry out the activities for which they are authorised under Directive 2013/36/EU, Directive 2014/65/EU or equivalent legislation ('recapitalisation') in addition to a safety margin determined by the resolution authority as provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article ;
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 71 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 d – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Where the resolution plan provides that the entity shall be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, the requirement referred to in Article 12a(1)for that entity shall not exceed an amount sufficient to absorb losses in accordance with point (a) of the first subparagraphvability assessment concludes that liquidation of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings is feasible and credible, the recapitalisation amount shall be zero, unless the resolution authority determines that a positive amount is necessary on the grounds that liquidation would not achieve the resolution objectives to the same extent as an alternative resolution strategy.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 76 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 d – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point a – point i
(i) the amount of losses that may need to be absorbed in resolution that corresponds to the requirements referred to in Article 92(1)(a),(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Article 104a and 104b of Directive 2013/36/EU of the resolution entity at sub-consolidated resolution group level, as well as the combined buffer requirements as defined in Article 128(1)(6) of Directive 2013/36/EU or any higher amount necessary to comply with the Basel I floor according to Article 500 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 78 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 d – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point a – point ii
(ii) a recapitalisation amount that allows the resolution group resulting from resolution to restore its total capital ratio referred in Article 92(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and its requirement referred to in Article 104a and 104b of Directive 2013/36/EU at resolution group sub- consolidated level in accordance with the resolution actions foreseen in the resolution plan in addition to a safety margin determined by the Board as provided for in the last subparagraph of this paragraph;
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 85 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 d – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4
The Board shall set the recapitalisation amounts referred to in the previous subparagraphs in accordance with the resolution actions foreseen in the resolution plan and may adjuin order to enable the entity to cover any additional losses or costs those recapitalisation amounts to adequately reflect risks that affect resolvability arising from the resolution group’s business model, funding profile and overall risk profiat may arise following the Board’s exercise of the power under Article 21 or in relation to the implementation of the business reorganisation plan by the resolution entity (“safety margin”). When estimating the institution’s regulatory capital needs after implementation of the preferred resolution strategy, the Board shall use the most recent reported values for the relevant total risk exposure amount or leverage ratio denominator, as applicable.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 87 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 d – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4 a (new)
The Board shall adjust the amount of losses to be absorbed referred to in the previous subparagraphs taking into account information requested from the competent authority relating to the institution’s business model, funding model, and risk profile, and in order to reduce or remove an impediment to resolvability or absorb losses on holdings of MREL instruments issued by other group entities as well as whenever the combined buffer requirement is assessed not to be relevant to the need to ensure losses can be absorbed in resolution.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 89 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 d – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Without prejudice to the last subparagraph, for entities that are not themselves resolution entities, the amount referred to in paragraph 2 shall not exceedat least amount to the greater of any of the following:
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 92 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 d – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – point a – point i
(i) the amount of losses to be absorbed in resolution that corresponds to the requirements referred to in Article 92(1)(a),(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Article 104a and 104b of Directive 2013/36/EU of the entity as well as the combined buffer requirements as defined in Article 128(1)(6) of Directive 2013/36/EU or any higher amount necessary to comply with the Basel I floor according to Article 500 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, and
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 94 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
(ii) a recapitalisation amount that allows the entity to restore its total capital ratio referred in Article 92(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and its requirement referred to in Article 104a and 104b of Directive 2013/36/EU in accordance with the resolution plan in addition to a safety margin determined by the resolution authority as provided for in the last subparagraph of paragraph 3 of this Article ; or
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 99 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 d – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 4
The Board shall set the recapitalisation amounts referred to in this paragraph in accordance with the resolution actions foreseen in the resolution plan and may adjust upwards those recapitalisation amounts to adequately reflect risks that affect the recapitalisation needs arising from the entity's business model, funding profile and overall risk profiin order to ensure that the resolution group resulting from resolution has sufficient resources in order to cover any additional costs that may arise from implementing either resolution actions or the business reorganisation plan (“safety margin”). When estimating the institution’s regulatory capital needs after implementation of the preferred resolution strategy, the resolution authority shall use the most recent reported values for the relevant total risk exposure amount or leverage ratio denominator, as applicable.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 101 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5 (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 d – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 4 a (new)
The Board shall adjust the amount of losses to be absorbed referred to in the previous subparagraphs taking into account information requested from the competent authority relating to the institution’s business model, funding model and risk profile, and in order to reduce or remove an impediment to resolvability or absorb losses on holdings of MREL instruments issued by other group entities as well as whenever the combined buffer requirement is assessed not to be relevant to the need to ensure losses can be absorbed in resolution.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 102 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 d – paragraph 5 – introductory part
5. Where the Board expects that certain classes of eligible liabilities might be excluded from bail-in under Article 27(5) or might be transferred to a recipient in full under a partial transfer, the requirement referred to in Article 12a(1) shall not exceed an amount sufficient toat least:
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 103 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 d – paragraph 6
6. The Board's decision to impose a minimum requirement of own funds and eligible liabilities under this Article shall contain the reasons for that decision, including a full assessment of the elements referred to in paragraphs 2 to 5, in particular as regards the need and the level of the requirement referred to in Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU in the recapitalisation amount.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 108 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 d – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 2 – point a
(a) be less than20 per cent of a prudent estimate of the potential losses which the deposit guarantee scheme would have had to bear, had the institution been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, taking into account the priority ranking of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 108 of Directive 2014/59/EU;
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 110 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 e – title
Determination of the requirement for entities that are G-SIIs, O-SIIs and institutions not considered as less significant in accordance with Article 6(4) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 111 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 e – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. The minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities of a resolution entity that is a G-SII or part of a G-SII a O-SIIs and institutions subject to direct supervision by the SSM or part of a G-SII or a O-SIIs and institutions not considered as less significant in accordance with Article 6(4) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013shall consist of:
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 114 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 e – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) where the requirement referred to in point (a) of paragraph 1 is not likely to be insufficient to fulfil the conditions set out in Article 12d; and
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 115 #
3. The decision of the Board to impose an additional requirement of own funds and eligible liabilities under point (b) of paragraph 1 shall contain the reasons for that decision, including a full assessment of the elements referred to in paragraph 2.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 121 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 f – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
The Board mayshall give guidance to an entity to have own funds and eligible liabilities that fulfil the conditions of Article 12c and Article 12h(3) in excess of the levels set out in Article 12d and Article 12e for amounts for the following purposes:
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 126 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 f – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
The amount of the guidance given in accordance with point (a) of paragraph 1 may be set only where the competent authority has already set its own guidance in accordance with Article 104b of Directive 2013/36/EU and shall not exceed the level of that guidance.deleted
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 129 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 f – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
The amount of the guidance given in accordance with point (b) of paragraph 1 shall not exceedbe equal to the amount of the combined buffer requirement referred to in point (6) of Article 128 of Directive 2013/36/EU, except for the requirement referred to in point (a) of that provision unless a higher level is necessary to ensure that, following the event of resolution, the entity continues to meetunless a higher or lower level is appropriate to sustain market confidence and ensure both the continued provision of critical economic functions by the institution and the access to funding without recourse to extraordinary financial support other thean conditributions for its authorisation for an appropriate period of time that is not longer than one yearrom resolution financing arrangements, consistently with Article 101(2) and Article 44(5) and (8) of Directive 2014/59/EU.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 130 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
The resolution authority shall provide to the entity the reasons and a full assessment for the need and the level of thefor the need for guidance given in accordance with this Article.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 134 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 f – paragraph 3
3. Where an entity consistently failsthe failure of an entity to have additional own funds and eligible liabilities as expected under the guidance referred to in the first paragraph, the Board may require that the alasts longer than six mount ofhs, the requirement referred to in Article 12d(2) be increased to cover the guidance given pursuant to thisBoard shall exercise its powers under Article 12g.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 137 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 f – paragraph 4
4. An entity that fails failure by an entity to have additional own funds and eligible liabilities as expected under the guidance referred to in the first paragraph, shall not be subject to the restrictions referred to in Article 141 of Directive 2013/36/EU with the short fall relative to the guidance amount multiplied by a factor G being treated as a shortfall relative to requirements in Articles 12c, 12d and 12e. The factor G shall be calculated as m /6 where m is the number of days that have elapsed since the guidance was provided divided by 30.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 159 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 j – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Any breach of the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities by an entity shall be addressed by the Board and other relevant authorities through at least one of the following means:The Board and the other resolution authorities shall monitor on a monthly basis the fulfilment of the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities and shall inform the competent authority of any breaches or other relevant events that may affect the fulfilment of the requirement. Any breach of the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities by an entity shall be subject to the restrictions referred to in Article 141 of Directive 2013/36/EU. In addition to the first subparagraph, the relevant authorities shall address any breach of the above requirement within a specified timeframe that cannot extend three months, on the basis of at least one of the following: Failure to meet the requirement set by Articles 12c to 12h by an entity shall be considered to constitute a significant impediment to resolvability for the purpose of Article10.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 160 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 j – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) early intervention measures in accordance with Article 13 to 13b;
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 162 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 j a (new)
Article 12ja Transitional Period 1. The Board, after consulting the relevant competent authorities, including the ECB, shall set the transitional period for compliance with the MREL requirements as defined in Articles 12g and 12h. 2. The transitional period referred to in paragraph 1 shall end not later than 1 January 2022.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 164 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5 a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 13 – paragraph 1
5a. in Article 13 paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: "1. TWhe ECB or national competent authorities shall inform the Board of any measure thatre an entity or group referred to in Article 7(2)(a) infringes due to, inter alia, a rapidly deteriorating financial condition, including deteriorating liquidity situation, increasing level of leverage, non-performing loans or concentration of exposures, as assessed on a weekly basis on the basis of a set of triggers, which shall include the institution’s own funds requirement plus 1,5 percentage points, or is likely in the near future to infringe they require an institution or group to take or that they take themselves pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, to Article 27(1) or Article 28 or 29 of Directive 2014/59/EU, or to Article 104 of Directive 2013/36/EU. The Board shall notify the Commission of any information which it has ments of Regulation (EU) No575/2013, Directive 2013/36/EU, Title II of Directive 2014/65/EU or any of Articles 3 to 7, Articles 14 to 17, and Articles 24, 25 and 26 of Council Regulation (EU) No1024/2013 or if its annual earnings before interest and tax is bigger than its risk adjusted cost of capital, the ECB shall apply without prejudice to the measures referred to in Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 where applicable, at least the following measures: (a) require the management body of the institution to implement one or more of the arrangements or measures set out in the recovery plan or to update such a recovery plan when the circumstances that led to the early intervention are different from the assumptions set out in the initial recovery plan and implement one or more of the arrangements or measures set out in the updated plan within a specific timeframe and in order to ensure that the conditions referred to in the introductory phrase no longer apply; (b) require the management body of the institution to convene, or if the management body fails to comply with that requirement convene directly, a meeting of shareholders of the institution, and in both cases set the agenda and require ceived pursuant to the first subparagraph. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0806)rtain decisions to be considered for adoption by the shareholders; (c) require the management body of the institution to draw up a plan for negotiation on restructuring of debt with some or all of its creditors according to the recovery plan, where applicable; (d) require changes to the legal structures of the institution." Or. en
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 165 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5 b (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
From the date of receipt of the information referred to in paragraph 1, and without prejudice to the powers of t5b. in Article 13(2), first subparagraph is replaced by the following: "The ECB andor national competent authorities in accordance with other Union law, the Board may prepare forshall inform the Board of any measure that they resolution of thequire an institution or group concerned. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0806&from=EN)to take or that they take themselves pursuant toArticle13(1) or Articles 13(a) or 13(b) of this Regulation or to Article 27(1) or Article 28 or 29 of Directive 2014/59/EU," Or. en
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 166 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5 c (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 13 a (new)
5c. the following Article is inserted Article 13a Removal of senior management and management body Where there is a significant deterioration in the financial situation of an institution or where there are serious infringements of law, of regulations or of the statutes of the institution, or serious administrative irregularities, the ECB may require the removal of the senior management or management body of the institution, in its entirety or with regard to individuals. The appointment of the new senior management or management body shall be done in accordance with national and Union law and be subject to the approval or consent of the ECB.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 167 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5 d (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 13 b (new)
5d. the following Article is inserted : Article 13b Temporary administrator 1. The ECB may, based on what is appropriate in the circumstances, appoint any temporary administrator either to replace the management body of the institution temporarily or to work temporarily with the management body of the institution and the ECB shall specify its decision at the time of appointment. If the ECB appoints a temporary administrator to work with the management body of the institution, the ECB shall further specify at the time of such an appointment the role, duties and powers of the temporary administrator and any requirements for the management body of the institution to consult or to obtain the consent of the temporary administrator prior to taking specific decisions or actions. The ECB shall be required to make public the appointment of any temporary administrator except where the temporary administrator does not have the power to represent the institution. Any temporary administrator shall have the qualifications, ability and knowledge required to carry out his or her functions and be free of any conflict of interests. 2. The ECB shall specify the powers of the temporary administrator at the time of the appointment of the temporary administrator based on what is proportionate in the circumstances. Such powers may include some or all of the powers of the management body of the institution under the statutes of the institution and under national law, including the power to exercise some or all of the administrative functions of the management body of the institution. The powers of the temporary administrator in relation to the institution shall comply with the applicable company law. 3. The role and functions of the temporary administrator shall be specified by the ECB at the time of appointment and may include ascertaining the financial position of the institution, managing the business or part of the business of the institution with a view to preserving or restoring the financial position of the institution and taking measures to restore the sound and prudent management of the business of the institution. The ECB shall specify any limits on the role and functions of the temporary administrator at the time of appointment. 4. The ECB shall have the exclusive power to appoint and remove any temporary administrator. The ECB may remove a temporary administrator at any time and for any reason. The ECB may vary the terms of appointment of a temporary administrator at any time subject to this Article. 5. The ECB may require that certain acts of a temporary administrator be subject to the prior consent of the ECB. The ECB shall specify any such requirements at the time of appointment of a temporary administrator or at the time of any variation of the terms of appointment of a temporary administrator. In any case, the temporary administrator may exercise the power to convene a general meeting of the shareholders of the institution and to set the agenda of such a meeting only with the prior consent of the ECB. 6. The ECB may require that a temporary administrator draws up reports on the financial position of the institution and on the acts performed in the course of its appointment, at intervals set by the ECB and at the end of his or her mandate. 7. The appointment of a temporary administrator shall not last more than one year.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 168 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5 e (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
5e. in Article 14(2), subparagraph 2 is replaced by the following: "When pursuing the objectives referred to in the first subparagraph, the Board, the Council, the Commission and, where relevant, the national resolution authorities, shall seek to minimise the cost of resolution and avoid destruction of value unless necessary to achieve the resolution objectives. , while taking due account of the likelihood of public funds being used when resolution is not triggered inter alia the context of liquidation state aid provided due to serious impact of related measures adopted for the regional economy. ." Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0806)
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 169 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5 f (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 14 – paragraph 3
5f. in Article 14, paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: "3. Subject to different provisions of this Regulation, the resolution objectives are of equal significance, and shall be balanced, as appropriate, to the nature and circumstances of each case and shall in particular consider the likely requirement for public support in insolvency ." Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0806)
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 171 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 7
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – point b
7. 'Relevant capital instruments' in point (b) of Article 18(1) is replaced by 'relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities'.deleted
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 172 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 7 a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – point b
7a. in Article 18, paragraph 1, point (b) is replaced by the following: "(b) having regard to timing and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measures, including measures by an IPS, or supervisory action, including early intervention measures or the write-down or conversion of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities in accordance with Article 21, taken in respect of the entity, would prevent its failure within a reasonable timeframe; , that shall not exceed 3 months;" Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0806)
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 173 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 7 b (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18 – paragraph 4 – point c
(c) the entity7b. in Article 18, paragraph 1, point (c) is replaced by the following: (c) the institution is, or there are objective elements to support a determination that the entityinstitution will, in the near futurext 30 days, be unable to pay its debts or other liabilities as they fall due;
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 174 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 7 c (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18 – paragraph 4
7bc. in Article 18, paragraph 4 is replaced by the following: "4. For the purposes of point (a) of paragraph 1, the entity shall be deemed to be failing or to be likely to fail in one or more of the following circumstances: (a) the entity infringes, or there are objective elements to support a determination that the institution will, in the near futurext thirty days , infringe the requirements for continuing authorisation in a way that would justify the withdrawal of the authorisation by the ECB, including but not limited to the fact that the institution has incurred or is likely to incur losses that will deplete all or a significant amount of its own funds; (aa) where there is no reasonable prospect of the institution complying with the amount of eligible liabilities and own funds held by the institution required in accordance with Articles 45c to 45 g following a failure to comply with the restoration plan provided for in Article 17(5)h1 of Directive 2014/59/EU; (b) the assets of the entity are, or there are objective elements to support a determination that the assets of the entity will, in the near futurext 30 days, be less than its liabilities; (c) the entity is, or there are objective elements to support a determination that the entity will, in the near futurext 30 days , be unable to pay its debts or other liabilities as they fall due; (d) extraordinary public financial support is required except where, in order to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State and preserve financial stability, that extraordinary public financial support takes any of the following forms: (i) a State guarantee to back liquidity facilities provided by central banks in accordance with the central banks' conditions; (ii) a State guarantee of newly issued liabilities; or (iii) an injection of own funds or purchase of capital instruments of institutions subject to public ownership at prices and on terms that do not confer an advantage upon the entity, where neither the circumstances referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of this paragraph nor the circumstances referred to in Article 21(1) are present at the time the public support is granted. In each of the cases referred to in points (i), (ii) and (iii) of point (d) of the first subparagraph, the guarantee or equivalent measures referred to therein shall be confined to solvent entities and shall be conditional on final approval under the Union State aid framework. Those measures shall be of a precautionary and temporary nature and shall be proportionate to remedy the consequences of the serious disturbance and shall not be used to offset losses that the entity has incurred or is likely to incur in the near futurext 30 days . Support measures under point (d)(iii) of the first subparagraph shall be limited to injections necessary to address capital shortfall established in the national, Union or SSM-wide stress tests, asset quality reviews or equivalent exercises conducted by the ECB, EBA or national authorities, where applicable, confirmed by the competent authority. If the Commission submits a legislative proposal pursuant to Article 32(4) of Directive 2014/59/EU, it shall, if appropriate, submit a legislative proposal amending this Regulation in the same way. " Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0806)
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 179 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 9 b (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 27 – paragraph 3 a (new)
9b. In Article 27, paragraph 3a is inserted : 3a. Member States shall prohibit the institutions or entities referred to in points (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) from making any suggestion, communication or representation that a liability other than those listed in points (a) to (g) of paragraph 2 of this Article would not be subject to write-down or conversion powers. Any breach to such prohibition shall by subject penalties in accordance with Chapter VI.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 180 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 9 c (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 27 – paragraph 3 b (new)
9c. In Article 27, paragraph 3b is inserted : 3b. Member States shall ensure that, for the purposes of Article 25 of Directive 2014/65/EU the debt instruments referred to in paragraph 2 of Article108 are considered complex and that the provisions in that Directive concerning conflict of interest are strictly enforced in relation to the sale of such instruments to existing clients of the issuing institution. The Board shall ensure that investment firms are regarded as not fulfilling their obligations under Directive 2014/65/EU where they pay or are paid any fee or commission, or provide or are provided with any non-monetary benefit or whenever they do not disclose specific internal sales guidelines in connection with the marketing of senior non- preferred debt to investors not qualifying as professionals under that Directive.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 181 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 9 d (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 27 – paragraph 3 c (new)
9d. In Article 27, paragraph 3c is inserted : 3c. The Board shall as part of the assessment of resolvability in accordance with Articles 15 and 16 monitor the extent to which debt instruments susceptible to bail-in are held by investors that do not qualify as professional investors according to Directive 2014/65/EU and report the results to EBA at least once per year. EBA shall disclose annually on a group or, where relevant, institution specific basis the amounts of debt instruments susceptible to bail-in that are held by investors that do not qualify as professional investors. Where, on the basis of this information, EBA deems it necessary, it shall issue warnings or recommendations for remedial action.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 182 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 9 e (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 90 a (new)
9e. the following Article is inserted: Article 90a Post Resolution Public Transparency After the financial institution to which resolution actions have been applied ceases to meet the conditions for resolution, and after the conclusion of any insolvency proceeding relating to that institution or institutions resulting from the resolution actions, the Board shall without delay make publically available a suitably aggregated balance sheet valued according to the principles set out in this regulation at the moment the decision to resolve the institution was taken, clearly showing the net asset value of the institution and the value of the classes of assets and liabilities. In addition, the Board shall publish the total amount of losses born by the different classes of creditors where bail-in was applied, the amount and sources of funding used in the resolution process, and the proceeds of any sales of business units or assets.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON