BETA

28 Amendments of Ernest URTASUN related to 2017/2072(INI)

Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 4 a (new)
- having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank of 8 November 2017 on amendments to the Union framework for capital requirements of credit institutions and investment firms (CON/2017/46),
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 4 b (new)
- having regard to the ESRB report on Financial Stability Implications of IFRS of 9July 2017,
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 25 a (new)
- having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank of 8 November 2017 on revisions to the Union crisis management framework (CON/2017/47),
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 25 b (new)
- having regard to the European Commission’s withdrawal of the proposal on structural measures improving the resilience of EU credit institutions COM(2014)0043,
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 25 c (new)
- having regard to the European Commission’s April infringements package:key decisions (MEMO/17/1045),
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 25 d (new)
- having regard to the EBA Risk Dashboard, the ESMA Report on Trends, Risks and Vulnerabilities No. 2, 2017, the ESRB Risk Dashboard, the ESRB Annual Report 2016, ESRB Review of Macro- prudential Policy in the EU of April 2017 and the EU Shadow Banking Monitor No. 2 of May 2017,
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
A a. whereas, even though there is an urgent need to limit the damage due to failures within the current structure of the banking system, structural reforms aimed at reducing a priori the systemic risks due to interconnections and complexity, underpinning the “too big to fail problem”, would be much more effective;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 115 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. Reiterates the need to accompany any action on the regulation of the banking sector by appropriate regulation of the shadow banking sector; regrets that the Commission failed to address the issue in its replies to last year’s report 1a; takes note of the 2017 EU Shadow Banking Monitor by the ESRB that underlines several risks and vulnerabilities which need to be monitored in the EU shadow banking system including liquidity risk and risks associated with leverage among some types of investment funds, interconnectedness and contagion risk, pro-cyclicality, leverage and liquidity risk created through the use of derivatives and securities financing transactions as well as vulnerabilities in some parts of the other financial institutions sector, where significant data gaps prevent definitive risk assessments; calls, therefore, for coordinated action to address these risks in order to ensure fair competition and financial stability; _________________ 1aEuropean Parliament, Resolution of 15 February 2017 on ‘Banking Union – Annual Report 2016’, paragraph 9.
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Reiterates its concerns about the high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that ‘Member States and banks themselves have a primary responsibility in tackling non-performing loans’4 ; welcomes, nonetheless, the work done by different EU institutions and bodies on this issue; supports, in this respect, the Commission’s decision to explore the potential harmonisation in prudential terms at EU level of new loans that become non-performing in order to ensure sufficient and timely provisioning levels for NPLs across Member States and banks, which will also help ensure a level playing field for banks in the Banking Union; looks forward to the results of the work on a EU insolvency framework aimed at renegotiating the conditions of the loans and safeguarding the most vulnerable debtors such as SMEs and households; calls on these actors and the Member States to duly implement the Council conclusions of 11 July 2017 on the action plan to tackle non-performing loans in Europe; _________________ 4 Commission communication on completing the Banking Union, 11 October 2017, p. 15 (COM(2017)0592).
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Points out that the European Commission referred Croatia, Cyprus, Portugal and Spain to the Court of Justice for failing to fully enact the Mortgage Credit Directive (2014/17/EU), a failure which resulted in the their citizens not being able to benefit from the protection guaranteed by the Directive when taking out their mortgage loans or when they experience difficulties repaying it;notes with concern that, in Spain alone, since the beginning of the crisis 500.000 families have lost their houses and are still paying the debt to the bank due to the foreclosure law;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 155 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly invested in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessive ‘home bias’ while one of the main objectives of the BU is to break the bank-sovereign-risk nexus; considers, therefore, as a potential solution charging capital on banks’ sovereign portfolios in proportion to the extent to which they deviate from an EU sovereign benchmark portfolio representing a well- diversified holding of such assets; takes note, in this respect, of the Commission’s ongoing work on the idea of so-called sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS) as a possible way of addressing the issue;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 172 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Welcomes the work done by the ECB to assess the adequacy of internal models, including its new guide to the TRIM, with a view to addressing the variability in risk-weights applied to risk- weighted assets of the same class across credit institutions; calls for a rapid conclusion of negotiations on output floors within the BCBS;Is concerned about the conclusion of the research of the Economic Governance Support Unit of the European Parliament that either the internal market risk models currently used by European banks strongly violate the Level Playing Field Principle or the results of the 2016 EBA benchmarking study on internal models for market risk (MR) are incorrect;2a Welcomes the work done by the ECB to assess the adequacy of internal models, including its new guide to the TRIM, with a view to addressing the variability in risk-weights applied to risk- weighted assets of the same class across credit institutions; calls for a rapid conclusion of negotiations on output floors within the BCBS; asks the Commission to push for the consideration in the BCBS framework of the prudent restriction of internal models for regulatory capital calculation and concommitent increased use of better designed regulatory formulae as backstops to improve the level playing field; is concerned about persisting options and national discretions (ODN) in the EU financial legislation; notes the different exercise of capital buffers in Member States; asks for more harmonization to achieve a level playing field; _________________ 2a"What conclusions can be drawn from the EBA 2016 Market Risk Benchmarking Exercise?", October 2017, Economic Governance Support Unit.
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 196 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Welcomes the banking reform package proposed by the Commission in November 2016; underlines the importance of the fast-track procedure for the phasing- in of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 in order to avoid cliff effects on the regulatory capital of credit institutions; notes, however, the opinions of ECB and EBA that a transitional should not lead to unduly delay the positive effect of IFRS 9 on banks’ timely risk provisioning; supports the efforts made to reduce the reporting burden for smaller banks; is concerned, however, about the proposed amendments to the waivers in Articles 7 and 8 of the CRR, and more generally, about the proposed shift in the home-host balance; is concerned that deviations from FRTB delay the full implementation of higher capital requirements for market risks; is concerned that the overall effect of the Commission’s banking reform package on banks’ capital requirements is unclear due to the absence of a proper impact assessment;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 209 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Points out that the purpose of the Maximum Distributable Amount (MDA) is to ensure that the distribution of profits does not jeopardise the regulatory capital position of a credit institution; is concerned that the introduction of capital guidance might encourage supervisors to reclassify Pillar 2 capital requirements as Pillar 2 capital guidance so as to allow distributions; calls therefore for clear incentives for banks to comply in a timely manner with guidance such as progressive increases in restrictions on distributions proportional to the time since the guidance was established;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 213 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6b. Reiterates the need to strengthen macro-prudential policy at the European level in order to address cross-border spillovers of systemic risk; looks forward to the Commission overall review of the macroprudential framework promised for 2017, that shall, as expressed in the previous report 3a, establish an effective and coherent macro-prudential supervision clearly stipulating, among others, the interaction of macro- prudential and microprudential policy instruments; is, thus, concerned that prior to the conclusion of the above framework the Commission proposal in the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD V) explicitly bars competent authorities from imposing Pillar 2 capital requirements to cover macro-prudential or systemic risks potentially leaving such risks undercapitalised in the interim; re-iterates the need to enhance ESRB institutional and analytical capacity to assessing risks and vulnerabilities beyond the banking sector, as for instance by looking carefully at the insurance sector which is becoming increasingly involved in financial services originally provided by banks; recalls that the ESRB should address the interconnectedness of financial markets and any other systemic risk affecting the stability of financial markets, including preventing large fluctuations in the financial cycle and developing tools such as the systemic risk index; further considers that borrowing based instrument (such as LTVs and DSTIs) should be embedded in European legislation to ensure harmonisation in the use of this additional type of macro- prudential instruments; stresses that the SSM should also focus on financial risks related to climate change, specifically potential threat to financial stability posed by so-called “stranded assets”; deplores the ad-hoc evaluation which has been applied in one selective case by the SSM in the stress test exercise, which lead to the inclusion in the starting level of capitalisation of Deutsche Bank of a sale of assets which had not fully materialised by 31 December 2015, and therefore it appears in contradiction with the Common Methodology for the 2016 EU stress test; considers that to ensure a level playing fields exceptions which are not going to be included in the stress test results following negative opinion from the NCA, should be communicated to the EBA and the SSM; is of the opinion that to enhance the systems of check and balance, the SSM should have the right to vote in the EBA board while EBA should express motivated technical opinion on SSM decisions related to the EBA set of competences; considers that the opacity surrounding financial conditions of those banks which are not covered by the stress tests and the lack of transparency characterising the ECB’s own stress test for additional banks under its supervision, imply uncertainty in supervisory practices and can lead to undermining, rather than enhancing, market confidence; reiterates the need to ensure higher transparency in the SREP cycle and on the full set of supervisory practices; regrets that EBA has failed to provide RTSs on condition of capital requirements for mortgage exposure under Articles124 (4) (b) and 164 (6) CRR; stresses that the different viewpoints regarding the micro prudential or the macro prudential concerns signals that the double majority requirements in the EBA boards between SSM members and countries outside the SSM, undermine en efficient decision- making process; stresses, however, the need to streamline and clarify the framework to ensure effective interaction of macro-prudential and micro-prudential policy instruments; _________________ 3aEuropean Parliament, Resolution of 15 February 2017 on ‘Banking Union – Annual Report 2016’paragraph 48
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 259 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Is concerned about the high number of legal applications lodged before the General Court of the EU in relation to the Banco Popular Español S.A. case; asks the Commission to assess whether this could endanger the effectiveness of the new resolution regime; calls on the SRB and the Commission to provide more transparency in future resolution decisions, including access, under appropriate conditions, by Members of the Parliament to key documents informing resolution decisions such as the valuation reports by independent valuers such as that produced by Deloitte in the case of Banco Popular; stresses, in this respect, that the justification of decisions including the application of proportionality may only be challenged on the basis that the decision was arbitrary and unreasonable at the time it was taken, based on the information then readily available and shall not lead to an excessive burden of proof to be met by the relevant authorities in litigation proceedings that would deter regulatory action and render the resolution framework in effect inapplicable;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 269 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Notes that, while the concern about the mismatch between state aid rules and Union legislation as expressed in the previous report5 related to the ability of deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) to participate in resolution as provided for in the BRRD and DGSD, the 2017 banking cases brought to light other areas of mismatch, in particular the possibility for Member States to avoid being subject to the discipline of the BRRD by paying ‘liquidation aid’; underlines that in the case of Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza, albeit the SRB had concluded that the resolution was not warranted in the public interest, the Commission indicated that it approved state aid on the basis that it mitigates economic disturbance at regional level, thus leading to the application of two different definitions of “public interest” one at the EU level and another one by national authorities; urges, therefore, the Commission to reconsider its interpretation of the relevant state aid rules in the area of “liquidation aid” in a way consistent with the BRRD resolution framework and to revise its 2013 Banking Communication accordingly; underlines respectively that the assessment of the public interest criterion under BRRD should also take due account of the likelihood of public funds being used when resolution is not triggered and national insolvency proceedings applied; _________________ 5 European Parliament, Resolution of 15 February 2017 on ‘Banking Union – Annual Report 2016’, paragraph 38.
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 278 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Points out, in the case of Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza , investors suffering from mis-selling could have been protected without removing the responsibilities of all creditors, as the Commission stated “In situations where banks that have mis-sold financial instruments have left the market, it is up to Member States to decide whether to take exceptional measures to address social consequences of mis-selling as a matter of social policy” 4a; _________________ 4a http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAl lAnswers.do?reference=E-2017- 004987⟨ uage=EN
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 281 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Calls on the Commission to undertake as soon as possible the review referred to in the last subparagraph of Article 32(4) of the BRRD, overdue since 2015, taking into account the interplay between the new resolution regime and the 2013 Banking Communication, in order to draw lessons from the 2017 banking cases; stresses in this respect the need to specify uniform and precise criteria, potentially in the form of regulatory technical standards, on the different circumstances when an institution shall be considered to be failing or likely to fail , including the methodology for calculating expected losses in case of resolution and the determination of when an institution is considered solvent;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 288 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Calls on the Commission to assess whether the banking sector has benefited since the beginning of the crisis from implicit subsidies and state aid by means of the provision of unconventional liquidity support;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 290 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Welcomes the SRB’s prioritiszation of enhancing resolvability of credit institutions, as well as the progress made in developing minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) targets in the framework of institution- specific resolution strategies; underlines that need for an expedited and effective regime to address breaches of this requirement; calls for the relevant authorities to be empowered to require banks to be able to deliver complete and up to date liability data reporting sheet within 24 hours of a request;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 296 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Regrets that the EC proposal on the revision of the BRRD defines maximum thresholds for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) to be held by institutions that are lower than the current levels as stipulated in the MREL RTS;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 297 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 b (new)
14b. Calls on the Single Resolution Board (SRB) to present the results on the resolvability assessments for G-SIB and other banks, including the proposed measures to overcome impediments to resolution; is concerned that there is no evidence to date that any major bank has been asked to remove obstacles to resolvability; calls on the Single Resolution Board to provide a comprehensive list of obstacles to resolvability encountered in national or European legislation;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 303 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Reiterates its position, as expressed in the previous report 5a, to enforce and enhance the consumer protection framework for banking services and that bail-inable instruments should be sold to appropriate investors who can absorb potential losses without threatening their own financial standing; calls, therefore, that resolution authorities shall monitor the extent to which instruments susceptible to bail-in are held by non professional investors and that the EBA shall proceed to an annual disclosure of these amounts as well as ,where appropriate, issue warnings and recommendations for remedial action; further calls, for senior non-preferred debt instruments to be treated as complex instruments for the purposes of the MIFID Directive and investment firms providing these instruments to non- professional investors to be considered as not fulfilling their obligations under that Directive; _________________ 5aEuropean Parliament, Resolution of 15 February 2017 on ‘Banking Union – Annual Report 2016’, paragraph 48
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 308 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for progress to be made on the legislative proposals implementing total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) in Union law; supportnotes the inclusion of a pre- resolution moratorium tool in the BRRD; calls for more proportionality for small banks that are deemed to be liquidated and not resolved;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 340 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Welcomes the EBA’s decision to publish on an annual basis data received by it in accordance with Article 10(10) of the DGSD; regrets that the data do not allow for a direct comparison of the adequacy of funding between deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs); notes, nonetheless, the need for several DGSs to accelerate the build-up of available financial means in order to achieve the target level of 0.8 % of covered deposits by 3 July 2024;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 362 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern and a public good for all EU citizens; is currently debating the proposal on an EDIS at committee level; notes, in this respect, the Commission’s more proportionate ‘new approach’ to an EDIS as put forward in its communication of 11 October 2017;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 384 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Notes the potential benefits and the likely risks related to the introduction of an EDIS; considers, therefore, risk reduction measures to be essential building blocks laying the foundations for an EDISat risk sharing in the context of EDIS must go hand in hand with risk reduction measures;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON