Activities of Gerolf ANNEMANS
Plenary speeches (1)
Abuse of new technologies to manipulate and radicalise young people through hate speech and antidemocratic discourse (debate)
Written questions (1)
Compensation for President von der Leyen’s special adviser
Amendments (612)
Amendment 123 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 47 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Rule 47 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Parliament's resolution shall indicate the appropriate legal basis upon the opinion of the committee responsible for legal affairs. The financial implications of each proposal are also considered upon the opinion of the committee responsible for budgetary issues.
Amendment 124 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 47 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
Rule 47 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
The proposal shall be submitted to the President, who shall verify whether the legal requirements are fulfilled. The President mayshall refer the proposal for an opinion on the appropriateness of the legal basis to the committee responsible for such verificationlegal affairs. If the President declares the proposal to be admissible, he or she shall announce it in plenary and refer it to the committee responsible for the subject matter.
Amendment 126 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 47 – paragraph 3
Rule 47 – paragraph 3
Amendment 130 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 47 – paragraph 4
Rule 47 – paragraph 4
4. WThere a proposal has financial implications, Parliament shall indicate how sufficient financial resources can be provided committee responsible for budgetary issues shall provide the committee responsible for the subject- matter with an opinion on the potential financial implications of the proposal.
Amendment 151 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 51 – paragraph 2
Rule 51 – paragraph 2
2. After taking a decision on the procedure to be followed, and if the simplified procedure under Rule 52 does not apply, political groups in the committee shall appoint a rapporteur on the proposal for a legally binding act from among ithe committee's members or permanent substitutes if it has not yet done so on the basis of Rule 48(4).1a. According to Rule 214, rapporteurs are appointed by the committee coordinators. These are chosen from among members of the political groups or from among non-attached members in the committee. In the case of a rapporteur moving from one political group to another, the report is reassigned to a member of the group that originally appointed him or her. In the event of a non-attached rapporteur joining a political group, the report is retained by the member. (The last subparagraph is inserted as interpretation)
Amendment 152 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 53 – paragraph 1
Rule 53 – paragraph 1
1. Where a committee draws up a non-legislative report, itpolitical groups in the committee shall appoint a rapporteur from among ithe committee's members or permanent substitutes 1a. _________________ 1a The interpretation of Rule 51(2) shall apply.
Amendment 157 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 54 – paragraph 3 a (new)
Rule 54 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Where a committee draws up a non-legislative report under paragraph 1, political groups in the committee shall appoint a rapporteur from among the committee's members or permanent substitutes 1a. _________________ 1a The interpretation of Rule 51(2) shall apply.
Amendment 159 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 54 – paragraph 4
Rule 54 – paragraph 4
4. Motions for resolutions submitted to Parliament shall be examined under the short presentation procedure set out in Rule 160 or submitted directly for a vote in plenary, unless, before the adoption of the final draft agenda pursuant to Rule 157, a political group or groups reaching at least the high threshold submit a request for them to be subject of a debate. Amendments to such motions for resolutions and requests for split votes or separate votes shall only be admissible for consideration in plenary if they are tabled either by the rapporteur, in order to take account of new information, or by at least one-tenth of the Members. PAt least one- tenth of the Members and political groups may table alternative motions for resolutions in accordance with Rule 181(3). Rule 190 shall apply to the committee’s motion for a resolution and amendments thereto. Rule 190 shall also apply to the single vote on alternative motions for resolutions.
Amendment 164 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 56 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Rule 56 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
The opinion giving committee mayshall appoint a rapporteur for opinion from among its members or permanent substitutes or send its views in the form of a letter from the Chair. Rule 51(2) shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Amendment 188 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 58 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Rule 58 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
In that event, the respective rapporteurs shall draw up a single draft report, which shall be examined and voted on by the committees involved, under the joint chairmanship of the committee Chairs. The chairmanship of meetings shall alternate among the Chairs of the committees involved.
Amendment 190 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 58 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Rule 58 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
At all stages of the procedure, the rights attaching to the status of committee responsible may be exercised by the committees involved only when they are acting jointly. The committees involved may set up working groups to prepare the meetings and votes. When voting, the numerical strength of the larger committee shall be reduced to that of the smaller one, maintaining the proportional representation of the political groups and non-attached Members unchanged. For the calculation of quorums, majorities and thresholds, all committees involved shall be considered to constitute a single committee.
Amendment 192 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 71 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Rule 71 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Decisions to enter into negotiations shall be announced at the beginning ofput to vote at the part- session following their adoption in committee. By the end of the day following the announcement in Parliament, Members or a political group or groups reaching at least the medium threshold may request in writing that a committee decision to enter into negotiations be put to the vote. Parliament shall then proceed to that vote during the same part-session.
Amendment 195 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 71 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Rule 71 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Amendment 198 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 71 – paragraph 4
Rule 71 – paragraph 4
4. Negotiations may start at any time after the deadline laid down in the first subparagraph of paragraph 2 has expired without a request for a vote in Parliament on the decision to enter into negotiations having been made. If such a request has been made, negotiations may start at any time after the committee decision to enter into negotiations has been approved in Parliament.
Amendment 204 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 133 – title
Rule 133 – title
Statements explainingcrutiny debates on Commission decisions
Amendment 205 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 133 – paragraph 1
Rule 133 – paragraph 1
Amendment 210 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 136 – title
Rule 136 – title
Questions for oral answer with debat Time
Amendment 211 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 136 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Rule 136 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Questions for oral answer to the Council, to the Commission or to the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy may be put by a committee, a political group or Members reaching at least the low threshold, accompanied with a request that they be placed on the agenda of Parliament.
Amendment 212 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 136 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Rule 136 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Such questions shall be submitted in writing to the President. The President shall immediately refer them to the Conference of Presidentsadmissible questions to the addressee.
Amendment 213 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 136 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
Rule 136 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
Amendment 214 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 136 – paragraph 2
Rule 136 – paragraph 2
2. Questions to the Commission and to the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security PolicyTwo weeks after being referred to the addressee, questions shall be referrplaced ton the addressee at least one week before the sitting on the agenda of which they are to appear and questions to the Council at least three weeks before that dategenda for the next part-session. No more than two questions presented by the same questioners can be placed on the agenda of the same sitting.
Amendment 215 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 136 – paragraph 3 a (new)
Rule 136 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. At each part-session, a Question Time of sixty minutes shall be devoted to answering questions. Once time has elapsed, the President shall postpone unanswered questions until the next part- session.
Amendment 216 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 136 – paragraph 4
Rule 136 – paragraph 4
4. A Member designated in advance by the questioners shall be given two minutes to move the question in Parliament. If that Member is not present, the question shall lapse. The addressee shall answerbe given five minutes to answer. The questioner shall be given one minute to reply after the addressee's answer to each question, with the aim of declaring whether or not he or she considers the answer to be sufficient and satisfactory.
Amendment 217 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 136 – paragraph 5
Rule 136 – paragraph 5
5. Rule 132(2) to (8) concerning the tabling and voting of motions for resolutions shall apply mutatis mutandisSuch questions, as well as the related answers, shall be published on Parliament's website.
Amendment 221 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 137
Rule 137
Amendment 234 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 158 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1a (new)
Rule 158 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1a (new)
Where several amendments on the same or similar subjects are tabled to the final draft agenda, the President shall put them to the vote in the chronological order in which they are received. The movers may submit a joint amendment to the President, at least thirty minutes before the opening of the part-session.The joint amendment shall be put to the vote first. Amendments covered by the joint amendment shall fall.
Amendment 238 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 171 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Rule 171 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. For the purposes of calculating the overall speaking time, where the Rules of Procedure do not stipulate the duration of a debate, the minimum duration of a debate shall be sixty minutes. The duration of each sitting shall be adjusted accordingly.
Amendment 247 #
2024/2000(REG)
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure
Rule 178 – paragraph 5
Rule 178 – paragraph 5
5. If fewer than 38 Members are present, the President mayshall rule that there is no quorum. Paragraphs 3 and 3a shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Amendment 2 #
2023/2104(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6
Citation 6
Amendment 2 #
2023/2104(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6
Citation 6
Amendment 7 #
2023/2104(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the European Parliament is the only institution of the Union where citizens are directly represented; whereas the citizens’ well founded expectation to be fairly represented in this institution is a matter of democratic legitimacy; whereas, in any event, the European Parliament cannot be compared to a national parliament in terms of representativeness;
Amendment 7 #
2023/2104(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the European Parliament is the only institution of the Union where citizens are directly represented; whereas the citizens’ well founded expectation to be fairly represented in this institution is a matter of democratic legitimacy; whereas, in any event, the European Parliament cannot be compared to a national parliament in terms of representativeness;
Amendment 23 #
2023/2104(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Recital G a (new)
Ga. whereas the seats in the European Parliament left by the United Kingdom after Brexit have been partly redistributed among the Member States; whereas in the interest of the European tax payers it would have been preferable not to redistribute part of the seats left by the United Kingdom, but to deduct them from the total number provided for by the Treaty;
Amendment 23 #
2023/2104(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Recital G a (new)
Ga. whereas the seats in the European Parliament left by the United Kingdom after Brexit have been partly redistributed among the Member States; whereas in the interest of the European tax payers it would have been preferable not to redistribute part of the seats left by the United Kingdom, but to deduct them from the total number provided for by the Treaty;
Amendment 32 #
2023/2104(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)
Recital J a (new)
Ja. whereas the establishment of a European constituency for the election of 28 members on transnational lists is not feasible, as it would alter the proportions between population and the number of seats allocated in the EP;
Amendment 32 #
2023/2104(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)
Recital J a (new)
Ja. whereas the establishment of a European constituency for the election of 28 members on transnational lists is not feasible, as it would alter the proportions between population and the number of seats allocated in the EP;
Amendment 34 #
2023/2104(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. WelcomesTakes note of the fact that European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 has tasked the Parliament with proposing an objective, fair, durable and transparent seat allocation method implementing the principle of degressive proportionality, without prejudice to the prerogatives of the institutions under the Treaties; emphasises in this regard that the competence to decide on the composition of the Parliament lies with the European Council;
Amendment 34 #
2023/2104(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. WelcomesTakes note of the fact that European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 has tasked the Parliament with proposing an objective, fair, durable and transparent seat allocation method implementing the principle of degressive proportionality, without prejudice to the prerogatives of the institutions under the Treaties; emphasises in this regard that the competence to decide on the composition of the Parliament lies with the European Council;
Amendment 78 #
2023/2104(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Underlines that the establishment of a European constituency for the election of 28 members on transnational lists is not feasible, as it would alter the proportions between population and the number of seats allocated in the EP, undermining the determination of an objective, fair, durable and transparent method of seat allocation and its effectiveness; expresses therefore its opposition to this proposal;
Amendment 78 #
2023/2104(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Underlines that the establishment of a European constituency for the election of 28 members on transnational lists is not feasible, as it would alter the proportions between population and the number of seats allocated in the EP, undermining the determination of an objective, fair, durable and transparent method of seat allocation and its effectiveness; expresses therefore its opposition to this proposal;
Amendment 87 #
2023/2104(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Calls in the interest of the European tax payers for reflection on the need to maintain the current upper limit of 751 seats provided for by the Treaty; considers, in this regard, that it would have been preferable not to redistribute part of the seats left by the United Kingdom, but to deduct them from the total number provided for by the Treaty; calls for reducing the number of seats in the European Parliament;
Amendment 87 #
2023/2104(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Calls in the interest of the European tax payers for reflection on the need to maintain the current upper limit of 751 seats provided for by the Treaty; considers, in this regard, that it would have been preferable not to redistribute part of the seats left by the United Kingdom, but to deduct them from the total number provided for by the Treaty; calls for reducing the number of seats in the European Parliament;
Amendment 7 #
2022/2142(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the unanimity requirement in the Council continues to be one of the biggest impediments in EU decision- making processes; whereas some Member States have used their right to veto to block or delay decisions in order to raise concerns on other unrelated issuthe main guarantee of sovereignty of the Member States and the intergovernmental character of the EU, which are preconditions for mutually beneficial and harmonious cooperation between independent European nation states;
Amendment 21 #
2022/2142(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Believes that the Union must be able to respond rapidly and effectively to the unprecedented challenges it is facing; regrets that, even though the Union has proven in specific cases to be able to act decisively, the unanimity voting requirement has often blocked EU action in different areasreturn to the intergovernmental cooperation model and preserve the unanimity voting requirement; regrets that willingness of some Member States to abide by the EU treaties and to maintain their sovereignty is being used as a scapegoat for the EU's internal problems to further a federalist agenda;
Amendment 24 #
2022/2142(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Considers it urgent, therefore, to go beyondmaintain unanimity and move as soon as possible toreject QMV and OLP in key policy fields in order to improve the EU’s capaconsensus and ability to act;
Amendment 62 #
2022/2142(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 – point c
Paragraph 8 – point c
c) and decisions regarding civilian common security and defence policy (CSDP) missionsit would be self-defeating for the EU to undo the unanimity rule that enables even the smallest Member States to secure their core national interests inside the EU;
Amendment 4 #
2022/2069(REG)
Rule 216 – paragraph 1
1. A committee shall meet when convened by its Chair or at the request of the President. When convening the meeting, the Chair shall submit a draft agendasuch a meeting, the Chair may decide, on a case-by-case basis and with the approval of coordinators representing a majority of the committee members, that the meeting may also be attended remotely, except for votes and committee meetings to be held in camera. Votes shall ordinarily take place on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays, except in urgent or exceptional circumstances. When convening the meeting, the Chair shall submit a draft agenda, in which it shall be stated whether the meeting may also be attended remotely. The committee shall take a decision on the agenda at the beginning of the meeting.
Amendment 278 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas amending the Treaties is necessary, not as an end in itself, but in the interest of all Union citizens, as these amendments aim to reshape the Union in a way that will enhance its capacity to actstrengthen the sovereignty of the Member States, asnd weill as itsenhance its effectiveness, flexibility, democratic legitimacy and accountability;
Amendment 278 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas amending the Treaties is necessary, not as an end in itself, but in the interest of all Union citizens, as these amendments aim to reshape the Union in a way that will enhance its capacity to actstrengthen the sovereignty of the Member States, asnd weill as itsenhance its effectiveness, flexibility, democratic legitimacy and accountability;
Amendment 281 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the Union’s institutional framework, and in particular its decision -making process, especially that in the Council, is barely adequate for a Union ofcontinues to be effective in protecting the sovereignty and interests of the 27 Member States; whereas the prospect of future enlargements makes a reform of the Treaties inevitablikely; whereas this reform must move towards a Union that is more flexible with regard to specific national characteristics and more respectful of an enhanced subsidiarity principle;
Amendment 281 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the Union’s institutional framework, and in particular its decision -making process, especially that in the Council, is barely adequate for a Union ofcontinues to be effective in protecting the sovereignty and interests of the 27 Member States; whereas the prospect of future enlargements makes a reform of the Treaties inevitablikely; whereas this reform must move towards a Union that is more flexible with regard to specific national characteristics and more respectful of an enhanced subsidiarity principle;
Amendment 288 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Highlights the importance of reforming decision-making in the Union to more accurately reflect a bicameral system by further empowering the European Parliament, and by changing the voting mechanism in the Councildemocratic system based on the Member States, in which the citizens rightfully put their trust;
Amendment 288 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Highlights the importance of reforming decision-making in the Union to more accurately reflect a bicameral system by further empowering the European Parliament, and by changing the voting mechanism in the Councildemocratic system based on the Member States, in which the citizens rightfully put their trust;
Amendment 292 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. DemandRejects the strengthening of the Union’s capacity to act by considerably increasing the number of areas where actions are decided by qualified majority voting (QMV) and through the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP); considers that these proposals bear no relation to the citizens’ priorities and form part of a federalist political agenda that is in no way appropriate for the Union’s organisation and identity;
Amendment 292 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. DemandRejects the strengthening of the Union’s capacity to act by considerably increasing the number of areas where actions are decided by qualified majority voting (QMV) and through the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP); considers that these proposals bear no relation to the citizens’ priorities and form part of a federalist political agenda that is in no way appropriate for the Union’s organisation and identity;
Amendment 295 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
Amendment 295 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
Amendment 317 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. ProposesQuestions the relevance of the introduction of an consultative EU referendum on matters relevant to the Union’s actions and policies; calls forrejects the strengthening of the instruments for citizens’ participation in the EU decision- making process within the framework of representative democracyas they are a serious breach of the actual democratic will expressed in elections; opposes any creation of citizens’ panels, which cannot under any circumstances be regarded as representative of the citizens of the Member States; points out that such an idea poses serious problems in terms of the selection of citizens, the organisation of such agoras in the EU Member States, the costs associated with the contributions and payment of the citizens, and the real and continuous participation of those citizens throughout the process;
Amendment 317 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. ProposesQuestions the relevance of the introduction of an consultative EU referendum on matters relevant to the Union’s actions and policies; calls forrejects the strengthening of the instruments for citizens’ participation in the EU decision- making process within the framework of representative democracyas they are a serious breach of the actual democratic will expressed in elections; opposes any creation of citizens’ panels, which cannot under any circumstances be regarded as representative of the citizens of the Member States; points out that such an idea poses serious problems in terms of the selection of citizens, the organisation of such agoras in the EU Member States, the costs associated with the contributions and payment of the citizens, and the real and continuous participation of those citizens throughout the process;
Amendment 325 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Proposes to establish exclusive UnionMember State competence for the environment and biodiversity as well as negotiations on climate change, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle;
Amendment 325 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Proposes to establish exclusive UnionMember State competence for the environment and biodiversity as well as negotiations on climate change, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle;
Amendment 329 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. PropoRefuses to further develop Union shared competences in the areas of energy, foreign affairs, external security and defence, external border policy in the area of as they are integral to the sovereignty, freedom, and security and justice, and cross-border-infrastructureof the Member States;
Amendment 329 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. PropoRefuses to further develop Union shared competences in the areas of energy, foreign affairs, external security and defence, external border policy in the area of as they are integral to the sovereignty, freedom, and security and justice, and cross-border-infrastructureof the Member States;
Amendment 331 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. ProOpposes that the subsidiarity review by the European Court of Justice being strengthened; calls for the opinion of regional parliaments with legislative powers to be taken into account in thsocial and political issues to be dealt with at the most immediate or closest level to the citizens that enables them to be reasoned opinions on legislative drafts of national parliaments; proposes to extend the deadline for “yellow card” procedures to 12 weekslved; proposes, therefore, that the EU’s competences in the fields of defence, foreign affairs, taxation, the environment, culture, education and energy be reduced;
Amendment 331 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. ProOpposes that the subsidiarity review by the European Court of Justice being strengthened; calls for the opinion of regional parliaments with legislative powers to be taken into account in thsocial and political issues to be dealt with at the most immediate or closest level to the citizens that enables them to be reasoned opinions on legislative drafts of national parliaments; proposes to extend the deadline for “yellow card” procedures to 12 weekslved; proposes, therefore, that the EU’s competences in the fields of defence, foreign affairs, taxation, the environment, culture, education and energy be reduced;
Amendment 335 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
Amendment 335 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
Amendment 353 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Calls forRejects categorically the establishment of a defence union including permanently stationed European military units, a permanent rapid deployment capacity, under the operational command of the Union; proposes that joint procurement and the development of armaments be financed by the Union through a dedicated budget under parliamentary co- decision and scrutiny and proposes that the competences of the European Defence Agency be adjusted accordingly; notes that clauses with regard to national traditions of neutrality and NATO membership would not be affected by these changes;
Amendment 353 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Calls forRejects categorically the establishment of a defence union including permanently stationed European military units, a permanent rapid deployment capacity, under the operational command of the Union; proposes that joint procurement and the development of armaments be financed by the Union through a dedicated budget under parliamentary co- decision and scrutiny and proposes that the competences of the European Defence Agency be adjusted accordingly; notes that clauses with regard to national traditions of neutrality and NATO membership would not be affected by these changes;
Amendment 372 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Suggests that the promotion of democratic values, good governance, human rights and sustainability as well as foreign investment, investment protection and economic security be included in the scope of the common commercial policy; proposes that the European Parliament and the Council, upon a recommendation from the Commission, open trade negotiations; proposes to establish a permanent mechanism for the screening of foreign direct investmentProposes that the Council, upon a recommendation from the Commission, open trade negotiations;
Amendment 372 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Suggests that the promotion of democratic values, good governance, human rights and sustainability as well as foreign investment, investment protection and economic security be included in the scope of the common commercial policy; proposes that the European Parliament and the Council, upon a recommendation from the Commission, open trade negotiations; proposes to establish a permanent mechanism for the screening of foreign direct investmentProposes that the Council, upon a recommendation from the Commission, open trade negotiations;
Amendment 380 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Calls forOpposes the creation of an integrated European energy union; suggests that the Union’s energy system must be affordable and based on energy efficiency, renewable energieslow-carbon energies, including nuclear, and in conformity with international agreements to mitigate climate change;
Amendment 380 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Calls forOpposes the creation of an integrated European energy union; suggests that the Union’s energy system must be affordable and based on energy efficiency, renewable energieslow-carbon energies, including nuclear, and in conformity with international agreements to mitigate climate change;
Amendment 389 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Calls for common minimum standards for the acquisition of Union citizenship by third-country nationals, as well as for commonEncourages Member States to discuss strict minimum standards for long- term visas and residency permits to prevent the sale and abuse of citizenship and residency;
Amendment 389 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Calls for common minimum standards for the acquisition of Union citizenship by third-country nationals, as well as for commonEncourages Member States to discuss strict minimum standards for long- term visas and residency permits to prevent the sale and abuse of citizenship and residency;
Amendment 391 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Proposes that the Union’s common immigration policy be strengthened by taking appropriate and necessary measures to ensure theies of the Member States and the Union be strengthened by taking drastic measures aimed at completely prevention ofng illegal crossings and for; proposes that the Union’s migration policy to take into account the economic and social stability of Member States, the availability of skilled labour to the single market, as well as the efficient management of migration, taking into account the fair treatment of thirdMember States’ right to cultural and political continuity, and the preservation of historical demographic balances within the nations on our country nationalsinent;
Amendment 391 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Proposes that the Union’s common immigration policy be strengthened by taking appropriate and necessary measures to ensure theies of the Member States and the Union be strengthened by taking drastic measures aimed at completely prevention ofng illegal crossings and for; proposes that the Union’s migration policy to take into account the economic and social stability of Member States, the availability of skilled labour to the single market, as well as the efficient management of migration, taking into account the fair treatment of thirdMember States’ right to cultural and political continuity, and the preservation of historical demographic balances within the nations on our country nationalsinent;
Amendment 398 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 a (new)
Paragraph 40 a (new)
40a. Emphasises that, if allowed under their constitutions, Member States should put to a referendum any changes to the EU Treaties;
Amendment 398 #
2022/2051(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 a (new)
Paragraph 40 a (new)
40a. Emphasises that, if allowed under their constitutions, Member States should put to a referendum any changes to the EU Treaties;
Amendment 509 #
2022/2051(INL)
Annex to the motion for a resolution Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Article 119 – paragraph 2
2. Concurrently with the foregoing, and as provided in the Treaties and in accordance with the procedures set out therein, these activities shall include a single currency, the euro, and the definition and conduct of a single monetary policy and exchange-rate policy the primary objective of both of which shall be to maintain price stabilityensure the economic growth, full employment and the social resilience and, without prejudice to thisese objectives, to maintain price stability, to support the general economic policies in the Union, in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, as well as the stability of the financial system.
Amendment 509 #
2022/2051(INL)
Annex to the motion for a resolution Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Article 119 – paragraph 2
2. Concurrently with the foregoing, and as provided in the Treaties and in accordance with the procedures set out therein, these activities shall include a single currency, the euro, and the definition and conduct of a single monetary policy and exchange-rate policy the primary objective of both of which shall be to maintain price stabilityensure the economic growth, full employment and the social resilience and, without prejudice to thisese objectives, to maintain price stability, to support the general economic policies in the Union, in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, as well as the stability of the financial system.
Amendment 510 #
2022/2051(INL)
Annex to the motion for a resolution
The financial system is considered stable when banks, other lenders, and financial markets are able to provide citizens, households and businesses with the financing they need to invest, grow, and participate in a well-functioning economy and can do so without making the system more vulnerable.
Amendment 510 #
2022/2051(INL)
Annex to the motion for a resolution
The financial system is considered stable when banks, other lenders, and financial markets are able to provide citizens, households and businesses with the financing they need to invest, grow, and participate in a well-functioning economy and can do so without making the system more vulnerable.
Amendment 511 #
2022/2051(INL)
Annex to the motion for a resolution Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Article 119 – paragraph 3
3. These activities of the Member States and the Union shall entail compliance with the following guiding principles: the pursuit of economic growth and full employment stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments.
Amendment 511 #
2022/2051(INL)
Annex to the motion for a resolution Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Article 119 – paragraph 3
3. These activities of the Member States and the Union shall entail compliance with the following guiding principles: the pursuit of economic growth and full employment stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments.
Amendment 519 #
2022/2051(INL)
Annex to the motion for a resolution Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Article 127 – paragraph 1
1. The primary objectives of the European System of Central Banks (hereinafter referred to as ‘the ESCB’) shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective ofhe pursuit of economic growth, full employment and to maintain price stability, t. The ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union. The ESCB shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in compliance with the principles set out in Article 119.
Amendment 519 #
2022/2051(INL)
Annex to the motion for a resolution Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Article 127 – paragraph 1
1. The primary objectives of the European System of Central Banks (hereinafter referred to as ‘the ESCB’) shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective ofhe pursuit of economic growth, full employment and to maintain price stability, t. The ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union. The ESCB shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in compliance with the principles set out in Article 119.
Amendment 20 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 38 a (new)
Citation 38 a (new)
— having regard to Article 140(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;
Amendment 21 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 38 b (new)
Citation 38 b (new)
— having regard to Articles 114 and 127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;
Amendment 22 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 38 c (new)
Citation 38 c (new)
— having regard to the ECB´s Targeted Review of Internal Models, published in April 2021;
Amendment 41 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the BU is open to all EU Member States, provided the conditionality of meeting the ERM II requirements;
Amendment 43 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
B a. whereas a Banking Union requires first and foremost accelerated efforts by various Member States to reduce their high levels of non-performing loans and prevent their increase in the future;
Amendment 44 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)
Recital B b (new)
B b. whereas sound public finances are a necessary condition for the macro- financial stability of the Banking Union;
Amendment 45 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B c (new)
Recital B c (new)
B c. whereas the near zero interest rates greatly reduce the profitability of banks in one of their most important areas of business activity, the provision of credit for long-term investments;
Amendment 52 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the problems of the banking sector mayare likely to worsen after the temporary support measures introduced during the COVID-19 crisis are lifted;
Amendment 57 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas some financial institutions in the BU are heavily invested in the debt of their own home sovereign, with total sovereign exposure of banks in the euro area currently amounting to EUR 2.9 trillion, i.e. a substantial 9% of total assets, including EUR 2.1 trillion claims on domestic governments; whereas sovereign risk on bank balance sheets has still not been tackled, in contrast to other risk mitigation measures introduced by the Banking Union; whereas the pandemic´s surge in public debt highlights the need for reform;
Amendment 68 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas the rolestability of the banking sector, including strong capital buffers, is crucial to the recovery and transition to a low-carbon economy;
Amendment 81 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas there is a need for effective anti-money laundering supervisionare still important loopholes in the EU AML framework, such as the explicit exemption of the non- profit sector from anti-money laundering reporting and transparency requirements as non-obliged entities, even though certain non-profit organisations and other non-financial entities operate with larger amounts of money than numerous European banks;
Amendment 89 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas consumers, investors and all depositors should be well protectedArticle 169 of the TFEU states that EU measures shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent consumer protection measures provided that they are compatible with the Treaties; in this way EU law provides a common basic level of protection for all consumers residing in the EU; recalls that there is no consistent and uniform definition of consumer protection in EU law, which justifies divergences amongst the Member States;
Amendment 97 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)
Recital I a (new)
I a. whereas in carrying out its supervisory activities, the ECB has so far failed to take the proportionality principle sufficiently into account;
Amendment 106 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls that onthe goal of the BU is the security of the banking system and the prevention of bank bailouts by taxpayers; supports efforts to strengthen the BU; stresses that a solid BU will result in increased confidence in the banking sectortresses that increased confidence in the banking sector requires accelerated efforts by various Member States to reduce their high levels of non-performing loans and to prevent their increase in the future;
Amendment 127 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Stresses that the relatively good performance of banks during the COVID- 19 crisis is related to the policies implemented by the Member States during the pandemic, as well as to temporary measures under Regulation (EU) 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation), proving that equity and not debt is the solution to solve crises and build up resilience against economic and financial shocks;
Amendment 131 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Expresses deep concern about the findings of the ECB´s Targeted Review of Internal Models, published in April 2021, which shows that the biggest euro area banks have repeatedly been too optimistic in their risk-modelling, confirming longstanding suspicions among regulators and analysts that larger banks have often artificially inflated the strength of their balance sheets by underestimating the riskiness of their assets, giving them a short-term advantage over more cautious competitors; is alarmed that the Review resulted in more than 5.800 deficiencies and 253 supervisory corrections of internal models by the ECB, which pushed up the banks’ risk-weighted assets by EUR 275 billion, a 12 per cent increase in the models examined, which reduced their average common equity tier one ratios by 0.71 percentage points;
Amendment 160 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5 a. Deplores the ECB´s role in massively inflating the money supply and expanding its balance sheet up to over 80% of euro area GDP; recalls that banks in the northern euro area hold a disproportionately high amount of deposits with the ECB, and pay disproportionately high penalty interest to the ECB; by contrast, banks in the southern euro area benefit disproportionately from the negative interest rates on TLTRO loans;
Amendment 163 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5 b. Recalls that the Targeted Long Term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs) further zombify the European economy and deteriorate the real income prospects, especially of young Europeans;
Amendment 164 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 c (new)
Paragraph 5 c (new)
5 c. Is concerned about the high levels of legacy non-performing exposures many institutions had, even before the pandemic;
Amendment 184 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Amendment 191 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8 a. Notes the accelerated pace of digitalisation in the banking sector; looks forward to the further development of DORA and its effect on digital operational resilience for the financial sector; calls on the ESAs and ENISA to step up their efforts in monitoring and mitigating the risks concerning third country ICT third parties, if these third-parties have or are suspected of having ties to foreign governments or foreign militaries;
Amendment 204 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Notes that there is a prospect ofCalls for the gradually phasing out of emergency measures and returning to pre-COVID-19 capital requirements;
Amendment 206 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9 a. Takes the view that supervision continues to focus solely on credit risk, underestimating the importance of financial risk;
Amendment 226 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11 a. Recalls that total sovereign exposure of banks in the euro area currently amounts to EUR 2.9 trillion, i.e. a substantial 9% of total assets, and that claims on domestic governments account for the bulk of that with EUR 2.1 trillion;
Amendment 230 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 b (new)
Paragraph 11 b (new)
11 b. Is concerned that as Member States sell increasing amounts of sovereign bonds, their share in banks’ balance sheets grows, potentially aggravating the doom loop; points out that this trend is exacerbated by the zero risk weight assigned to sovereign exposures that incentives excessively large positions in sovereign exposures; stresses the need to modify incentives for banks so that they scale back their investment in public bonds, by introducing non-zero risk weights for sovereign exposures;
Amendment 232 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 c (new)
Paragraph 11 c (new)
11 c. Stresses that the rising public debt levels following the pandemic make an appropriate treatment of sovereign exposures more pressing;
Amendment 239 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Notes that the transition to a low- carbon economy presents new challenges and risks related to the preference for sustainable investments; stresses the need for an in-depth analysis of the economic efficiency of and the consequences of oversubsidising sustainable investments in order to avoid a future bubble of green assets; calls for clear guidelines for banks based on economic data;
Amendment 271 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14 a. Stresses the importance to consider the impact of potentially rising interest rates on banks’ balance sheets;
Amendment 272 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 b (new)
Paragraph 14 b (new)
14 b. Calls on the ECB to end its stimulus packages immediately, including phasing out TLTRO;
Amendment 273 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 c (new)
Paragraph 14 c (new)
14 c. Is concerned that loose monetary policy contributes to lower long-term economic growth and creates an incentive to delay the implementation of necessary structural reforms;
Amendment 274 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Indicates thaExpressed deep concern about the trend towards increased consolidation in the banking sector, which is likely to increase further as a result of the pandemic; recognises the challenges posed to banking supervision by large systemically important institutions, whose possible problems may affect financial stability in many jurisdictions; regrets in this respect the calls of Andrea Enria to further latinise the European banking market through consolidation; rejects this pathway to institutionalising the risk of 'too big to fail'; proposes rather to break up banks, instead of consolidating them;
Amendment 276 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Indicates that the trend towards consolidation in the banking sector is likely to increase as a result of the pandemic; recognises the challenges posed to banking supervision by large systemically important institutions, whose possible problems may affect financial stability in many jurisdictions; calls for a regulatory firewall between savings banks and investment banks, in order to improve the stability of the financial and banking system and to prevent financial and banking crises due to negative financial contagion effects between savings banks and investment banks, which have proven to be often at the very heart of financial and banking crises;
Amendment 280 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15 a. Stresses that strict application of the proportionality principle is key in banking supervision, especially for smaller institutions;
Amendment 281 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 b (new)
Paragraph 15 b (new)
Amendment 282 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 c (new)
Paragraph 15 c (new)
15 c. Stresses the benefits of a diversified banking sector in Europe, composed of banks with different business models, legal structures and sizes;
Amendment 289 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Notes the problems and challenges related to home/host issues; points out that greater market integration requires credible safeguards in EU law for host Member States;
Amendment 295 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Stresses the need for an effective anti- money laundering supervisionory framework; notes the Commission’s adoption of the anti-money laundering (AML) package of proposals; regrets the further explicit exemption of non-profit organisations from the anti-money laundering transparency and reporting requirements as non-obliged entities, in spite of numerous reports by FATF, Europol and the European Court of Auditors asking for more scrutiny on the non-profit sector, as entities which are prone to be used as vehicles for money laundering and terrorist financing;
Amendment 302 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17 a. Requests increased transparency standards in banking supervision, for instance in the outcomes of the supervisory review and evaluation process, in order to reinforce the trust of capital and financial markets, companies and citizens, as well as to ensure consistency of treatment across Member States; welcomes improved and refined information-sharing between supervisory institutions;
Amendment 313 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18 a. Calls on the supervisory authorities to monitor financial risks closely, in particular those linked to the shadow banking system, and to take appropriate steps wherever necessary; calls on the supervisory authorities, further, to monitor closely aspects linked to the professionalism of and generational change in governance, in particular in the smallest banks;
Amendment 316 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)
Paragraph 18 b (new)
Amendment 333 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20 a. Believes that the Banking Union will further disintegrate due to moral hazard and lead to a permanent Transfer Union if mechanisms such as the backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) are implemented; regrets that insufficient progress in risk reduction in some member states serves as an argument for mutualisation of deposit insurance schemes, creating incentives for some member states not to reduce risk, or even to engage in even more excessive risk-taking; points out that the absence of a proper impact assessment of the EDIS proposal is fundamentally at odds with the principles of sound governance;
Amendment 343 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21 a. Requests increased transparency standards in banking resolution, for instance in the outcomes of the resolution review and evaluation process, in order to reinforce the trust of capital and financial markets, companies and citizens, as well as to ensure consistency of treatment across Member States;
Amendment 356 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Recalls that the SSM and the SRM operate at EU level, while deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) are operated at national level; recognises that a European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) would improve protection for depositors in the EUunderlines that depositors across the Banking Union are exposed to varying levels of credit, market and operational risk, which justifies varying levels of protection;
Amendment 369 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23 a. Regrets that insufficient progress in risk reduction in some Member States serves as an argument for mutualisation of deposit insurance schemes, creating incentives for some Member States not to reduce risk, or even to engage in even more excessive risk-taking; points out that the absence of a proper impact assessment of any EDIS proposal is fundamentally at odds with the principles of sound governance;
Amendment 384 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Considers that the main obstacles for EDIS are concerns about risks in somUnderlines that depositors across the bBanking systems; stresUnion are exposesd that the implementation of credible and effective risk reduction measures could enable an agreement on EDISo varying levels of credit, market and operational risk, which justifies varying levels of protection;
Amendment 393 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Points out that any EDISfurther harmonisation of deposit insurance schemes should take into account clear rules for the participation or non- participation of non-euro area Member States;
Amendment 397 #
2021/2184(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 a (new)
Paragraph 26 a (new)
26 a. Recalls that gold is money and fiat is debt; welcomes the fact that the German Bundesbank, for the first time since the introduction of the euro, has started to buy gold, thereby taking the necessary precautions for the inevitable; welcomes the fact that the Polish central bank has repatriated its gold reserves; welcomes the recent statement by the Dutch Central Bank that if there were to be a major monetary reset, gold stock can serve as a basis to rebuild the global monetary system; highly welcomes the decision of central bank of Hungary to treble its gold reserves to more than 94.49 tons; underlines that gold bolsters confidence in the stability of the central bank’s balance sheet and creates a sense of security; calls, therefore, on all national central banks, especially those in the euro area, to hold on to sufficient amounts of physical gold, and repatriate any gold reserves currently kept outside the national borders;
Amendment 20 #
2021/2048(REG)
Parliament's Rules of Procedure
Rule 213 – paragraph 1
Rule 213 – paragraph 1
1. At the first committee meeting after the appointment of committee members pursuant to Rule 209, and again two and a half years thereafter, the committee shall elect a bureau consisting of a Chair and of Vice-Chairs from among its full members in separate ballots. The number of Vice- Chairs to be elected shall be determined by Parliament upon a proposal by the Conference of Presidents. The diversity of Parliament must be reflected in the composition of the bureau of each committee; i. The Chair and the first Vice- Chair of a committee shall not be of the same gender or nationality or come from the same political group. The composition of the Committee bureaux shall fully reflect the political diversity of Parliament. It shall not be permissible to have an all male or all female bureau or for all of the Vice-Chairs to come from the same Member State.
Amendment 3 #
2021/2025(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
Amendment 9 #
2021/2025(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Stresses that the attribution of the parliamentary report on the Commission's Rule of Law Report to LIBE, with JURI and AFCO only providing opinions, already contains a certain biased approach to the theory of the rule of law from a positive rights perspective, which is a contested interpretation of the concept in legal theory; suggests that future reports should be drafted by JURI-AFCO joint committees, with LIBE providing an opinion, with a view to ensuring that the European Union strictly respects the limits of its powers to monitor obedience of the rule of law in Member States;
Amendment 11 #
2021/2025(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Recalls that the Commission’s report is a response to the Council’s failure to trigger the procedure under Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), as requested by the Commission in 2017 and Parliament in 2018; regrets that the Council has failed to resume hearings under Article 7 of the TEU since December 2019; notes that the failure to apply Article 7 of the TEU, also due to the requirement of unanimity for the sanctions mechanism, enables continued divStresses that there is no legal basis in the EU Treaties that grants the Commission the competence to assess Member States' respect for or violation of the rule of law; recalls that according to Article 5 (1) TEU, the Commission should act in accordance with and within the boundaries of the Treaties; underlines that Article 2 TEU merely mentions the rule of law, but does not define it, nor does it give the Commission the power to enforce it; regrets that the Commission's 2020 Rule of Law report mentions interpretation of the principle of the rule of law by jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union, but fails to provide the refergence from the values enshrined in Article 2 of the TEUs to the relevant case law;
Amendment 20 #
2021/2025(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Regrets that the report fails to fully address allcomprehensively define Union values set out in Article 2 of the TEU, such as democracy and fundamental rights; reiterates the need to have a single monitoring system for democracy,pluralism; recalls that according to the Commission’s own definition, “[u]nder the rule of law, and fundamental rights, as proposed by Parliament1 ; calls on the Council and the Commission to engage in discussions to set up such a mechanism via an interinstitutional agreement; _________________ 1European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2020 on the establishment of an EU Mechanismll public powers always act within the constraints set out by law [...]”; strongly regrets that the report fails to take a critical look at the European Union’s own Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights (texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0251).activities from aforementioned point of view;
Amendment 26 #
2021/2025(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. WelcomeQuestions the methodology of the report, which focuses on four pillars: independence of the judiciary, the anti- corruption framework, media pluralism, and checks and balances; invites the Commission to include in the next editions an assessment of how the right to a fair trial is guaranteed in Member States, with deeply regrets that the Commission did not provide an assessment of its own institutions' adherence to the rule of law; calls on the Commission to do so as of the 2021 Report; provides some suggestions: 1) the comparticular attention paid to the right of defence, and equality between prosecution and defence parties; believes that the report should go beyond monitoring and include preventive and corrective elements with a clear outline of enforcement measurbility of the Next Generation EU programmes with the no bail-out clause of article 125 TFEU and the no debt clause of article 310TFEU; 2) whether the ECB's asset purchasing programs, such as PEPP, CSPP and PSPP fall within the scope of the Bank's mandate; strongly invites the Commission to treat all Member States on an equal footing in its assessments regardless of the Member State governments’ political stances;
Amendment 34 #
2021/2025(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Amendment 38 #
2021/2025(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 b (new)
Paragraph 4 b (new)
4 b. Calls on the Commission to extend the scope of the Report with a fifth pillar, named 'political pluralism'; recalls that according to the principles of the rule of law, citizens should not be intimidated to refrain from expressing their views and from gathering with like-minded people, as such actions are rights enshrined in Articles 12 and 21 of the EU Charter of Human Rights; recalls that according to official statistics of the German Ministry of the Interior4d, almost 700 members, candidates and elected officials of the right-wing AfD party were physically assaulted in 2020, constituting 45% of all victims of political violence in Germany, and up 36% compared to 2019, and more than 3 times the number of attacks of the second most assaulted political party; calls on FRA to conduct a similar study as the German Ministry of the Interior on EU scale; calls on FRA to include political affiliation in its assessment of hate crimes, and not only focus on crimes against ethnic and sexual minorities, solely relying on the heavily biased EU- MIDIS survey data; calls on the Commission to include these findings in its reports as of next year, and to formally recognize political pluralism as a pillar of the rule of law, not only in the East, but also in the West of the EU; _________________ 4dKleine Anfrage des Abgeordneten Martin Hess u.a. und der Fraktion der AfD, 1. Februar 2021, BT-Drucksache 19/25517.
Amendment 41 #
2021/2025(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. CRecalls on the Commission to use all tools at its disposal to counter violations of EU values, such as infringement procedures, including expedited procedures, actthat according to international law, as stated e.g. in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations5a, “No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State”; calls on the Commissions to ensure compliance with the judgments of the Court of Justice and applications for interim measures before the Court; welcomes the new rule of law conditionality mechanism and asks that it be fully enforced with regard to all EU funds, including Next Generation EU; follow aforementioned principle in its relations with the Member States; invites the European Union to resort to tools adequate for an international organisation consisting of independent and sovereign nation states, such as sharing of best practices and providing assistance to the Member States, rather than to coercion and threats of punishment, in order to strengthen the rule of law in the EU Member States; is deeply concerned that the Commission’s willingness to interfere in internal affairs of the Member States, as well as its reluctance to consider the EU’s own deficiencies in complying with the rule of law principle, is a sign that it considers the EU to be sovereign and the Member States subordinated to it; _________________ 5aDeclaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Available at: https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/3dda1f 104.pdf
Amendment 60 #
2021/2025(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6 a. Is deeply concerned about the compatibility of several harsh lockdown measures and the far-reaching restrictions placed on social life and the enforcement of these measures by the police with the principles of the rule of law; recalls that public gatherings to express discontent with public policy is covered by articles 12 and 21 of the EU Charter of Human Rights; calls on the Commission to go beyond the general observations from the 2020 Report and scrutinize national and regional lockdown measures and laws more thoroughly as of next year and, if need be, open infringement proceedings;
Amendment 42 #
2021/0114(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
Recital 2
(2) At the same time, undertakings might receive subsidies from third countries, that provide public funds which are then used, for instance, to finance economic activities in the internal market in any sector of the economy, such as participation in public procurement tenders, or acquisitions of undertakings, including those with strategic assets such as critical infrastructure and innovative technologies. Such subsidies, including monetary financing of an economy to artificially lower the production costs, are currently not subject to Union State aid rules.
Amendment 52 #
2021/0114(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5
Recital 5
(5) It iscould therefore necessarybe useful to complement existing Union instruments with a new tool to effectively deal with distortions in the internal market caused by foreign subsidies and ensure a level playing field. In particular, the new tool complements Union State aid rules which deal with distortions in the internal market caused by Member State subsidies.
Amendment 53 #
2021/0114(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
Recital 6
(6) Rules and procedures to investigate foreign subsidies that actually or potentially distort the internal market should be laid down and, where relevant, those distortions should be redressed. Foreign subsidies benefitting a certain economic activity of an undertaking could distort the internal market if the undertaking benefitting from the foreign subsidy engages in anthat subsidized economic activity in the Union. This Regulation should therefore establish rules for all undertakings engaging in an economic activity in the Union. Given the significance of the economic activities pursued by SMEs, and their contribution to the fulfilment of the Union’s key policy goals, special attention is given to the impact of this Regulation on them.
Amendment 55 #
2021/0114(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
Recital 7
(7) To ensure a level playing field throughout the internal market and consistency in the application of this Regulation, the Commission should be the sole authority competent to apply this Regulation. The Commission should have the power to examine any foreign subsidy to the extent it is in the scope of this Regulation in any sector of the economy on its own initiative relying on information from all available sources. To ensure effective control, in the specific case of large concentrations (mergers and acquisitions) and public procurement procedures above certain thresholds, the Commission should have the power to review foreign subsidies based on a prior notification by the undertaking to the Commission.
Amendment 63 #
2021/0114(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
Recital 9
(9) There should be a financial contribution provided, directly or indirectly, by the public authorities of a third country. The financial contribution may be granted through public or private entities. Whether a public entity provides a financial contribution should be determined on a case-by-case basis with due regard to elements such as the characteristics of the relevant entity and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy. Financial contributions may also be granted through a private entity if its actions can be attributed to the third country. Corporate bonds bought by a foreign central bank should also be considered as financial contributions.
Amendment 65 #
2021/0114(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
Recital 10
(10) Such a financial contribution should confer a benefit to an undertaking engaging in an economic activity in the internal market. A financial contribution that benefits an entity engaging in non- economic activities does not constitute a foreign subsidy. The existence of a benefit should be determined on the basis of comparative benchmarks, such as the investment practice of private investors, rates for financing obtainable on the market, a comparable tax treatment, tailored lending conditions, or the adequate remuneration for a given good or service.. If no directly comparable benchmarks are available, existing benchmarks could be adjusted or alternative benchmarks could be established based on generally accepted assessment methods.
Amendment 68 #
2021/0114(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11 a (new)
Recital 11 a (new)
(11 a) Foreign subsidies to undertakings supplying energy to the Member States should be exempt from this Regulation;
Amendment 118 #
2021/0114(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2
Article 1 – paragraph 2
(2) This Regulation addresses foreign subsidies granted tobenefitting a certain economic activity of an undertaking engaging in anthat subsidized economic activity in the internal market. An undertaking acquiring control or merging with an undertaking established in the Union or an undertaking participating in a public procurement procedure is considered to be engaging in an economic activity in the internal market.
Amendment 121 #
2021/0114(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 2 a (new)
(2 a) Foreign subsidies to undertakings supplying energy to Member States shall be exempt from this Regulation;
Amendment 126 #
2021/0114(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a – point i
Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a – point i
(i) the transfer of funds or liabilities, such as capital injections, grants, loans, loan guarantees, tailored lending conditions, fiscal incentives, setting off of operating losses, compensation for financial burdens imposed by public authorities, debt forgiveness, debt to equity swaps or rescheduling, corporate bond buying programmes;
Amendment 129 #
2021/0114(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point b – point ii
Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point b – point ii
(ii) foreign public entities, whose actions can be attributed to the third country, taking into account elements such as the characteristics of the entity, the legal and economic environment prevailing in the State in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy, such as central banks or public investment banks; or
Amendment 1 #
2020/2254(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6
Citation 6
Amendment 6 #
2020/2254(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the unprecedented impact and magnitude of the national and regional lockdowns and other measures that have restricted economic activity, following the COVID-19 crisis, on the economy, has led to a decrease in tax revenues and an increase in fiscal expenditures to protect society and the economy, and is leading to a sharp increase in government debt; whereas tax fraud and tax evasion undermines government revenues, as well as the sustainability of public finances and taxation systems; whereas it is paramount to keep taxes low to support the growth of the economy;
Amendment 12 #
2020/2254(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
A a. whereas in 2020, tax revenue in the Union fell by EUR 215 billion compared to 2019, while at the same time the tax-to-GDP ration has increased from 41.1 to 41.3%1a; _________________ 1a https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/prod ucts-eurostat-news/-/ddn-20211029-2
Amendment 29 #
2020/2254(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas current international corporate tax rules are no longer suitableneed to be updated in the context of digitalisation and globalisation of the economy; whereas developments of digitalisation create afiscal challenge in terms of traceability of economic operations and taxable events;
Amendment 36 #
2020/2254(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas increased transparency in the area of corporate taxation can improve tax collection and is also necessary to strengthen fair competitiveness in the single markettaxation of corporates, non- financial entities (NFEs) and high-net worth individuals (HNWIs) can improve tax collection, which will make the work of tax authorities more efficient; whereas the use of technology and digitalisation focused on a more efficient use of the available data can support efficiency and transparency of tax authorities and reduce the costs of compliance and increase the trust of the public;
Amendment 43 #
2020/2254(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. WelcomesTakes note of the Commission's Action Plan and supports its thorough implementation; observes that the majority of the 25 actions are related to VAT, which is appropriate due to the high level of revenue losses in the area of VAT; considers howeverit absolutely crucial that an impact assessment should be carried out, before presenting concrete legislative proposals to better apprehend the potential effects on taxpayers and businesses;
Amendment 45 #
2020/2254(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Believes that the Commission’s decision to carry out initiatives aimed at enhancing cooperation among tax authorities and increased harmonisation of procedural rules across the single market is of the highest importance; welcomes the Commission’s initiative for the ‘EU cooperative compliance programme’is of the highest importance;
Amendment 77 #
2020/2254(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Notes that the Union decision- making process is not promoting change, as tax policy is a national prerogative and subject to unanimity; regrets that the current situation sometimes leads to an uneven or inconsistent application of tax regulations; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure more harmonised and consistent tax rules and their implementation, to protect the functioning of the single market and to assure the principle of “taxing where profit is generated”Recalls that tax policy is a national prerogative and subject to unanimity;
Amendment 90 #
2020/2254(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Takes note of the existing limits on decision making in the CUnderlines that the European Parliament takes the rule of law very seriously; therefore denounciles and calls for exploring all legal options as provided y attempt to circumvent its own Treaty rules by advocating avoiding the Treaties on taxation especially in order to ensure functionality of the single market and preserve Union competitiveness in the global markeunanimity principle in tax matters; believes that Institutions that preach the importance of the rule of law should live by it;
Amendment 94 #
2020/2254(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8 a. Regrets that very little progress is registered on reducing VAT arrears, on increasing transparency, and on addressing organised crime more strongly; welcomes that digitalisation continues to be adopted in public administration, albeit at a moderate pace, with spending growing from 0.020% of GDP in 2019, to 0.022 % in 20258a; _________________ 8aEPRS, PE 694.223, September 2021, 30.
Amendment 110 #
2020/2254(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10 a. Stresses that the amount of VAT arrears registered for each Member State is an important driver of administrative ineffectiveness; underlines that VAT arrears would need to decrease substantially, by close to 17 percentage points, from currently 37% on average to around 20%, in order to decrease the VAT gap by one percentage point10a; _________________ 10a EPRS, PE 694.223, September 2021, p. 29
Amendment 116 #
2020/2254(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)
Paragraph 10 b (new)
10 b. Recalls that in order to decrease the VAT gap by one percentage point, transparency would need to increase by 15 units, which for the Union on average means a move from 64 to 79 units, a substantial move towards the best performers2a; _________________ 2aEPRS, PE 649.223, September 2021, 29.
Amendment 126 #
2020/2254(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Highlights that the current global tax environment is outdated, and canneeds to be modernised, and that some tax issues could only be fully addressed on a global level; considers that a multilateral agreement negotiated OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS is a unique opportunity to make international tax architecture more consistent with the development of the economy by further addressing the distortions of fair competition in the market, which was accentuated during the COVID-19 crisis and highlighted problems related to the taxing of large multinational enterprises (MNEs);
Amendment 136 #
2020/2254(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Welcomes the efforts of the Commission to address the problem at least partially by introducing various initiatives, but sStresses the high importance of the Union in contributing to the success of global negotiations towards the ongoing necessary reforms;
Amendment 145 #
2020/2254(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. WelcomesTakes note of the two-pillar agreement reached at the G7/G20 levels on the allocation of taxing rights and the application of a minimum effective tax rate of at least 15% on the global profits of MNEs; notes the need for effective implementation; calls on the Commission to make the necessary legislative proposals to implement the agreement into Union law as quickly as possible after the finalisation of the technical work on the OECD approach;
Amendment 161 #
2020/2254(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
Amendment 169 #
2020/2254(INL)
17. Considers, however, that the BEFIT initiative should be supported by the political process, including with full respect for the unanimity principle, in building political support for change and that the initiative should be accompanied by a thorough impact assessment to shape future proposals, which should contribute to reaching a consensus between Member States;
Amendment 177 #
2020/2254(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Considers that the new corporate tax agenda should include a mechanism to address the debt-equity bias through an incentive system, helping to supportimprove the resilience of companies in adverse economic circumstances in the future;
Amendment 15 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas since 1976, when the European Electoral Act paved the way for the election of the representatives of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage for the first time, the EP has continuously requested the reform of EU electoral law and moves towards a more a genuine, uniform and European electoral procedure; whereas electoral law falls within the competence of the Member States;
Amendment 23 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
Amendment 31 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas, despite some steps forward in defining common standards of electoral procedures for the European Parliament, today EU elections are still mostly governed by national laws and therefore more improvements are needed to establish a genuinely uniform procedure for European elections today EU elections are still mostly governed by national laws and are a collection of national elections and they should stay as such in the future;
Amendment 38 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas the turnout registered in the 2019 European elections was the highest of any elections to the European Parliament in the last 20 years; whereas increased turnout is a positive signal shows that citizens of the Union are taking an increasing interest in the development of thea new European integratUnion, as indicated also by the results of the special Eurobarometer of 9 March 2021;
Amendment 52 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas an appropriate approach to reforming the European electoral law should be based on respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the introduction of recommendations for common minimum standards , based on the European best practices;
Amendment 56 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital M
Recital M
M. whereas the reform of the European Parliament's electoral procedure should aim to enhance the democratic and transnational dimension of the European elections and the democratic legitimacy of the Union decision-making process, reinforce the concept of citizenship of the Union, improve the functioning of the European Parliament and the governance of the Union, make the work of the European Parliament more legitimate, strengthen the principles of electoral equality and equal opportunities, enhance the effectiveness of the system for conducting European elections, and bring Members of the European Parliament closer to their voters, and in particular the youngest amongst them, while preserving the national character of electoral matters;
Amendment 79 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital T
Recital T
Amendment 98 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital W
Recital W
W. whereas an electoral authority, acting as a network of network and synergies among Member States' single contactelectoral authorities, should be set updeveloped at Union level, as this would facilitate access to information on the rules governing the European elections, as well as streamlining the process, managing the joint constituency and enhancing the European character of those elections;
Amendment 103 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital X
Recital X
X. whereas postal, electronic and internet voting could make the conduct of European elections more efficient and more appealing for voters, whilstthe voting system in each Member State should be efficient and should ensuringe the highest possible standards of data protection;
Amendment 111 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Suggests the reform of its electoral procedure with the goal of shaping in a concrete way a European public sphere, by suggesting recommendations for common minimum standards and legislative changbased on the European best practices ahead of the 2024 European elections;
Amendment 113 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Considers it essential to improve the transparency and democratic accountability of the Parliament, by strengthening the European dimension of the elections, notably by shifting the debate in election campaigns away from national topics towards genuinely European issues; in addition, considers it essential to transform the European elections into a single European election, as opposed to the collection of 27 separate national elections, which is the way that European elections are mainly perceived today; in addition, considers it essential to provide national electoral authorities with support from the EU level;
Amendment 124 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Observes that diverging electoral cultures have resulted in a range of different electoral systems; considers therefore that recommon minimum standards are needed, in order to ensure approximation towards a unified European electoral law and equality of the vote for citizens of the Unionendations for common standards, based on the European best practices, are needed, including as regards: the right to register a party and to stand for elections; access to ballots; the fielding of candidates; accessibility of voting; or what happens on the day of the elections;
Amendment 130 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Calls for the establishment of a common framework of recommendations, with benchmarks and minimum standards for election rules across the EU, and suggests focusing on a strong coordination with national measures for implementing the core of its proposals, without prejudice to the Member States' authority in the field of electoral law;
Amendment 139 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Considers gender equality to be a key horizontal element for improving the quality of EU democracy and enhancing a European public space; calls on Member States to apply this principle and the provisions contained in the Parliament’s proposal in the attached legislative act in a comprehensive way, in accordance with their own competences; calls for the introduction of lists of candidates with an equal number of male and female candidates for the electable places, for example through the use of zipped lists or other equivalent methods, since, in many Member States, there is no legislation that ensures political gender parity in electionfurther calls on Member States to increase efforts to ensure gender equality and equal opportunities in the European electoral process;
Amendment 156 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
Amendment 164 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Calls on EuropeanEncourages political parties and movements to nominindicate their candidates for the position of President of the Commission - or common candidates of a coalition of European parties and movements - at least 12 weeks before the start of the electoral period; consi, in orders that binding democratic procedures and transparency in the selection should be ensured; expects candidates to be placed in the first position of the corresponding list of the joint constituencyo ensure the democratic scrutiny and a fully informed choice of EU citizens when voting in the European elections;
Amendment 174 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Calls for enhancing the visibility of European parties and movements through media campaigns and on ballot papers and all electoral materials; determines that national parties shallcan indicate their affiliation to the European political parties and to the corresponding lead candidate during the electoral campaign;
Amendment 188 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
Amendment 204 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Believes that transnational lists are a lever that can be used to bring about the formation of true and effectiveEuropean elections are a collection of national processes, in which European political parties and movements can play an important role;
Amendment 215 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Suggests including common provisions governing expenditure linked to the European electoral campaign for each entity admitted for the purpose of tabling a list of candidates for members of the European Parliament in the Union-wide constituencyto the EU elections; calls for strong coordination with the upcoming revision of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/20214 on this matter;
Amendment 222 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Recalls that the minimum age for eligibility to stand as a candidate across the 27 Member States varies between 18 and 25; calls for the introducobserves that its determination falls within national competences and encourages the adoption of a recommendation ofor a single, harmonised age for passive and active voting rights across Member States as a way to ensure real voting equality and to avoid discrimination in the most fundamental area of citizenship, namely the right to participate in the democratic process;
Amendment 229 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Considers transparency of the electoral process and access to reliable information to be essential elements for raising European political awareness and securing an election turnout that is high enough to constitute a mandate from the electorate; highlights that citizens shall be informed well in advance - notably 12 weeks before the elections - about the candidates standing in the European elections and about the affiliation of national political parties to a European political party;
Amendment 237 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Proposes establishing a European Estructured network between national electoral Aauthority in charge ofies for coordinating information on the European elections, monitoring the implementation of the common standards of the European electoral law and supervising the exchange of information on voting by citizens of the Union outside their home country; considers that such a bodystructure could facilitate an efficient exchange of information, and in particular the sharing of best practices, between national bodies; suggests that an essential task of the Authority would be the management of the register of electoral lists for joint constituencies;
Amendment 255 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Believes that the introduction of postal voting is neededcould be useful for voters who are unable to go to the polling stations on election day, and that this could make the conduct of European elections more efficient and more appealing for voters in specific or exceptional circumstances; calls in this regard on Members States to consider the possible introduction of complementary enhancing tools such as electronic or internet votingeffective tools and procedures, in accordance with their own national traditions and constitutions, and with appropriate safeguards;
Amendment 262 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Believes that establishing a common European voting day would create a more coherent pan-European election and therefore suggests fixing 9th May as the European election day , regardless of the day of the week on which it falls, with the possibility of that day becoming a public holiday; considers it important that the first official projections of the electoral results are announced simultaneously in all Member Statenational authorities make independent decisions regarding election times, e.g. the first official projections onf the election day at 21:00 hours CEToral results;
Amendment 270 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Recital 4
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Recital 4
(4) In spite of the provisions of the Electoral Act, elections to the European Parliament, which are largely determined by national rules, which differ considerably across Member States, resulting in a range of different electoral systems. Elections for the European Parliament take place on different days, and votes are cast for national parties with national candidates on the basis of national programmes. Approximation of those different electoral systems through the adoption of a more unified European electoral lawrecommendations for a more harmonised European electoral process across the Member States, based on clear common principles and rulesstandards, would ensure voter equality for all citizens of the Union, and strengthen the European public sphere.
Amendment 272 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Recital 5
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Recital 5
Amendment 284 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Recital 6
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Recital 6
(6) According to Article 10(4) of the TEU, political parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union. European political parties and movements should therefore play a more central role in the European elections’ process, including by giving them the possibility of tabling pan- European lists in the Union-wide constituency, so that they become known by and and become more visible to electors, both on ballot papers and in campaign materials and publications.
Amendment 301 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Recital 9
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Recital 9
(9) A European Electoral Authority should be established for the management of the Union-wide constituency. Such a European Estructured network between national electoral Aauthority wies should be essentialtablished for coordinating information on the European elections and monitoring the implementation of the common standards of the European electoral law, by ensuring an efficient exchange of information and best practices between national bodies. In addition.
Amendment 313 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Recital 10
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Recital 10
(10) In order to encourage voter participation in elections to the European Parliament, Member States shcould provide for advance and postal voting. To fully take advantage of the possibilities offered by technological developments, Member States could also permit electronic and internet votingevaluate other tools with respect of their constitutional traditions, while ensuring the reliability of the result, the secrecy of the vote and the protection of personal data, in accordance with applicable Union and national law.
Amendment 320 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Recital 12
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Recital 12
(12) The minimum age for the exercise of active passive voting rights varies across the 27 Member States. AMember States shall assess to introduce a single harmonised age for active and passive voting should be introduced across the Union in order to, while always ensureing equality and to avoid discrimination in the most fundamental civic and political right - the right to vote.
Amendment 330 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Recital 13
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Recital 13
(13) The 1976 Electoral act established a common electoral period, giving the Member States the power to set the exact date and the time for the elections within that period. A truly pan-European election requires not just a common period, but a common European voting day. The elections for the European Parliament shcould be held on 9 May, Europe Day, marking the anniversary of the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950.
Amendment 348 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 2 – point 3
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 2 – point 3
(3) ‘European coalition of national political parties and/or national political movements’ means an electoral alliance by a number of national political parties and/or national political movements equal to one quarter of the Member States, where necessary rounded up to the nearest whole number, that tables a candidacy to, and campaigns for the Union-wide constituencdeclaring their affiliation of a same European political party;
Amendment 365 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 2 – point 6
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 2 – point 6
(6) ‘European electoral coalition’ means an electoral and political alliance by two or more European political parties and/or European political movements that fields a list of candidates for and campaigns in the Union-wide constituency. National political parties and/or national political movements can also join such an electoral alliance provided that they are not affiliated to a European political party and there is no other affiliated national political party to any of the European political parties of the electoral allianceor movements and/or national parties or movements from different Member States;
Amendment 375 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 2 – point 8
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 2 – point 8
Amendment 392 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 4
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 4
Every European Union citizen from 18 years of age shallcan have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate for election to the European Parliament, in both the national and in the Union-wide constituency, without prejudice to those Member States that, at the date of the entry into force of this Regulation, have set the minimum age that is lower than 18without prejudice to the competence of the Member States to set the minimum age for eligibility to vote and for eligibility to stand as a candidate.
Amendment 415 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 8 – paragraph 1
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 8 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shallcan provide for postal voting in elections to the European Parliament, including for citizens living in a third country, and shall adopt measures that ensure that postal voting is accessible accessibility of vote, in particular for persons with disabilities. Member States shall adopt all necessary measures to ensure the reliability and secrecy of the vote, and the protection of personal data in accordance with applicable Union law.
Amendment 418 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 8 – paragraph 2
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 8 – paragraph 2
2. Member States may providevaluate additional possibilities of voting by way of electronic and internet systems, without prejudice to the possibility of proxy voting as allowed by applicable national provisions at the time of the entry into force of this Regulation. In the event of electronic, internet, and proxy voting,and means of voting, with respect of their constitutional traditions. Member States shall adopt all necessary measures to ensure the reliability and the secrecy of the vote, and the protection of personal data in accordance with applicable Union law.
Amendment 437 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 10 – paragraph 2
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 10 – paragraph 2
The lists of candidates for election to the European Parliament shall ensure gender parity. This shall be ensured through the introduction of lists of candidates with an equal number of male and female candidates for the electable placequality and equal opportunities. The names of the male and female candidates shall appear alternately on the ballot paper.
Amendment 446 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 12 – paragraph 2
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 12 – paragraph 2
2. Members of the European Parliament shall be elected as representatives of the citizens of the Union on the basis of proportional representation, in each Member State and in the Union- wide constituency.
Amendment 455 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 12 – paragraph 4
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 12 – paragraph 4
Amendment 465 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 13 – paragraph 2
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 13 – paragraph 2
Amendment 477 #
Amendment 546 #
Amendment 603 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 17 – paragraph 4
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 17 – paragraph 4
4. Member States shall ensure that European electoral entities are given equal treatment and opportunities as national parties and national political movements regarding the electoral campaign related to the Union-wide constituencyopportunities to be visible during the electoral campaign.
Amendment 606 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 18 – paragraph 1
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 18 – paragraph 1
1. Each Member State shall designate a contact authority responsible for exchanging data on voters and candidates with its counterparts in the other Member States and with the European Einformation on voting data and procedures and on internal best practices (“national electoral authority”) with its counterparts in the other Member States, in order to establish the structured and coordinated network of national electoral Aauthority established underies foreseen in Article 27.
Amendment 611 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 18 – paragraph 2
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 18 – paragraph 2
Amendment 616 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 19 – paragraph 1
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 19 – paragraph 1
1. Elections to the European Parliament shallmay be held on 9 May of the last year of a parliamentary term, as referred to in Article 20. The election shall end in all Member States by 21:00 hours local time on that day, unless otherwise determined by the individual Member States for objective impossibility or other internal reasons, as assessed by the national authorities.
Amendment 619 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 19 – paragraph 2
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 19 – paragraph 2
Amendment 628 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 22 – paragraph 2
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 22 – paragraph 2
For this purpose it shall take note of the results declared officially by the Member States and by the European Electoral Authority, and shall rule on any disputes which may arise out of the provisions of this Regulation other than those arising out of the national provisions to which this Regulation refernational authorities.
Amendment 638 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 26 – paragraph 5
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 26 – paragraph 5
Amendment 655 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 – paragraph 1
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 – paragraph 1
1. A European Estructured network among national electoral Aauthority is hereby establishies shall be implemented for the purpose of coordinating the exchange of information on the European elections across the EU, monitoring the implementation of this Regulation and supervising the exchange of information on citizens of the Union voting outside their home country, as well as conducting and monitoring the electoral process of the Union-wide constituency.
Amendment 659 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
2. The Adesignated authorityies shall be independent and shall exercise itstheir functions in full compliance with national law and this Regulation.
Amendment 663 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
The Aauthorityies shall exercise all the functions related to the electoral process of the Union-wide constituency and liaise with the authorentities referred to in Article 18 and this Article.
Amendment 667 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
The Union-wide constituency lists of candidates shall be submitted to the Anational authority, who shall verify that the conditions laid down in this Regulation and in the national law are fully met. The Aauthority shall establish and manage a Register of the different Union- wide constituency lists submitted by the European Electoral Entitielists submitted by national parties or movements whose information from the register shall be public.
Amendment 669 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 4
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 4
Amendment 670 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5
In its decisions, the Aeach authority shall give full consideration to the fundamental rights to vote and to stand as a candidate.
Amendment 675 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 –paragraph 3
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 –paragraph 3
Amendment 682 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
The members of the Anational authorityies shall not be members of the European Parliament, hold any electoral mandate or be a current or former employee of any EU institution or of any European political party or movement, or of any European political foundation.
Amendment 685 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 – paragraph 4
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 – paragraph 4
Amendment 697 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 – paragraph 5
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 – paragraph 5
Amendment 700 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 – paragraph 6
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 – paragraph 6
6. The AEach electoral authority shall submit a report to the European Parliament on the organisation of the European elections and on the implementation of this Regulation and the attainment of its aims, within one year after the European elections. The European Electoral Authority will supervise the procedure established in Article 15.
Amendment 703 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 – paragraph 7
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 27 – paragraph 7
Amendment 712 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 30
Annex to the motion for a resolution – Article 30
Amendment 728 #
Amendment 731 #
2020/2220(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex 3 – Practical example of Transnational list using the five categories group with 46 seats
Annex 3 – Practical example of Transnational list using the five categories group with 46 seats
Amendment 15 #
2020/2202(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls that the Withdrawal Agreement allowed for the orderly withdrawal of the UK from the EU, avoiding a ‘cliff edge’; was a compromise solution between a full EU membership and a clean break from the EU system; reminds that in the latter case trade between the EU and the UK would still have been governed by the WTO's rule-based trading regime, which is the foundation of the international trading system, and which is comprehensive, tried, tested, and respected by the world's trading nations;
Amendment 17 #
2020/2202(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
Amendment 23 #
2020/2202(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
Amendment 27 #
2020/2202(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Stresses that compliance with treaties constitutes a fundamental principle of international law and that a trusting relationship between the EU and the UK depends ; reminds, however, that according to a general principle of internation all parties respecting their legally binding commitment law, states can terminate or modify a treaty due to changed circumstances;
Amendment 30 #
2020/2202(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5 a. Regrets that the EU has failed to learn from its mistakes, which led to the Brexit, and to reform itself to a community of free cooperation between independent and sovereign nation states, and, consequently, risks being fallen apart;
Amendment 16 #
2020/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas the principles and provisions of international law, and in particular the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, are applicable;
Amendment 54 #
2020/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Recognises but nevertheless considers regrettable the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union;
Amendment 55 #
2020/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Recognises but nevertheless considers regrettable the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union;
Amendment 60 #
2020/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
Amendment 76 #
2020/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Believes that the clear division of tasks among the institutions and the inclusive and transparent approach adopted by the Commission and its Chief Negotiator were paramount in, in the event of the withdrawal of a Member State, the conduct of the negotiations, and in particular the clear division of tasks and responsibilities among the institutions, should be based on verticality, centrality, transparency and inclusivity, with the aim of maintaining unity within the EU and in promoting the EU’s priorities and interests in the negotiations;
Amendment 86 #
2020/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Believes, nevertheless, that the withdrawal process was also characterised by hesitancy on the part of the UK, leading to protracted uncertainty from the outset, reflected, among other things, in the time gap between the referendum and the withdrawal notification under Article 50 of the TEU, and until the end of the negotiations, due to the spectre of a no-deal withdrawal; believes, however, in this regard, that the decision concerning when to give formal notification is at the sole discretion of the State; believes, furthermore, that assessing the conformity of the withdrawal decision with the constitutional requirements of the withdrawing State is a matter for that State alone;
Amendment 90 #
2020/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
Amendment 109 #
2020/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 – introductory part
Paragraph 11 – introductory part
11. Considers that Article 50 of the TEU strikesuck a balance between ensuring a withdrawal process and safeguarding the flexibility necessary for adaptation to the specific circumstances; believes, however, that, in the framework of a future reform of the Treaty, the opportunity of remedying some of the loopholes and shortcomings identified in Article 50 of the TEU could be assessed, with particular regard to the following:
Amendment 116 #
2020/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 – indent 1 a (new)
Paragraph 11 – indent 1 a (new)
- laying down a negotiation period longer than the two years set out under Article 50(3) of the TEU,
Amendment 141 #
2020/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. BelieveConsiders that the EU institutions and the Member States have collectively been responsive and have followed a coherent and unified approach, providing for a timely, clear and well-structured definition of the aspects of the withdrawal process, including those which are not explicitly specified in Article 50 of the TEU, in particular the objectives and general principles ofble for acting in bad faith in the withdrawal process by not allowing negotiations about the future relationship to take place before the negotifications, the EU’s competences for issues related to the withdrawal, the sequencing of negotiations, the scope of the Withdrawal Agreement, the transitional arrangements, and the framework of the future relationship of Article 50; is therefore of the view that in potential future withdrawal cases the EU should abandon its policy of no negotiation before notification of Article 50 in order to emphasise bona fide and to demonstrate that the EU is a voluntary union of independent and sovereign nation states;
Amendment 142 #
2020/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Believes that the EU institutions and the Member States have collectivelyin general been responsive and have followed a coherent and unified approach, providing for a timely, clear and well- and structured definition of the aspects of the withdrawal process, including those which are not explicitly specified in Article 50 of the TEU, in particular the objectives and general principles of the negotiations, the EU’s competences for issues related to the withdrawal, the sequencing of negotiations, the scope of the Withdrawal Agreement, the transitional arrangements, and the framework of the future relationship;
Amendment 143 #
2020/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Considers that the withdrawal agreement and the negotiation of future trade relations with the withdrawing State, pursuant to Article 50(2) of the TEU, should be more strictly aligned with each other, in view of the obstacles in the sequencing of negotiations imposed by the EU and the delays in resolving issues concerning withdrawal resulting from the absence of a shared vision on the content of future relations; in addition, asserts the importance of defining transitional measures inspired by the principle of sincere cooperation, with conditions set in the interests of both parties and of European citizens, which must be clearly defined and limited in time and subject to effective and fair application mechanisms;
Amendment 164 #
2020/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Emphasises that the role of political oversight of the European Parliament, through full and immediate provision of information at all stages of the procedure, is indispensable in a parliamentary democratic system; insists, in this regard, that no procedural constraints or political objectives should override or limit in time or scope the parliamentary scrutiny phase as regards any international agreements, and in particular, those concluded in the context of a withdrawal from the European Union;
Amendment 177 #
2020/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Considers that Article 50 of the TEU addresses and solves the procedural aspect of a Member State’s withdrawal, but does not solve the significant political and economic consequences and disruptive effects of the withdrawal of a Member State from the EU; believes, nonetheless, that Brexit has demonstrated that it is not possible in all cases to set out in the Treaty all the practical requirements of withdrawal, since many questions and problems that arose during the process were addressed using ad hoc decisions and procedures, developed by interpreting the wording of Article 50 of the TEU, as they were both unexpected and unforeseeable;
Amendment 181 #
2020/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. Emphasises the need to lay down a negotiation period of more than two years, since Brexit has confirmed that the time currently allowed by the provision is not sufficient to achieve the orderly withdrawal of a State from the EU;
Amendment 189 #
2020/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Believes that it is the responsibility and role of the Union and itsto repatriate powers to Member States to prev, and to loosent the repetition of a withdrawal from the EU; calls on Member States to consistently provide wide- reaching information to EU citizens on the functioningcurrently prevalent character of the EU as a centrally led political union ofn the European Union, its areas of action and its decision-making processes; considers that for this purpose the Conference on the Future of Europe offers an opportunity for enhanced dialogue with citizens and civil society on the European Union and how it should evolvepath to become a superstate, in order to prevent the repetition of withdrawals from the EU;
Amendment 191 #
2020/2136(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Believes that it is the responsibility and role of the Union and its Member States to prevent the repetition of a withdrawal from the EU; calls on Member States to consistently provide wide-reaching information to EU citizens on the functioningconsiders that the Conference on the Future of Europe could offer an opportunity for enhanced dialogue and reflection with citizens and civil society ofn the European Union, its areas of action and its decision- making processes; considers that for this purpose the Conference on the Future of Europe offers an opportunity for enhanced dialogue with citizens and civil society on the European Union and how it should evolve and how it should evolve, including with a view to fully understanding all the problems of the European project that led the United Kingdom to withdraw from the European Union;
Amendment 50 #
2020/2122(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
D a. Expresses deep concern about the findings of the ECB´s Targeted Review of Internal Models, published in April 2021, which shows that the biggest euro area banks have repeatedly been too optimistic in their risk-modelling, confirming longstanding suspicions among regulators and analysts that larger banks have often artificially inflated the strength of their balance sheets by underestimating the riskiness of their assets, giving them a short-term advantage over more cautious competitors; is alarmed that the Review resulted in more than 5.800 deficiencies and 253 supervisory corrections of internal models by the ECB, which pushed up the banks’ risk-weighted assets by € 275 billion, a 12 per cent increase in the models examined, which reduced their average common equity tier one ratios by 0.71 percentage points;
Amendment 87 #
2020/2122(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Recalls thatwhereas the Banking Union has delivered the institutional set-up for greater market integration, through the SSM and the SRM, while a European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) is still lackingwill further disintegrate due to moral hazard and lead to a permanent Transfer Union if mechanisms such as the backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) are implemented; regrets that insufficient progress in risk reduction in some member states serves as an argument for mutualisation of deposit insurance schemes, creating incentives for some member states not to reduce risk, or even engage in even more excessive risk-taking; points out that the absence of a proper impact assessment of the EDIS proposal is fundamentally at odds with the principles of sound governance;
Amendment 113 #
2020/2122(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Underlines the vital contribution to addressing the crisis of public guarantee schemes, moratoria on loan repayments for borrowers in financial difficulty, the central banks’ liquidity programmes and the ECB’s targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO) and pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP)Deplores the ECB's role in massively inflating the money supply and expanding its balance sheet up to over 70% of euro area GDP; recalls that banks in the northern euro area hold a disproportionately high amount of deposits with the ECB, and pay disproportionately high penalty interest to the ECB; by contrast, banks in the southern euro area benefit disproportionally from the negative interest rates on TLTRO loans;
Amendment 121 #
2020/2122(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5 a. Deplores that PEPP has had an overwhelming influence on the narrowing of yield spreads and has ensured that southern European government bonds from highly indebted Member States were viewed by investors as less risky5a, which shows that PEPP is disproportionately directed towards highly indebted euro area Member States, and that the ECB is thereby guaranteeing the liquidity of highly indebted euro countries; _________________ 5aLeibniz Centre for European Economic Research, https://www.zew.de/presse/pressearchiv/di e-stabilitaet-der-eurozone-haengt-am- tropf-der-ezb
Amendment 246 #
2020/2122(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Stresses the benefitWarns of banking consolidation inas a supposed solution to addressing the overcapacities and fragmentation of the banking sector; regrets in this respect the calls of Andrea Enria to further latinize the European banking market through consolidation; rejects this pathway to institutionalising the risk of "too big to fail"; proposes rather to break up banks, instead of consolidating them;
Amendment 24 #
2020/2088(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the higher turnout was ultimately linked to gains by Eurosceptics, which should be considered as a warning for European integration, especially in several founding Member States where far-right extremists and anti-European forces won the elections;
Amendment 30 #
2020/2088(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
Amendment 71 #
2020/2088(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas the 2019 elections failed to culminate in the choice of a Commission President from among the various Spitzenkandidaten, resulting in a backward stepdeparture from the process which was established in 2014;
Amendment 73 #
2020/2088(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital K
Recital K
Amendment 82 #
2020/2088(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas the Spitzenkandidaten system needs to be improved and formalised in the EU’s primary lawabandoned after an in- depth institutional reflection; whereas this reflection should also include the de factoexcessively broad political role of the Commission and its President and any related changes to the decision-making process of the Union;
Amendment 112 #
2020/2088(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital Q
Recital Q
Q. whereas European political parties and foundations are the primary facilitators of a successful European political debate, both during and beyond European elections;
Amendment 121 #
2020/2088(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Takes note of the higher turnout in the 2019 European elections; considers that this shows that an increasing proportion of citizens consider the EU to be the appropriate level at which to address the challenges of our time such as climate change and environmental concerns, social and gender inequalities, sustainable growth, and geopolitical concerns such as migration and foreign policy; urges all the European institutions, therefore, to take responsibility and to act upon the mandate they have been given, directly or indirectly, by the citizens; regrets both the lack of decisiveness by the Council and the lack of clear intent to achieve solutions based on a common approach;
Amendment 157 #
2020/2088(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Is of the opinion that the reason why the Spitzenkandidaten process failed to produce a President of the European Commission after the 2019 elections is because no improvements were made to it following the experience of 2014; intendthe Member States tdo strengthen the democratic process for choosing the Commission President before the next European elections of 2024not want it; calls for it to be abandoned once and for all;
Amendment 164 #
2020/2088(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. WelcomDeplores the up-coming joint declaration of the three European institutions on the Conference on the Future of Europe, recalls the commitment by the Commission President to address the issue of transnational lists and the Spitzenkandidaten process as the priority institutional issues during the Conferencefact that the idea of establishing transnational lists, rejected by the European Parliament in 2018, is being revived; calls for it to be abandoned once and for all;
Amendment 172 #
2020/2088(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
Amendment 187 #
2020/2088(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Considers that the outcome of the European elections has reinforced the political dimension of the election of the European Commission, and thereforeproblems encountered by the von der Leyen Commission highlight the need for more accurate and objective scrutiny of the declarations of interests of the Commissioners-designate; calls for the creation of an independent body, endowed with the appropriate means, to have this scrutiny included in its responsibilities;
Amendment 191 #
2020/2088(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
Amendment 197 #
2020/2088(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
Amendment 205 #
2020/2088(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
Amendment 214 #
2020/2088(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Points out that the proposed changes to the EU’s primary law within this report, which reflect the increased political role of the Commission within the EU framework, should also include the individual and collective responsibility of the Commission towards Parliament and the Council, as well as the transformation of the Council into a second legislative chamber of the Uniontransformation of the Commission into a simple permanent technical Secretariat, with no policy-making role;
Amendment 224 #
2020/2088(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Acknowledges that despite the fact that the agreed reform of the Electoral Law has not yet been ratified by some Member States, further improvements are required, such as provisions for remote voting operations in defined or exceptional circumstances, as well as on the elections in the joint European constituency;
Amendment 231 #
2020/2088(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Takes note of the efforts by the Commission and other institutions to tackle foreign interference during the electoral campaign; points out, nevertheless, that the financial and human resources needed to counter these attacks on European democracy, including at national level, are many times superior to the combined designated European resources; urges the Commission and the Member States to raise significantly the financing they make available for the fight against foreign interference;
Amendment 240 #
2020/2088(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Urges the Commission and the Council to consider, in accordance with the work of Parliament’s Special Committee on Foreign interference and Disinformation, the urgent creation of a European organisation dedicated to the fight against foreign interference; eEncourages the Commission and the Council to work much more closely with Parliament on these matters of interference, as the protection of our democratic institutions is a core competence of the European Parliament;
Amendment 253 #
2020/2088(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Proposes to amend Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations16 to allow European political parties and foundations to fully participate in the European political space while at the same time increasingincrease the transparency of their funding, especially when funding comes from member parties outside the EU; _________________ 16 OJ L 317, 4.11.2014, p. 1.
Amendment 255 #
2020/2088(INI)
17a. Emphasises, nevertheless, that this 2014 regulation has already been modified twice1 a; expresses concern at the fact that the most recent modification was made only two months prior to the May 2019 European elections, in a breach of the recommendations issued by the Venice Commission2 b; points out that a further revision would do nothing to strengthen public confidence in the European parties and foundations; _________________ 1aOJ L 114l, 4.5.2018, p. 1. 1. OJ L 85I, 27.3.2019, p. 7. 2b 'Stability of the law is a crucial element for the credibility of electoral processes. It is therefore important that stability of electoral law be ensured in order to protect it against political manipulation.' Joint Guidelines for preventing and responding to the misuse of administrative resources during electoral processes, Study 778/2014 of the Venice Commission - Strasbourg, Warsaw, 14 March 2016
Amendment 265 #
2020/2088(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Considers that the outcome of the European elections is a clear signal for an in-depth institutional reflection that will allow States, citizens, civil society and their representatives to shape the future of the Union; calls, therefore, on all institutional partners to assume their responsibility and deliver an ambitious Conference on the Future of Europe;
Amendment 2 #
2020/2080(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. WelcomNotes the interestparticipation of Member States in permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) following its establishment by Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017, as shown by the significant number of projects established so far by the Council under PESCO; encourages participating Member States to advance this work and focus on the swift and effective implementation of these projects;
Amendment 8 #
2020/2080(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
Amendment 17 #
2020/2080(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Welcomes in this regardCondemns the political guidelines of the Commission regarding defence policy, and in particular regarding the need for bold steps towardsutopian dreaming of a genuine European Defence Union, and for an integrated and comprehensive approach to the EU’s security; hopes thatfurther condemns the creation of a new Commission Directorate- General for Defence Industry and Space, will serve as a catalyst for enhanced coherence in the creation of defence capabilitiehich demands resources urgently needed by the Member States in tackling economic and social impacts of the Covid-19 crisis;
Amendment 23 #
2020/2080(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Considers it necessary to step up the actual contribution of PESCO projects to the achievement of the EU’s ambiimplement the PESCO projects according to nationsal in the area of security and defence, by effectively ensuring that the participating Member States strengthen their collaboration in significant and ambitious capability development, and that there is coherence between the EU and NATO in terms of priorititerests of the Member States, bearing in mind their sovereignty and that security and defence policy in the European Union is a competence of the Member States;
Amendment 31 #
2020/2080(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Calls on the participating Member States to continue making resources available for PESCO projects, while ensuring real ownership of and commitment to PESCO coordinating and pooling processthe participation in the PESCO projects as long as it furthers their national interests, without any pressure from the EU institutions or other Member States;
Amendment 43 #
2020/2080(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
Amendment 47 #
2020/2080(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Stresses that security and defence policy remains in the core of the sovereignty of the Member States; reminds that it is impossible to determine a common security and defence policy line for the EU due to diversity of historical backgrounds, geographical positions and geostrategic interests of the Members States; urges the European Parliament to bear in mind lessons of history for limits of European integration drawn by failures of projects even between six founding members of the European integration project, e.g. the collapse of the Fouchet Plan in the 1960s;
Amendment 89 #
2018/2170(REG)
Parliament's Rules of Procedure
Rule 165 – paragraph 1
Rule 165 – paragraph 1
1. The President shall call to order any Member who disrupts the smooth conduct of the proceedings orand whose conduct fails to comply with the relevant provisions of Rule 11.
Amendment 90 #
2018/2170(REG)
Parliament's Rules of Procedure
Rule 165 – paragraph 6
Rule 165 – paragraph 6
Amendment 91 #
2018/2170(REG)
Parliament's Rules of Procedure
Rule 165 – paragraph 7
Rule 165 – paragraph 7
7. The powers provided for in paragraphs 1 to 65 shall be vested, mutatis mutandis, in the presiding officers of bodies, committees and delegations as provided for in the Rules of Procedure.
Amendment 92 #
2018/2170(REG)
Parliament's Rules of Procedure
Rule 166 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Rule 166 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
In serious cases of disorder or disruption of Parliament in violation of the principles laid down in Rule 11, the President shall adopt a reasoned decision imposing the appropriate penalty.
Amendment 93 #
2018/2170(REG)
Parliament's Rules of Procedure
Rule 167 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Rule 167 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Without prejudice to the external rights of appeal open to the Member, the internal appeal procedure shall respect the rights of the defence and the adversary procedure. The final Bureau decision shall be reasoned and shall be notified to the Member concerned by registered letter.
Amendment 94 #
2018/2170(REG)
Parliament's Rules of Procedure
Rule 168a – paragraph 1 – point b
Rule 168a – paragraph 1 – point b
Amendment 95 #
2018/2170(REG)
Parliament's Rules of Procedure
Rule 174 – paragraph 7
Rule 174 – paragraph 7
7. The President may put other amendments to the vote collectively where they are complementary, unless a political group or Members reaching at least the low threshold have requested separate or split votes. Authors of amendments may also propose such collective votes where their amendments are complementary unless there is opposition from a political group or Members reaching at least the low threshold.
Amendment 97 #
2018/2170(REG)
Parliament's Rules of Procedure
Rule 179 – interpretation
Rule 179 – interpretation
The provisions of Rule 179 on voting by roll call do not apply to the reports provided for in Rule 8(2) and Rule 9(4), (7) and (97) in the context of procedures relating to the immunity of a Member.
Amendment 101 #
2018/2170(REG)
Parliament's Rules of Procedure
Rule 210a – paragraph 4
Rule 210a – paragraph 4
4. Members or a pPolitical groups or groups reaching at least the medium threshold inmembers of the committee which has applied the confidential procedure may request consideration of a breach of confidentiality. This request may be placed on the agenda of the next committee meeting. By a majority of its members, the committee may decide to submit the matter to the President for further consideration under Rules 11 and 166.
Amendment 11 #
2018/2094(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
Amendment 43 #
2018/2094(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
E a. whereas the last elections in various Member States clearly show a rise of euroscepticism;
Amendment 55 #
2018/2094(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas the EU is facing a particularly important period in its construction process, given the nature and dimension of its challenges, and whereas these can only be solved by working together and through greater and better integration;
Amendment 64 #
2018/2094(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas the Meseberg Declaration proposes putting in place transnational lists for the European elections as of 2024; and that proposal was rejected by the European Parliament 1a ; _________________ 1a Composition of the European Parliament - Wednesday, 7 February 2018 - Strasbourg
Amendment 70 #
2018/2094(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls that Parliament’s resolutionsConsiders that a debate on the state of the debate on the fFuture of Europe of 16 February 2017 emphshould be an opportunity to objectively asisedss the importance of the single institutional framework and the Community method and suggested several proposals and initiatives of particular importance for European integration that can contribute to building Europe’s futurestate of European integration and not an exercise of self-satisfaction aimed at proposing the same solutions to increasingly pressing problems ;
Amendment 77 #
2018/2094(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Underlines that the Union must tackle the challenges of its future with greabetter and betternew political integrationproposals, with full respect for fundamental and democratic values, and by working together; agrees with the heads of state and government who addressed Parliament in plenary during the debates on the future of Europe that citizens want a Europe that protects their way of life, their rights and their social model on the basis of shared sovereignty, and that the problems we face in Europe can only be solved together;
Amendment 81 #
2018/2094(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Reiterates its belief that differentiated integration must remain open to all Member States and continue to act as an example of deeper European integration, not as a way to facilitate à la carte solutions;
Amendment 90 #
2018/2094(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Reiterates that the unanimity, which the Treaties require in some fundamental matters, is an almost insurmountable obstacle in important moments and decisions, and advocates therefore, with regard to decision-making procedures, the principle of qualified majority voting (QMV) in Council and the use of the ordinary legislative procedure; recalls that under the current Treaties this can be achieved by using the various passerelle clauses or, in the case of enhanced cooperation, by using Article 333 TFEU guarantee against European interferences ;
Amendment 95 #
2018/2094(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
Amendment 100 #
2018/2094(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
Amendment 105 #
2018/2094(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
Amendment 121 #
2018/2094(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Takes note of the report of the Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and ‘Doing Less More Efficiently’ of 10 July 2018, presenting recommendations on a new way of working and strongly advocates the full respect of these principles;
Amendment 145 #
2018/2094(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
Amendment 174 #
2018/2094(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16 a. Is of the opinion that taking into account the results of both the Lisbon and Europe 2020 strategy, the EU should refrain from asking for more competences in economic matters;
Amendment 177 #
2018/2094(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
Amendment 188 #
2018/2094(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Deplores the absence of agreement among the Member States on the priorities and implementation of an EU-level comprehensive immigration policy, which would make it possible to organise and regulatestop migratory flows, control our external borders more effectively, cooperate with countries of origin and transit, and guarantee respect for the fundamental rights of migrants and asylum seekers, among other objectives; underlines that the obvious contradictions in interests exposed by Member States need to be overcome in order not to jeopardise the European integration project;
Amendment 195 #
2018/2094(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
Amendment 202 #
2018/2094(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
Amendment 215 #
2018/2094(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Underlines the need to strengthen the European public sphere as a supranational area of European democracy; sStresses that the major challenges Europe is facing must be addressed and discussed from a Europeannational perspective and not from a nationalEuropean perspective; points out that, for this reason, European democracy needlacks a European identity, a genuinely European demos, more European institutional education and a deliberative, more participatory and less national social framemos and therefore legitimacy; underlines however the deep cultural ties that unite Europeans and distinguish them from the rest of the workld;
Amendment 225 #
2018/2094(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Welcomes the approach taken to the current negotiations on the United Kingdom’s orderly withdrawal from the European Union, and underlines the remarkable unity displayed by the EU institutions and Member States ; notes that experience in the negotiations to date has shown the enormous complexities of such decisions;
Amendment 228 #
2018/2094(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Underlines once more that neitherthat national sovereignty norand subsidiarity can justify orand legitimise the systematic refusal on the part of a Member State to comply with the interpretation of fundamental values of the European Union which inspired the introductory articles of the European Treaties, which every Member State has willingly endorsed and committed to respectmade by the European parliament ; underlines furthermore that upholding these values is fundamental for the cohesion of the European project, the rights of all Europeans and the mutual trust needed among the Member States; recalls its recommendation to establish a European mechanism for democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights;
Amendment 1 #
2018/2002(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas Member States have exclusive competence in the area of direct taxation, any Union proposal on the tax treatment of personal pension products will encroach upon this exclusive competence of the Member States;
Amendment 2 #
2018/0902R(NLE)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Expresses deep concern about the deliberate and systematic efforts of the Hungarian Government to undermine the founding values of the Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU, in particular through the removal of the constitutional checks and balances, by the limitation of the independence of the judiciary, by intentional alteratirection to which the whole European Union is heading due to unfounded and politically motivated attacks against the Member States, which oppose the mainstream visions of the national electoral system and by hampering freedom of expression; highlights that these trends have substantially worseneEU as an ever closer federal supra-national state, and defend the sovereignty and since the triggering of Article 7(1) TEU and have been severely amplified by the COVID-19 crisidependence of the Member States;
Amendment 9 #
2018/0902R(NLE)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Deplores the fact that theRegards that constitutional balance inchanges that Hungary has continued to be significantly altered by a deliberately broad and instrumental use of cardinal laws and constitutional amendments aiming to entrench the issues which are to beapproved during the last decade are a regsulated by ordinary legislation, with no or lt of a legitimiated public consultation, in use of a govery expedient manner, without any effective involvement of the opposition or civil society; highlights that such a trend is contrary to the rule of law, to constitutional traditions and to principles common to Member States and has been a source of open and consistent criticism by the EU and by the Council of Europe institutions; denounces the excessive use of extraordinary powers with the declaration of the state of danger at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemicning majority received in democratic elections, if and to the extent to which the Hungarian Constitutional Court has upheld them or, at any rate, not questioned them constitutionally;
Amendment 19 #
2018/0902R(NLE)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Expresses concern about the steps the Hungarian Government has taken to further limit the independenceRecalls that the fact that the Hungarian Government relies ofn the judiciary, in particular by weakening the powers of the National Judicial Council, which damages mutual trust in the EU, as national judges are judges of first instance of EU law and guarantee equality between EU citizens; highlights, furthermore, that the Hungarian Government increasingly relies on the Hungarian Constitutional Court to avoid compliance with the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), thereby undermining the primacy of EU lawHungarian Constitutional Court without seeking compliance with the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is legitimate use of state sovereignty, which is in compliance with the EU treaties; further recalls that the principle of primacy of EU law has no basis in the EU treaties except for the normative ambiguous Declaration 17 to the Treaty on European Union;
Amendment 24 #
2018/0902R(NLE)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Insists that the Council’s constitutional obligation to organise hearings, enshrined in Article 7(1) TEU, should be implemented in an open, regular and structured manner; insists that in all proceedings related to Article 7 TEU, Parliament and the Commission shoulEU institutions terminate proceedings under Article 7(1) TEU due to the fact that it results in interference in internal affairs of a sovereign and independent state, which is contrary to public international law; recalls that according to the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co- operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted bey treated equally; calls on the Council to systematically provide the Member State concerned with recommendations, and to oversee the implementation thereof on a regular basis, following the hearings under Article 7 TEU; he UN General Assembly on 24 October 1970 (resolution 26/25 (XXV))1a, "[n]o state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state", and that "interference or attempted threats against the personality of the state or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law"; _________________ 1a https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/3dda1f 104.pdf
Amendment 39 #
2018/0902R(NLE)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. InsistsPoints out that legitimacy of the EU’s action on the rule of law needs to be underpinned by a coherent, effective and visible EU annual rule of law monitoring cycle, which should also integrate procedures under Article 7 TEU and under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; calls on the Council and the Commission to respond without delay to Parliament’s requests to negotiate an interinstitutional agreement under Article 295 TFEU framing such a mechanism suffers from actions that create tensions and erode unity between the Member States e.g. from procedures under Article 7 TEU and under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; calls on the Council and the Commission to terminate aforementioned proceedings;
Amendment 45 #
2018/0902R(NLE)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Takes note of the recent parliamentary elections in Hungary and insists that any Hungarian government elected remains responsible for eliminating the risk of serious breaches of EU values.totally respects their legitimate and democratic outcome;
Amendment 21 #
2017/2233(ACI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas, according to Article 10(4) TEU, political parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of the citizens of the Union, even if they are critical of the institutions of the EU and their functioning, since it can not be the intention to limit opinions or beliefs to those of proponents of the Union and its current functioning;
Amendment 31 #
2017/2233(ACI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls that the Commission President will be elected by the European Parliament on a proposal by the European Council, taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after appropriate consultations have been held, and that therefore, as was the case in 2014, European political parties shallcan come up with lead candidates (‘Spitzenkandidaten’) in order to give the European citizens the choice whom to elect as Commission President in the European Parliament elections; points out that the system of the Spitzenkandidaten is a possibility that - as in 2014 - could take the form of an agreement to limit voters' options to candidates appointed by parliamentary groups; points out however that introducing such a system gives rise to the unjustified suggestion that the system of the Spitzenkandidaten is a 'so-called' democratic election of the President of the Commission, while, in fact, it continues to be an indirect imitation of a direct election by the population as a whole, which operates within the strict framework of the existing structures of the political groups and/or parties currently existing in the outgoing Parliament;
Amendment 37 #
2017/2233(ACI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Stresses that the Spitzenkandidaten process is a further step in strengthening the EU’s parliamentary dimension, and therefore warns that the European Parliament willcan reject any candidate in the investiture procedure of the Commission President who was not appointed as a Spitzenkandidat in the run-up to the elections of the European Parliament; points out that the system of the Spitzenkandidaten is a possibility that - as in 2014 - could take the form of an agreement to limit voters' options to candidates appointed by parliamentary groups; points out however that introducing such a system gives rise to the unjustified suggestion that the system of the Spitzenkandidaten is a 'so-called' democratic election of the President of the Commission, while, in fact, it continues to be an indirect imitation of a direct election by the population as a whole, which operates within the strict framework of the existing structures of the political groups and/or parties currently existing in the outgoing Parliament;
Amendment 43 #
2017/2233(ACI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Underlines that the Spitzenkandidaten process fosters the political awareness of European citizens in the run-up to the elections of the European Parliament and reinforces the political legitimacy of both Parliament and the Commission by connecting their respective elections a little bit more directly to the choice of the voters; points out that the system of the Spitzenkandidaten is a possibility that - as in 2014 - could take the form of an agreement to limit voters' options to candidates appointed by parliamentary groups; points out however that introducing such a system gives rise to the unjustified suggestion that the system of the Spitzenkandidaten is a 'so- called' democratic election of the President of the Commission, while, in fact, it continues to be an indirect imitation of a direct election by the population as a whole, which operates within the strict framework of the existing structures of the political groups and/or parties currently existing in the outgoing Parliament;
Amendment 48 #
2017/2233(ACI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Recalls that all majorseveral5a European political parties embraced the Spitzenkandidaten process in the run-up to the 2014 European elections, which is itself a sign of its success, and stresses that the 2019 European elections will be the occasion to cement the use of that process; _________________ 5aa factual correction that avoids giving the impression that some political parties or opinions are not taken into account or that their opinion should not be respected.
Amendment 31 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) has provided important support for investment in the EUfailed to fill the large investment gap in Europe, to restore growth and tackle unemployment, in addition to the European Structural and Investment Funds, while at the same time the orientation of savings towards equity has decreased returns and provided fewer incentives for investment;
Amendment 74 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Takes note ofIs concerned about the publication of the 2018 Annual Growth Survey (AGS) package and the proposfailed policy mix of investment, structural reform and fiscal consolidation, presented as a way to further promote higherunderperforming growth levels and to strengthen European recovery and contra-productive upward convergence;
Amendment 266 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to adopt adequate measures to help refugees settle and integratwithin their region of origin instead of migrating to Europe and to anticipate at an early stage the requirements for facilitating their smooth transition to the labour market, as well as ensuring that public services are provided with sufficient resources; stresses that social partners should play a key role in facilitating the integration of migrants and preventing them from suffering from labour abusereturn to their country of origin;
Amendment 322 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
Amendment 359 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Underlines that any further step towards a deepening of the EMU must go hand in hand with strongerlacks democratic controls; insists that, to this end, the role of the European Parliament and national parliaments must be strengthened; asks to include trade unions in the negotiation process at both national and European level; urges the launch of the long- awaited negotiation of an interinstitutional agreement (IIA) on the Semester;
Amendment 22 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas, in its ruling of 18 July 2017, the German Constitutional Court stated that there were serious indications that the asset purchase programme breached the prohibition on monetary financing and exceeded the ECB's monetary policy mandate, as a result of which it encroached upon the powers of the Member States;1 a _________________ 1a http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/ SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2017/ bvg17- 070.html;jsessionid=29BCB67B8B3DA0C 6801D8EB0F1CD1778.1_cid394 “Nach Auffassung des Senats sprechen gewichtige Gründe dafür, dass die dem Anleihenkaufprogramm zugrundeliegenden Beschlüsse gegen das Verbot monetärer Haushaltsfinanzierung verstoßen sowie über das Mandat der Europäischen Zentralbank für die Währungspolitik hinausgehen und damit in die Zuständigkeit der Mitgliedstaaten übergreifen”
Amendment 5 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6
Citation 6
— having regard to the ECB’s guidance to banks on non-performing loans of 20 March 2017, and to the public consultation on its draft addendum to this guidance of 4 October 2017,
Amendment 7 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 a (new)
Citation 6 a (new)
- having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament's Legal Service of 9 November 2017 on the addendum to the ECB guidance to banks on non- performing loans (SJ-0693/17),
Amendment 8 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 b (new)
Citation 6 b (new)
- having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 4 September 2007 on institutional and legal implications of the use of “soft law” instruments (P6_TA(2007)0366),
Amendment 65 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
D a. whereas the Banking Union is acting on the consequences of the crisis and not on the causes;
Amendment 67 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D b (new)
Recital D b (new)
D b. whereas a proper structural reform of banks based on a clear separation between trading and credit activities is the only way to prevent the risk of bail-out at the expense of taxpayers and ensure financial stability;
Amendment 98 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Takes note of the ECB’s ‘failing or likely to fail’ assessments in respect of Banco Popular Español S.A., Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca; whereas Banco Popular Español S.A. has been saved by private bond holders but Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca have been saved by state aid;
Amendment 113 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Notes the ECB’s determination in the context of the precautionary recapitalisation of Monte dei Paschi di Siena that the bank is solvent and meets the capital requirements; notes, in this regard, that the determination of solvency leaves room for an element of subjectivity as this determination greatly depends on how a bank’s assets are valued; notes that the market return of the bank implied a large paper loss for Italian tax payers;
Amendment 119 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Notes that the current supervisory system focuses on credit risk, completely ignoring exposure to risky trading activities and legal risks possibly affecting the sustainability of financial institutions;
Amendment 127 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Reiterates its conceWarns about the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that ‘Member States and banks themselves have a primary responsibility in tackling non-performing loans’4 ; welcomes, nonetheless, the work done by different EU institutions and bodies on this issue; calls on these actors and the Member States to duly implement the Council conclusions of 11 July 2017 on the action plan to tackle non- performing loans in Europe; _________________ 4 Commission communication on completing the Banking Union, 11 October 2017, p. 15 (COM(2017)0592).
Amendment 140 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Reiterates its concerns aboutNotes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that ‘Member States and bpoints out that the problem can only be tackled definitively by meanks themselvof a systemic solution; stresses thave a primary responsibility in tackling non-performing loans’4; welcomes, nonetheless, the work done by different EU institutions and bodies ont this is the result of the macroeconomic imbalances caused by the EMU and poor crisis management with mistaken economic policies; considers thise issue; calls on these actors and the Member States to duly implement the Council conclusions of 11 July 2017 on to be crucial and calls on the Member States to adopt anti-cyclical policies to stimulate growthe action plan to tackle non- performing loans in Europe; _________________ 4Commission communication on completing the Banking Union, 11 October 2017, p. 15 (COM(2017)0592).nd support domestic demand in order to limit NPLs, given the need to resolve macroeconomic problems associated with chronic demand shortages and the collapsing purchasing power of households;
Amendment 163 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly invested in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessive ‘home bias’; takes notewarns, in this respect, of the Commission’s ongoing work on the idea of so-called sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS), which opens the door to a transfer union;
Amendment 177 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. WelcomNotes the work done by the ECB to assess the adequacy of internal models, including its new guide to the TRIM, with a view to addressing the variability in risk-weights applied to risk- weighted assets of the same cl: maintains, however, that the use of such models increases across credit institutions; calls for a rapid conclusion of negoregulatory asymmetries in the banking union and results in an unjustified competiations on output floors wve disadvantage for smaller credith in the BCBSstitutions;
Amendment 184 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Stresses that any further measures proposed by the ECB, a purely technocratic institution, should respect the principle of accountability and democratic transparency;
Amendment 212 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Calls for the repeal of the BRRD, which has already shown itself to be ineffective and dangerous for investors, bondholders and savers and for the stability of the financial system as a whole;
Amendment 306 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for progress to be made on the legislative proposals implemeOpposes the inclusion of a pre- resolution moratorium tool in the BRRD; strongly criticises the ECB proposal of 8 November 2017 containg total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) in Union law; supports the inclusion of a pre-resolution moratorium tool in the BRRDed in the 'Opinion of the ECB of 8 November 2017 on revisions to the Union crisis management framework(CON/2017/47), paragraph 5 point 1' ; Believes that freezing accounts below EUR 100 000 would have a devastating impact on confidence in the banking system and the protection of savers and their right, as enshrined in numerous national constitutions;
Amendment 358 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern for all EU citizens that should be managed at national level; is currently debating the proposal on an EDIS at committee level; notewarns, in this respect, that the Commission’s more proportionate ‘new approach’ to an EDIS as put forward in its communication of 11 October 2017 still infringes on national sovereignty;
Amendment 378 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Notes the potential benefits and the likely risks related to the introduction of an EDIS; considers,alls therefore, risk reduction measures to be essential building blocks laying the foundations for a for a halt to activities on EDIS;
Amendment 16 #
2017/2054(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
Amendment 23 #
2017/2054(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
Amendment 46 #
2017/2054(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
Amendment 58 #
2017/2054(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Underlines that, whilst the mathematical formulas display great potential for providing a permanent system for the distribution of seats in the future, the political and legal uncertainty as a result of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU ultimately make it politically unviable for Parliament to suggest a permanent system at this stage and that the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will take place on 29 March 2019 at the latest;
Amendment 63 #
2017/2054(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Notes that until the United Kingdom withdraws from the Union, the most viable solution providing legal certainty to Member States would be to maintain the same distribution of seats iand sending a political signal to citizens that fewer Member States means fewer Members of the European Parliament ais the one applio subtract the 73 seats allocated to the United Kin respect of the 2014 - 2019 parliamentary termgdom from the maximum number of Members of the European Parliament as set out by Article 14(2) TEU;
Amendment 68 #
2017/2054(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
Amendment 77 #
2017/2054(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Proposes that this new distribution of seats should be fair, objective and based on the following principles: respect for the principle of degressive proportionality, no loss of seats for any Member State, and the use of only a minimal fraction of the seats vacated by the UK;
Amendment 92 #
2017/2054(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Underlines that the new distribution proposed would allow for a reduction in the size of Parliament to 69977 members plus the President, thereby leaving sufficient room for manoeuvre to accommodate potential future enlargements of the EU and members elected in a joint constituency;
Amendment 110 #
2017/2054(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Considers that the proposed distribution based on principles provides a solid foundation for the future establishment of a permanent system and calls for the adoption of such permanent system in the near future; proposes that this system be chosen well in advance ofbefore the elections to the European Parliament in 202419;
Amendment 119 #
2017/2054(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – recital 3
Annex – recital 3
Amendment 137 #
2017/2054(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – Article 3 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – introductory part
Annex – Article 3 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – introductory part
However, once the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the Union becomes legally effective, the number of representatives in the European Parliament elected in each Member State, for the 2019 - 2024 parliamentary term, shall be set as follows:by a European Council decision
Amendment 139 #
2017/2054(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – Article 3 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – table
Annex – Article 3 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – table
Amendment 151 #
2017/2054(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – Article 3 – paragraph 2
Annex – Article 3 – paragraph 2
Amendment 157 #
2017/2054(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – Article 3 – paragraph 3
Annex – Article 3 – paragraph 3
Amendment 166 #
2017/2054(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – Article 4
Annex – Article 4
Amendment 9 #
2017/2010(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Welcomes the fact that more national chambers have issued reasoned opinions (26 out of 41 in 2016, compared with eight in 2015); notes the marked difference between chambers active within the framework of political dialogue and reasoned opinions; underlines that national parliaments continue to have more interest incongratulates national parliaments which persevere in their efforts to influencinge the content of EU legislation than in identifying cases in which subsidiarity may be an issue;
Amendment 11 #
2017/2010(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Welcomes the fact that Parliament increasingly plays the role ofQuestions the role of Parliament as interlocutor with and intermediary between the national parliaments with regard to the subsidiarity and proportionality mechanisms; considers that enhancing dialogue at political level with national parliaments could be a means to rationalise subsidiarity and proportionality checks by better addressing the substance of legislative proposals;
Amendment 18 #
2017/2010(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Underlines that subsidiarity and proportionality are fundamental principles, enshrined by the Member States in the Edinburgh Declaration of 1992, that the EU institutions should take into consideration when exercising EU competences; recalls that these principles are aimed at enhancing the functioning of the Union by ensuring that actions are always taken at the most appropriate level of government; draws attention to the fact that these principles can be distorted to serve Eurosceptic ends and emphasises that the EU institutions should be vigilant in order to avoid and counteract this risk;
Amendment 19 #
2017/2010(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Commends the placing ofIs doubtful as to whether subsidiarity and proportionality are placed at the heart of EU decision-making, as evidenced by the Commission’s political priorities and the adoption of the Better Regulation Packagenotably with regard to the adoption of the Better Regulation Package, intended to make it look like there is a democratic strengthening of the Union's legal and political system;
Amendment 23 #
2017/2010(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. ReiteraNotes the need to enhance the flexibility of the early warning system, and notably of the eight-week period for submitting reasoned opinions, and to continue to reflect on the introductmonitoring of the application and respect of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; notes, in that regard, that the time that national parliaments currently have to assess compliance with the subsidiarity principle is often considered too short; takes the view that a periond of a green card mechanism12 weeks would be more appropriate at the start of the legislative process;
Amendment 26 #
2017/2010(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Recognises the work done by the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) and its successor as of July 2015 the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB); notes that the IAB and the RSB considered that 23 % of the impact assessments (IAs) reviewed by them in 2015 needed improvements on either subsidiarity or proportionality, or both; observes that in 2016 the percentage of IAs considered unsatisfactory by the RSB was of 15 %; welcomes the factnotes that these percentages have decreased compared with previous years; underlin but they remain too high; notes that the Commission reviewed all of the IAs concerned taking into account the analyses from the RSB;
Amendment 30 #
2017/2010(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Welcomes the adoption by the Commission in May 2015 of a new Better Regulation package to ensure, inter alia, that the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are applied in a more integrated and comprehensive manner; considers that the new Better Regulation framework should be a tool for the European Union to deliver legislation in full compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; stresses, notwithstanding the above, that it should not give rise to unnecessary delays in the adoption of the relevant legislation;
Amendment 33 #
2017/2010(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. WelcomesTakes note of the creation of the Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and ‘Doing Less More Efficiently’, three of whose members will be MEPs; recalls that this Task Force should be a tool for the European Union to deliver legislation in full compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;
Amendment 38 #
2017/2010(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Praises the Commission’s commitment to ‘evaluate first’ before considering potential legislative changes; considers, in this respect, that the European Union andshould work closely together with the authorities of the Member States should work closely together to ensure better monitoring, measurement and evaluation of the actual impact of EU regulation on the economy, social structure and environment in the Member States;
Amendment 41 #
2017/2010(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Welcomes the reference to subsidiarity in the Rome Declaration of 25 March 2017; takes the view that subsidiarity should have a prominent place in the reflection on the EU’s future since it currently represents the Union's least respected principle.
Amendment 44 #
2017/2010(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. IRespectfully invites national parliaments to clearly indicate from the outset that their submission is a reasoned opinion under Protocol (No 2) to the Treaties and the legislative proposal(s) it refers to, to clearly state the reasons for which it considers that the proposal breaches the subsidiarity principle, to include a brief summary of the argumentation, and, where possible, to respect the eight- week time limit from the date of transmission of the relevant draft legislative act; notes that this will facilitate a timely and adequate treatment of reasoned opinions by all the institutions involved;
Amendment 47 #
2017/2010(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Is of the opinion that, since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs has developed significantly, including through their linking up with other national parliaments; encourages national parliaments to continue and reinforce inter-parliamentary contacts, also on bilateral basis, as a means of enhancing cooperation between Member States, and to do so with a European vision and in a European spirit of cooperation, when necessary, based on the rule of law and fundamental rights; underlines that these contacts can facilitate an exchange of best practices concerning the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;
Amendment 49 #
2017/2010(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Draws attention to the fact that in 2016 14 chambers of 11 national parliaments submitted reasoned opinions on the proposal for a Directive amending Directive 96/71/EC of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services3, thus reaching the threshold of one third of the votes required by Article 7(2) of Protocol (No 2) to the Treaties to trigger the so-called ‘yellow card’ procedure; recalls that the arguments put forward by the national parliaments were widely debated in Parliament with the Commission; notes that the Commission engaged with national parliaments within the framework of COSAC; notes that the Commission issued a communication in which it gave extensive reasons for maintaining the proposal4; considers that, with the reasons set out therein, the Commission fully complied with its obligation to give reasons for its decision; _________________ 3_________________ 3 COM(2016)0128. COM(2016)0128. 4 Communication of 20.7.2016 from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the National Parliaments on the proposal for a Directive amending the Posting of Workers Directive, with regard to the principle of subsidiarity, in accordance with Protocol No 2 (COM(2016)0505).
Amendment 51 #
2017/2010(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
Amendment 57 #
2017/2010(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Takes note of the changes proposed by some national parliaments to the subsidiarity control mechanism; welcomnotes the conclusion reached by COSAC that any improvement to the subsidiarity control mechanism should not entail Treaty change; notes that an extension of the eight-week time limit in which national parliaments can issue a reasoned opinion would require an amendment of the Treaties or the Protocols thereto; notes that exclusions in addition to the month of August for the calculation of the eight- week period would unnecessimprove the scrutiny of the enforcement of and compliance with the principles of subsidiarilty slow down the legislative process and the adoptand proportionality; notes, in that regard, that the time that national parliaments currently have to assess compliance with the subsidiarity principle is often considered too short; takes the view that a periond of important legislation12 weeks would be more appropriate at the start of the legislative process;
Amendment 60 #
2017/2010(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Notes, further, that national parliaments should be able to issue a reasoned opinion at any point in the legislative process or at the very least at its mid-point and its end;
Amendment 62 #
2017/2010(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Notes that a number of tools enabling national parliaments and citizens to participate in every step of the legislative process, which ensurcould be used to guarantee monitoring of respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, already exist; encourages, therefore, that full use of these existing tools be made without creating even more complex administrative structures and lengthy procedures in times when the EU is struggling to make itself understood by itseet the needs of the Member States' citizens;
Amendment 10 #
2017/0219(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 a (new)
Recital 1 a (new)
(1a) National political parties and individual members attendance in the European Parliament is both legal and legitimate. Legal as long as they meet the requirements set up in their national legislation, legitimate by the citizens vote. The present legislation aims to ensure the fair allocation of European funding between European political parties based on these two criteria and in full accordance with Article 2 TEU.
Amendment 11 #
2017/0219(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3
Recital 3
(3) It is necessary to better ensure a genuine transnational dimension of European political parties and political foundations as regards their acquisition of the specific European legal status through registration. Moreover, in order to strengthen the link between politics at national level and at Union level and to prevent the same national party from artificially creating several European political parties with similar or identical political tendencies, it should be excluded that members of the same national political party are taken into account in relation to different political alliances, for the purpose of the minimum representation requirements for those alliances to be registered as a European party. Therefore, only political parties and no longer individuals should be taken into account for the purpose of these minimum representation requirements.
Amendment 15 #
2017/0219(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5
Recital 5
(5) For reasons of transparency and in order to strengthen the scrutiny and the democratic accountability of European political parties and the link between European civil society and the Union institutions, in particular the European Parliament, access to funding from the general budget of the European Union should be made conditional upon the publication by the member parties of the programme and logo of the European political party concerned, as well as information regarding the gender representation among the candidates at the last elections to the European Parliament and among the members of the European Parliament.
Amendment 28 #
2017/0219(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 1141/2014
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b – subparagraph 1
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b – subparagraph 1
its member parties must be represented by, in at least one quarter of the Member States, mby Members of the European Parliament, ofr in the national Parliaments, ofr regional pParliaments or ofin the regional assemblies, or
Amendment 35 #
2017/0219(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 1141/2014
Article 17 – paragraph 4
Article 17 – paragraph 4
4. Financial contributions or grants from the general budget of the European Union shall not exceed 905 % of the annual reimbursable expenditure indicated in the budget of a European political party and 95 % of the eligible costs incurred by a European political foundation. European political parties may use any unused part of the Union contribution awarded to cover reimbursable expenditure within the financial year following its award. Amounts still unused after that financial year shall be recovered in accordance with the Financial Regulation.
Amendment 37 #
2017/0219(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 1141/2014
Article 18 – paragraph 3 a
Article 18 – paragraph 3 a
3a. A European political party shall include in its application evidence demonstrating that its member parties have continuously published on their websites, during 123 months preceding the moment at which the applications is made, the political programme and logo of the European political party as well as information, in relation to each of the member parties of the European political party, on the gender representation among the candidates at the last elections to the European Parliament and among the Members of the European Parliament.
Amendment 44 #
2017/0219(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 1141/2014
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – indent 1
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – indent 1
– 520 % shall be distributed in equal shares among the beneficiary European political parties,
Amendment 47 #
2017/0219(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 1141/2014
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – indent 2
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – indent 2
– 9580 % shall be distributed in proportion to their share of elected members of the European Parliament among the beneficiary European political parties.
Amendment 54 #
2017/0219(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 a (new)
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 1141/2014
Article 24 – paragraph 4 a (new)
Article 24 – paragraph 4 a (new)
(4a) In Article 24, the following paragraph 4a is added: “4a. The Authority shall establish in the Annex to the Regulation an exhaustive list of good and bad practices of European political foundations and European political parties in reporting to the Authority. This annex provides a precise definition of the Authority’s requirements to parties and foundations. It has a jurisprudential value in the event of disputes and conflicts of interpretation between the Authority and the parties and foundations.”
Amendment 56 #
2017/0219(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 b (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 b (new)
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 1141/2014
Article 26
Article 26
(4b) Article 26 is replaced by the following: “1. All technical support provided by the European Parliament to European political parties and European political foundations shall be based on the principle of equal treatment. It shall be granted on conditions no less favourable than those granted to other external organisations and associations that may be accorded similar facilities and shall be supplied against invoice and payment. 2. The European Parliament shall provide the European political parties and European political foundations with the necessary offices physically located in the European Parliament in Brussels and Strasbourg.”
Amendment 65 #
2017/0219(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 1141/2014
Article 40 a – paragraph 1
Article 40 a – paragraph 1
By the way of derogation from Article 18(3a) and as regards applications for funding for the financial year 2019, the Authorising Officer of the European Parliament shall, before deciding on an application on funding, request evidence from a European political party demonstrating that its member parties have continuously published on their websites, for a period beginning one month after the entry into force of Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No. XX/2018, the political programme and logo of the European political party as well as information, in relation to each of the member parties of the European political party, on the gender representation among the candidates at the last elections to the European Parliament and among the members of the European Parliament.
Amendment 184 #
2017/0143(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 a (new)
Recital 1 a (new)
(1a) A substantial part of old age pensions is provided under public schemes, so that there is a direct connection between national pension systems and the sustainability of public finances. Given the exclusive national competence regarding the organisation of pension systems as determined by the Treaties, only the Member States are responsible for income adequacy and financial sustainability of national pension systems.
Amendment 189 #
2017/0143(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 b (new)
Recital 1 b (new)
(1b) The Union is facing several challenges, including demographic challenges because of the fact that Europe is an ageing continent. In addition, career patterns, the labour market and the distribution of wealth are undergoing radical changes, not least as a result of the digital revolution. At the same time, it is increasingly clear that national security systems are not adjusted to a globalised knowledge economy with open borders, labour mobility and migration which should be cause for a halt to immigration and a stop to social dumping. Too many people are not, or are inadequately covered by the traditional national pension systems.
Amendment 194 #
2017/0143(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 c (new)
Recital 1 c (new)
(1c) Priority should be given to further developing, strengthening and reforming the first (public) and second (occupational) pillars of the national pensions systems. However, it is expected that the share of first pillar pay-as-you-go public pensions as part of the placement rate will decline. This could be partly compensated by accrued pension entitlements from second pillar funded schemes. But a well-developed third pillar could and should contribute substantially to improving the adequacy and sustainability of the existing national pension systems. It should stay an exclusive national competence.
Amendment 210 #
2017/0143(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 a (new)
Recital 3 a (new)
(3a) The European pension market is highly fragmented and diverse, so PEPP cannot be implemented without encroaching upon the competences of the Member States. In Member States where the first and second pillar are insufficiently developed, PEPP might override national solutions for people who do not currently have access to adequate provisions. In Member States with highly developed pension markets, the PEPP could cannibalise the national first and second pillar.
Amendment 16 #
2017/0035(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
Recital 2
(2) The system established by Regulation (EC) No 182/2011 has, overall, proven to work well in practice and struck an appropriate institutional balance as regards the roles of the Commission and the other actors involved. That system should therefore continue to function unchanged except for certain targeted amendments concerning specific aspects of procedure at the level of the appeal committee. These amendments are intended to ensure wider political accountability and ownership of politically sensitive implementing acts without, however, modifying the legal and institutional responsibilities for implementing acts as organised by Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.
Amendment 23 #
2017/0035(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
Recital 7
(7) While the Commission is empowered to decide in such cases, due to the particular sensitivity of the issues at stake, Member States should also fully assume their responsibility in the decision- making process. This, however, is not the case when Member States are not able to reach a qualified majority, due to, amongst others, a significant number of abstentions or non-appearances at the moment of the vote. The Commission, for its part, experiences great difficulties in assuming its decision-making powers and it is these difficulties that lie behind the proposition presented by the Commission.
Amendment 24 #
2017/0035(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
Recital 8
(8) In order to increase the added value of the appeal committee its role should therefore be strengthened by providing for the possibility of holding a furthat it vote unanimously. In fact, as ther meeting of the appeal committee whenever no opinion is delivered. The appropriate level of representation at the further meeting of the appeal committee should be ministerial level, to ensure a political discussion. To allow the organisation of such a further meeting the timeframe for the appeal committee to deliver an opinion should be extendedatters discussed within this committee are extremely sensitive and neither the Commission nor the Member States wish to assume responsibility for certain decisions, a power the Commission no longer wants should be withdrawn while the Member States should be made to act in accordance with their prerogatives. Unanimity will ensure that in regard to extremely political issues Member States cannot have unwelcome rules imposed on them.
Amendment 26 #
2017/0035(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
Recital 9
Amendment 34 #
2017/0035(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 a (new)
Amendment 35 #
2017/0035(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 b (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 b (new)
Regulation (EU) No 182/2011
Article 5 – paragraph 5
Article 5 – paragraph 5
(1b) In Article 5, paragraph 5 is deleted.
Amendment 36 #
2017/0035(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point -a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point -a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 182/2011
Article 6 – paragraph 1
Article 6 – paragraph 1
Amendment 37 #
2017/0035(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point a a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point a a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 182/2011
Article 6 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
Article 6 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
(aa) In paragraph 3, the second subparagraph is deleted:
Amendment 40 #
2017/0035(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point b a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point b a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 182/2011
Article 6 – paragraph 4
Article 6 – paragraph 4
(ba) Paragraph 4 is deleted.
Amendment 41 #
2017/0035(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point b b (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point b b (new)
Regulation (EU) No 182/2011
Article 6 – paragraph 5
Article 6 – paragraph 5
(bb) Paragraph 5 is deleted.
Amendment 923 #
2016/2114(REG)
Parliament's Rules of Procedure
Rule 26 – paragraph 2
Rule 26 – paragraph 2
2. The President of Parliament shall invite one of the non-attached Members, to be selected from among them by consensus or a vote by majority, to attend meetings of the Conference of Presidents, without having the right to vote.
Amendment 1083 #
2016/2114(REG)
Parliament's Rules of Procedure
Rule 153 a (new)
Rule 153 a (new)
Rule 153 a Topical debate requested by a political group 1. At each part-session, one or two periods of not less than 60 minutes each shall be set aside in the draft agenda for debates on a topical matter of major interest to European Union policy. 2. Each political group shall have the right to propose the topical matter of its choice for at least one such a debate every year. The Conference of Presidents shall ensure, over a rolling period of one year, a fair distribution among the political groups of that right. 3. The political groups shall transmit the topical matter of their choice to the President in writing before the drawing up of the final draft agenda by the Conference of Presidents. Rule 38(1) concerning the rights, freedoms and principles recognised by Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and the values enshrined in its Article 2 shall be fully respected. 4. The Conference of Presidents shall determine the time at which such a debate is to be held. It may decide by a majority representing 95 % of the component Members of Parliament to reject a matter put forward by a group. 5. The debate shall be introduced by a representative of the political group having proposed the topical matter. Following this introduction, speaking time shall be allocated in accordance with Rule 162 (4) and (5). 6. The debate shall be wound up without the adoption of a resolution.
Amendment 1144 #
2016/2114(REG)
Parliament's Rules of Procedure
Rule 199 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Rule 199 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. The proportionality of the distribution of committee seats among political groups shall be aligned at the beginning of each year, in order to ensure the fair representation of political views in the committees.
Amendment 128 #
2016/0362(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 18
Article 1 – paragraph 18
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 27 – paragraph 1 – point i
Article 27 – paragraph 1 – point i
Amendment 134 #
2016/0362(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 19
Article 1 – paragraph 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 29a
Article 29a
Amendment 192 #
2016/0362(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45 – paragraph 2 – point a
Article 45 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the total risk exposure amountliabilities of the relevant entity referred to in paragraph 1 calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013,
Amendment 385 #
2016/0362(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45e
Article 45e
Amendment 112 #
2016/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 e – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 12 e – paragraph 1 – point b
Amendment 475 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 39 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 39 – point a
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 92 – paragraph 1 – point d
Article 92 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) a leverage ratio of 3%.. 9% in 2025; The leverage ratio will be set at 3% in 2019 and rise in annual steps to reach 9% by 2025. Institutions shall set their leverage ratio as follows: 4% by 2020; 5% by 2021; 6% by 2022; 7% by 2023; 8% by 2024; 9% by 2025.
Amendment 519 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 94 – paragraph 3 – point a – point i
Article 94 – paragraph 3 – point a – point i
(i) positions concerning foreign- exchange and commodities;
Amendment 560 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 52 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 52 a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 124 – paragraph 2
Article 124 – paragraph 2
(52a) In Article 124, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: "(2) Based on the data collected under Article 101, and any other relevant indicators, the competent authorities shall periodically, and at least annually, assess whether the risk-weight of 310 % or 25 % for exposures secured by mortgages on residential property referred to in Article 125 and the risk weight of 540 % for exposures secured on commercial immovable property referred to in Article 126 located in their territory are appropriately based on: (a) the loss experience of exposures secured by immovable property; (b) forward-looking immovable property markets developments; Competent authorities may set a higher risk weight or stricter criteria than those set out in Article 125(2) and Article 126(2), where appropriate, on the basis of financial stability considerations. For exposures secured by mortgages on residential property, the competent authority shall set the risk weight at a percentage from 3510 % to 150 %. For exposures secured on commercial immovable property, the competent authority shall set the risk weight at a percentage from 540 % through 150 %, Within these ranges, the higher risk weight shall be set based on loss experience and taking into account forward-looking markets developments and financial stability considerations. Where the assessment demonstrates that the risk weights set out in Article 125(2) and Article 126(2) do not reflect the actual risks related to one or more property segments of such exposures, fully secured by mortgages on residential property or on commercial immovable property located in one or more parts of its territory, the competent authorities shall set, for those property segments of exposures, a higher risk weight corresponding to the actual risks. The competent authorities shall consult EBA on the adjustments to the risk weights and criteria applied, which will be calculated in accordance with the criteria set out in this paragraph as specified by the regulatory technical standards referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article. EBA shall publish the risk weights and criteria that the competent authorities set for exposures referred to in Articles 125, 126 and 199(1)(a)." (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32013R0575&rid=1)Or. en
Amendment 563 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 52 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 52 a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 125 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 125 – paragraph 1 – point a
(52b) In paragraph 1 of Article 125, point (a) is replaced by the following: "(a) exposures or any part of an exposure fully and completely secured by mortgages on residential property which is or shall be occupied or let by the owner, or the beneficial owner in the case of personal investment companies, shall be assigned a risk weight of 35 %;" 10% or 25% in accordance with the conditions of paragraph 2;" Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32013R0575&from=EN)
Amendment 570 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 52 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 52 a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 125 – paragraph 2 – point d
Article 125 – paragraph 2 – point d
(52a) In paragraph 2 of Article 125, point (d) is replaced by the following: "(d) unless otherwise determined under Article 124(2), the part of the loan to which the 3510 % risk weight is assigned does not exceed 80 % of the market value of the property in question or 80 % of the mortgage lending value of the property in question in those Member States that have laid down rigorous criteria for the assessment of the mortgage lending value in statutory or regulatory provisions. ; the part of the loan which exceeds 80% of the market value of the property in question or 80% of the mortgage lending value of the property in question receives a risk weighting of 25%." Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32013R0575&from=EN)
Amendment 602 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 325 – paragraph 1 – point b
Amendment 607 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 – paragraph 1 – point d
Article 325 – paragraph 1 – point d
Amendment 609 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 – paragraph 3
Article 325 – paragraph 3
Amendment 610 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 – paragraph 4
Article 325 – paragraph 4
Amendment 611 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 – paragraph 5
Article 325 – paragraph 5
Amendment 612 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 – paragraph 6
Article 325 – paragraph 6
Amendment 613 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 – paragraph 7
Article 325 – paragraph 7
Amendment 614 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 – paragraph 8
Article 325 – paragraph 8
EBA shall develop regulatory technical standards to specify in more detail how institutions shall determine the own funds requirements for market risks for non- trading book positions subject to foreign exchange risk or commodity risk in accordance with the approaches set out in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1.
Amendment 636 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Chapter 1 b
Chapter 1 b
Amendment 637 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b a
Article 325 b a
Amendment 641 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b b
Article 325 b b
Amendment 642 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b c
Article 325 b c
Amendment 643 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b d
Article 325 b d
Amendment 644 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b e
Article 325 b e
Amendment 646 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b f
Article 325 b f
Amendment 662 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b g
Article 325 b g
Amendment 663 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b h
Article 325 b h
Amendment 669 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b i
Article 325 b i
Amendment 673 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b j
Article 325 b j
Amendment 675 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b k
Article 325 b k
Amendment 676 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b l
Article 325 b l
Amendment 677 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b m
Article 325 b m
Amendment 678 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b n
Article 325 b n
Amendment 680 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b o
Article 325 b o
Amendment 681 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b p
Article 325 b p
Amendment 682 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b q
Article 325 b q
Amendment 686 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 88
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 88
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Chapter 5
Chapter 5
(88) In Title IV of Part Three, the Title of Chapter 5 is replaced by the following:Chapter 5 is deleted.
Amendment 765 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 l – title
Article 428 l – title
Article 428l 530% available stable funding factor
Amendment 778 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 r – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
Article 428 r – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
(aa) assets that have a residual maturity of less than six months resulting from secured lending transactions and capital market driven transactions as defined in Article 192(2) and (3) with financial customers, where those assets are collateralised by assets that qualify as Level 1 assets under Title II of Delegated Regulation (EU)2015/61, excluding extremely high quality covered bonds referred to in point (f) of Article 10(1) of that Delegated Regulation, and where the institution would be legally entitled and operationally able to reuse those assets for the life of the transaction, regardless of whether the collateral has already been reused. Institutions shall take those assets into account on a net basis where Article 428e(1) of this Regulation applies;
Amendment 789 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 s – point b
Article 428 s – point b
Amendment 797 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 s – point b a (new)
Article 428 s – point b a (new)
(ba) assets that have a residual maturity of less than six months resulting from secured lending transactions and capital market driven transactions as defined in Article192(2) and (3) with financial customers, other than those referred to in point (b) of Article 428s. Those assets shall be taken into account on a net basis where Article428e(1) applies;
Amendment 798 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 s – point b b (new)
Article 428 s – point b b (new)
(bb) assets that have a residual maturity of less than six months resulting from transactions with financial customers other than those referred to in point (b) of Article428s and in point (a) of this Article;
Amendment 809 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 u – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 428 u – paragraph 1 – point a
Amendment 813 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 u – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 428 u – paragraph 1 – point b
Amendment 1020 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 127
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 127
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 501a
Article 501a
Amendment 1071 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 128
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 128
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 507
Article 507
Amendment 1073 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 128
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 128
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 507
Article 507
Amendment 10 #
2015/2344(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Believes that the euro crisis enhanced the need for improvement in EU economic governance and that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must be progressivehas shown that the EMU is not functioning, and calls, to that end, for the current Monetary Union not to be continued or supposedly completed;
Amendment 12 #
2015/2344(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Notes that already existing supranational components of the EMU, such as the Stability and Growth Pact, have not encouraged greater convergence between the eurozone Member States;
Amendment 22 #
2015/2344(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. ConsiderNotes that the establishment of aidea of a single budgetary capacity within the eurozone is necessary to complete the EMU andis contrary to the Treaties and points out that, it in 2012, the previous Precommendable to create a budgetary capacity, albeit limited, under the current Treaty frameworksident of the European Commission, Mr Barroso, stated that a fiscal capacity for the EMU could not can be achieved without detailed treaty adjustments;
Amendment 27 #
2015/2344(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Takes note of different proposals for this purpose, with different designs and assigning different funcStrongly opposes the idea of a single fiscal capacity for the EMU, since this would further erode the powers of the Member States and amount to debt mutualisations;
Amendment 28 #
2015/2344(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Takes note of different proposals for this purpose, with different designs and assigning different functionsWarns that the idea of a single fiscal capacity is an infringement of no bail-out clause (Art. 125 TEU);
Amendment 29 #
2015/2344(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Takes note of different proposals for this purpose, with different designs and assigning different functionsOpposes firmly any further extension of supranational budgetary policy;
Amendment 72 #
2015/2344(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. RecallNotes that the protocols on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on the role of national parliaments offer ample opportunities for national parliaments’ involvement in this respectidea of a single budgetary capacity would necessitate an additional federalist or tax structure and regards this as contrary to every principle of subsidiarity;
Amendment 9 #
2015/2115(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas, according to the same forecast, unemployment in the euro area is expected to record a slow decrease, from 11.6 % at the end of 2014 to 10.5 % at the end of 2016; whereas there are major disparities between the unemployment rates in different Member States, with figures ranging from 6.4 % in Germany to 26.6 % in Greece, and whereas, particularly in Southern Europe, such economic indicators as public debt and unemployment remain at alarming levels;
Amendment 10 #
2015/2115(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas, according to the same forecast, unemployment in the euro area is expected to record a slow decrease, from 11.6 % at the end of 2014 to 10.5 % at the end of 2016; whereas there are major disparities between the unemployment rates in different Member States, with figures ranging from 6.4 % in Germany to 26.6 % in Greece; whereas this is yet further evidence that the ‘one size fits all’ approach has failed;
Amendment 20 #
2015/2115(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the current recovery is mainly supported by private consumption, while private investment in the euro areaexternal factors such as the falling price of oil, and whereas Southern countinues to stagnate at levels significantly below those registered before the start of the crisisries still need an external devaluation of their currencies if they are to become competitive in the longer term;
Amendment 36 #
2015/2115(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas in 2014 the ECB lowered its key refinancing rates to the effective lower bound and reduced its deposit facility rate to -0.20 %; whereas lower real rates have not translated into either increased credit for households and businesses, especially SMEs, or GDP growth and job creation; whereas, regrettably, because of the ECB’s low interest rate policy, many insurance funds and pension funds are finding it increasingly difficult to honour their obligations, which entails a serious risk in the medium term in view of the ageing of the European population;
Amendment 38 #
2015/2115(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas in 2014 the ECB implemented a series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) and purchase programmes for selected private-sector assets aimingwhich in theory aimed at supporting lending to the real economy, but which in practice have almost completely failed and have had extremely little impact on the real economy;
Amendment 83 #
2015/2115(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Acknowledges that, in reaction to a complex environment of falling inflation, contraction of credit and sluggish economic growth, and with its interest rates close to the zero lower bound, the ECB resorted to non-conventional monetary policy instruments, and observes that there are doubts as to whether some of these measures – such as the direct or indirect purchase of government debt – are compatible with the no-bail-out clause;
Amendment 184 #
2015/2115(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Notes that austerity policies in a number of Member States have contributed to stagnation and recession, with damaging effects on euro area members’ public accounts, levels of unemployment and social cohesion; observes furthermore that, after years of crisis, the gulf between the Northern and Southern EMU countries has only grown wider, and therefore advocates that the monetary union be split into Northern and Southern currency areas;
Amendment 253 #
2015/2115(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – subparagraph 1 (new)
Paragraph 26 – subparagraph 1 (new)
Calls on the ECB, furthermore, to set up a working party including academic experts and the central bankers from the EMU countries with the aim of devising an orderly plan for bringing about an orderly division of the current monetary union; considers that this working party should help, by means of its well-considered analyses and orderly plan, to minimise any forward-looking speculation against Southern Member States on the financial markets;
Amendment 13 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 2
Citation 2
Amendment 14 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 3
Citation 3
Amendment 15 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 4
Citation 4
Amendment 19 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6
Citation 6
Amendment 24 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
Amendment 33 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
Amendment 36 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
Amendment 37 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
Amendment 39 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas the only reform of the Electoral Act itself took place in 2002 through Council Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom11, which requires the Member States to conduct the elections on the basis of proportional representation using a list system or a single transferable vote system and which abolished the dual mandate for Members of the European Parliament; __________________ 11 OJ L 283, 21.10.2002, p. 1.
Amendment 42 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
Amendment 44 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
Amendment 45 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
Amendment 48 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital K
Recital K
Amendment 52 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
Amendment 56 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital M
Recital M
Amendment 62 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital N
Recital N
Amendment 67 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital O
Recital O
Amendment 74 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital P
Recital P
Amendment 83 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital Q
Recital Q
Amendment 92 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital R
Recital R
Amendment 98 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital S
Recital S
Amendment 100 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital T
Recital T
Amendment 110 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Decides to reform its electoral procedure in good time before the 2019 elections, with the aim of enhancing the democratic dimension of the European elections, reinforcing the concept of citizenship of the Union, improving the functioning of the European Parliament and the governance of the Union, making the work of the European Parliament more legitimate and efficient, enhancing the effectiveness of the system for conducting European elections, and providing for greater electoral equality for citizens of the Unionhat, apart from technical adjustments, such as for example the number of languages in which the Act is written (Article 15) or the updating of Article 7(2), nothing should be amended or inserted in the Electoral Act of 20 September 1976;
Amendment 119 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Observes that, in its existing form, the Act guarantees direct general elections in accordance with democratic principles;
Amendment 120 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)
Paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. Adds that the Member States have the autonomous power to decide for themselves the conditions and procedures for the elections which apply to their citizens;
Amendment 122 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
Amendment 134 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
Amendment 142 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
Amendment 156 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
Amendment 166 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
Amendment 175 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
Amendment 186 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
Amendment 195 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
Amendment 197 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
Amendment 203 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
Amendment 218 #
2015/2035(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
Amendment 18 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
–
–
The Committee on Constitutional Affairs asks the committee responsible, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, to propose rejecting the Commission proposal on setting up a European Deposit Insurance Scheme.
Amendment 92 #
Amendment 434 #
2015/0009(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26
Recital 26
Amendment 719 #
2015/0009(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
Article 2 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
Amendment 8 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the European Union and its Member States are facing major challenges, for which no Member Stateit should be further examined whether these challenges can be tackle on its owd individually by the Member States or rather benefit from a collective response from the Union;
Amendment 10 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas the further exploitation of the Lisbon Treaty is an attempt to further undermine Member State sovereignty, e.g., by switching in an increasing number of areas from unanimity to qualified majority voting, by increasing economic dependence through the establishment of a fiscal union, and by the lasting irreconcilability of the EU institutions with subsidiarity and democracy; therefore, and taking into account the results of the European elections of 2014, the potential of the Lisbon Treaty should be blocked rather than expanded;
Amendment 19 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the provisions ofsubsidiarity principle within the Lisbon Treaty haves not yet been exploited to theirits full potential; whereas some proposals can only be fully realised by Treaty change, emphasising a two-step approach to EU reform (within and beyond the Treaties);
Amendment 23 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the Community method must be preserved and not be undermined by intergovernmental solutions, not even in areas where not all Member States fulfil the condishould be an added value to the various intergovernmental methods, the former respecting the sovereignty of the European States and the latter preventing alienations for participationrom supranational goals and responsibilities;
Amendment 32 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the European Parliament is the parliament of the whole Union anary institution of the European Union and, technically speaking, should plays an essential but additional role in ensuring the legitimacy and accountability of EU decisions by ensuring proper parliamentary scrutiny over the Commission at the Union level;
Amendment 35 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas political dialogue between national parliaments and the European Parliament should be enhanced and practical possibilities for the use of the ‘'yellow’' and ‘'orange card’' improved and should be binding, which implies that national parliaments should be able to withdraw a proposal on the grounds that it infringes subsidiarity, without the EU institutions having the power to ignore it;
Amendment 40 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the European Council’'s working methods should be rendered more transparent vis-à-vis Parliament and its interference in legislative decision- making should remain within the limits of the Treaty provisionsspecial legislative procedures should be replaced by the ordinary legislative procedure, analogous to the legislative process in any democratic State;
Amendment 44 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
Amendment 53 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas the Commission’s role as the executive should be strengthened in the field of Economic and Monetary Policy by the creation of the positionre is no need for the appointment of a EU Finance Minister, assisted by an EU Fiscal and Treasury administration, and by endowing it with the powers to implement and enforce any future and existing Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) instrumentssince the European Monetary Union is made up of differing economies, which are impossible to be represented by one person at a supranational level; the Ecofin configuration within the Council of the European Union already covers economic matters on a supranational level;
Amendment 62 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
Amendment 68 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas the existing economic governance system is not yet strong enough to tackle all potential future crises and shocks as it should, nor is it yet sufficiently good at generating higher competitiveness, structural convergence among its members, sustainable growth and social cohesion; whereas, therefore, progress towards the completion of the EMU should be sustained, as well as efforts to render its institutional structure more legitimate and democratically accountablethe dissolution or, at least, the withdrawal (or non-admittance) of weak economies from the EMU should be sustained;
Amendment 77 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital K
Recital K
K. whereas the Fiscal Compact should be incorporated into the EU legal framework on the basis of an assessment of experience with its implementation, in view of the recent sovereign financial crises, adding a fiscal union to an already failing monetary union would constitute an extra safety net in order to keep high-debt Member States afloat; therefore, the Fiscal Compact should not be incorporated into the EU legal framework;
Amendment 86 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas the institutional structure of the EMU should be transformed into an effective and democratic economic government, with Parliament and Council acting as equal co-legislators, the Commission fulfilling the role of the executive, national parliaments scrutinising national governments, monitoring subsidiarity and approving or rejecting Treaty amendments, the European Parliament scrutinising the EU level of decision-making, and the Court of Justice having control over all aspects of EMU enshrined in the Treaties;
Amendment 91 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital M
Recital M
M. whereas the Union needs a new legal act on economic policy, including the adoption of Convergence Guidelines, as well as some crucial structural reforms in the areas of competitiveness, growth and social cohesionafter more than one decade Convergence Guidelines fail to be respected; therefore, and given the fact that the eurozone can impossibly be considered an Optimum Currency Area, a so-called "Convergence Code" will not work;
Amendment 97 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital N
Recital N
N. whereas the European Semester process should be simplified, and rendered more focused and democratic, by enhancing P, democratic and effective, by greater involvement of national stakeholders, by enhancing European and especially national parliament’s' scrutiny role over it and by investing ithem with a more substantial role in the various cycles of negotiations;
Amendment 104 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital O
Recital O
O. whereas the use of the Union budget should be (1) more streamlined, its revenue shouldtransparent, viz. aiming to reduce fraud, irregularities and errors (especially in regional and farm spending, as announced in the report of the European Court of Auditors 2014), (2) more autonomous, viz. with a revenue originateing from genuine own resources and not predominantly from Gross National Income (GNI) contributions, and (3) more democratic, by switching the procedure for adoption of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and the legislation relevant to own resources should be switched to the ordinary legislative procedure;
Amendment 112 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital P
Recital P
P. whereas the Union should be endowed with increased investment capacity by ensuring better use ofa more responsible investment strategy, by better controlling the existing structural funds and by fullycertainly not by further implementing the existing six-pack and two-pack legal framework, which are highly anti-democratic, since the indicators of competitiveness, as well as the thresholds of what is considered a macro-economic imbalance, are set unilaterally by the Commission, and, as such, undermine democratic decision making on the national level;
Amendment 120 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital Q
Recital Q
Amendment 133 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital R
Recital R
R. whereas the growth potential of the Single Market should be further exploitedinvestigated, e.g. in the areas of services, the Digital Single Market, the Energy Union, the Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union;
Amendment 145 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital U
Recital U
U. whereas recent security challenges, some in the immediate vicinity of the EU’'s borders, have revealed the need to move progressively towards the establishment of a common defence policy, and eventually, a common defence; whereas the Treaty already contains clear provisions as to how this could be done, notably in Articles 41, 42, 44 and 46 TEUclose EU's external borders and to re-establish internal borders in order to avoid further economic and social chaos and free traveling of refugees;
Amendment 153 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital V
Recital V
V. whereas the refugee crisis has exposed the need for a common asylum and immigration policy, which should provide as well for a fair distribution of asylum seekers across the European Unioneach Member State should be able to determine how many refugees it will host, without the EU governments imposing mandatory quotas;
Amendment 165 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Notes that the European Union and its Member States are facing unprecedented challenges, such as the refugee crisis, the foreign policy challenges in the immediate neighbourhood and the fight against terrorism, as well as globalisation, climate change, the consequences of the financial and debt crisis, the lack of competitiveness and the social consequences in several Member States, and the need to reinforce the EU internal market, which have so far been inadequately addressed;
Amendment 173 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Underlines that it should be investigated whether these challenges cannot be tackled individually by the Member States, but needor rather benefit from a collective response from the Union;
Amendment 181 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Stresses that the Union needs to restore the lost confidence and trust of its citizens by enhancing the transparency of its institutions and decision-focusing on areas of competence that truly benefit from a supranational approach, viz. the free trade of goods, the fight against international crime and terrorism, and the waterproof protection of the external borders; shared competences in these domaking, and improving its capacity to acts can be established through multi- or bilateral agreements and do not require the intervention, nor the existence, of the European Union;
Amendment 192 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Points out that the provisions ofsubsidiarity principle in the Lisbon Treaty haves not yet been exploited to their full potential even though they contain some necessary tools that could have been applied to prevent some of the crises with which the Union is confronted, or could be used to cope with the current challenges without having to initiate a Treaty revision in the short termits full potential;
Amendment 197 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Stresses that the Community method is superior to the intergovernmental method as it is the only one that allows for transparency,, based on QMV in the Council, as well as ond the equal right of co-legislation by the European Parliament and Council, as well as preventing a fragmentation of institutional responsibilities and the development of competing institutionshould be an added value to the various intergovernmental methods, the former respecting the sovereignty of the European States and the latter preventing alienation from supranational goals and responsibilities;
Amendment 204 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Is of the opinion that intergovernmental solutions should not exist, not even in areas where not all the Member States fulfil the conditions for participation, and thatnsists that, in view of the recent sovereign financial crises, adding a fiscal union to an already failing monetary union would constitute an extra safety net in order to keep high-debt Member States afloat; therefore, the Fiscal Compact ands well as the European Stability Mechanism, as intended by the Treaties should therefore should not be incorpotegrated into Union law and no new institutions should be introduced;
Amendment 212 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Underlines that the directly elected European Parliament plays, technically speaking, an essential role in ensuring the legitimacy of the Union, as well as in making the Union’'s decision- making system accountable to citizens by ensuring proper parliamentary scrutiny over the executiveCommission at the Union level and, by the legislative co-decision procedure, and by attributing direct legal initiative to the European Parliament, akin to national parliaments;
Amendment 217 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Recalls that the European Parliament is the parliament of the wholeary institution of the European Union; considers that its working methods should be reformed so as to strengthen its control over the Commission in the implementation of the acquis, and to ensure proper democratic accountability even in the areas in which not allose chapters of the acquis with respect to freedom of expression, the fight against corruption, and the independence of the judiciary for (candidate) Member States participate;
Amendment 222 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Considers that political dialogue between national parliaments and the European Parliament should be intensified and made more meaningful and substantial, without overstepping the limits of their respective constitutional competences; points out, in this regard, that national parliaments are best placed to mandate and scrutinise at national levelonitor subsidiarity through the early warning mechanism (Protocol nr 2 in conjunction with Article 5.3 TEU), as well as the action of their respective governments in European affairs, while the European Parliament should ensure the democratic accountability and legitimacy of the European executiveCommission;
Amendment 232 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
Amendment 238 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Considers it necessary for the European Parliament to reform its working methods in order to cope with the challenges ahead, by using its control over the Commission, including in relation to the implementation and application of the acquis in the Member States, by limiting first-reading agreements to exceptional cases of urgencyespecially those chapters of the acquis with respect to freedom of expression, the fight against corruption, protection of religious and minority rights and the independence of the judiciary for (candidate) Member States, by abolishing the possibility of first-reading agreements, and by improving its own electoral procedure through the revision of the 1976 Electoral Act in line with Parliament’'s proposals contained in its resolution of 11 November 2015 on the reform of the electoral law of the European Union5 or as a future step through the adoption of implementing measures in application of Article 14 of the Electoral Act; __________________ 5 Texts adopted, P8_TA(2015)0395. Texts adopted, P8_TA(2015)0395.
Amendment 257 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Encourages meaningful political dialogue with national parliaments on the contents of legislative proposals; insists, however, on a clear delineation of the respective decision-making competences of the national parliaments and the European Parliament, where the former should exercise their European function on the basis of their national constitutions, in particular via the control of their national governments as members of the European Council and the Council, which is the level where they are best placed to directly influence the content of and exercise scrutiny over the European legislative process; is therefore against the creation of joint parliamentary decision- making bodies for reasons of transparency, accountability and ability to actand adoption or rejection of legislative and budgetary proposals; therefore, national parliaments should have a greater say over EU law-making, by using the tools at their disposal, viz. the yellow and orange card (whose result should be binding, without the Commission having the possibility to ignore it), and by introducing the so- called "green card" procedure, in conformity with a recent proposal of the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC), whereby legislative initiatives could be proposed to the EU institutions by national parliaments;
Amendment 289 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Notes that it is possible within the Treaties to mergInsists to keep separate the function of President of the European Council withand that of President of the European Commission; and that the European Council, by means of an Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA), could engage itself politically to appoint as its President the Commission President, who should be elected by the European Parliament on a proposal by the European Council on the basis of the European election results, as was the case in the 2014 European election, since a double-hatted presidency might result in an over-centralisation of powers;
Amendment 293 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Calls on the European Council to start activating the ‘passerelle clause’ (Article 48 (7) TEU) in order to switch from unanimity to QMV voting in the remaining policy areas where this inot to extend QMV since this would promote the Union's movement toward supra- nationalism and, as such, would threaten the sovereignty of (smaller) Member States that unanimous nvot yet the caseing would protect;
Amendment 312 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
Amendment 326 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Demands that the Council switches completely to QMV voting and that it abandons the practice of transferring contentious legislative fields to the European Council, as this goes against the letter and the spirit of the Treaty, which stipulates that the European Council can only decide unanimously, and should only do so, on broad political goals, notnot to further extend QMV voting in the Council, since the preservation of unanimity in several fields is of crucial importance in order to avoid (1) further erosion of national sovereignty and (2) disproportionate influence onf legislationarger Member States;
Amendment 334 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Is determined to implement fully Treaty provisions on enhanced cooperation by committing not to give its consent to any new enhanced cooperation proposals unless the participating Member States commit to activate the special ‘passerelle clause’ enshrined in Article 333 TFEU to switch from unaniaware that, in the undesirable context of continuous enlargement of the European Union, possibilities for enhanced cooperation should be increased since it can be a valuable alternative for Member States that are not willing to commity to QMV, and from a special to the ordinary legislative procedurefurther supranational integration;
Amendment 346 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
Amendment 358 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Insists on ensuringthat a single representation of the EU/eurozone within the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and other international financial institutions (Article 138 TFEU) by its Finance M, would imply that in these international inister/VP of the Commission and the President of the European Central Bank (ECB)itutions the various Eurozone members would lose control over their respective economic policies;
Amendment 374 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Calls on the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission to organise better co-operation modalities with the Committee of the Regions (CoR) and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) in order to be able to take their opinions into account at an earlier stage in the legislative procedurinvestigating the possibilities for the abolition or merger of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), since currently both institutions are too costly and do not add sufficient value;
Amendment 384 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Stresses the importance of the subsidiarity principle, as laid down in Article 5 TEU, which is binding on all institutions and bodies, notably the CoR and the EESC, and of the instruments contained in Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; supports a flexible interpretatn extension of the deadlines enshrined in the Protocol and callsfrom 8 to 12 weeks, an improvement of the quality onf the Commission to improve the quality of its responses to reasoned opinions's responses to reasoned opinions, and a more effective use of the yellow and orange card procedure, implying that the final legislative decision on subsidiarity rests with the national parliaments instead of with the EU institutions (as is currently the case);
Amendment 397 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. Considers that the practical possibilities for national parliaments to ensure the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality should be improved, andrevised, more particularly, by making the yellow card an imperative for the Commission in order to (at least) review the proposal and by making the orange card independent from the voting in the European Council and in the European Parliament; these two measures entail that for national parliaments it will become more meaningful to object to Commission proposals, rather than a waste of time (as it currently is); cooperation between national parliaments should be strengthened, to enable them, in close cooperation among themselves, to reach the necessary quorum under article 7(3) of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;
Amendment 411 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
Amendment 418 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31 a (new)
Paragraph 31 a (new)
31a. The EMU is to be considered a failed supranational project, which is kept alive by large-scale transfers from Northern to Southern Europe;
Amendment 421 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Calls for further institutional reforms in order to provide the EMU with an effective and democratic economic government with improved capacities and integrated within Opposes against further integration of the EMU; argues that further institutional framework of the Union, whereby the Commission acts as the executive and Parliament and Council as co-legislators, as outlined belowreforms should contribute exclusively to the strengthening of the economic and monetary sovereignty of the Member States;
Amendment 435 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. Insists on the adoption of CArgues that after more than one decade convergence Gguidelines, fail to be enshrined within a Convergence Code and adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure, with a view to creating a more binding framework for economic policy coordination (with key economic, competitiveness and social targets, such as in the areas of labour markets, competitiveness, business environment and public administrations, aspects of tax policy and social protection) that is open to all 28 Member States and that guarantees them the possibility of participating in a shock-absorption mechanismrespected; therefore, and given the fact that the eurozone can impossibly be considered an Optimum Currency Area, a so-called "Convergence Code" will not work;
Amendment 443 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. BelievConcludes that a limitedthe number of crucial areas for structural reforms that increase competitiveness, the growth potential, real economic convergence and social cohesion over a five-year period to strengthen the European social market economy, as outlined in Article 3 (3) TEU,ous European Structural and Investment Funds failed to resolve the social and economic contradictions within the EMU; therefore, the development of a Social Market Economy is only possible at the national level, where political institutions can be sensitive to the needs and the desires of the citizens; this presumes that the Union's fetishism for complete uniformity and unlimited market access should be laid downovercome;
Amendment 453 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
Amendment 472 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
Paragraph 40
40. Calls for the establishment of an enhancedintergovernmental dialogue between Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Eurogroup by agreeing on dedicated meeting time-slots during the main steps of the European Semester cyclethe Members of the EMU in the Council as well as within the Eurogroup;
Amendment 484 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
42. Calls for the integration ofDemands that the Fiscal Compact is not integrated into the EU legal framework on the basis of an assessment of the experience with its implement, not only because of the economic ineffectiveness of its budgetary provisions (i.e. the requirement of debt levels far below those considered sensible), but also because these budgetary rules do not result from national democratic deliberation;
Amendment 492 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43
Paragraph 43
43. Points out the need to switch from unanimity tonot to extend QMV forto the adoption of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) Regulation, by using the provisions of Article 48 (7) TEU and Article 312 (2) TFEUsince QMV threatens the sovereignty of (smaller) Member States that unanimous voting would protect; highlights the importance of establishing a link between the duration of Parliament’'s legislative term and the duration of the MFF, which can be reduced to five years under the provisions of Article 312 (1) TFEU;
Amendment 509 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45
Paragraph 45
45. Calls for better use and surveillance of the existing structural funds in the direction of fostering competitiveness and cohesion, and for the creation of anaiming at reducing fraud, irregularities and errors (especially inc reased EU investment capacity through the exploitation of innovative approaches such as the European Fund for Strategic Investments, or through the creation of a specific facility to finance and guarantee infrastructure projects gional and farm spending, as announced in the report of the European Court of Auditors 2014); concludes that the European Fund for Strategic Investment is a risky investment vehicle leading the interest of the Uniono even higher debts;
Amendment 519 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 46
Paragraph 46
46. Insists onthat the full implementation of the existing six-pack and two-pack framework and the European Semester to address, in particular, macroeconomic imbalancwould further undermine the economic autonomy of the Member States, and secure long-term control overthat the control over economic imbalances, deficits and still extremely high levels of debt by improving spending efficiency, prioritising productive investments, providing incentive to structural reform and taking into account business cycle conditionsdebts should be exercised on the level of the nation-state;
Amendment 526 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 47
Paragraph 47
47. Recalls that the euro is the currency of the Union and that the EU budget is designed to help less developed Member States catch up and become able to join the eurozoneEU budget should not be used in order to drag less developed Member States into the Eurozone, since such practices are highly unproductive and self-destructive, being one of the fundamental roots of the eurocrisis; calls for the dissolution of the eurozone, implying at least a split into a Northern and Southern euro, consistent with the internal European differences for what concerns organization, productivity and social needs;
Amendment 535 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 48
Paragraph 48
Amendment 550 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 49
Paragraph 49
49. Pledges to increase the resilience of the EMU when facing economic shocks while preventing any form of permanent fiscal transferConcludes that the EMU is currently acting as a large-scale transfer union, whereby the no-bailout clause has already been violated multiple times;
Amendment 561 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 50
Paragraph 50
50. Reiterates its support for the suggestion to transform the position of Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs intoStates that the creation of a EMU Treasury and, consequently, the appointment of a Treasury Minister, ais made in its resolution of 12 December 2013 on constitutional problems of a multitier governance in the European Union6 undesirable, since this implies further infringement on national economic autonomy; __________________ 6 Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0598.
Amendment 566 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 51
Paragraph 51
51. Considers it necessary to incorporatethat the European Stability Mechanism into the Union legal framework and, as a next step, to transform it into a European Monetary Funds a highly undemocratic bailout fund, since (1) the ESM deals with millions of taxpayers' euros, which are given away to over-indebted Member States; and (2) the social consequences of the austerity programs attached to the loans have proved to be destructive for the beneficiaries (by sky-high unemployment, reduced access to health care, increasing poverty and homelessness and general demolition of the welfare state);
Amendment 573 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52
Paragraph 52
Amendment 583 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 53
Paragraph 53
53. Calls for duonsiders that a European Redemption Fund would be, on the consideration to be given to the main findingse hand, undemocratic and unfair with respect to sound Member States that are capable of managing their public debt rations, and, ofn the Expert Group created by the Commission, with a view to constituting a Redemption Fund; other hand, is unlikely to work for those Member States that would make use of the Redemption Fund, since the conditions required to avail of the ERF are unrealistic, requiring tax increases and/or savings so severe that it would not only undermine growth but would be completely self-defeating;
Amendment 588 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 54
Paragraph 54
54. Believes that the Single Market contains growth potential that has not yet been fully exploited, particularly with reference to the Digital Single Market; calls, therefore, for better control of the correct application, and better enforcement, of the existing acquis in this domaindomain of services;
Amendment 597 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 55
Paragraph 55
55. Calls for the rapidBelieves that the completion of a Banking Union based on a single supervision mechanism (SSM) and a single resolution mechanism (SRM), and sustained by an adequate backstop; calls, to thi will lead to ever-increasing administrative costs of compliance, both for the banks eand, for a swift agreement on an adequate bridge financing mechanism until the Single Resolution Fund becomes operational and a European Insolvency Scheme is created their customers, and means assuming collective liability and shared responsibility for the debts of all banks in the euro-system; consequently, the Banking Union is a significant encroachment on national sovereignty on several levels;
Amendment 602 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 56
Paragraph 56
Amendment 608 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 57
Paragraph 57
57. Calls for the establishonsiders that the further development of a true capital markets union, with a single European capital markets supervisorshould be on intergovernmental level;
Amendment 614 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 58
Paragraph 58
Amendment 622 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59
Paragraph 59
59. Considers it necessary to improve the automaticthat the initiative of information exchange between national tax authorities in order to avoid tax planning, base erosion and profit shifting, as well as to promote coordinated actions to fight tax havens; calls for the adoption of a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base directive establishing a minimum rate and spelling out common objectives for progressive harmonisation; deems it necessary to embark on a comprehensive review of the existing VAT legislshould reside with the Member States, rather than being imposed by the Union; argues that the adoption of a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base fails to meet with the subsidiarity requirements and will paralyze national economic governance: each Member State should remain in control over taxation, addressing i.a. the issue of reduced rates and the introduction of the country of origin principle, and to establish a partially automatic stabilising mechanism to foster convergence and counter differences in the economic cycles of the Member Statesnd should have the ability to define the taxation level in line with the country-specific economic needs and situation;
Amendment 631 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60
Paragraph 60
60. Recalls the need for proper democratic legitimacy and accountability to be ensured at the levels of decision-making with national parliaments scrutinising national governments, with an enhanced scrutiny role for Concludes that the EMU has become an undemocratic currency area, since (a) illegitimate purchase programs are used to buy debt, (b) tax money is transferred from Northern to Southern European Parliament at EU level, including a central role, toge; and (c) several countries fail to fulfil their with the Council, in the adoption of the Convergence Codeobligations while they are not sufficiently being held to account;
Amendment 635 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 62
Paragraph 62
62. Reiterates that interparliamentary cooperation should not be seen as establmore incentives (i.e. the effective use of the exishting a new joint parliamentary body or any other institution, because the euro is the currency of the EU and the European Pyellow and orange card and the creation of a green card) should be given to national parliaments is the parliament of the EUn order to get involved in EMU matters; recalls that the EMU is established bywithin the Union, whose citizens are directly represented at Union level by Parliament, which canhas to find ways to guarantee the parliamentary democratic accountability of eurozone- specific decisions;
Amendment 640 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 63
Paragraph 63
Amendment 655 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 67
Paragraph 67
67. Is convinced that the deepening of the EMU should go hand in hand with the completion of the internal market by removing all remaining internal barriers, especially as concerns the Energy Union, the common digital market and the market in serviceEMU in its current state should be abandoned or, at least, dismantled into smaller economic confederations, in a EEC-like framework, which is more compatible with internal European differences with regard to economic organization, productivity and social needs;
Amendment 659 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 68
Paragraph 68
68. Calls for full enforcement of existing internal energy market legislation according to Article 194 TFEU in order to establish an Energy Union; Sustains that the establishment of an Energy Union is unrealistic, given the massive investment and infrastructure costs, and given the idea of replacing the dependence on Russia for the gas supply with dependence on other authoritarian regimes (such as Azerbaijan, Algeria, Libya, Turkmenistan, Qatar, Iraq and Iran, all named in the Commission's communication on the Energy Union) with questionable human rights;
Amendment 663 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 69
Paragraph 69
Amendment 691 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 72
Paragraph 72
72. Points out the importance of promoting the idea of a minimal wage determined by each Member State, and suggests that, under current Treaty provisions, an ‘Employees Mobility Directive’ could be adopted to reduce still-existing barriers for employeethat each Member State should have the freedom to impose or not impose minimal wages, in line with the national employment markets;
Amendment 717 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 75
Paragraph 75
75. Calls for the establishment of a new social pact aimed at preserving Europe’s social market economy, respecting the right to collective bargaining; points out that such a pact could enhance the coordination of the social policies of the Member StatesArgues that the extent to which the implementation of the social market is pursued should best be left to the policy space of the national state, since they are best placed to make the trade-off between the welfare state on the one hand and budgetary restraints, earnings equality and employment growth on the other hand; as such, the establishment of a new social pact aimed at preserving Europe's social market economy is not needed at this point in time;
Amendment 737 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 78
Paragraph 78
78. Calls for European and national parliamentary oversight of EU external action to be strengthened, including by continuing the regular consultations with the Vice-President/High Representative (VP/HR), the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission, and for negotiations on replacing the 2002 Interinstitutional Agreement on access to sensitive information of the Council in the field of CFSP to be concluded;
Amendment 754 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 83
Paragraph 83
83. Calls for progressive steps to be taken towards a common defence policy (Article 42(2) TEU) and, eventually, a common defence, which can be set up by unanimous decision of the European CouncilArgues that defence is a national and not a EU responsibility; common interests in defence matters can be pursued within the framework of multi-lateral or bilateral agreements;
Amendment 758 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 83 a (new)
Paragraph 83 a (new)
83a. Underlines that Europe is in the first place a civilian power; EU military power should be seriously questioned;
Amendment 760 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 84
Paragraph 84
Amendment 766 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 85
Paragraph 85
Amendment 771 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 86
Paragraph 86
86. Underlines the need to define common European capabilities and armaments policy (Article 42(3) TEU), which would encompass the joint planning, development and procurement of military capat Europe is in the first place a civilian power; EU military power should be seriously questioned, since (1) it is impossible to reach consensus between the Member States on the use of military force; (2) the estabilities and which should also include proposals to react to cyber, hybrid and asymmshment of a EU army will raise distrust and suspicion with other powers such as Russia and the United States; (3) it would be highly unetrhical threats; encourages the Commission to work on an ambitious European Defence Action Plan, as announced in the 2016 Work Programmeo send soldiers possibly to their deaths on the basis of the vague political declarations the EU is able to generate at present;
Amendment 776 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 87
Paragraph 87
87. Considers it necessary to strengthenhat the strategy followed by the European Defence Agency (EDA) by providing itshould first be the object of public consultation and public debate, before it is provided with needed resources and political backing, ; othereby allowing it to play a leadwise, the lack of public involvement ing and coordinating role in capability development, research ntroversial domain will undermine its legitimacy and risks further erosion of public support for the wider Europeand procuremenject;
Amendment 784 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 89
Paragraph 89
89. Suggests that Article 41 (3) TEU be used toDisagrees with the establishment of a start-up fund comprised of Member States’' contributions to finance preparatory activities pertaining to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) activities not charged to the Union budget;
Amendment 789 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 91
Paragraph 91
91. Calls forIs opposed to the creation of a permanent military operational headquarters that would cooperate closely with the existing Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC); calls for the institutionalisation of the various European military structures (among others the different ‘Battle Groups’, Euroforces, France- United Kingdom defence cooperation, Benelux air defence cooperation) into the EU framework, and for an increase in the usability of EU battlegroups, inter alia by extending common financing and by considering, by default, their deployment as an initial entry force in future crisis management scenariobecause (1) it duplicates NATO structures and permanently disassociates EU planning from NATO planning; (2) it will undoubtedly be a far more costly solution than (improving) the existing structures;
Amendment 792 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 92
Paragraph 92
Amendment 823 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 96
Paragraph 96
96. Highlights the need to set up an EU common asylum and immigration policy, which should provide as well for fair distribution of asylum seekers in the European Union; takes the view that such a policy should involve all Member States, but that, if this proves impossible, the potential of enhanced cooperation could be exploitedfor the Member States to determine themselves how many refugees they will host, without the EU governments imposing mandatory quotas;
Amendment 837 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 97
Paragraph 97
97. Considers it necessary to strengthen Frontex and transform it into a European System of Border Guards, to be supported, when necessary, by military instruments such as a European Maritime Force (Euromarfor) and an upgraded European Corps (Eurocorps), together with the resources pooled through Permanent Structured Cooperation; suggests that automatic adjustment should also be envisaged of the databasesimmediately suspend Schengen until further notice, in order to take control over the refugee crisis and illegal immigration; consequently, internal border controls among the Member States should be reinstated; the main task of Frontex (or of the European System of bBorder agencies such as Eurodac, and, in future, Smart Borders, such that they incorporate the ‘European list of dangerous persons’ and the ‘European Database for wanted persons’Guards) should consist in supervising a correct and thorough border management of the Member States;
Amendment 846 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 98
Paragraph 98
98. Stresses the importance of distinguishing between the concepts of ‘'unsafe third countries’' (war zones) and ‘'safe third countries’' (mostly Western Balkans countries), and the corresponding distinction of procedures for processing applicants coming from these two categories of countries; calls for the immediate inadmission of applications for asylum coming from safe third countries and for the signature of agreements with safe third countries in order to control and reduce migration flows before migrants arrive at the EU border; insists, at the same time, on strict procedures for returning applicants with unfounded claims and on their detention in closed asylum centres in the period before their expulsion;
Amendment 855 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 99
Paragraph 99
Amendment 864 #
2014/2249(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 101
Paragraph 101
101. Underscores the importance of improved coordination between EASO, Frontex and the Office of the European Ombudsman in order to allow for smoother adoption of Early Alert Reports in the event of particular migratory pressure, which is likely to put at risk respect for the fundamental freedoms of asylum seekers and of the European citizens; considers it possible for the Commission to use these Early Alert Reports as basis to trigger the contingency measures provided for in Article 78(3) TFEU;
Amendment 48 #
2014/2228(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1.- Point (e) -subpoint (vi.) -a- (new)
Paragraph 1.- Point (e) -subpoint (vi.) -a- (new)
vi) a - regardless of the outcome of the TTIP negotiations, to broaden public support in the EU Member States and additionally to safeguard the cultural and linguistic diversity of the Member States, which has until now been guaranteed by well-defined national legislation in different Member States, given that national legislation which relates to cultural and linguistic issues inevitably affects the sort of economic and social relations which form the subject of TTIP, all the more so because any TTIP will be a treaty of a ‘mixed’ nature.