10 Amendments of Luke Ming FLANAGAN related to 2018/2151(INI)
Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 a (new)
Citation 5 a (new)
- having regard to the European Ombudsman 'Decision in case 1316/2016/TN on alleged shortcomings in the European Investment Bank’s Transparency Policy(1)'; (1) https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/de cision/en/95520
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 b (new)
Citation 5 b (new)
- having regard to the Review of the Complaints Mechanism (CM) arising from the European Ombudsman 'Decision in case 1316/2016/TN on alleged shortcomings in the European Investment Bank’s Transparency Policy(1)'; (1) https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/de cision/en/95520
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the EIB is at the heart ofcan play a role in the economic recovery efforts at the Union level, with two successive capital increases and through its pivotal role in implementing the Investment Plan for Europe via the management of the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI);
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas the EIB’s role in leveraging public money is essential forplays a role in the capacity of the Union to respond and to adapt to new economic trends and geopolitical uncertainties, while enhancing and strengthening the EIB Group risk oversight and prudential risk management;
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas the EIB should deliver added value with the highest level of integrity, good governance, and especially, in light of the Ombudsman's findings in the 'Decision in case 1316/2016/TN on alleged shortcomings in the European Investment Bank’s Transparency Policy(1)', the highest level of transparency and accountability, as well as being in accordance with the applicable Best Banking Practice; (1) https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/de cision/en/95520
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Reiterates its concern that half of the Member States received 80% of the total EIB investment inside the EU while the other 14 Member States received only 10% of this investment; as well asreiterates additionally that three Member States individually received 16%, 15% and 11% respectively; asks the Bank to include in its reporting breakdown information about its investment in low income and high income regions according to its own Investment Survey (EIBIS) and with regard to the potential effect for overcoming investment gaps and barriers in less favorable regions in the EU;
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 a (new)
Paragraph 35 a (new)
35 a. Takes note of the findings of the European Ombudsman in her 'Decision in case 1316/2016/TN on alleged shortcomings in the European Investment Bank’s Transparency Policy' on the EIB's Complaint Mechanism (CM) in which, among other adverse findings, the Ombudsman 'asked the EIB to explain why the EIB-CM considered most aspects of the complaint to be inadmissible.Given that the complainants had put forward certain concerns related to procedural aspects of the EIB-CM complaints handling procedure, the Ombudsman also asked the EIB for clarification on these aspects, such as on the EIB-CM rules and practices as regards acknowledging receipt of complaints and on its procedure for communicating the outcome of the admissibility check to complainants.' (1) https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/de cision/en/95520
Amendment 33 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 b (new)
Paragraph 35 b (new)
35 b. Regrets that, in response to the Ombudsman's criticisms, the resultant EIB Review of its Complaints Mechanism weakens the EIB's accountability.According to one article in the respected and independent NGO financial services watchdog 'bankwatch' (1), 'The new policy leaves room for the EIB staff and services—those whose decisions may well be the cause of adverse impacts—to interfere with the Complaints Mechanism’s decisions, thus further weakening its capacity to operate independently for those who need redress the most.Rather than raising the bar for a fairer and more transparent mechanism for those harmed by the bank’s investments, the policy undermines its legitimacy.An independent and safe Complaints Mechanism is especially important when it comes to the EIB’s activities outside the EU, where the bank operates most often within contexts where there is closing space for civil society.In such cases, there is a high risk that the bank’s standards of public participation and open consultations are not met, and that its projects end up being associated with, contributing to, or exacerbating human rights violations and environmental damage. (2) https://bankwatch.org/press_release/eib- to-weaken-accountability-mechanism- despite-civil-society-criticism
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 c (new)
Paragraph 35 c (new)
35 c. asks that the EIB again review its Complaints Mechanism with a view to addressing those and other weaknesses;
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44
Paragraph 44
44. Takes note of the Ombudsman Decision in case 1316/2016 TN (referred to above) on allegations in the EIB’s transparency policy from 23 May 2018 and invites the Bank to implement the suggested improvements by the Ombudsman concerning removal of the presumption of non-disclosure related to documents collected and generated during inspections, investigations and audits, as well as redrafting relevant provisions of its Transparency policy related to intermediated loans and deadlines for handling information requests;