BETA

47 Amendments of Daniel BUDA related to 2016/0359(COD)

Amendment 86 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1
(1) The objective of this Directive is to remove obstacles to the exercise of fundamental freedoms, such as the free movement of capital and freedom of establishment, which result from differences between national laws and procedures on preventive restructuring, insolvency and second chance. This Directive aims at removing such obstacles by ensuring that viable enterprises and personally liable entrepreneurs in financial difficulties have access to effective national preventive rapid restructuring frameworks which enable them to continue operating; that honest over indebted entrepreneurs have a second chance after a full discharge of debt after a reasonable period of time, during which they have gone through insolvency proceedings; and that the effectiveness of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures is improved, in particular with a view to shortening their length.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 89 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 2
(2) Restructuring should enable enterprises and personally liable entrepreneurs in financial difficulties to continue business in whole or in part, by changing the composition, conditions or structure of assets and liabilities or of their capital structure, including by sales of assets or parts of the business. Preventive restructuring frameworks should above all enable the enterprises to restructure rapidly at an early stage and to avoid their insolvency. Those rapid preventive frameworks should maximise the total value to creditors, owners and the economy as a whole and should prevent unnecessary job losses and losses of knowledge and skills. They should also prevent the build- up of non-performing loans. In the restructuring process the rights of all parties involved should be protected. At the same time, non-viable businesses with no prospect of survival should be liquidated as quickly as possible. The availability of preventive rapid restructuring procedures would ensure that action is taken before companies default on their loans, thereby helping to reduce the risk of loans becoming non-performing in cyclical downturns and cushioning the adverse impact on the financial sector. A significant percentage of businesses and jobs could be saved if preventive procedures existed in all Member States where their establishments, assets or creditors are situated.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 93 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 3
(3) There are differences between the Member States as regards the range of the procedures available to debtors in financial difficulties in order to restructure their business. Some Member States have a limited range of procedures meaning that businesses are only able to restructure at a relatively late stage, in the context of insolvency procedures. In other Member States, restructuring is possible at an earlier stage but the procedures available are not as effective as they could be or are very formal, in particular limiting the use of out- of-court processes. Similarly, national rules giving entrepreneurs a second chance, in particular by granting them discharge from the debts they have incurred in the course of their business, vary between Member States in respect of the length of the discharge period and the conditions for granting such a discharge. Also, the degree of involvement of judicial or administrative authorities or their appointees varies from minimal involvement in some countries to full participation in others.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 98 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 7 a (new)
(7a) More efficient restructuring, insolvency and debt remission proceedings and in particular the digitisation of all insolvency proceedings will help expedite matters, thereby cutting restructuring costs and improving creditor recovery rates. More specifically, this directive will to help increase investment and job opportunities in the single market, reduce unnecessary liquidations of viable companies, avoid unnecessary job losses, prevent the build-up of non-performing loans, facilitate cross-border restructuring, cut costs and provide more opportunities for honest entrepreneurs to be given a fresh start.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 102 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 13
(13) In particular small and medium sized enterprises should benefit from a more coherent approach at Union level, since they do not have the necessary resources to cope with high restructuring costs and to take advantage of the more efficient restructuring procedures in some Member States. Small and medium enterprises, especially when facing financial difficulties, often do not have the resources to hire professional advice, therefore early warning tools should be put in place to alert debtors to the urgency to act. In order to help such enterprises restructure at low cost, model restructuring plans that take particular account of the needs and characteristics of small and medium-sized businesses should also be developed nationally and made available online. Debtors should be able to use and adapt them easily to their own needs and to the specificities of their business.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 114 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 16
(16) The earlier the debtor can detect its financial difficulties and can take appropriate action, the higher the probability of avoiding an impending insolvency or, in case of a business whose viability is permanently impaired, the more orderly and efficient the winding-up process. Clear information on the available preventive restructuring procedures as well as early warning tools should therefore be put in place to incentivise debtors who start to experience financial problems to take early action. Possible early warning mechanisms should be accompanied by clear and transparent explanations concerning their nature and content and include accounting and monitoring duties for the debtor or the debtor's management as well as reporting duties under loan agreements. In addition, third parties with relevant information such as accountants, tax and social security authorities could be incentivised or obliged under national law to flag a negative development.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 118 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 17
(17) A restructuring framework should be available to debtors and honest entrepreneurs to enable them to address their financial difficulties effectively at an early stage, when it appears likely that their insolvency may be prevented and the continuation of their business assured. A restructuring framework should strike a proper balance between the interests of debtors and those of creditors and should be available before a debtor becomes insolvent according to national law, i.e. before the debtor fulfils the conditions for entering collective insolvency procedure which entail normally a total divestment of the debtor and the appointment of a liquidator. A test of viability should not therefore be made a pre-condition for entering negotiations and for granting a stay of enforcement actions. Rather, the viability of an enterprise should most often be an assessment to be made by affected creditors who in their majority agree to some adjustments of their claims. However, in order to avoid the procedures being misused, the financial difficulties of the debtor should reflect a likelihood of insolvency and the restructuring plan should be capable of preventing the insolvency of the debtor and ensuring the viability of the business.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 124 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 19
(19) A debtor should be able to request the judicial or administrative authority for a temporary stay of individual enforcement actions which should also suspend the obligation to file for opening of insolvency procedures where such actions may adversely affect negotiations and hamper the prospects of a restructuring of the debtor's business. The stay of enforcement could be general, that is to say affecting all creditors, or targeted towards individual creditors. In order to provide for a fair balance between the rights of the debtor and of creditors, the stay should be granted for a period of no more than fourtwo months. Complex restructurings may, however, require more time. Member States may decide that in such cases, extensions of this period may be granted by the judicial or administrative authority, providing there is evidence that negotiations on the restructuring plan are progressing and that creditors are not unfairly prejudiced. If further extensions are granted, the judicial or administrative authority should be satisfied that there is a strong likelihood that a restructuring plan will be adopted. Member States should ensure that any request to extend the initial duration of the stay is made within a reasonable deadline so as to allow the judiciary or administrative authorities to deliver a decision within due time. Where a judicial or administrative authority does not take a decision on the extension of a stay of enforcement before it lapses, the stay should cease to have effects on the day the stay period expires. In the interest of legal certainty, the total period of the stay should be limited to twelve months.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 130 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 28
(28) While a restructuring plan should always be deemed adopted if the required majority in each affected class supports the plan, a restructuring plan which is not supported by the required majority in each affected class may still be confirmed by a judicial or administrative authority provided that it is supported by at least onethe majority of affected classes of creditors and that dissenting classes are not unfairly prejudiced under the proposed plan (the cross-class cram-down mechanism). In particular, the plan should abide by the absolute priority rule which ensures that a dissenting class of creditors is paid in full before a more junior class can receive any distribution or keep any interest under the restructuring plan. The absolute priority rule serves as a basis for the value to be allocated among the creditors in restructuring. As a corollary to the absolute priority rule, no class of creditors can receive or keep under the restructuring plan economic values or benefits exceeding the full amount of the claims or interests of such class. The absolute priority rule makes it possible to determine, when compared to the capital structure of the enterprise under restructuring, the value allocation that parties are to receive under the restructuring plan on the basis of the value of the enterprise as a going concern. For creditors, compliance with the absolute priority rule is guaranteed by the involvement of the judicial or administrative authority. Member States may decide to vary the minimum number of affected classes necessary for approval of the restructuring plan, as long as the minimum number represents the majority of the classes.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 135 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 34
(34) TWorkers should enjoy full labour law protection throughout the preventive restructuring procedures, workers should enjoy full labour law protection and their rights to information should in no way be restricted. In particular, this Directive is without prejudice to workers' rights guaranteed by Council Directive 98/59/EC68, Council Directive 2001/23/EC69, Directive 2002/14EC of the European Parliament and of the Council70, Directive 2008/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council71 and Directive 2009/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council72. The obligations concerning the information and consultation of workers under national law implementing the above-mentioned Directives remain fully intact. This includes obligations to inform and consult workers' representatives on the decision to have recourse to a preventive restructuring framework in accordance with Directive 2002/14/EC. Given the need to ensure an appropriate level of protection of workers, Member States should in principle exempt workers' outstanding claims, as defined in Directive 2008/94/EC, from any stay of enforcement irrespective of the question whether these claims arise before or after the stay is granted. Such a stay should be permissible only for the amounts and for the period that the payment of such claims is effectively guaranteed by other means under national law. Where Member States extend the cover of the guarantee of payment of workers' outstanding claims established by Directive 2008/94/EC to preventive restructuring procedures set up by this Directive, the exemption of workers' claims from the stay of enforcement is no longer justified to the extent covered by that guarantee. Where under national law there are limitations to the liability of guarantee institutions, either in terms of the length of the guarantee or the amount paid to workers, workers should be able to enforce their claims for any shortfall against the employer even during the stay of enforcement period. _________________ 68 Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies, OJ L 225, 12.08.1998, p. 16. 69 Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses, OJ L 82, 22.03.2001, p. 16. 70 Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community, OJ L 80, 23.3.2002, p. 29. 71 Directive 2008/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 on the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer, OJ L 283, 28.10.2008, p. 36. 72 Directive 2009/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 on the establishment of a European Works council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and community-scale groups of undertakings for the purpose of informing and consulting employees, OJ L 122, 16.5.2009, p. 28.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 136 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 34
(34) Throughout the preventive restructuring procedures, workers should enjoy full labour law protection. In particular, this Directive is without prejudice to workers' rights guaranteed by Council Directive 98/59/EC68, Council Directive 2001/23/EC69, Directive 2002/14EC of the European Parliament and of the Council70, Directive 2008/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council71 and Directive 2009/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council72. The obligations concerning the information and consultation of workers under national law implementing the above-mentioned Directives remain fully intact. This includes obligations to inform and consult workers' representatives on the decision to have recourse to a preventive restructuring framework in accordance with Directive 2002/14/EC. Given the need to ensure an appropriate high level of protection of workers, Member States should in principle exempt workers' outstanding claims, as defined in Directive 2008/94/EC, from any stay of enforcement irrespective of the question whether these claims arise before or after the stay is granted. Such a stay should be permissible only for the amounts and for the period that the payment of such claims is effectively guaranteed by other means under national law. Where Member States extend the cover of the guarantee of payment of workers' outstanding claims established by Directive 2008/94/EC to preventive restructuring procedures set up by this Directive, the exemption of workers' claims from the stay of enforcement is no longer justified to the extent covered by that guarantee. Where under national law there are limitations to the liability of guarantee institutions, either in terms of the length of the guarantee or the amount paid to workers, workers should be ablehave the right to enforce their claims for any shortfall against the employer even during the stay of enforcement period. _________________ 68 Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies, OJ L 225, 12.08.1998, p. 16. 69 Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses, OJ L 82, 22.03.2001, p. 16. 70 Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community, OJ L 80, 23.3.2002, p. 29. 71 Directive 2008/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 on the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer, OJ L 283, 28.10.2008, p. 36. 72 Directive 2009/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 on the establishment of a European Works council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and community-scale groups of undertakings for the purpose of informing and consulting employees, OJ L 122, 16.5.2009, p. 28.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 141 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 37
(37) The different second chance possibilities in the Member States may incentivise over-indebted entrepreneurs to relocate to Member States in order to benefit from shorter discharge periods or more attractive conditions for discharge, leading to additional legal uncertainty and costs for the creditors when recovering their claims. Furthermore, the effects of bankruptcy, in particular the social stigma, legal consequences such as disqualifying entrepreneurs from taking up and pursuing entrepreneurial activity and the on-going inability to pay off debts constitute important disincentives for entrepreneurs seeking to set up a business or have a second chance, even if evidence shows that entrepreneurs who have gone bankrupt have more chance to be successful the second time. Steps should therefore be taken to reduce the negative effects of over-indebtedness and bankruptcy on entrepreneurs, in particular by allowing for a full discharge of debts after a certain period of time during which they have undergone an insolvency procedure and by limiting the length of disqualification orders issued in connection with the debtor's over-indebtedness.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 143 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 39
(39) Specialised insolvency practitioners and judges and the availability of digital tools can greatly help reduce the length of proceedings, lower costs and improve the quality of assistance or supervision. It is necessary to maintain and enhance the transparency and predictability of the procedures in delivering outcomes that are favourable for the preservation of businesses and for giving honest entrepreneurs a second chance or that permit the prompt and efficient liquidation of non-viable enterprises. It is also necessary to reduce the excessive length of insolvency procedures in many Member States, which results in legal uncertainty for creditors and investors and low recovery rates. It is also necessary to integrate digital communication tools into insolvency procedures to reduce the excessive duration thereof. Finally, given the enhanced cooperation mechanisms between courts and practitioners in cross- border cases set up by Regulation (EU) 2015/848, the professionalism and specialisation of all actors involved needs to be brought to comparable high levels across the Union. To achieve these objectives, Member States should ensure that members of the judicial and administrative bodies are properly trained and have specialised knowledge and experience in insolvency matters. Such specialisation of members of the judiciary should allow making decisions with potentially significant economic and social impacts within a short period of time and should not mean that members of the judiciary have to deal exclusively with restructuring, insolvency and second chance matters. For example, the creation of specialised courts or chambers in accordance with national law governing the organisation of the judicial system could be an efficient way of achieving these objectives.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 149 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) rapid preventive restructuring procedures available for debtors in financial difficulty when there is a likelihood of insolvency and a genuine possibility of saving the company from an insolvency procedure;
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 169 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 8
(8) 'a cross-class cram-down' means the confirmation by a judicial or administrative authority of a restructuring plan over the dissent of one or several affected classes of creditors;
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 179 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 14
(14) 'full discharge of debt' means cancellation of outstanding debt subsequent to a procedure comprising a realisation of assets and/or a repayment/settlement plann insolvency procedure;
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 185 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1
(1) Member States shall ensure that debtors and entrepreneurs have access todevelop early warning tools which can detect a deteriorating business development and signal to the debtor or the entrepreneur or the workers’ representative the need to act as a matter of urgency. Member States shall ensure that the nature and content of early warning instruments are clearly and transparently indicated and that borrowers and entrepreneurs have access to these instruments. Member States may require debtors to consider the need to use a restructuring instrument if, over a two- year period, financial indicators reflect the risk of the business being affected. Member States may decide to restrict access to pre-insolvency restructuring mechanisms for debtors who have failed to make use of early warning instruments despite these being made available to them.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 191 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 3
(3) Member States may limit the access provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 to small and medium sized enterprises or to entrepreneursdeleted
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 204 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 4
(4) Preventive restructuring frameworks shall be available on the application by debtors, or by. Member States may provide for restructuring frameworks to be made available at the request of creditors with the agreement of the debtors.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 211 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 2
(2) The appointment by a judicial or administrative authority of a practitioner in the field of restructuring shall not be mandaMember States may provide for expert supervision of the restructuring procedure to be mandatory. Member States may, in order to respect the creditors' rights, give them a major role to play in deciding on the need for the appointment of an insolvency practitioner and in the selection of such a practitioner to supervise the procedure for restructuring a ‘debtory in every casepossession’.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 216 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 3 – introductory part
(3) Member States may requireshall order the appointment of a practitioner in the field of restructuring in the following cases:
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 222 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 3 a (new)
(3a) Representatives of the borrower's employees shall be regularly informed about the restructuring process and about all developments recorded.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 224 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 6 – paragraph 1
(1) Member States shall ensure that debtors who are negotiating a restructuring plan with their creditors may benefit from a stay of individual enforcement actions in line with national law if and to the extent such a stay is necessary to support the negotiations of a restructuring plan.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 236 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 6 – paragraph 4
(4) Member States shall limit the duration of the stay of individual enforcement actions to a maximum period of no more than fourtwo months.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 243 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 6 – paragraph 7
(7) The total duration of the stay of individual enforcement actions, including extensions and renewals, shall not exceed twelvesix months.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 244 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 6 – paragraph 8 – introductory part
(8) Member States shall ensure that judicial or administrative authorities - in line with their remit under national law - may lift the stay of individual enforcement actions, in whole or in part:
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 250 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 6 – paragraph 9
(9) Member States shall ensure that, where an individual creditor or a single class of creditors is or would be unfairly prejudiced by a stay of individual enforcement actions, the judicial or administrative authority may decide - in line with their remit under national law - not grant the stay of individual enforcement actions or may lift a stay of individual enforcement actions already granted in respect of that creditor or class of creditors, at the request of the creditors concerned.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 261 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 7 – paragraph 6
(6) Member States shall ensure that nothing prevents the debtor from paying in the ordinary course of business claims of or owed to unaffected creditors and the claims of affected creditors that arise after the stay is granted and which continue to arise throughout the period of the stay.deleted
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 266 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
(aa) where appropriate, the identity of the restructuring practitioner
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 270 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) the classes into which the affected parties have been grouped - in line with national law on the basis of objective and transparent criteria - for the purposes of adopting the plan, together with a rationale for doing so and information about the respective values of creditors and members in each class;
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 280 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 8 – paragraph 3 a (new)
(3a) Member States shall ensure that pay entitlements and any workers’ rights are not affected by restructuring plans, without prejudice to Article 6(3) of this Directive.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 281 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 9 – paragraph 1
(1) Member States shall ensure that any affected creditors have a right to vote on the adoption of a restructuring plan. Member States may also grant such voting rights to affected equity holders, in accordance with Article 12(2), guaranteeing the application of the criterion of respect for creditors' interests set out in Article 2(9).
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 284 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 9 – paragraph 1 a (new)
(1a) Member States shall ensure that workers’ representatives are duly informed about the content of the restructuring plan before its adoption in accordance with Union and national law.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 302 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 10 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) any new financing is necessary and proportionate to implement the restructuring plan and does not unfairly prejudice the interests of creditors.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 307 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 11 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
(1) Member States shall ensure that a restructuring plan which is not approved by each and every class of affected parties may be confirmed by a judicial or administrative authority upon the proposal of a debtor or, when so provided by national law, of a creditor with the debtor's agreement and become binding upon one or more dissenting classes where the restructuring plan:
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 308 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 11 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) fulfils the conditions in Article 10 (2), while ensuring compliance with all the requirements laid down in national law;
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 309 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 11 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) has been approved by at least onethe majority of classes of affected creditors other thanamongst which there is neither an equity-holder class andnor any other class which, upon a valuation of the enterprise, would not receive any payment or other consideration if the normal ranking of liquidation priorities were applied;
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 311 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 11 – paragraph 2
(2) Member States may vary the minimum number of affected classes required to approve the plan laid down in point (b) of paragraph (1) to the extent that the minimum number covers the majority of classes.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 314 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – title
Valuation by the judicial or administrative authoritycompetent authorities of the Member States
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 315 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – paragraph 1
(1) A liquidation value shall be determined by the authorities of the Member States and the legality thereof by the judicial or administrative authority where a restructuring plan is challenged on the grounds of an alleged breach of the best interest of creditors test.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 318 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
(2) An enterprise value shall be determined by the judicial or administrative authorityauthorities of the Member States on the basis of the value of the enterprise as a going concern in the following cases:
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 321 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – paragraph 3
(3) Member States shall ensure that properly qualified experts are appointed to assist the judicial or administrative authority, when necessary and appropriate,authorities for the purposes of the valuation, including where a creditor challenges the value of the collateral.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 334 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) to have due regard to the interests of creditors, workers and other stakeholders;
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 341 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 19 – paragraph 1
(1) Member States shall ensure that honest over-indebted entrepreneurs may be fully discharged of their debts in accordance with this Directive after they have undergone an insolvency procedure.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 356 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 24 – paragraph 1
(1) Member States shall ensure that the members of the judiciary and administrative authorities dealing with restructuring, insolvency and second chance matters receive initial and specialist further training to a level appropriate to their responsibilities.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 365 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
(1) Member States shall ensure thatmay perform the following actions may be performed electronically, including in cross-border situations:
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI
Amendment 374 #
(3) Member States shall compile statistics from the aggregate data referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 for full calendar years ending on 31 December of each year, starting with data collected for the first full calendar year following12 months after [the date of start of application of implementing measures]. These statistics shall be communicated to the Commission on the basis of a standard data communication form annually, by 31 March of the calendar year following the year for which data is collected.
2017/11/16
Committee: JURI