BETA

32 Amendments of Cora van NIEUWENHUIZEN related to 2014/0020(COD)

Amendment 111 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
(10) Consistent with the goals of contributing to the functioning of the internal market, it should be possible to grant a derogation for a credit institution from the provisions on separation of certain trading activities where a Member State has adopted national primary legislation prior to 29 January 2014 (including secondary legislation subsequently adopted) prohibiting credit institutions, which take deposits from individuals and Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs) from dealing in investments as a principal and holding trading assets. The Member State should therefore be entitled to make a request to the Commission to grant a derogation from the provisions on separation of certain trading activities for a credit institution that is subject to the national legislation compatible with those provisions. This would allow Member States that already have primary legislation in place, the effects of which are equivalent to and consistent with this Regulation, to avoid alignment of existing, effective provisions. To ensure that the impact of that national legislation, as well as of subsequent implementing measures, does not jeopardise the aim or functioning of the internal market, the aim of that national legislation and related supervisory and enforcement arrangements must be able to ensure that credit institutions that take eligible deposits from individuals and from SMEs comply with legally binding requirements that are equivalent and compatible with the provisions provided in this Regulation. The competent authority supervising the credit institution subject to the national legislation in question should be responsible for providing an opinion that should accompany the request for the derogation.deleted
2015/02/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 124 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
(13) This Regulation will apply only to credit institutions and groups with trading activities that meet thresholdse criteria set out in the Regulation. This is in line with the explicit focus on the limited subset of the largest and most complexsystemically relevant credit institutions and groups that in spite of other legislative acts remain too-big-to-fail, too-big-to-save and too complex to manage, supervise and resolve. The provisions of this Regulation should accordingly only apply to those Union credit institutions and groups that either are deemed of global systemic importance or exceed certain relative and absolute accounting-based thresholds in terms of trading activity or absolutesignificant supervised entities or significant supervised groups under Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 or exceed certain accounting-based thresholds on size. Member States or the competent authorities may decide to impose similar measures also on smaller credit institutions.
2015/02/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 128 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
(13) This Regulation will apply only to credit institutions and groups with trading activities that meet thresholds set out in the Regulation. This is in line with the explicit focus on the limited subset of the largest and most complex credit institutions and groups that in spite of other legislative acts remain too-big-to-fail, too-big-to-save and too complex to manage, supervise and resolve. The provisions of this Regulation should accordingly only apply to those Union credit institutions and groups that either are deemed of global systemic importance or exceed certain relative and absolute accounting-based thresholds in terms of trading activity or absolute size. Member States or the competent authorities may decide to impose similar measures also on smaller credit institutions.
2015/02/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 137 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
(17) To ensure that the entities subject to the prohibition of proprietary trading can continue to contribute toward the financing of the economy, they should be allowed to invest in a closed list of funds. This exhaustive listertain funds. These should comprisinclude closed- ended and unleveraged alternative investment funds (AIFs), European Venture Capital Funds, European Social Entrepreneurship Funds and European Long Term Investment Funds. To ensure that these funds do not endanger the viability and financial soundness of the credit institutions that invest in them, it is essential that closed-ended and unleveraged AIFs in which credit institutions can still invest are managed by AIF managers that are authorised and supervised in accordance with the relevant provisionsUCITS, other funds marketed to retail investors, AIFs where the mandate of the fund does not allow a leverage higher than that laid down in Article 51(3) of Directive 201109/615/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council26 , and that those AIFs are established in the Union or, if they are not established in the Union, they are marketed in the Union according to the rules of that Directive. __________________ 26Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Counas referenced in Article 128(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) 575/2013, qualifying venture capital funds as defined in Article 3(b) of Regulation (EU) No 345/2013, qualifying social of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC andentrepreneurship funds as defined in Article 3(b) of Regulations (ECU) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010346/2013, and AIFs authorised as ELTIFs in accordance with Regulation (EU) No [XXX/XXXX].
2015/02/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 155 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23
(23) If, when assessing the trading activities, the competent authority concludes that they exceed certain metrics in terms of relative size, leverage, complexity, profitability, associated market risk, as well as interconnectedness, it should require their separation posing undue risks to the resolvability and stability of the core credit institution, or to the stability of the Union´s financial system, it should require additional measures which may take the form of enhanced supervision, higher capital requirements and separation of the relevant trading activities from the core credit institution unless the core credit institution can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the competent authority that those trading activities do not pose a threat to the financial stability of the core credit institution or to the Union financial system as a whole, taking into account the objectives set out in this Regulation.
2015/02/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 162 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24
(24) There are particular concerns in relation to market making. The resolvability of a bank may be impeded by the presence of trading and inventory within a large banking group, as individual trading positions are treated the same way in a resolution process, whether they result from client activity driven market making or from speculation. Additionally, market makers are interconnected with other large banking groups. Furthermore, market makers can be exposed to substantial counterparty risk and the concrete functioning of market making can vary in relation to different financial instruments and market models. Market making activities, however, are also indispensable to the well-functioning of the market for corporate bonds and other debt instruments, since liquidity is necessary to make the instruments appropriate for a wide variety of investors. Therefore, particular attention to those activities should be made during the assessment of the competent authority.
2015/02/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 243 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
(a a) any credit institution considered a significant supervised institution or significant supervised group as defined in point 16 and point 22, respectively, of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 468/2014; or
2015/02/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 253 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b – introductory part
(b) any of the following entities that for a period of three consecutive years has total assets amounting at least to EUR 30 billion and has trading activitiedeposits amounting at least to EUR 730 billion or 10 per cent of its total assets:
2015/02/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 276 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point 4
4. ‘proprietary trading’ means using own capital or borrowed money to take positions in any type ofimmediate transaction to purchase, sell or otherwise acquire or dispose of any financial instrument or commodities for the sole purpose of making a short term profit for own account, and without any connection to actual or anticipated client activity or for the purpose of hedging the entity’s risk as result of actual or anticipated client activity, through the use of desks, units, divisions or individual traders specifically dedicated to such position taking and profit making, including through dedicated web- based proprietary trading platforms;
2015/02/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 331 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point b – introductory part
(b) a situation where an entity referred to in Article 3 engages in proprietary trading through a separate legal entity or meets all of the following conditions:
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 347 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 3
3. The restrictions laid down in point (b) of paragraph 1 shall not apply with regard to closed-ended and unleveraged AIFs as defined in Directive 2011/61/EU where those AIF, UCITS, other funds mare established in the Union or, if they are not established in the Union, they are marketed in the Union according to Articles 35 or 40 of Directive 2011/61/EU keted to retail investors and to AIFs where the mandate of the fund does not allow a leverage higher than laid down in Article 51(3) of Directive 2009/65/EU as referenced in Article 128(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) 575/2013, to qualifying venture capital funds as defined in Article 3(b) of Regulation (EU) No 345/2013, to qualifying social entrepreneurship funds as defined in Article 3(b) of Regulation (EU) No 346/2013, and to AIFs authorized as ELTIFs in accordance with Regulation (EU) No [XXX/XXXX].
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 349 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. The prohibition in point (b) of paragraph 1 shall not apply if the amount of those activities is below 2% of the core credit institution´s own funds, calculated on a consolidated basis. The amount of those activities above 2% of the core credit institution´s own funds, calculated on a consolidated basis, shall be phased out during a period of five years after this Regulation enters into force.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 373 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
(a a) the management of liquidity, interest rate, currency and credit risk in a group or network according to Art. 113 (6), (7) Regulation (EU) No.575/2013 [CRR] or Art. 16(1) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 375 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
(b a) providing guarantees
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 387 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point (i a) (new)
(i a) Asset management services such as portfolio management and investment advice.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 391 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
(i a) the selling of interest rate derivatives, foreign exchange derivatives, credit derivatives, emission allowances derivatives and commodity derivatives eligible for central counterparty clearing, and emission allowances, to non-financial clients and to financial entities referred to in the second and third indents of point (19) of Article 5, to insurance undertakings, or to institutions providing occupational retirement benefits, where the sole purpose of the sale is to hedge interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, credit risk, commodity risk or emissions allowance risk.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 424 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Paragraph 1(a) shall not apply to a core credit institution which does not engage in the regulated activity of dealing in investments as principal and holding trading assets, with the exceptions of risk- mitigating activities for the purpose of prudently managing its capital, liquidity and funding and of providing limited risk management services to customers.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 428 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 b (new)
1 b. An assessment under paragraph 1(b) shall not affect any core credit institution within the group which is legally separated from group entities that engage in the regulated activity of dealing in investments as a principal or hold trading assets and which: - is able to make decisions independently of other group entities; - has a management body that is independent of other group entities; - is subject to capital and liquidity requirements in its own right; and - may not enter into contracts or transactions with other group entities other than on terms similar to those referred to in Article 13(7). Where all core credit institutions within the group meet those conditions, paragraph 1(b) shall not apply.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 460 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point h
(h) credit and liquidity risk arising from commitments and guarantees provided by the core credit institution.deleted
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 491 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1
1. Where the competent authority concludes that, following the assessment referred to in Article 9(1), the limits and conditions linked to the metrics referred to in points (a) to (h) of Article 9(2) and specified in the delegated act referred to in paragraph 5 are met, and it therefore deems that there is a threat to the financial stability of the core credit institution or to the Union financial system as a whole, taking into account the objectives referred to in Article 1, it shall, no later than two months after the finalisation of that assessment, start the procedure leading to a decision as referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 3.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 509 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2
2. Where the limits and conditions referred to in paragraph 1 are not met, the competent authority may still start the procedure leading to a decision as referred to in the third subparagraph of paragraph 3 where it concludes, following the assessment referred to in Article 9(1), that any trading activity, with the exception of trading in derivatives other than those permitted under Article 11 and 12, carried out by the core credit institution, poses a threat to the financial stability of the core credit institution or to the Union financial system as a whole taking into account the objectives referred to in Article 1.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 515 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
Unless the core credit institution demonstrates, within the time limit referred to in the first subparagraph, to the satisfaction of the competent authority, that the reasons leading to the conclusions are not justified, the competent authority shall adopt a decision addressing the core credit institution and requiring it not to carry outto reduce the risk that potential losses stemming from, the trading, related activities specified in those conclusionsare transferred to the core credit institution, by taking measures in accordance with Article 17 of Directive 2014/59/EU (BRRD) to restore the resolvability of the credit institution. Measures that the competent authority may take shall include enhanced supervision, higher capital requirements, and separation of the relevant trading activities from the core credit institution. The competent authority shall state the reasons for its decision and publicly disclose it.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 536 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4
For purpose of paragraph 2, where the competent authority decides to allowThe competent authority may, in particular, authorise the core credit institution to carry out those trading activities the competent authority shall adopt a decision addressed towhich do not pose a threat to the financial stability of the core credit institution or to that effecte Union´s financial system.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 553 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 5 – point a – point a
(a) (i) the relevant limit of each of the metrics provided in points (a) to (hg) of Article 9(1), above which the risk level of the trading activity concerned is deemed individually significant;
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 573 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
As part of the prudent management of its capital, liquidity and funding, a core credit institution may only use interest rate derivatives, foreign exchange derivatives and credit derivatives eligible for central counterparty clearing to hedge its overall balance sheet risk. The core credit institution shall demonstrate to the competent supervisor that the hedging activity is designed to reduce, and demonstrably reduces or significantly mitigates, specific, identifiable risks of individual or aggregated positions of the core credit institution. The competent supervisor may prohibit the core credit institution from using a type of instrument when it has good reason to believe that the use of such an instrument would pose a risk to the stability or resolvability of the core credit institution, or to the stability of the Union´s financial system.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 589 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
A core credit institution that has been subject to a decision referred to in Article 10(3) may sell interest rate derivatives, foreign exchange derivatives, credit derivatives, emission allowances derivatives and commodity derivatives eligible for central counterparty clearing and emission allowances to its non- financial clients, to financial entities referred to in the first, second and third indents of point (19) of Article 5, to insurance undertakings and to institutions providing for occupational retirement benefits when the following conditions have been satisfied:
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 601 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) the sales reflect the legitimate hedging objectives of the core credit institution'´s own funds requirements forclients, are fully disclosed to the competent authority, and the position risk arising from the derivatives and emission allowances does not exceed a proportion of to the core credit institution do not pose undue risk to the stability and resolvability of the core credit institution or stabilitsy total risk capital requirement to be specified in a Commission delegated act in accordance with paragraph 2. he Union´s financial system. The competent supervisor may at any time prohibit the core credit institution from engaging in a sale of a financial instrument, in particular those subject to the obligations set out in Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, when it has good reason to believe such a sale would pose a risk to the stability or resolvability of the core credit institution, or to the stability of the Union´s financial system.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 607 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 2
2. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 35 to: (a) permit other financial instruments than those mentioned in paragraph 1, in particular those subject to the obligations set out in Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, for purpose of hedging risk to be sold to the type of clients listed in paragraph 1 of this Article; (b) specify the proportion of the core credit institution's own funds requirements above which derivatives and emission allowances referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article may not be sold nor recorded on the balance sheet of the core credit institution.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 652 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16
In addition to the provisions of Articles 399 to 403 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, when measures have been imposed in accordance with this Chapter of this Regulation, restrictions with respect to the recognition of credit mitigation techniques shall apply to the computation of exposure values for the purposes of compliance with the large exposure limits as referred to in Articles 14 and 15 of this Regulation. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 35 to specify the extent to which credit risk mitigation techniques including types of and limits to eligible credit protection shall be recognised for the purposes of the first sub-paragraph with the purpose of ensuring that credit risk mitigation techniques do not fail when risks materialise so that there can be effective recovery of credit protection.Article 16 deleted Credit risk mitigation techniques
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 698 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21
[...]deleted
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 745 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 1
1. For the purpose of Article 3(b)(ii) and Article 9, the calculation of the thresholds shall be based on the consolidated accounts of the EU parent.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 751 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
By [OP insert the correct date by 12 months of publication of this Regulation], the competent authority shall annually identify credit institutions and groups that are subject to this Regulation in accordance with Article 3 and notify them immediately to the EBA.
2015/02/03
Committee: ECON