BETA

Activities of Barbara KAPPEL related to 2018/2100(INI)

Shadow reports (1)

REPORT on Banking Union – annual report 2018 PDF (435 KB) DOC (53 KB)
2016/11/22
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2018/2100(INI)
Documents: PDF(435 KB) DOC(53 KB)

Amendments (28)

Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas the role of the EBA needs to be significantly strengthened in order to effectively implementplay an important role in the implementation and coordination of anti- money laundering measures;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Takes note of the achievements of the Banking Union in fostering a trulystrengthening the single market, a level playing field and predictability for market actors; considers that a fully completstrengthened Banking Union will further strengthenenhance financial stability and growth prospects in the EU;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 48 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Stresses the importance of completing the capital markets union, which will help to channel credit intostabilize the real economy, further enable private risk sharing and complement funding through banks;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Considers that one of the aims of the Banking Union should be to preserve the diversity of EU banking models, as this enables the requirements ofnd national banking contexts, thus providing for the best financial service for citizens and ofor their projects to be metinvestments and savings, as well as acting as a diversification tool, a key feature to cope with potential shocks;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Recalls the need for a coherent and concise set of rules for the proper functioning of the Banking Union; calls on the Commission to prioritise regulations over directives as the legislative tool for the Banking Union and to make it a priority to fully ensure that all relevant legislation is fuladequately implemented in all Member States; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the European supervisory authorities, to identify and remove obstacles to the internal market;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 68 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Expresses its concern about recent cases of breaches or alleged breaches of anti-money laundering rules, such as the liquidation of the directly supervised ABLV Bank in Latvia, and the liquidation of Versobank in Estonia, as well as about the limits of the supervisory framework as shown by cooperation between the Danish and Estonian financial supervisory institutions during the investigation of Danske Bank's Estonian operations1a. _________________ 1a https://www.fi.ee/index.php?id=22493
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 72 #
6b. Recalls that indicators such as ownership concentration, the share of non-resident clients, the share of non- euro deposits and loan-to-deposit ratios are likely indicators of money laundering problems2a; urges the European supervisory authorities to give special attention to these parameters; _________________ 2a PE 614.496
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 c (new)
6c. Expresses concern about ABLV's and Versobank's very high ownership concentration: a. In case of ABLV, the bank’s controlling interest was held by the bank’s Chief Executive Officer and the bank’s Chairman of the Council (combined they held 87% of the shares with voting rights), while the rest was held by other closely related shareholders (management and employees), but there was no free float of shares or outside shareholders; b. In case of Versobank, the main share of the bank was owned by Cyprus Popular Bank until March 2012, thereafter Ukrainian investors became the main shareholders, and more than 85% of the shares were then held by a single Ukrainian agro-industrial company;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 d (new)
6d. Expresses concern about the very high share of non-resident clients in Versobank and ABLV: a. In case of Versobank, at the end of 2017, 83% of the bank’s liabilities to customers were owed to non-resident clients outside of Estonia; b. In case of ABLV, at the end of June 2017, 84% of the total deposits placed at ABLV came from clients whose beneficiaries are residents in the CIS countries.
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 e (new)
6e. Expresses concern about the large share of deposits made in non-euro currencies in Versobank and ABLV: a. In case of Versobank, more than one third of its deposits were made in US dollars; b. In case of ABLV, deposits made in USD apparently exceeded even 60% of the total deposit base at the end of 2016;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Highlights that sovereign debt is not risk-free; takes note of the on-going work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on sovereign risk; is concerned by the fact that some financial institutions are heavily invested in their own sovereign debt, constituting excessive "home bias"; calls on the Commission to assess whether to introduce risk weighting on sovereign bonds or exposure limits in the EU; rejects, in this respect, the Commission's ongoing work on the idea of a so-called sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS);
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. WelcomesTakes note of the Commission proposal to reinforce the role of the EBA in anti-money laundering supervision in the financial sector; calls on the co-legislators adopt the proposal without undue delayurges the Commission however to await the implementation of the fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive and the new EU rules regarding VAT fraud; stresses that the EBA should stay within its current mandate; urges the Commission not to tread on the role and sovereignty of the Member States and of the national anti-money laundering supervisors; calls on the Commission to incorporate concerns about money laundering within the ESFS review;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Urges all negotiators to work towards the adoption of the legislative package to reduce risk in the banking system before the European elections in 2019as swiftly as possible;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the NPL package; welcomes the ECB addendum on NPLs and the work of the EBA on guidelines on management of non-performing and forborne exposures; welcomes the reduction in volumof the average rate of NPLs over the past years, from 6.4% in December 2014 to 4.2% at the end of September 2017; stresses that the risk to financial stability posed by NPLs is still significant and that the current NPL level in the EU is still higher than in other major developed countries such as the United States of America and Japan, where NPL ratios are lower than 2%; stresses that in 9 Member States NPL ratios are still well over 10%3a; expresses concern that the coverage ratio differ significantly from one Member State to another, reflecting various levels of collateralisation and heterogeneous accounting practices; agrees with the Commission that the primary responsibility for reducing NPLs lies with the banks themselves and Member States, notably through efficient insolvency laws, and banks themselves; the establishment of asset management companies themselves; _________________ 3a EBA Risk Dashboard.
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 115 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Expresses concern that, as evidenced by some recent liquidation cases, namely the Veneto Banks in Italy and ABLV in Latvia, whether the resolution of a bank (that has been deemed failing or likely to fail) is in the public interest or whether a bank should be liquidated in the absence of a public interest has been assessed differently at the EU and at national level based on the current legal framework;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 117 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 b (new)
13b. Recalls that the BRRD and the SRM Regulation have only partially harmonised insolvency law so far (i.e. ranking of claims for the purposes of applying the bail-in tool) although implementation of resolution action remains rooted in national insolvency law for the purposes of protection of creditors and of applying resolution tools at legal entity level;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 c (new)
13c. Rejects any solution at EU level to the problem of NPLs that would go beyond guidelines for selling NPLs on secondary markets;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 124 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS); believes that a single market needs appropriate supervisory powers at EU level;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 126 #
15. Welcomes the Commission communication on FinTech; recognises the great potential of FinTech and the need to encourage innovation; notes, however, the need for clear regulation and appropriate supervision that protects consumers and ensures financial stability as well as a level playing field for financial market actors; underlines the need to continuously strengthenimprove the cyber resilience of the EU financial sector;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 129 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Remains concerned about the spread of shadow banking in the EU; recalls that the problem needs to be addressed at both EU and global level in order to ensure fair competition, transparency and financial stability; calls on the Commission to urgently identify remaining gaps in the current regulations, and to put the problem on the agenda at international level;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Recalls the initial debate on the role of the ECB as both monetary and supervisory authority; considers that, overall, the ECB has succeeded in keeping the two roles separate; believes, however,regrets that doubts have risen about the success of the ECB in keeping the two roles separate, such as in the context of fiscal dominance, since monetary policy was largely dominated by the lack of sound fiscal policies in some Member States; points out that the balance sheet of the ECB has surpassed 40% of GDP of the Euro area, which inevitably affects the capacity of the ECB to supervise the risk of its own balance sheet; points out that the ECB's ultra- loose interest policies has negatively affected return on invested capital and average cost of capital, which has driven investors to higher yielding investments, in turn leading to rapidly rising property prices in certain Member States; is convinced that further debate is necessary to avoid the risk of a conflict of interests between the two tasks;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 145 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. WelcomesTakes note of the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018; is concerned that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will provide the common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and be turned into a true European Monetary Fund (EMF) based on strict conditions ensuring responsibility and the principle of avoiding moral hazard, in line with the risk reduction measures such as MREL, TLAC, rules and adequate amounts for the bail-inable buffers; calls for strict conditions ensuring responsibility and the principle of avoiding moral hazard if the EMF were ever to be implemented, such as maintaining the lead role of the Member States and the unanimity procedure; stresses that substantial risk- reduction should be a prerequisite to the potential establishment of an EMF; stresses the need for proper democratic scrutiny by the Parliament and the Member States; recalls Parliament’s position that the EMF should be fully incorporated into the Union's institutional framework;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 152 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. Recalls the constitutional review of the ESM by the German Constitutional Court in 2014, concerning the question of adequate democratic control by national parliaments on ESM decisions; points out that the introduction of a qualified majority rule could potentially substantially reduce such democratic control4a; _________________ 4a BVerfG (2014) Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 18. März 2014. Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 1390/12 - Rn. (1-245).
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 167 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Calls on the Commission to regularly assess whether the banking sector has benefited from implicit subsidies and State aid; underlines the distortive effect State aid can havehas on the functioning of the internal market; recalls the strict requirements for the application of Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU);
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 171 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. WelcomesTakes note of the conclusion of the ECA, in its report on the operational efficiency of the ECB’s crisis management for banks, that the organisational set-up of the ECB and its resourcing for the assessment of recovery plans and the supervision of banks in crisis are satisfactory, while noting that there are outstanding issues concerning information sharing and efficiency of coordination;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 180 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
23. Takes note of the agreement reached at the Euro Summit meeting of 29 June 2018 on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS); underlines the necessity of EDIS as the third pillar of the Banking Unioneffective risk-reduction before discussing tools for risk-sharing such as EDIS; believes it shcould be fully implemented, but only once significant and substantial risk reduction has taken placebeen implemented;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 183 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23a. Recalls that the moral hazard of deposit protection spurs deposit banks to engage in overly risky behaviour; recalls that deposit protection disincentivizes deposit holders to scrutinise their bank and its investment and management decisions;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 185 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 b (new)
23b. Stresses that any new primary, secondary rules or even guidelines must be accompanied by an in-depth impact analysis which makes clear the overall impact on the real economy, especially on SMEs and on the financing of households, on employment and on the demand for investment;
2018/10/25
Committee: ECON